Tiramisu and precept breaking

[samseva]

It is true that that is my interpretation of his explanation of the fifth precept. The clear knowledge of the intoxicating potencial of the substance happens on the course of action, somewhere between the intentional thought and the actual ingestion of the substance.

[...]

Yes, but the factors in question have no implications to change the fact that the food item is an intoxicant. Whether or not the person fulfilled the factor of perception (knowing that the item contained alcohol), objectively and physically, the intoxicant remains an intoxicant no matter what. Therefore, all factors presented by Bhikhhu Bodhi can be fulfilled, regardless if the person is knowledgable or not that he is ingesting/ingested an intoxicant.

For the precept to be violated four factors are required: (1) the intoxicant; (2) the intention of taking it; (3) the activity of ingesting it; and (4) the actual ingestion of the intoxicant.

(1) The person was given a plate of food that contained some alcohol in it. (2) There was the intention to eat it. (3) He or she ate it. (4) He or she ingested it.

If you take the factors of the first precept, you can see that the factors of perception and result are both presented (2 and 5):

1) a living being; (2) the perception of the living being as such; (3) the thought or volition of killing; (4) the appropriate effort; and (5) the actual death of the being as a result of the action.

• http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/auth ... html#prec2

However, with the precept of intoxicants, notice that there is no mention at all of the factor of perception (knowing that the food contained alcohol or not) nor of result (if the amount of alcohol resulted in heedlessness).

Yet I think one does not give full justice to the nature of dhamma by providing an utilitarianistic view of morality over one that stresses on intentionality.

While I understand your according of the highest importance to intention (which is crucial), the precept of intoxicants, as well as probably half or more of the Pātimokkha and Khandhaka rules, have to do with a much more practical and realistic approach. While gauging if such and such amount of alcohol could cause heedlessness would be more in line with giving more importance to results and intention, it would make no sense at all and would be highly impractical.

I also understand your position for things such as eating a desert containing a small amount alcohol, which is then considered breaking the precept. But again, I don't see it making much sense if the precept were to rather be "Abstaining from alcohol, but a bit is fine. Gauge how much causes heedlessness and if you deem it not to cause heedlessness, you can eat or drink it. If it is enough to cause heedlessness, don't drink or eat it. If the food item caused heedlessness, you ate or drank too much of it." While not formulated elegantly, this is pretty much what the precept would be if it were to take into consideration the almost endless possibilities of the factors of perception and result and would render the precept a huge mess to give/teach and follow.

[Dhamma_Basti]

It is true that that is my interpretation of his explanation of the fifth precept. The clear knowledge of the intoxicating potencial of the substance happens on the course of action, somewhere between the intentional thought and the actual ingestion of the substance.

[...]

Yes, but the factors in question have no implications to change the fact that the food item is an intoxicant. Whether or not the person fulfilled the factor of perception (knowing that the item contained alcohol), objectively and physically, the intoxicant remains an intoxicant no matter what. Therefore, all factors presented by Bhikhhu Bodhi can be fulfilled, regardless if the person is knowledgable or not that he is ingesting/ingested an intoxicant.

You take alcohol-flavoured food to be an intoxicant, which even according to Bhikkhu Bodhi is not the case. Also the intention to get intoxicated was not fulfilled by the op, so at no time was he in the position to break the fifth precept.

For the precept to be violated four factors are required: (1) the intoxicant; (2) the intention of taking it; (3) the activity of ingesting it; and (4) the actual ingestion of the intoxicant.

(1) The person was given a plate of food that contained some alcohol in it. (2) There was the intention to eat it. (3) He or she ate it. (4) He or she ingested it.

Well you assume that intention of eating food in order to fill the belly, not being aware of it's alcoholic content, and drinking beer in order to get drunk is the same. It's not. Intention has a very broad range of meaning, and the term cetanā is also used to describe the striving for purification. Just because BB did not write "intention to take the intoxicant", this has nevertheless to be supplied from the context, as we are dealing with intoxicants in this chapter. You can't simply take another cetanā, this time related to eating food and not to intoxicants, and use it to justify your view.

If you take the factors of the first precept, you can see that the factors of perception and result are both presented (2 and 5):

1) a living being; (2) the perception of the living being as such; (3) the thought or volition of killing; (4) the appropriate effort; and (5) the actual death of the being as a result of the action.

