Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

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Assaji
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Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

Hi Sylvester and Pali friends,
Sylvester wrote:It is obvious from the context that here, the meditator is trying to attain the jhanas, and what stands in his way are the defilements. Grief, as a cetasika vedanā flows from painful kāyika vedanā. I take the painful kāyika vedanā to arise on discernment that the defilements atthi (are present).
The difference between cetasika and kāyika vedanā is one of the keys to Satipatthana practice.

It is described in such a way in Mahasatipatthana sutta:

393. "Katama~nca, bhikkhave, dukkha.m? Ya.m kho, bhikkhave, kaayika.m dukkha.m kaayika.m asaata.m kaayasamphassaja.m dukkha.m asaata.m vedayita.m, ida.m vuccati, bhikkhave, dukkha.m.
394. "Katama~nca, bhikkhave, domanassa.m? Ya.m kho, bhikkhave, cetasika.m dukkha.m cetasika.m asaata.m manosamphassaja.m dukkha.m asaata.m vedayita.m, ida.m vuccati, bhikkhave, domanassa.m.

So the feeling that arises on discernment would be mano-samphassa, and hence cetasika, vedana.

The physical pain has to be endured, but the mental pain is unnecessary, as described in Sallatha sutta:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

This classification is evidently identical with classification into the classes of 'nirāmisa' and 'sāmisa' feelings, which is emphasized in the section on feelings in Satipatthana sutta:

Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Sāmisaṃ vā sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'sāmisaṃ sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Nirāmisaṃ vā sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'nirāmisaṃ sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Sāmisaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'sāmisaṃ dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Nirāmisaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'nirāmisaṃ dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Sāmisaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'sāmīsaṃ adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti. Nirāmisaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno 'nirāmisaṃ adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmī'ti pajānāti.
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Sylvester »

Thanks Dmytro.

I think this will be one of those points where one can detect the Abhidhamma going off on a significantly different trajectory from the suttas.

One of the reasons why I laboured so much in the other thread to establish anusaya as a sankhāra, instead of a kamma, is to address the havoc that Ven T's interpretation of anusaya wreaks on the suttanta distinction between kāyika and cetasika.

For me, what the suttas term kāyika/bodily feelings refers to the hedonic tone, ie pleasant, painful or neutral. The cetasika/mental feelings would definitely be the emotions of somanassa, domanassa and upekhā.

In MN 148, you will see how kāyika/bodily feelings arise with manoviññāṇa -
Dependent on the mind & mental states there arises consciousness at the mind. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there arises what is felt either as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain.

Manañca bhikkhave, paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññāṇaṃ. Tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso. Phassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā.


That is then followed by the emotional sequel, described by the formulaic description of cetasika feelings from SN 36.6-
So sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati. Tassa rāgānusayo anuseti. Dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃkandati sammohaṃ āpajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo anuseti.

(If, when) touched by a feeling of pleasure, one relishes it, welcomes it, or remains fastened to it, then one's latent tendency to lust underlies. If, when touched by a feeling of pain, one sorrows, grieves, & laments, beats one's breast, becomes distraught, then one's latent tendency to aversion underlies.
So, it does appear that in the suttas, "bodily" feelings include the hedonic tone at all 6 bases, while "mental" feelings are restricted to the emotional tone at the mind base. There is a reason why in the Abhidhamma and Commentaries, kāyika came to be limited to the 5 bases of eye, ear, nose, tongue and body. This was due to the Abhidhammic identification of these 5 bases with the rūpakkhandha. However, you would be familiar with Sue Hamilton's point that nowhere in the suttas is the rūpakkhandha associated only with the 5 bases. For that matter, the suttas do not even treat the 5 āyatanā as even being physical or corporeal.

The rūpakkhandha is just an aspect of experience, arising with contact at any of the 6 āyatanā - MN 28.

Something to ponder...
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

Hi Sylvester,
Sylvester wrote:For me, what the suttas term kāyika/bodily feelings refers to the hedonic tone, ie pleasant, painful or neutral. The cetasika/mental feelings would definitely be the emotions of somanassa, domanassa and upekhā.
Why do you think so?
In MN 148, you will see how kāyika/bodily feelings arise with manoviññāṇa -
Dependent on the mind & mental states there arises consciousness at the mind. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there arises what is felt either as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain.

Manañca bhikkhave, paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññāṇaṃ. Tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso. Phassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā.
There's no "kāyika" terms in this passage. It is about "mano-samphassa-ja", "manoviññāṇa" dukkha, i.e. "domanassa".

