Life from what period

[mikenz66]

Hi Venerable,

As advised by the Buddha, this is the third advice I heard just after receiving my higher ordination, so does any bhikkhu.

"When a monk is ordained he should not intetionally deprive a living thing of life, even if it is only an ant. What ever monk deprives a human being of life even down to causing abortion, he becomes not a (true) recluse, not a son of the Sakyans. As a flat stone, broke, becomes (scmething) not to be put together again, even so a monk, having intentionally deprived a human being of life, becomes not a (true) recluse, not a son of the Sakyans. This is a thing not to be done by you as long as life lasts."

- Vinaya, Mahāvagga, 1. Mahā Khandhaka (The Book of Descipline IV, page 125)

I don't think anyone is disputing that. But to me the interesting question is what the vinaya, suttas, abdhidhamma, and commentary say about when life begins for a human embryo.

Personally, I would probably tend to err on the side of caution, and use conception as the starting point, but the question is, I think, worth discussing.


Mike

[DNS]

If he thinks that it is not a living thing when it is a living thing, there is no offence.
- Vinaya, Pācittiya 61 (The Book of Descipline II, page 1-2)

There it is right there in your quote. If he thinks it is not a living thing, i.e., does not visibly see it and does not believe there is any living being there; there is no offence.

I am not in any way saying this justifies abortion. It was just something I mentioned earlier and also mentioned that the physician does in fact see the fetus with the aid of medical equipment, indeed, even seeks it out to intentionally destroy it.

The question remains, still unanswered conclusively, when does the stream of consciousness enter the womb? Is it right after conception? Is it after about 8 weeks when it becomes a fetus? Or some other time? I don't know.

edit: (was posting at same time as mike) Yes, what Mike said ^ Thanks.

[Mkoll]

Personally, I would probably tend to err on the side of caution, and use conception as the starting point, but the question is, I think, worth discussing.