• http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/auth ... html#prec2

However, with the precept of intoxicants, notice that there is no mention at all of the factor of perception (knowing that the food contained alcohol or not) nor of result (if the amount of alcohol resulted in heedlessness).

When you read the whole article you will see that the part of clear awareness is also missing when dealing with sexual misconduct and speaking false words. In these two cases it was probably omitted by BB because the context automaticly makes clear to the subject that he is committing a transgression. In the case of killing, this is explicitly mentioned because there can be doubt whether the victim is alive or not. With regard to alcohol content, there can also be doubt, yet BB, for whatever reason, does not esteem this important enough to mention it. I guess he wanted to keep things simple, yet his way of dealing with this aspect is not precise.

Yet I think one does not give full justice to the nature of dhamma by providing an utilitarianistic view of morality over one that stresses on intentionality.

While I understand your according of the highest importance to intention (which is crucial), the precept of intoxicants, as well as probably half or more of the Pātimokkha and Khandhaka rules, have to do with a much more practical and realistic approach. While gauging if such and such amount of alcohol could cause heedlessness would be more in line with giving more importance to results and intention, it would make no sense at all and would be highly impractical.

I also understand your position for things such as eating a desert containing a small amount alcohol, which would then be considered breaking the precept. But again, I don't see it making much sense if the precept were to rather be "Abstaining from alcohol, but a bit is fine. Gauge how much causes heedlessness and if you deem it not to cause heedlessness, you can eat or drink it. If it is enough to cause heedlessness, don't drink or eat it." While not formulated elegantly, this is pretty much what the precept would be if it were to take into consideration the almost endless possibilities of the factors of perception and result and would render the precept a huge mess to give/teach and follow.

Well our world is not simple, and we have to make complex decisions all the time. Giving such a simple answer as "don't do it" doesn't pay respect to the depth of the whole problem. That just doesn't seem very wise to me.

[samseva]

...

• et al.

Up until this point, the burden of giving references as to if the complete abstention of alcohol is what is recommended in the texts has solely been put on my (and others') shoulders. Although not being highly conclusive, we have provided some. It is now for you to provide at least some textual references that say that "drinking or consuming alcohol is fine if it doesn't cause heedlessness" (which with the Pāḷi formulation of the precept—not incorrectly translated—this would again be incorrectly inferring about something that hasn't been said).

[samseva]

...

I am not quite following you. For the factors, the factors of perception and result are rather precise (I don't understand what you are saying about the impossibility of a second cetāna and so on). These two factors are very important to determine a situation having to do with the precepts (and many many of the Vinaya rules)—with their absence being much of time of the same importance or more.

Regarding Bhikhhu Bodhi's text, I think it is quite clear and well-written. That some things can be "supplied from the context", that it "automatically makes it clear for the subject" or that it "seems that Bhikkhu Bodhi wanted to keep things simple" are not things which I am detecting from reading it at all, and these all seem much more like interpretations (or extrapolations).

[Dhamma_Basti]

I feel sorry, it seems as if I am not able to express myself in a way that you can understand what I want to tell you. This is certainly not your fault, but I believe that this won't improve by prolonging the discussion, as I have not much to add to my last statements. I excuse again for not being able to express myself clearly and leave the discussion here. Have a nice evening and I hope we will have fruitful encounters in the future again.

[samseva]

No worries (but you still seem to be able to work with English quite well).

Have a nice evening and I hope we will have fruitful encounters in the future again.

Same here. Take care.

[Dhammanando]

I'm pretty sure intention has nothing to do with the breaking of the precept or not; whether one intended to drink alcohol or not is still a breach of the precept. I would need to check for sure for the precept, but I can confirm for pācittiya 51 (Vinaya rule regarding alcohol).

Dear samseva,
Where exactly do you see your interpretation of intentionality in the Patimokkha-Sutta? I just see a rule that says 'drinking of alcohol has to be confessed', not stating however whether this includes unintentional drinking of alcohol.

What Samseva stated is correct.

It isn’t possible to get a full understanding of any Vinaya rule just by looking at how it’s phrased as a training clause in the Pāṭimokkha. You need to look at the Vinaya’s detailed adjudications on it. What you’ll then find is this...

• “Thinking that it is an intoxicant when it is an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of expiation.”
  
  “Being in doubt about whether it is an intoxicant when it is an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of expiation.”
  
  “Thinking that it is not an intoxicant when it is an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of expiation.”
  