As Mahasatipatthana sutta states, 'domanassa' is a "cetasika", "mano-samphassa-ja" type of 'dukkha':

"394. "Katama~nca, bhikkhave, domanassa.m? Ya.m kho, bhikkhave, cetasika.m dukkha.m cetasika.m asaata.m manosamphassaja.m dukkha.m asaata.m vedayita.m, ida.m vuccati, bhikkhave, domanassa.m."
That is then followed by the emotional sequel, described by the formulaic description of cetasika feelings from SN 36.6-
So sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati. Tassa rāgānusayo anuseti. Dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃkandati sammohaṃ āpajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo anuseti.

(If, when) touched by a feeling of pleasure, one relishes it, welcomes it, or remains fastened to it, then one's latent tendency to lust underlies. If, when touched by a feeling of pain, one sorrows, grieves, & laments, beats one's breast, becomes distraught, then one's latent tendency to aversion underlies.
There's no mention of cetasika.

Surely the painful feeling may be aggravated by additional mental pain, as described in forementioned Sallatha sutta.
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Sylvester »

Hi Dmytro
There's no "kāyika" terms in this passage. It is about "mano-samphassa-ja", "manoviññāṇa" dukkha, i.e. "domanassa".
Absolutely correct, but neither is there any explicit mention of manosamphassa dukkha. Yet, you are able to infer correctly that domanassa was meant by the passage.

There's no mention of cetasika.
Again, absolutely correct. But how I infer that cetasika dukkha was intended was to simply look at the formula in MN 148 –
...socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati
This very same formula appears in SN 36.6 and is identified with cetasika feeling –
Evameva kho bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati, kilamati, paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati, sammohaṃ āpajjati, so dve vedanā vediyati kāyikañca cetasikañca.
Further down, SN 36.6 identifies the source of the grief –
Tamenaṃ dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighavantaṃ yo dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo so anuseti,

When he harbours aversion towards painful feeling, the underlying tendency to aversion towards painful feeling underlies.
I think it will be obvious that paṭighānusaya does not create painful feelings, but it is, instead, the sankhara for grief. If paṭighānusaya were responsible for kāyika feelings, then we doomed to inescapable rebirth, by virtue of the anusaya's role in rebirth set out in SN 12.38. We see also in MN 148 a similar description of paṭighānusaya's connection to grief -
...(If, when) touched by a feeling of pain, one sorrows, grieves, & laments, beats one's breast, becomes distraught, then one's latent tendency to aversion underlies.

Surely the painful feeling may be aggravated by additional mental pain, as described in forementioned Sallatha sutta.
I absolutely agree. But the point I was trying to draw from MN 148 was that the mind as a sense-base can contact and give rise to 2 kinds of unpleasant experiences – pain and grief. Since SN 36.6 pointedly describes kāyika feelings as being either sukha, dukkha or adukkhamasukha, and describes cetasika feelings in the manosamphassa terms of DN 22, MN 148’s 6-fold analysis of sukha, dukkha and adukkhamasukha feelings cannot be an exposition of manosamphassa or cetasika feelings. That 6-fold analysis must be an exposition on kāyika feelings. If we insist that there is no difference between the mind's dukkha feelings and domanassa, MN 148's statement -
Dependent on the mind & states there arises consciousness at the mind. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there arises what is felt either as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain. ...(If, when) touched by a feeling of pain, one does not sorrow, grieve, or lament, beat one's breast or become distraught, then one's latent tendency to aversion does not underlie.
would be meaningless.


We see elsewhere a theory of feelings that is based on the notion of tajjam vedayitam; see for example SN 36.10 -
Dukkhavedaniyaṃ bhikkhave phassaṃ paṭicca uppajjati dukkhā vedanā tasseva dukkhavedaniyassa phassassa nirodhā yaṃ tajjaṃ vedayitaṃ dukkhavedaniyaṃ phassaṃ paṭicca uppannā dukkhā vedanā sā nirujajhati, sā vūpasammati.
Now, I believe that “corresponding feelings” are fixed outcomes and would therefore refer to kāyika feelings. I do not think any of the cetasika/manosamphassa feelings can be determined as tajja, as that would contradict the training potential outlined in SN 36.6-
Sutavā ca kho bhikkhave ariyasāvako dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattāḷiṃ kandati na sammohaṃ āpajjati: so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati kāyikaṃ, na cetasikaṃ.

