Alex123 wrote:Hello all,
If we take a piece clay and make various shapes out of it (ball, square, rectangle, pyramid, etc) it is still the same clay. Even if we split clay in
two parts, the same amount of clay remains. Person can eat with a fork and then stab someone with the same fork. Here the same object has different functions. A same object, lets say red ball can look different under different lighting. In dark room red ball can appear black or brown, in a bright room the same ball can appear red. Strait stick can appear bent in water and appear strait in the air.
What if the same thing is with the Citta? It can take different objects, it can cognize different things but it is still same in the sense of "knowing in first person".
Any comments? How to refute this?
With best wishes,
I don't think that there is a refutation as such, because if you conceive of cognizing as being logically dependent upon a mysterious something that cognizes, then you have defined yourself into a problem from which there is no escape. If you could see the Citta, it would be something other than the Citta in question; as the Citta would be the bit that was doing the seeing. The same for all the other ways of cognizing, including the necessity for the Citta to be aware of any analysis or reasoning for it even to make sense.
If there is merely cognizing, though, the problem does not arise. The things you list as examples are objects in space and time, and can carry the associations of similarity, difference, and so on; whereas if we knew the Citta like this, we would know whether it was one, two, many, or whatever.