  “Thinking that it is an intoxicant when it is not an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of wrong-doing.”
  
  “Being in doubt about whether it is an intoxicant when it is not an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of wrong-doing.”
  
  “Thinking that it is not an intoxicant when it is not an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits no offence.”
  (Vin. iv. 110)

From the third of the above judgments we can see that the prohibition against intoxicants is an example of an acittaka rule, meaning one in which the mere act is an offence, and so the bhikkhu’s intention and his perception of what he’s drinking are treated as irrelevant to the question of his culpability.

The fact that this rule is acittaka may also be seen from the Parivāra, in which it is stated that transgression of it may originate either from “body and mind” or from “body alone”. (Vin. v. 21).

From my point of view intention is the whole point behind the training rules.

Well, I’m afraid you’re mistaken, as even a very cursory survey of the Suttavibhaṅga’s adjudications will show you.

Intention is what makes an action a skilful or an unskilful kamma. But moral restraint in the Vinaya has a much broader scope than just avoiding unskilful kammas. It’s concerned also with the maintenance of communal harmony within the sangha and harmonious relations between sangha and laity.

Certain kinds of action are objectively disruptive of this; that is, the disruption produced is quite independent of the bhikkhu’s intention for doing those actions. The Vinaya rules that prohibit such actions are therefore more likely to be ranked as acittaka than sacittaka (i.e. they’ll be rules where the bhikkhu’s state of mind and motivation is treated as irrelevant).

In this connection you might also look up the ten reasons the Buddha gave Upāli for his establishing the Pāṭimokkha. It is clear from these that (contrary to a statement in one of your later posts in this thread) there is actually a strong utilitarian component to the Vinaya.

[Dhamma_Basti]

I'm pretty sure intention has nothing to do with the breaking of the precept or not; whether one intended to drink alcohol or not is still a breach of the precept. I would need to check for sure for the precept, but I can confirm for pācittiya 51 (Vinaya rule regarding alcohol).

Dear samseva,
Where exactly do you see your interpretation of intentionality in the Patimokkha-Sutta? I just see a rule that says 'drinking of alcohol has to be confessed', not stating however whether this includes unintentional drinking of alcohol.

What Samseva stated is correct.

It isn’t possible to get a full understanding of any Vinaya rule just by looking at how it’s phrased as a training clause in the Pāṭimokkha. You need to look at the Vinaya’s detailed adjudications on it. What you’ll then find is this...

• “Thinking that it is an intoxicant when it is an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of expiation.”
  
  “Being in doubt about whether it is an intoxicant when it is an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of expiation.”
  
  “Thinking that it is not an intoxicant when it is an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of expiation.”
  
  “Thinking that it is an intoxicant when it is not an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of wrong-doing.”
  
  “Being in doubt about whether it is an intoxicant when it is not an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits an offence of wrong-doing.”
  
  “Thinking that it is not an intoxicant when it is not an intoxicant a bhikkhu drinks it: he commits no offence.”
  (Vin. iv. 110)

From the third of the above judgments we can see that the prohibition against intoxicants is an example of an acittaka rule, meaning one in which the mere act is an offence, and so the bhikkhu’s intention and his perception of what he’s drinking are treated as irrelevant to the question of his culpability.

The fact that this rule is acittaka may also be seen from the Parivāra, in which it is stated that transgression of it may originate either from “body and mind” or from “body alone”. (Vin. v. 21).

From my point of view intention is the whole point behind the training rules.

Well, I’m afraid you’re mistaken, as even a very cursory survey of the Suttavibhaṅga’s adjudications will show you.

Intention is what makes an action a skilful or an unskilful kamma. But moral restraint in the Vinaya has a much broader scope than just avoiding unskilful kammas. It’s concerned also with the maintenance of communal harmony within the sangha and harmonious relations between sangha and laity.

Certain kinds of action are objectively disruptive of this; that is, the disruption produced is quite independent of the bhikkhu’s intention for doing those actions. The Vinaya rules that prohibit such actions are therefore more likely to be ranked as acittaka than sacittaka (i.e. they’ll be rules where the bhikkhu’s state of mind and motivation is treated as irrelevant).

In this connection you might also look up the ten reasons the Buddha gave Upāli for his establishing the Pāṭimokkha. It is clear from these that (contrary to a statement in one of your later posts in this thread) there is actually a strong utilitarian component to the Vinaya.

