The Burden

[beeblebrox]

Basically what I am talking about here is that the argument "there is no person,... thus who can practice?" seem to be shaky. Saying that 5 aggregates are not Atta, is NOT saying that there is no person that is conditioned, anicca, dukkha, and anatta that practices.

Again, I wonder if the problem arose from reading anatta as "no control." Is that actually the Thai translation of the term? I haven't verified this for myself.

[Alex123]

Basically what I am talking about here is that the argument "there is no person,... thus who can practice?" seem to be shaky. Saying that 5 aggregates are not Atta, is NOT saying that there is no person that is conditioned, anicca, dukkha, and anatta that practices.

Again, I wonder if the problem arose from reading anatta as "no control." Is that actually the Thai translation of the term? I haven't verified this for myself.

I wonder how modern Thai interpretation of pali word Anatta from Hindu context relates to what the Buddha meant in 5th BC India.

[daverupa]

The Buddha didn't deny that people (puggala) were different from each other, which is individuality. That one is not this one - we conventionally mark this by such and such a name, such and such a clan, etc.

When an individual appropriates the aggregates, this craving is the taking up of the burden, and this is carried by that individual, who then has sakkayaditthi.

It seems clear...

[beeblebrox]

Basically what I am talking about here is that the argument "there is no person,... thus who can practice?" seem to be shaky. Saying that 5 aggregates are not Atta, is NOT saying that there is no person that is conditioned, anicca, dukkha, and anatta that practices.

Again, I wonder if the problem arose from reading anatta as "no control." Is that actually the Thai translation of the term? I haven't verified this for myself.

I wonder how modern Thai interpretation of pali word Anatta from Hindu context relates to what the Buddha meant in 5th BC India.

Hi Alex,

I wasn't trying to suggest that there was any relevance... just wondering about where the confusion that seemed to be in the other thread came from. It can happen if two parties have two different readings of the same term, and they end up talking past each other.

[beeblebrox]

The Buddha didn't deny that people (puggala) were different from each other, which is individuality. That one is not this one - we conventionally mark this by such and such a name, such and such a clan, etc.

When an individual appropriates the aggregates, this craving is the taking up of the burden, and this is carried by that individual, who then has sakkayaditthi.

It seems clear...

Hi Dave,

"Seems" seem to be the key word here.

[daverupa]

Well, here's something from Nanavira's note on sakkaya:

Every set of pancakkhandha - not pancupadanakkhandha in the arahat's case - is unique, and individuality in this sense ceases only with the final cessation of the pancakkhandha at the breaking up of the arahat's body. But a living arahat is no longer somebody or a person, since the notion or conceit ‘(I) am’ has already ceased. Individuality must therefore be carefully distinguished from personality, which is: being a person, being somebody, being a subject (to whom objects are present), self-hood, the mirage ‘I am’, and so on. The puthujjana is not able to distinguish them - for him individuality is not conceivable apart from personality, which he takes as selfhood.

[tiltbillings]

Well, here's something from Nanavira's note on sakkaya:

Every set of pancakkhandha - not pancupadanakkhandha in the arahat's case - is unique, and individuality in this sense ceases only with the final cessation of the pancakkhandha at the breaking up of the arahat's body. But a living arahat is no longer somebody or a person, since the notion or conceit ‘(I) am’ has already ceased. Individuality must therefore be carefully distinguished from personality, which is: being a person, being somebody, being a subject (to whom objects are present), self-hood, the mirage ‘I am’, and so on. The puthujjana is not able to distinguish them - for him individuality is not conceivable apart from personality, which he takes as selfhood.

That is useful. Now, what does he have to say about choice in this context?

[beeblebrox]

Hi Dave,

Maybe there's some confusion... but in the original context of this discussion, it was about whether a person could practice for kusala citta (after encountering the Dhamma), or this is not possible because the citta only arise by itself, due to panna, that in turn arose by itself, on the condition of encountering the Dhamma, that also arose by itself, with the appropriate attention, that arose by itself, and so on, with the person not doing anything.

[Mr Man]

What I am thinking is that there is a "sense" of the individual and we have the convention of the individual who has this lifespan. But within this individual there is nothing intrinsic. The individual is conditioned and dependent. From the perspective of one who has put down the burden the sense of the individual is no more

"one is free from hunger, totally unbound" SN 22.22

[beeblebrox]

[ . . . ] but in the original context of this discussion, it was about whether a person could practice for kusala citta (after encountering the Dhamma), or this is not possible because the citta only arise by itself, due to panna, that in turn arose by itself, on the condition of encountering the Dhamma, that also arose by itself, with the appropriate attention, that arose by itself, and so on, with the person not doing anything.

Hi, I'd like to comment on my own post above:

I think the problem here seems to be in trying to view a "person" that is apart from all of these conditions which arise... rather than to merely view this "person" as a conventional pointer for the conditions.

That is why a person who practice could seem like he's trying to work against the conditions... but that is an illusion. It's not the fault of the conventional words, but the perceiver.

[daverupa]

whether a person could practice for kusala citta (-) or this is not possible because the citta only arise by itself, due to panna, that in turn arose by itself, on the condition of encountering the Dhamma, that also arose by itself, with the appropriate attention, that arose by itself, and so on, with the person not doing anything.