Monks, when the instructed noble disciple is contacted by a painful feeling, he does not sorrow, grieve, or lament; he does not weep beating his breast, he does not become distraught. He feels only one feeling – a kāyika feeling, not a cetasika feeling.
If the mind were incapable of feeling pain and grief separately, it would mean that grief is not optional. It would mean that grief is inevitably tied to dukkha. This would make the above training from SN 36.6 impossible to achieve.
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

Hi Sylvester,
Sylvester wrote:This very same formula appears in SN 36.6 and is identified with cetasika feeling –
Evameva kho bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati, kilamati, paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati, sammohaṃ āpajjati, so dve vedanā vediyati kāyikañca cetasikañca.
The formula socati, kilamati, paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati, sammohaṃ āpajjati describes the actions that result from cetasika feeling, but not the feeling itself.
I think it will be obvious that paṭighānusaya does not create painful feelings, but it is, instead, the sankhara for grief.
Yes.
If we insist that there is no difference between the mind's dukkha feelings and domanassa, MN 148's statement -
Dependent on the mind & states there arises consciousness at the mind. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there arises what is felt either as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain. ...(If, when) touched by a feeling of pain, one does not sorrow, grieve, or lament, beat one's breast or become distraught, then one's latent tendency to aversion does not underlie.
would be meaningless.
The meaning here is quite clear - mental pain also should not produce sorrow, grief and lament, but should be dealt with patience.
Now, I believe that “corresponding feelings” are fixed outcomes and would therefore refer to kāyika feelings. I do not think any of the cetasika/manosamphassa feelings can be determined as tajja, as that would contradict the training potential outlined in SN 36.6-
I don't see any contradiction here. The craving (tanha) brings forth additional "mano-samphassa" as one of the four nutriments (ahara):

http://dhamma.ru/lib/paticcas.htm" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

This mano-samphassa, correspondingly, brings forth additional "cetasika" feeling.
Sutavā ca kho bhikkhave ariyasāvako dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattāḷiṃ kandati na sammohaṃ āpajjati: so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati kāyikaṃ, na cetasikaṃ.

Monks, when the instructed noble disciple is contacted by a painful feeling, he does not sorrow, grieve, or lament; he does not weep beating his breast, he does not become distraught. He feels only one feeling – a kāyika feeling, not a cetasika feeling.
In this case, there's no craving, and hence no additional "mano-samphassa", and no cetasika feeling.

I wonder how you would account for the mental "niramisa" feelings, described, for example, in:

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/su ... mn137.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/su ... 6-031.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/su ... 6-063.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

The sukha of samadhi is clearly born out of mental contact.
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Sylvester »

Hi Dmytro.

Again, you've raised very good points, and I hope to do them justice. Please bear with my long-winded analysis.

The formula socati, kilamati, paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati, sammohaṃ āpajjati describes the actions that result from cetasika feeling, but not the feeling itself.
That’s correct, which was why I was careful to say “This very same formula appears in SN 36.6 and is identified with cetasika feeling ” instead of “This very same formula appears in SN 36.6 and is identified as cetasika feeling ”. But this pericope, whether used in SN 36.6 or MN 148 or the many other places where it occurs, is easily understood to be talking about the feeling of grief in its various manifestations. At least, even the Commentary understands it as a list of manifestations, so that socati is explained in mental terms –

Socatīti citte uppannabalavasokena socati,

while kilamati is explained in terms of kāya -

Kilamatīti kāye uppannadukkhena kilamati.


The meaning here is quite clear - mental pain also should not produce sorrow, grief and lament, but should be dealt with patience.
That is true. But what do you think about how SN 36.6 organise feelings into these categories -

Kāyika for pleasure (sukha), pain (dukha) and neutral (adukkhamasukha)

versus

Cetasika for joy (somanassa), grief (domanassa) and equanimity (upekhā)

Besides the SN 36.6 categorisation, you’ve also identified the mano-samphassa category. I would suggest that the mano-samphassaja feeling is cetasika feeling. This would tie its foil kāyasamphassaja feeling with kāyika feeling.

