Maybe as a one-off in a certain context that I can no longer recall. If I did, it clearly didn't leave an impression.
Metta,
Paul.
Maybe as a one-off in a certain context that I can no longer recall. If I did, it clearly didn't leave an impression.
If the format is amenable to it, I might drop a summary and mini-review at the end of each of the 8 main chapters.Preface
1. Panna
2. Citta
3. Satipatthana
4. Bhava
5. Kammatthana
6. Kama
7. Attha / Yoni
8. Kayagatasati
Bibliography
What is described here as "naturalized" is analogous to what is often termed "naive realism" here at Dhamma Wheel, or if one is following the venacular of Ven. Nanavira, it is "the scholar's essentially horizontal view of things".Bhikkhu Akincano wrote:"The natural attitude is a kind of global realism - the tacit assumption that the world is always there as real. Even though this or that particular thing may turn out to be different from the way I believe it would be (for example, I expect to find a pen in my bag and discover that it is not there), nevertheless the world as a whole is not brought into question (I must have left my pen on my desk). In the natural attitude, whatever is belongs to the domain of 'Nature' - the domain of psycho-physical entities existing in space and time, subject to the laws of causality. This 'naturalism' is essentially a metphysical realism - the monistic view that there is only one kind of thing: natural entities with their natural properties. As a result, one finds oneself committed to the idea that everything has to be studied according to the methods of natural science.
Naturalized Dhamma approaches the Dhamma from within the natural attitude. It involves thinking about meditation in naturalistic terms, as a set of techniques, where one focuses one's attention on this or that part of Nature." (pp13-14)
Melbourne before New Jersey??? smh...
Melbourne is always ahead of New Jersey. In fact, it's 10:11am, 11th October right now.
You Aussies and your "time zones" lolretrofuturist wrote: ↑Thu Oct 10, 2019 11:12 pm Greetings SDC,
Melbourne is always ahead of New Jersey. In fact, it's 10:11am, 11th October right now.
Reading between the lines, it sounds like you've ordered it yourself... so I look forward to hearing your thoughts on it.
Metta,
Paul.
I'll try to pick up on this, when I do a write up on the chapter on "pañña".
Something like that, except that you speak of "sense-objects" and by framing it that way, you're assuming a legitimate bifurcation between that "object" and a "subject" (i.e. you). If you challenge that assumption, you might see that there are merely phenomena arising and passing away. IMO, this is what it means to see all things as "not self, not I, not mine". If that assumption is not challenged and overcome, I don't see how you would ever see that sutta-defined reality, rather than just as an article of faith.
I think the difference is that with the phenomenologist approach to the dhamma any relationship between the phenomena arising at the individual and any existing "objects out there" is considered irrelevant. For example: To say that the buddhist phenomenologist deals exclusively with sense-objects is an idea which stems from naive realism in that it is based on "objects" while the buddhist phenomonemologist would analyze/understand "sense-objects" by trying to discern what/which phenomena give rise to the concept of "sense-object".....in other words for a buddhist pheneomenlogist there is phenomena which when viewed with ignorance gives rise to the false subject/object duality with its associated false self.Dinsdale wrote: ↑Thu Oct 10, 2019 10:53 am I'm trying to understand the practical distinction between phenomenology and naive realism.
Is it that the former approach deals exclusively with sense-objects, while the latter approach assumes those objects represent real things "out there"?
Something like that?