I would agree with you there.

~~~

I said before that there will always be an element of uncertainty as to when consciousness enters the womb. We'll only ever be able to observe signs of consciousness as outside observers. The embryo can't communicate with us and say: "Hey, I'm here now! I'm conscious!" Even though it may be conscious without showing any indication of it.

[Sylvester]

3c. The Buddha consistently stated that human life in this body
begins when consciousness first manifests inside the mother’s
womb. The Pāli word here rendered as “manifest” is Pātubhūta,
which also means to be open, visible, apparent. To be precise,
human life in this body begins not when consciousness first
exists in the mother’s womb, but when it first shows its
existence in the mother’s womb (these two events, I believe,
are simultaneous).

http://www.dhammatalks.net/Books7/Ajahn ... _Begin.pdf
How does consciousness first manifest its existence? Point 2d,
above, states that when consciousness first manifests then
nāma-rūpa also shows its first appearance. Two essential parts
of nāma-rūpa are vedana (feeling, the ability to distinguish
between painful or pleasurable or neutral sensations) and
cetanā (will, deliberate reactions to such sensations). So, when
vedana and will first manifest in the unborn being, then one
knows that nāma-rūpa has first manifested; and when nāmarūpa
has first manifested, then consciousness has first
manifested and human life has begun anew!
In conclusion, only when the embryo-fetus first shows
sensitivity to pleasure and pain (vedana) and first shows
will (such as by a purposeful shrinking away from a
painful stimulus) has consciousness and nāma-rūpa first
manifested and the new human life started

This idea from the article by teh venerable Bhikkhu
that consciousness only "manifests" or arises in an embryo when one can perceive the embryo reacting to pain "such as by a purposeful shrinking away from a
painful stimulus" is not supported by the texts .

The term Pātubhūta, manisfests , is just a way it say it appears or arises. We see in the quote given by Kevin that
Vsm (Visuddhimagga) Chapter XVI.32 wrote:

"Now, this word birth (játi) has many meanings...

...In the passage, “His birth is due to the first consciousness arisen, the first cognition manifested, in the mother’s womb” (Vin I 93) it is rebirth-linking."
In fact I seem to remember other passages note that in the early stages of life in the womb the being is mostly in bhavanga, deep sleep, and no reactions would be noticed at all. Also when the embryo is still very tiny would any reactions be easily seen by an outside observer.

Hi robert and Kevin

Let's see what the Vinaya passage which Ajahn Brahm relies on really says -

Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā kumārakassapo gabbhavīso upasampanno ahosi. Atha kho āyasmato kumārakassapassa etadahosi – ‘‘bhagavatā paññattaṃ ‘na ūnavīsativasso puggalo upasampādetabbo’ti. Ahañcamhi gabbhavīso upasampanno. Upasampanno nu khomhi, nanu kho upasampanno’’ti? Bhagavato etamatthaṃ ārocesuṃ. Yaṃ, bhikkhave, mātukucchismiṃ paṭhamaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ, paṭhamaṃ viññāṇaṃ pātubhūtaṃ , tadupādāya sāvassa jāti. Anujānāmi, bhikkhave, gabbhavīsaṃ upasampādetunti.

Now at that time the venerable Kassapa the Boy* became ordained twenty years after his conception. Then it occurred to the venerable Kassapa the Boy :
"It is laid down by the Lord that an individual who is under twenty years of age should not be ordained,^ and I am twenty years from my conception. Now am I ordained ^ or am I not ordained ?"

They told this matter to the Lord. He said : " When in his mother's womb the first thought (citta) has arisen (uppanna), the first consciousness (viññāṇa) appeared (pātubhūta),' his birth is (to be reckoned as) from that time. I allow you, monks, to ordain one who is twenty years of age from his conception."

trans. Horner, Book of Discipline, Vol IV, pp.119 - 120.

I'm not sure why Ven Nanamoli rendered tadupādāya sāvassa jāti as he did, when the function of upādāya here is to show derivation, ie how birth is to be reckoned with reference to conception. I am not aware of any sutta or vinaya usage of upādāya as carrying a causative sense as suggested by Ven Nanamoli's translation of the Vinaya passage.

I accept the concept of the rebirth-consciousness as being grounded in the suttas, principally DN 15 -

Viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpanti iti kho panetaṃ [PTS Page 063] [\q 63/] vuttaṃ. Tadānanda iminā petaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ. Yathā viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. Viññāṇaṃ ca hi ānanda mātukucchismiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātukucchismiṃ samuccissathāti"?

"No hetaṃ bhante. "

"Viññāṇaṃ ca hi ānanda mātukucchiṃ okkamitvā vokkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathāti"?

"No hetaṃ bhante".

"Viññāṇaṃ ca hi ānanda daharasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumārakassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissathāti'?

"No hetaṃ bhante. "

'Tasmātihānanda eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ. Esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa yadidaṃ viññāṇaṃ. "

"'From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form. If consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?"

"No, lord."

"If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart, would name-and-form be produced for this world?"

"No, lord."

"If the consciousness of the young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name-and-form ripen, grow, and reach maturity?"

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for name-and-form, i.e., consciousness."

trans, Ven T on ATI

And DN 15 is the elephant in the room that forms the backbone of Ajahn Brahm's argument that nobody has actually bothered to address.

Fundamentally, this boils down to the question - WHEN DOES THE REBIRTH CONSCIOUSNESS DESCEND INTO THE WOMB?

And for this, the next passage in DN 15 proposes this -

Nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇanti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ. Tadānanda imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ. Yathā nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ: viññāṇaṃ ca hi ānanda nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṃ na labhissatha, api nu kho āyatiṃ jātijarāmaraṇaṃ dukkhasamudayasambhavo paññāyethāti"?

"No hetaṃ bhante. "

"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo viññāṇassa yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ. "

"Ettāvatā kho ānanda jāyetha vā jīyetha vā mīyetha vā cavetha vā upapajjetha vā...

'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. If consciousness were not to gain a foothold in name-and-form, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth, aging, death, and stress in the future be discerned?

"No, lord."

"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a requisite condition for consciousness, i.e., name-and-form.

"This is the extent to which there is birth, aging, death, passing away, and re-arising...