“Mental pain”, as we see from MN 148, is described in terms of both dukha, and domanassa
Dependent on the mind & states there arises consciousness at the mind. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there arises what is felt either as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain. ...(If, when) touched by a feeling of pain, one does not sorrow, grieve, or lament, beat one's breast or become distraught, then one's latent tendency to aversion does not underlie.
According to DN 22, mano-samphassaja feeling is domanassa, thereby making it coincide with cetasika feeling. Yet, MN 148 provides that the mind as a sense base also facilitates contact which is the cause of pain (dukha), which according to SN 36.6 is kāyika feeling.

(As a sidenote, I’m puzzled by the absence of neutral kāyika feelings in the 5-fold analysis of feelings as indriya (faculties).)

My take-away from how these suttas are using kāya in this bifurcation between kāyika/ kāyasamphassa versus cetasika/ mano-samphassaja is that kāya is probably referring to the kāya (collection) of the 6 āyatanā/indriyā. This seems to be the only way to account for sukha, dukha or adukkhamasukha feelings being felt at the mind, without their usual anusaya intruding and giving rise to lust, grief or ignorance.

However, I do note one very unusual sutta, Pātāla Sutta, SN 36.4. Instead of kāyika (bodily), it uses sārīrikāya (BB translates this also a “bodily”), to describe bodily feelings. Interestingly, its Chinese parallel simply uses 身(body), without the technical 舍利 that would have stood for sārīra. We do not see this sārīrikāya occurring in the context of feelings anywhere else, except MN 36, where the term is used by Saccaka. However, in the Buddha’s reply to him, the Buddha did not employ the kāyika and cetasika terminology but simply described these 2 categories in non-technical terms –
Kathañca, aggivessana, abhāvitakāyo ca hoti abhāvitacitto ca? Idha, aggivessana, assutavato puthujjanassa uppajjati sukhā vedanā. So sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno sukhasārāgī ca hoti sukhasārāgitañca āpajjati. Tassa sā sukhā vedanā nirujjhati. Sukhāya vedanāya nirodhā uppajjati dukkhā vedanā. So dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati. Tassa kho esā, aggivessana, uppannāpi sukhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā kāyassa, uppannāpi dukkhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā cittassa. Yassa kassaci, aggivessana, evaṃ ubhatopakkhaṃ uppannāpi sukhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā kāyassa, uppannāpi dukkhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā cittassa, evaṃ kho, aggivessana, abhāvitakāyo ca hoti abhāvitacitto ca.

How, Aggivessana, is one undeveloped in body and undeveloped in mind? Here, Aggivessana, pleasant feeling arises in an untaught ordinary person. Touched by that pleasant feeling, he lusts after pleasure and continues to lust after pleasure. That pleasant feeling of his ceases. With the cessation of the pleasant feeling, painful feeling arises. Touched by that painful feeling, he sorrows, grieves, and laments, he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught. When that pleasant feeling has arisen in him, it invades his mind and remains because body is not developed. And when that painful feeling has arisen in him, it invades his mind and remains because mind is not developed. Anyone in whom, in this double manner, arisen pleasant feeling invades his mind and remains because body is not developed, and arisen painful feeling invades his mind and remains because mind is not developed, is thus undeveloped in body and undeveloped in mind.
Notice this “because body is not developed”. In MN 152, the road towards equanimity in the face of contact which is pleasant, painful or neutral is part of the noble disciple’s development of the indriya. Might the kāya in MN 36 refer to MN 152’s body of all 6 indriya?

The concept of a sārīrikāya is put into the mouth of a Jain. The Buddha, in MN 36, does not take up that term, but uses the more familiar SN 36.6 method of categorising feelings into hedonic tone versus emotional tone. Could the Pali version of SN 36.4 therefore be the outcome of an accidental use of a Jain term, since the Chinese version shows no such intrusion?
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Sylvester »

Hi Dmytro
I wonder how you would account for the mental "niramisa" feelings, described, for example, in:

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/su" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; ... mn137.html
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/su" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; ... 6-031.html
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/su" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; ... 6-063.html

The sukha of samadhi is clearly born out of mental contact.

Hurray! At least I won’t have to spill ink over the “secluded from kāmā” issue.