In Dhamma conversation, we often hear "panna" being regarded as synonymous with "wisdom". Instead, via reference to the suttas, Bhikkhu Akiñcano shows how it represents "understanding" and the word attached to it, shows which type of understanding is being referred to...Bhikkhu Akiñcano wrote:The Pali Text Society Pali-English dictionary defines panna as: "intelligence, comprising of all higher faculties of cognition, "intellect as conversant with general truths"..., reason, wisdom, insight, knowledge, recognition." This clearly illustrates the Cartesian bias which affects the traditional way of interpreting the Pali texts. Not only do we see panna being used to refer to the 'wisdom' or 'insight' which we are aiming for, which will arise in the future as long as we keep practicing correctly, but also we see that it is primarily associated with some form of cognition. It is 'intellect', 'intelligence', 'reason', 'cognition' - in other words, it is understood in terms of the Cartesian cogito. (pp30-31)
So to Dinsdale's earlier observation that "I'm trying to understand the practical distinction between phenomenology and naive realism", if we allow "naive realism" to be the understanding of the puthujjana...Bhikkhu Akiñcano wrote:Clearly, what is being spoken about here is some kind of distinction between the panna of the puthujjana and the panna of the ariyasekha. The sekha can be described in terms of adhipanna, sammappanna and ariyapanna whilst only the arahant can be said to have attained pannaparipurim. This suggests that even though the following words do not appear in the Pali texts, it seems that the understanding of the puthujjana may be described as anadhipanna (not-higher-understanding), micchappanna (wrong understanding) and anariyapanna (ignoble understanding). Even though his understanding may be wrong, ignoble, inferior to the understanding of the ariyasavaka, it is still a kind of understanding. (p34)
Recommendations for the puthujjana, here and throughout this chapter do not include "techniques", instead they include:Bhikkhu Akiñcano wrote:The view 'With not-self I perceive not-self' simply does not occur to him. It does not arise as a possibility. This means that for a puthijjana to cease being a puthujjana, not only does he need to be mindful, in order to make explicit the understanding of the situation he finds himself thrown into, he must also be suspicious of that understanding. He must regard mindfulness as a 'hermeneutics of suspicion'. He must take on the attitude that his understanding is inadequate, that the meaning of his situation that presents itself if somehow distorted, preventing him from seeing things clearly. He requires some external help in order to find an alternative way of interpreting his situation.MN 2 wrote:... the view 'With self I perceive self' arises for him as true and actual, or other view 'With self I perceive not-self' arises for him as true and actual; or the view 'With not-self I perceive self' arises for him as true and actual...
Metta,Nanavira Thera wrote:In order to put an end to avijjā, which is a matter of recognizing avijjā as avijjā, it is necessary to accept on trust from the Buddha a Teaching that contradicts the direct evidence of the puthujjana's reflexion. This is why the Dhamma is patisotagāmī (Majjhima iii,6 <M.i,168>), or 'going against the stream'. The Dhamma gives the puthujjana the outside view of avijjā, which is inherently unobtainable for him by unaided reflexion (in the ariyasāvaka this view has, as it were, 'taken' like a graft, and is perpetually available).
When a person is in darkness , recognising avijja as avijja is incorrect , without light not possible to illuminate the darkness . So , the actual thing is , with right attention , avijja destroy by the light that arises hence penetrating into the nature of it .
Sure, though sense-objects are actually phenomena, and phenomenology isn't the same as non-duality.retrofuturist wrote: ↑Thu Oct 10, 2019 11:30 pm Greetings Dinsdale,
I'll try to pick up on this, when I do a write up on the chapter on "pañña".
Something like that, except that you speak of "sense-objects" and by framing it that way, you're assuming a legitimate bifurcation between that "object" and a "subject" (i.e. you). If you challenge that assumption, you might see that there are merely phenomena arising and passing away. IMO, this is what it means to see all things as "not self, not I, not mine". If that assumption is not challenged and overcome, I don't see how you would ever see that sutta-defined reality, rather than just as an article of faith.
Metta,
Paul.
I think you're muddling up different ideas here. Sense-objects like sights and sounds ARE phenomena. The phenomenologist just works with these, and doesn't assume an underlying noumena, or essence.chownah wrote: ↑Fri Oct 11, 2019 2:44 amI think the difference is that with the phenomenologist approach to the dhamma any relationship between the phenomena arising at the individual and any existing "objects out there" is considered irrelevant. For example: To say that the buddhist phenomenologist deals exclusively with sense-objects is an idea which stems from naive realism in that it is based on "objects" while the buddhist phenomonemologist would analyze/understand "sense-objects" by trying to discern what/which phenomena give rise to the concept of "sense-object".....in other words for a buddhist pheneomenlogist there is phenomena which when viewed with ignorance gives rise to the false subject/object duality with its associated false self.Dinsdale wrote: ↑Thu Oct 10, 2019 10:53 am I'm trying to understand the practical distinction between phenomenology and naive realism.
Is it that the former approach deals exclusively with sense-objects, while the latter approach assumes those objects represent real things "out there"?
Something like that?
I think that many buddhist phenomenologist see that "objects out there" are unknowable except through whatever phenomena arises with respect to them....so....better to deal with what arises in experience (phenomena) than to go chasing after the unknowable and having done this they find that this approach is enough to attain the goal.
chownah