With regard to the vinaya and the Patimokha I agree with your statement. This needs to be dealt with seperately and can't be seen in the same way as the five precepts. This became clear to me in the course of the discussion so your statement about me being wrong in this regard is right.
The topic of discussion here however is a breach of the fifth precept, and in that case I cannot agree. Out of fear that we will repeat an useless discussion I kindly ask to read my last five postings in this thread before answering.

[samseva]

The topic of discussion here however is a breach of the fifth precept, and in that case I cannot agree. Out of fear that we will repeat an useless discussion I kindly ask to read my last five postings in this thread before answering.

But the precepts are very similar to the Vinaya. If you look them over, all of them (5, 8 and 10 precepts) without exception have to do with external actions.

[Mr Man]

The topic of discussion here however is a breach of the fifth precept, and in that case I cannot agree. Out of fear that we will repeat an useless discussion I kindly ask to read my last five postings in this thread before answering.

But the precepts are very similar to the Vinaya. If you look them over, all of them (5, 8 and 10 precepts) without exception have to do with external actions.

Is there anything in the sutta to suggest that the lay precepts should be paralleled to the monastic rule and maintained in the same way (Tatiyampi)?

[samseva]

Is there anything in the sutta to suggest that the lay precepts should be paralleled to the monastic rule and maintained in the same way (Tatiyampi)?

Well, for a monastic, the precepts are of parallel importance. However, having a passage that the lay precepts should be maintained in the same way as the monastic rules would not make much sense at all.

Similarly, the precepts are the most basic moral rules about restricting certain external actions; they can't be completely different or that different simply because they are followed by laypeople (the five lay precepts are the same as half of the monastic precepts as well). So although your question could be of interest, the fact that there would be no such passage wouldn't be revealing of much—i.e., the absence of something isn't necessarily a valid argument that something is false or true.

[Spiny Norman]

What is the key point "fermented and distilled" or "basis for heedlessness"? I'm sure many occasional dope smokers would love a literal implementation.

[samseva]

What is the key point "fermented and distilled" or "basis for heedlessness"? I'm sure many occasional dope smokers would love a literal implementation.

For such situation, the Great Standards would be applied. It is obvious that even though drugs such as crystal meth, heroin or marijuana aren't fermented or distilled, they still fall under the category of what was initially intended when the precept was formulated.

"Bhikkhus, whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is not allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.

"Whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is not allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you.

"And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.

"And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you." (BMC p.27; see also EV, II, p170)

• http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/auth ... tml#modern

[Mr Man]

Is there anything in the sutta to suggest that the lay precepts should be paralleled to the monastic rule and maintained in the same way (Tatiyampi)?

Well, for a monastic, the precepts are of parallel importance. However, having a passage that the lay precepts should be maintained in the same way as the monastic rules would not make much sense at all.

Similarly, the precepts are the most basic moral rules about restricting certain external actions; they can't be completely different or that different simply because they are followed by laypeople (the five lay precepts are the same as half of the monastic precepts as well). So although your question could be of interest, the fact that there would be no such passage wouldn't be revealing of much—i.e., the absence of something isn't necessarily a valid argument that something is false or true.

I see the five precepts as the basic moral guidelines for a lay persons (a standard of behaviour) where as the monastic rule is something rather different. I'm not sure if the concept of "transgression" or "being broken" even applies (that is not to say that they should not be upheld though).

I'm not sure if there would have been a similar desert to Tiramisu in the Buddha's day but if a lay person wishes to eat Tiramisu so be it and if another decides to hold the precepts in such a way that they will not eat Tiramisu so be it. I personally wouldn't see eating Tiramisu as a breaking of the laypersons moral guidelines even if the same actions would be an offence for a bhikhu.

[Mr Man]

What is the key point "fermented and distilled" or "basis for heedlessness"? I'm sure many occasional dope smokers would love a literal implementation.

For such situation, the Great Standards would be applied. It is obvious that even though drugs such as crystal meth, heroin or marijuana aren't fermented or distilled, they still fall under the category of what was initially intended when the precept was formulated.

"Bhikkhus, whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is not allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.

"Whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is not allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you.

"And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.

"And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you." (BMC p.27; see also EV, II, p170)

• http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/auth ... tml#modern

There is no need for the "Great Standards", which again is something directed to the monastic community, just common sense.