Yes, “other-worldly” or “non-carnal”/ nirāmisa states are born of mental contact, and have nothing to do with the kāmā, IMO. But we need to be careful here. According to the 1st Jhana pericope, this nirāmisa sukha arises with 2 seclusions as condition, ie seclusion from kāmā, as well as seclusion from unwholesome states. These unwholesome states are all purely mental, exemplified by the short-form abhijjhādomanassa. As an example, desire for a kāmā, or even thinking about a kāmā would be covered by the standard list of Hindrances. As such, simply being born out of mental contact would not suffice, since the unwholesome mental contacts would also need to be excluded. As such, the simple hedonic tone of a sensual fantasy also needs to be stamped out. In such a case, the better reading of manosamphassaja would be to exclude from its range hedonic content arising from mental contact. It should cover only the emotional content.
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

Ñāṇa writes clearly in this subject:

Joy (pīti) and pleasure (sukha) born of seclusion (vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ)

The discourses differentiate between carnal joy and pleasure (sāmisā pīti and sukha) and non-carnal joy and pleasure (nirāmisā pīti and sukha). SN 36.31 Nirāmisa Sutta tells us that carnal joy and pleasure arise in dependence on the five strands of sensual pleasure, while non-carnal joy arises in the first two jhānas and non-carnal pleasure arises in the first three jhānas.

SN 48.40 Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta states that the pain faculty (dukkhindriya) ceases completely in the first jhāna, the unhappiness faculty (domanassindriya) ceases completely in the second jhāna, the pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) ceases completely in the third jhāna, and the happiness faculty (somanassindriya) ceases completely in the fourth jhāna.

SN 48.37 Dutiyavibhaṅga Sutta informs us that the pleasure and pain faculties are born of body contact (kāyasamphassaja), whereas the happiness and unhappiness faculties are born of mind contact (manosamphassaja).

Taking all of the above passages into consideration we can deduce that the non-carnal joy of the first jhāna is mental pleasure (cetasika sukha, i.e. somanassa) born of mind contact, and the non-carnal pleasure of the first jhāna is bodily pleasure (kāyika sukha) born of body contact.

This reading of these sutta sources accords with Peṭakopadesa 7.72:

The twofold bodily and mental pain does not arise in one steadied in directed thought and evaluation, and the twofold bodily and mental pleasure does arise. The mental pleasure thus produced from directed thought is joy, while the bodily pleasure is bodily feeling.


This understanding is also supported by the Vimuttimagga. The author of the Vimuttimagga was knowledgeable of and quotes from the Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta, the Paṭisambhidāmagga, the Vibhaṅga, and the Peṭakopadesa. And when commenting on the bathman simile for the first jhāna (e.g. DN 2, MN 119, etc.) he explains:

Just as the bath-powder when inside and outside saturated with moisture, adheres and does not scatter, so the body of the meditator in the first jhāna is permeated with joy and pleasure from top to bottom, from the skullcap to the feet and from the feet to the skullcap, skin and hair, inside and outside. And he dwells without falling back. Thus he dwells like a Brahma god.

[Q.] Joy (pīti) and pleasure (sukha) are said to be formless phenomena (arūpa-dhamma). How then can they stay permeating the body?

[A.] Name (nāma) depends on form (rūpa). Form depends on name. Therefore, if name has joy, form also has joy. If name has pleasure, form also has pleasure.

Again, form born from joy causes tranquility of body, and when the entire body is tranquillized there is pleasure due to the tranquility of form. Therefore there is no contradiction.


To this we can add a couple of more points. First, due to the presence of directed thought and evaluation in the first jhāna, intermittent occurrences of mental unhappiness can still arise, as indicated in SN 48.40. Thus the singleness of mind of the first jhāna isn’t necessarily as unified as in the higher jhānas. Secondly, when the meditator is steadied in the first jhāna, all of the jhāna factors work together to maintain what DN 9 calls an actual refined recognition of joy and pleasure born of seclusion (vivekajapītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā). Thus, while the singleness of mind of the first jhāna may not be as unified as in the higher jhānas, it is still a very refined samādhi. It takes considerable mental development in order to be able to successfully induce and maintain this level of heightened mind (adhicitta).

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Sylvester
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Sylvester »

Hi Dmytro

I think the above will be difficult to reconcile with AN 9.37.

There, Ven Ananda first confirms that in the Formless Attainments, one will not be sensitive to that dimension (tañcāyatanaṃ no paṭisaṃvedissatī) where the internal and external bases of sight, hearing, olfaction, taste and tactility are present.

