Theravada against mathematics

[Sherab]

Germann's argument:

The concept of "satta" in the Theravadin Abhidhamma is the concept of not-existent (satta-pannatti is the avijjamana-pannatti). There was no one who could select events. This means that in the beginningless Buddhist past (the chain of conditioned dhammas does not have a first link) all possible events would have happened. If the realization of Nibbana refers to possible events, then all the causes and conditions of the impersonal-mechanical achievement of Nibbana should have formed in the past.

There are two key elements in Germann's argument:
(1) Whether there exists of an ability to select event. That ability must be outside the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas.
(2) Whether the realization of NIbbana refers to possible events.

Implication of (1):
If you hold the belief of beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas, then any ability to select an event must necessarily be an emergent phenomenon of the begninningless chain of conditioned dhammas. This means that any self with an ability to make choices must be an emergent phenomenon of the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas. Taken to its logical conclusion, the tenet of cessation would lead to a tenet of annihilation. Such a tenet would be the same as the tenet of non-existent of satta.

Implication of (2):
Assume that the realization of Nibbana refers to possible events.
Assume also that all possible events can only exist within the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas.
If we divide the chain of conditioned dhammas into a portion that is beginningless until now and a portion that is from now to the some future point in time, then the first portion is must be infinite, since it is beginningless. If it is infinite, then Nibbana as an event must be somewhere in that portion.

[Germann]

Implication of (1):
If you hold the belief of beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas, then any ability to select an event must necessarily be an emergent phenomenon of the begninningless chain of conditioned dhammas. This means that any self with an ability to make choices must be an emergent phenomenon of the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas. Taken to its logical conclusion, the tenet of cessation would lead to a tenet of annihilation. Such a tenet would be the same as the tenet of non-existent of satta.

Man as a parliament of living atoms, man as a parliament of mortal souls with a short life, decision makers to practice the Dhamma. Then it is a religion for atoms, not for man. Atoms practice Dhamma. Atoms preach to atoms.

Нow is the conditioned dhamma (moral subject) capable of attaining liberation? Nibbana remains Nibbana. The conditioned dhamma dies and does not become Nibbana. These are two different dhammas: these are two different subjects of free choice.

The liberation is not available for the subject (for the living atom, for the mortal soul with a short life, for the conditioned dhamma).
If, however, we consider liberation (Nibbana) a simple cessation, any subject, regardless of his moral path, reaches Nibbana by death.

This is the reason why a separate dhamma cannot be recognized as a subject of free choice.

Implication of (2):
Assume that the realization of Nibbana refers to possible events.
Assume also that all possible events can only exist within the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas.
If we divide the chain of conditioned dhammas into a portion that is beginningless until now and a portion that is from now to the some future point in time, then the first portion is must be infinite, since it is beginningless. If it is infinite, then Nibbana as an event must be somewhere in that portion.

In this case, cardinality of an infinite set of moments of the past should be less than the cardinality of an infinite set of all possible events (combinations of dhammas), which is not true. A countable set is the "smallest" among infinite sets.

http://mymathforum.com/number-theory/34 ... ments.html

[JamesTheGiant]

Has anyone commented that the original argument is invalid?
Because we do not live in a universe where all things are possible. Our universe has hard laws and underlying structure that severely limits possible events.
Where are all the Boltzmann Brains?
Yeah nah, our universe isn't that kind of place.

I haven't read past the first page... Not interested in digesting 31 pages or 432 posts (and counting!)

[Germann]

Has anyone commented that the original argument is invalid?
Because we do not live in a universe where all things are possible. Our universe has hard laws and underlying structure that severely limits possible events.
Where are all the Boltzmann Brains?
Yeah nah, our universe isn't that kind of place.

I haven't read past the first page... Not interested in digesting 31 pages or 432 posts (and counting!)

The infinite set of steps of the deterministic algorithm is a countable set. The cardinality of an infinite countable set are no more than the cardinality of an infinite set of moments of the past. All the steps of the deterministic algorithm that worked in the past find their place in the infinite past. All deterministic events have already occurred.

[JamesTheGiant]

The infinite set of steps of the deterministic algorithm is a countable set. The cardinality of an infinite countable set are no more than the cardinality of an infinite set of moments of the past. All the steps of the deterministic algorithm that worked in the past find their place in the infinite past. All deterministic events have already occurred.

I think you're a bot which constructs unintelligible but authentic-sounding math-babble.
Since it was possible, it must have happened, and THIS is that occasion. Probability guarantees it.
You're a bot.