Now, what does [Nanavira] have to say about choice in this context?

Ah, I see. Well, Nanavira seems to take choice as a given; while he does discuss various aspects of choosing in his notes on cetana, sankhara, et al, I don't seem to recall a dedicated discussion of free will. So let's see...

"And how is striving fruitful, how is exertion fruitful? There is the case where a monk, when not loaded down, does not load himself down with pain, nor does he reject pleasure that accords with the Dhamma, although he is not fixated on that pleasure. He discerns that 'When I exert a [physical, verbal, or mental] fabrication against this cause of stress, then from the fabrication of exertion there is dispassion. When I look on with equanimity at that cause of stress, then from the development of equanimity there is dispassion.' So he exerts a fabrication against the cause of stress where there comes dispassion from the fabrication of exertion, and develops equanimity with regard to the cause of stress where there comes dispassion from the development of equanimity. Thus the stress coming from the cause of stress for which there is dispassion through the fabrication of exertion is exhausted & the stress resulting from the cause of stress for which there is dispassion through the development of equanimity is exhausted.

Seems as though one can and ought to choose to exert certain fabrications...

"For a person endowed with virtue, consummate in virtue, there is no need for an act of will, 'May freedom from remorse arise in me.' It is in the nature of things that freedom from remorse arises in a person endowed with virtue, consummate in virtue.

"For a person free from remorse, there is no need for an act of will, 'May joy arise in me.' It is in the nature of things that joy arises in a person free from remorse.

...

...while in some cases things proceed automatically.

Part of the original context was abhidhamma... so, does this problem of choice arise sans abhidhamma?

[ancientbuddhism]

I don't know exactly what atman refered to in 5th BC India but I'm sure that the sense of "I", "me", "my", "mine" was much the same then as it is today and was a source of suffering then as it is now.

I'm not going to argue the existence of a car but it's existence is conditional and dependent.

What is the difference between Atta and Puggalo?

The Buddha disproved Atta by pointing to the fact that 5 aggregates are inconstant and unsatisfactory. This wouldn't even refute the wrong idea of a Christian idea of a soul (that changes and can suffer), much less and empiric person.

• "And which is the carrier of the burden? 'The person,' it should be said. This venerable one with such a name, such a clan-name.SN22.22

In the Upaniṣads, the ātman was considered as the catalyst of the person (puruṣa), even that the act of utterance was given by Ātman.

• Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad I. 4.1 (S. Radhakrishnan):
  
  “ātmaivedam agra āsīt puruṣavidhaḥ, so’nuvīkṣya nānyad ātmano’paśyat, so’ham asmīty agre vyāharat; tato’haṃ nāmābhavat, tasmād apy etarhy āmantritaḥ; aham ayam ity evāgra uktvā, athānyan nāma prabrūte yad asyabhavati.”
  
  “I. In the beginning this (world) was only the self, in the shape of a person. Looking around he saw nothing else than the self. He first said, ‘I am.’ Therefore arose the name of I. Therefore, even to this day when one is addressed he says first ‘This is I’ and then speaks whatever other name he may have.”

Considering that there is no reason to doubt that this idea was common knowledge at the time of the Tathāgata, it would seem that in the case of the Bhāra Sutta (as he was in many places in the Nikāyas) he was punning on the Upaniṣadic ātman claim by deconstructing the person as consisting of merely the five conditional bases which would give rise to a name and designations. Here the Buddha is replacing an Upaniṣadic epithet for the ātman/puruṣa dynamic, with the dhammic contemplative object of the individual (sakkāya) who's craving causes the burden of self and dukkha.

[Dan74]

Basically what I am talking about here is that the argument "there is no person,... thus who can develop wisdom or sati?" seem to be shaky. Saying that 5 aggregates are not Atta, is NOT saying that there is no person that is conditioned, anicca, dukkha, and anatta that practices and develops wisdom or sati.

I guess this is an old argument that one cannot wish one's way to anatta.

Of course one can develop all sorts of qualities in spite of the fact that these qualities only provisionally refer to a self.

But when it comes to insight or liberation, acting from a perceived self who wishes or strives for insight and liberation, is in a way counter-productive, or at least needs to be let gone of eventually.

[imagemarie]

Hi

This from Ñánavìra, "Desire to end desire"

So, on account of his craving for arahatship, he sets out to get it.
But, since he does not understand what arahatship is, he does not know what it is that he is
seeking; and when, in due course, he does come to know what it is he is seeking, he has ipso
facto found it (or at least the first instalment of it). It is by making use of bhavatanhá that he
gives up bhavatanhá (and a fortiori all other kinds of tanhá). It is because of bhavatanhá that,
with the Buddha’s help, we make an attempt to recognize bhavataóhá and succeed in doing so,
thereby bringing bhavatanhá to an end.

The Tragic, The Comic And The Personal

[Alex123]

I guess this is an old argument that one cannot wish one's way to anatta.

Right. One cannot wish oneself to be skillful (at something) either. One has to practice the skill.

Also, the conditionality and "no-control" doesn't alter the fact that when one is hungry, one goes and eats something. One doesn't say "there is no control" and starves to death.