Almost as a casual afterthought, Ven Ananda closes off the sutta by referring to yet another set of attainments where one will not be sensitive to that dimension -
...yāyaṃ, bhagini, samādhi na cābhinato na cāpanato na ca sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato, vimuttattā ṭhito, ṭhitattā santusito, santusitattā no paritassati. Ayaṃ, bhagini, samādhi aññāphalo vutto bhagavatā’ti. Evaṃsaññīpi kho, āvuso, tadāyatanaṃ no paṭisaṃvedetī’’ti

Sister, the concentration that does not lean forward and does not bend back, and that is not reined in and checked by forcefully suppressing [the defilements] - by being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, one is not agitated. The Blessed One said that this concentration has final knowledge as its fruit. When one is thus percipient too, friend, one does not experience that base.
I've elected to go with BB's translation, as he gives a very good explanation for why the compounds kiṃphalo and aññāphalo should be bāhubbīhi compounds (see note 1931). Ven T translated these compounds as tappurisa compounds, which is also indefensible on doctrinal grounds. The key lies in the predicate "na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato".

In DN 34, one is left in no doubt that the samādhi that is "na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato" are the 4 Jhanas. Now, if AN 9.37 is correct in asserting that one is also insensitive to the kāmā when one is in the 4 Jhanas, is it possible to equate the nirāmisa sukha of the first 3 Jhanas as emanating from contact based on the physical body as an internal āyatana?
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

Hi Sylvester,
...yāyaṃ, bhagini, samādhi na cābhinato na cāpanato na ca sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato, vimuttattā ṭhito, ṭhitattā santusito, santusitattā no paritassati. Ayaṃ, bhagini, samādhi aññāphalo vutto bhagavatā’ti. Evaṃsaññīpi kho, āvuso, tadāyatanaṃ no paṭisaṃvedetī’’ti

Sister, the concentration that does not lean forward and does not bend back, and that is not reined in and checked by forcefully suppressing [the defilements] - by being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, one is not agitated. The Blessed One said that this concentration has final knowledge as its fruit. When one is thus percipient too, friend, one does not experience that base.
'too' here refers to above paragraphs of the sutta, which describe arupa attainments.
AN 9.37 does not say anything about the four jhanas.
In DN 34, one is left in no doubt that the samādhi that is "na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato" are the 4 Jhanas.
Why do you think so?
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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Sylvester »

Hi Dmytro

My thoughts –
'too' here refers to above paragraphs of the sutta, which describe arupa attainments.
I doubt if such a reading is tenable for the following reasons –

AN 9.37 reports 2 narratives. The first narrative involves Ven Ananda and the monks at Ghosita’s Park. That narrative touches on the Formless Attainments where the meditator will be percipient of each of the 4 Formless Attainment and yet not experience the 5 kāmā .

The 2nd narrative is then given by Ven Ananda about his meeting with Jaṭilagāhiyā at Añjana Grove, which obviously predates the Ghosita Park gathering. This is how that 2nd narrative is reported by Ven Ananda –
Ekamidāhaṃ, āvuso, samayaṃ sākete viharāmi añjanavane migadāye. Atha kho, āvuso, jaṭilagāhiyā bhikkhunī yenāhaṃ tenupasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā maṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ aṭṭhāsi. Ekamantaṃ ṭhitā kho, āvuso, jaṭilavāsikā bhikkhunī maṃ etadavoca – ‘yāyaṃ, bhante ānanda, samādhi na cābhinato na cāpanato na ca sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato, vimuttattā ṭhito, ṭhitattā santusito, santusitattā no paritassati. Ayaṃ, bhante ānanda, samādhi kiṃphalo vutto bhagavatā’’’ti?

‘‘Evaṃ vutte, sohaṃ, āvuso, jaṭilavāsikaṃ bhikkhuniṃ etadavocaṃ – ‘yāyaṃ, bhagini, samādhi na cābhinato na cāpanato na ca sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato, vimuttattā ṭhito, ṭhitattā santusito, santusitattā no paritassati. Ayaṃ, bhagini, samādhi aññāphalo vutto bhagavatā’ti.
The singular pronoun yāyaṃ is used, not the plural yāsu. This must clearly be functioning to report Ven Ananda’s specific reply to Ayya Jaṭilagāhiyā who was also enquiring on a singular yāyaṃ.
It is only after Ven Ananda has recounted the Añjana Grove conversation that the narrative moves back to Ghosita’s Park, with Ven Ananda saying –
Evaṃsaññīpi kho, āvuso, tadāyatanaṃ no paṭisaṃvedetī’’ti.
It’s quite clear to me that the evaṃsaññā is a reference to what Ven Ananda had earlier reported to Ayya Jaṭilagāhiyā on the Buddha's declaration, ie Ayaṃ samādhi aññāphalo vutto bhagavatā’ti.