According to DN 15, there will be NO rebirth-consciousness, without the requisite nāmarūpa. This is the crux of Ajahn Brahm's analysis - the stream of consciousness cannot descend into the womb (gabbha) if the feeling component of nāmarūpa is absent.

In fact, I would go even further than Ajahn Brahm and the Vsm to point out that the Vinaya determination of conception has 2 qualifications, ie -

1. cittaṃ uppannaṃ (mind has arisen), AND
2. viññāṇaṃ pātubhūtaṃ (consciousness has been manifested).

What if citta were given its normal sense of mind as the emotional apparatus? What if there is only a "human being" when the foetus finally acquires its affective capacities?



PS - it should also be apparent from this, why Ajahn Brahm disagrees with BB's translation of gabbhassa avakkanti as referring to the descent of the embryo, when the Vinaya discussion indicates that gabbha is simply womb. This means that the -assa ending carries a dative sense, ie descent into the womb, not descent of the embryo.

[cooran]

Hello all,

I'm not sure if this will be add anything to the discussion, but it appears that even by eight weeks after conception, a foetus can feel pain - if not sooner :

http://www.lifenews.com/2013/05/23/expe ... t-8-weeks/

With metta,
Chris

[tiltbillings]

Hello all,

I'm not sure if this will be add anything to the discussion, but it appears that even by eight weeks after conception, a foetus can feel pain - if not sooner :

http://www.lifenews.com/2013/05/23/expe ... t-8-weeks/

With metta,
Chris

Considering the source, I certainly would not take this as a final or reliable word.

[cooran]

Hello Tilt,

I assumed Maureen Condic being a PhD and an Associate Professor of Neurobiology and Anatomy was a trustworthy source.
But you are saying she isn't?

With metta,
Chris

[Mr Man]

Hello Tilt,

I assumed Maureen Condic being a PhD and an Associate Professor of Neurobiology and Anatomy was a trustworthy source.
But you are saying she isn't?

With metta,
Chris

But isn't this topic exploring "Life from what period" from the "Classical Theravada" perspective?

[tiltbillings]

Hello Tilt,

I assumed Maureen Condic being a PhD and an Associate Professor of Neurobiology and Anatomy was a trustworthy source.
But you are saying she isn't?

With metta,
Chris

I would not simply assume it to be the case either way, but like what we see here, predilections can drive assumptions and conclusions.

[Sylvester]

Since this is the Classical section, I'll cite something from the Comy interpretation of DN 15.

There are 2 propositions concerning consciousness and name-&-form in DN 15. For convenience, I'll call them Proposition A and Proposition B.

Proposition A

Viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpanti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ. Tadānanda iminā petaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ. Yathā viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. Viññāṇaṃ ca hi ānanda mātukucchismiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātukucchismiṃ samuccissathāti"?
"No hetaṃ bhante. "

'From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form. If consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?"

"No, lord."

Proposition B

Nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇanti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ. Tadānanda imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ. Yathā nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ: viññāṇaṃ ca hi ānanda nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṃ na labhissatha, api nu kho āyatiṃ jātijarāmaraṇaṃ dukkhasamudayasambhavo paññāyethāti"?
"No hetaṃ bhante. "

'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. If consciousness were not to gain a foothold in name-and-form, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth, aging, death, and stress in the future be discerned?

"No, lord."

Let's see what the Comy says about Proposition A -

Samuccissathāti paṭisandhiviññāṇe asati api nu kho suddhaṃ avasesaṃ nāmarūpaṃ antomātukucchismiṃ kalalādibhāvena samuccitaṃ missakabhūtaṃ hutvā vattissatha.

"Take shape" - If there were no rebirth-linking consciousness, would the remaining bare mentality-materiality occur in the mother's womb, "taking shape" by developing through the various embryonic stages?

trans. BB, The Great Discourse on Causation: The Mahānidāna Sutta and Its Commentaries

I've highlighted in red above the existential locative absolute that is used in the Dependant Cessation formula. The function of this grammatical construction is to say that rebirth-linking consciousness is the necessary condition for nāmarūpa. Ergo, no rebirth-linking consciousness = no nāmarūpa.

Now, what about Proposition B? You can see what the Comy has to say about Proposition B. Although the existential locative absolute was not employed by the Comy to indicate that nāmarūpa is the necessary condition for the rebirth-linking consciousness, the Comy makes this necessity very clear as follows -

In the same way, as it were, mentality-materiality might say to consciousness: "Who is it that made you the rebirth-linking consciousness? Didn't we do so? If you could become a rebirth-linking consciousness without the support of the other three mental aggregates and the heart-basis, then we would see what kind of rebirth-linking consciousness you are.

Ergo, no nāmarūpa = no rebirth-linking consciousness.

So, are we still going to insist that a fertilised embryo without sensing faculties will qualify as the Abhidhammic nāmarūpa?

[cooran]

Hello Mr. Man,

It is modern science seeming to support what Robert quoted from the Visuddhimagga in the first few posts in this thread.

With metta,
Chris

[tiltbillings]

Hello Mr. Man,

It is modern science seeming to support what Robert quoted from the Visuddhimagga in the first few posts in this thread.

With metta,
Chris

And educated opinions on that vary, and certainly the article quoted, even the "full trstimony" does not establish without question Condic’s claim or the claim of the OP.

[Sylvester]

Hello all,

I'm not sure if this will be add anything to the discussion, but it appears that even by eight weeks after conception, a foetus can feel pain - if not sooner :

http://www.lifenews.com/2013/05/23/expe ... t-8-weeks/

With metta,
Chris

Hmm, a coincidence or what? Both Condic and AB suggest 8 weeks as the threshold...

[robertk]

The idea expressed in some posts above that the classical Theravada position is that there are such elements of nama as vedana present but no citta (vinnana) is so unusual that I really think it would be a waste of space to go further on this line. Perhaps members who think that this is the case can start a new topic somewhere.

[Sylvester]

That's most startling, robert.

Where in the above posts has the suggestion been made that "there are such elements of nama as vedana present but no citta (vinnana)"?

I believe I've been very vigorous in complying with the Comy and Pali grammar in stating that it is not possible for viññāṇa to be present when nāma is absent.