Great. Very interested in looking at these. Thanks for the list!Ñāṇa wrote: For starters, your man Chalmers argues against materialism in The Conscious Mind (Ch. 4). Hasker goes beyond Chalmers' natural dualism and argues against causal closure of the physical domain in his paper How Not To Be A Reductivist. Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World doesn't reject causal closure of the physical, but argues that physics doesn't offer a complete picture of causation, i.e. physics doesn't provide a theory of causation. Thus, he rejects physicalism (and he rejects epiphenomenalism and interactionist dualism as well). Papers on panpsychism can be found in Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. And a number of different arguments are put forward in Mind And Its Place in the World: Non-reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness, some less coherent than others.
Have you read Henry Stapp's book? I haven't got to it yet, but am planning to this year.
No, I don't think there is. But my comment was actually with regard to kamma as an explanation for human differences -- i.e. why so-and-so becomes a child prodigy, or grows to a certain height, has green eyes, etc.Ñāṇa wrote:Is there an "empirically demonstrable explanation" for the existence of consciousness that can withstand rigorous questioning? If there were, the "hard problem" would have already been solved.