As for DN 34, there is this –
katame pañca dhammā uppādetabbā? Pañca ñāṇiko sammāsamādhi – ‘ayaṃ samādhi paccuppannasukho ceva āyatiñca sukhavipāko’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘Ayaṃ samādhi ariyo nirāmiso’ti paccattaññevañāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘Ayaṃ samādhi akāpurisasevito’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘Ayaṃ samādhi santo paṇīto paṭippassaddhaladdho ekodibhāvādhigato, na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘So kho panāhaṃ imaṃ samādhiṃ satova samāpajjāmi sato vuṭṭhahāmī’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. Ime pañca dhammā uppādetabbā.
Sammāsamādhi is obviously the 4 Jhanas, based on the aṭṭha dhammā bhāvetabbā list. In the pañca dhammā bhāvetabbā list, it confirms sammāsamādhi as such by reiterating factors from AN 5.28.

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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

Hi Sylvester,
Sylvester wrote:As for DN 34, there is this –
katame pañca dhammā uppādetabbā? Pañca ñāṇiko sammāsamādhi – ‘ayaṃ samādhi paccuppannasukho ceva āyatiñca sukhavipāko’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘Ayaṃ samādhi ariyo nirāmiso’ti paccattaññevañāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘Ayaṃ samādhi akāpurisasevito’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘Ayaṃ samādhi santo paṇīto paṭippassaddhaladdho ekodibhāvādhigato, na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. ‘So kho panāhaṃ imaṃ samādhiṃ satova samāpajjāmi sato vuṭṭhahāmī’ti paccattaṃyeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati. Ime pañca dhammā uppādetabbā.
Sammāsamādhi is obviously the 4 Jhanas, based on the aṭṭha dhammā bhāvetabbā list. In the pañca dhammā bhāvetabbā list, it confirms sammāsamādhi as such by reiterating factors from AN 5.28.
Here we have not just sammāsamādhi, but ñāṇiko sammāsamādhi, i.e. sammāsamādhi which is connected with knowledges. For example, ‘‘Ayaṃ samādhi ariyo nirāmiso’' clearly refers to the Noble state.

‘Ayaṃ samādhi santo paṇīto paṭippassaddhaladdho ekodibhāvādhigato, na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato’ refers to the samadhi of the Arahant.

Sakalika sutta:

Then another devata exclaimed in the Blessed One's presence: "See a concentration well-developed, a mind well-released — neither pressed down nor forced back, nor with mental fabrication kept blocked or suppressed. Whoever would think that such a naga of a man, lion of a man, thoroughbred of a man, peerless bull of a man, strong burden-carrier of a man, such a tamed man should be violated: what else is that if not blindness?"

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Pansadhovaka sutta:

"When he is rid of them, there remain only thoughts of the Dhamma. His concentration is neither calm nor refined, it has not yet attained serenity or unity, and is kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint. But there comes a time when his mind grows steady inwardly, settles down, grows unified & concentrated. His concentration is calm & refined, has attained serenity & unity, and is no longer kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint.

"And then whichever of the higher knowledges he turns his mind to know & realize, he can witness them for himself whenever there is an opening.
...

"If he wants, then through the ending of the mental effluents, he remains in the effluent-free awareness-release and discernment-release, having known and made them manifest for himself right in the here and now. He can witness this for himself whenever there is an opening."

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Nettippakarana 89:

Yo ca samādhi ariyo nirāmiso, yo ca samādhi akāpurisasevito, yo ca samādhi santo ceva paṇīto paṭippassaddhiladdho ca ekodibhāvādhigato ca na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato ca yañcāhaṃ taṃ kho panimaṃ samādhiṃ sato samāpajjāmi sato vuṭṭhahāmīti, ayaṃ vipassanā.


Bhikkhu Bodhi in his translation of AN 9.37 also writes:

"The Blessed One said this concentration has final knowledge as its fruit."

and explains this in detail in the note 1931 you mentioned.

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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Sylvester »

Hi Dmytro

Thanks for your thoughts. Just for discussion –
Here we have not just sammāsamādhi, but ñāṇiko sammāsamādhi, i.e. sammāsamādhi which is connected with knowledges.