[Germann]

The infinite set of steps of the deterministic algorithm is a countable set. The cardinality of an infinite countable set are no more than the cardinality of an infinite set of moments of the past. All the steps of the deterministic algorithm that worked in the past find their place in the infinite past. All deterministic events have already occurred.

I think you're a bot which constructs unintelligible but authentic-sounding math-babble.
Since it was possible, it must have happened, and THIS is that occasion. Probability guarantees it.
You're a bot.

A countable set is the "smallest" among infinite sets.
All steps of the algorithm, all possible combinations of dhammas - fit in the infinity of the past.

[JamesTheGiant]

You honor, I rest my case. Bot.

[Germann]

You honor, I rest my case. Bot.

This case does not help. Here Theravada is refuted.

[JamesTheGiant]

You live in a small place.
But I'll not argue, enjoy your world.

[Germann]

All possible sequences of events — all possible lives — are a countable set (the “smallest” among infinite sets). An infinite set of past lives may not have less cardinality: all possible lives find their place among past lives.

http://mymathforum.com/advanced-statist ... inite.html

It does not matter whether there are random events or no random events. All possible lives fit in the infinity of the past, along with the realization of Nibbana.

Sorry. Correct link:

http://mymathforum.com/number-theory/34 ... ments.html

[Sherab]

Implication of (1):
If you hold the belief of beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas, then any ability to select an event must necessarily be an emergent phenomenon of the begninningless chain of conditioned dhammas. This means that any self with an ability to make choices must be an emergent phenomenon of the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas. Taken to its logical conclusion, the tenet of cessation would lead to a tenet of annihilation. Such a tenet would be the same as the tenet of non-existent of satta.

Man as a parliament of living atoms, man as a parliament of mortal souls with a short life, decision makers to practice the Dhamma. Then it is a religion for atoms, not for man. Atoms practice Dhamma. Atoms preach to atoms.

Нow is the conditioned dhamma (moral subject) capable of attaining liberation? Nibbana remains Nibbana. The conditioned dhamma dies and does not become Nibbana. These are two different dhammas: these are two different subjects of free choice.

The liberation is not available for the subject (for the living atom, for the mortal soul with a short life, for the conditioned dhamma).
If, however, we consider liberation (Nibbana) a simple cessation, any subject, regardless of his moral path, reaches Nibbana by death.

This is the reason why a separate dhamma cannot be recognized as a subject of free choice.

As mentioned before, I see where you were coming from and I have also mentioned where I disagreed with you.

I am curious as to what your actual view is, or more specifically, whether or not the Buddha taught an ontology. If yes, what is that ontology. As this is off-topic, perhaps you could message me instead.

Implication of (2):
Assume that the realization of Nibbana refers to possible events.
Assume also that all possible events can only exist within the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas.
If we divide the chain of conditioned dhammas into a portion that is beginningless until now and a portion that is from now to the some future point in time, then the first portion is must be infinite, since it is beginningless. If it is infinite, then Nibbana as an event must be somewhere in that portion.

In this case, cardinality of an infinite set of moments of the past should be less than the cardinality of an infinite set of all possible events (combinations of dhammas), which is not true. A countable set is the "smallest" among infinite sets.

http://mymathforum.com/number-theory/34 ... ments.html

I think you are making the assumption that the first portion is injective into the second portion. I don't think that is true.

[Germann]

As mentioned before, I see where you were coming from and I have also mentioned where I disagreed with you.

If we attribute the free choice to a separate, conditioned dhamma, making it a subject, then regardless of the moral choice, the fate of all the subjects is the same — the termination. There is no kammic reward for dhammas.

[Germann]

I think you are making the assumption that the first portion is injective into the second portion. I don't think that is true.

Why? Events are already connected with the past. The events have already gone.
Yes, the first portion is injective into the second portion.

[Germann]

I am curious as to what your actual view is, or more specifically, whether or not the Buddha taught an ontology. If yes, what is that ontology. As this is off-topic, perhaps you could message me instead.

Buddha taught about the multitude of buddhas and sentient beings.
Buddha did not teach the mereological nihilism.

[Germann]

Implication of (2):
Assume that the realization of Nibbana refers to possible events.
Assume also that all possible events can only exist within the beginningless chain of conditioned dhammas.
If we divide the chain of conditioned dhammas into a portion that is beginningless until now and a portion that is from now to the some future point in time, then the first portion is must be infinite, since it is beginningless. If it is infinite, then Nibbana as an event must be somewhere in that portion.

Do you agree that the achievement of Nibbana should have happened in the past, because set of the moments of the past are infinite? If you agree, I have nothing to argue about. I argued only with the "fact" that the achievement of Nibbana may be in the second part of the events, but not in the endless past.