Grammatically, I think your explanation makes sense, but if we look elsewhere to AN 5.27, it becomes apparent that the 5 knowledges arise from such concentration:
Samādhiṃ, bhikkhave, bhāvetha appamāṇaṃ nipakā patissatā. Samādhiṃ, bhikkhave, bhāvayataṃ appamāṇaṃ nipakānaṃ patissatānaṃ pañca ñāṇāni paccattaññeva uppajjanti. Katamāni pañca? ‘Ayaṃ samādhi paccuppannasukho ceva āyatiñca sukhavipāko’ti paccattaññeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati, ‘ayaṃ samādhi ariyo nirāmiso’ti paccattaññeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati, ‘ayaṃ samādhi akāpurisasevito’ti paccattaññeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati, ‘ayaṃ samādhi santo paṇīto paṭippassaddhaladdho ekodibhāvādhigato, na saṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato’ti paccattaññeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati, ‘sato kho panāhaṃ imaṃ samāpajjāmi sato vuṭṭhahāmī’ti paccattaññeva ñāṇaṃ uppajjati.
Samādhiṃ, bhikkhave, bhāvetha appamāṇaṃ nipakā patissatā. Samādhiṃ, bhikkhave, bhāvayataṃ appamāṇaṃ nipakānaṃ patissatānaṃ imāni pañca ñāṇāni paccattaññeva uppajjantī’’ti.
So, it would appear that the –iko suffix in DN 34 is not a relational one, but a possessive one that guarantees that such a samādhi will be endowed with these 5 knowledges.
‘Ayaṃ samādhi santo paṇīto paṭippassaddhaladdho ekodibhāvādhigato, na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato’ refers to the samadhi of the Arahant.
May I trouble you to explain why you say so? I do see SN 1.38 which you cite, but that is a perplexing sutta, if we accept it without question. 7 devas spoke, with the initial 6 describing the Buddha enduring painful feelings. It’s only the 7th that describes the Buddha in a concentration that is suvimuttaṃ. I think the traditional understanding taken from the SN 48.40, is that pain cannot invade the 1st Jhana onwards, so is there a contradiction between the 6 devas’ speech versus the 7th deva’s?

As BB rightly points out, this na saṅkhāraniggayhavāritagato samādhi leads to awakening, but nothing in the text suggests that such a samādhi is within reach of the Arahant alone (unless one insists on following Ven T in translating the aññāphalo as a genitive tappurisa, instead of a bāhubbīhi ).

I’m glad you cited AN 3.101, although I wonder if you might not have noticed a potential inconsistency between that sutta and Nettippakarana 89. The latter declares that samādhi to be vipassanā, and I wonder how that is possible if all vitakka has been abandoned. Anyway, AN 3.101 also does not seem to be describing the Arahant’s practice, but of the monk devoted to the higher mind.

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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

Hi Sylvester,
Sylvester wrote:I’m glad you cited AN 3.101, although I wonder if you might not have noticed a potential inconsistency between that sutta and Nettippakarana 89. The latter declares that samādhi to be vipassanā, and I wonder how that is possible if all vitakka has been abandoned.
Evidently vitakka can be a hindrance to vipassanā.

"Here a certain teacher is a reasoner (takkii), an inquirer (viima.msii). He teaches a Dhamma hammered out by reasoning (takka), following a line of inquiry (viima.msa) as it occurs to him. But when a teacher is a reasoner, an inquirer, some is well reasoned (sutakkita) and some is wrongly reasoned (duttakkita), some is true and some is otherwise."

http://www.westernbuddhistreview.com/vol3/Knowledge.htm" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

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Re: Pali Terms: Cetasika and Kāyika, Nirāmisa and Sāmisa

Post by Assaji »

The Abhidharmasamuccaya additionally explains that feeling can also be classified as physical (kāyika) or mental (caitasika), being either related to the five sense perceptions (and thus based on the contact of the five sense faculties with their objects) or to the mental perception (manovijñāna). Another distinction proposed by the Abhidharmasamuccaya is between feeling “associated with worldly pleasures” (sāmiṣa) and “not associated with worldly pleasures” (nirāmiṣa) or between feeling “based on craving” (gredhāśrita) and “based on renunciation” (naiṣkramyāśrita). The feeling associated with worldly pleasures is explained in the Abhidharmasamuccaya as being associated with desire for the self, whereas the feeling that is based on craving is paraphrased as relying on greed for the five sense objects.
JOWITA KRAMER
Descriptions of “Feeling” (vedanā), “Ideation” (saṃjñā), and “the Unconditioned” (asaṃskṛta) in Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka and Sthiramati’s Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā

http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/b ... 0000000009
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