I would like to take a closer look at Ven T’s critique of the so-called “bare awareness” method as Ven T understands it. It will be obvious from his “Right Mindfulness – Memory and Ardency on the Buddist Path” that his belief is firmly grounded in “development” (
bhavana) being a very intentional, controlled and directed practice. In his method, all states are the direct application and product of intention, thereby leaving no place for “bare awareness”.
My approach is to approach his critique through his philosophy, principally in his understanding of DO’s
idappaccayatā formula,
cetanā (intention) in particular and
sankhāra (all forms of intention) in general.
Firstly, we have his interpretation of
idappaccayatā as follows –
The Buddha expressed this/that conditionality in a simple-looking formula:
(1) When this is, that is.
(2) From the arising of this comes the arising of that.
(3) When this isn't, that isn't.
(4) From the stopping of this comes the stopping of that.
— AN 10.92
There are many possible ways of interpreting this formula, but only one does justice both to the way the formula is worded and to the complex, fluid manner in which specific examples of causal relationships are described in the Canon. That way is to view the formula as the interplay of two causal principles, one linear and the other synchronic, that combine to form a non-linear pattern. The linear principle — taking (2) and (4) as a pair — connects events, rather than objects, over time; the synchronic principle — (1) and (3) — connects objects and events in the present moment. The two principles intersect, so that any given event is influenced by two sets of conditions: input acting from the past and input acting from the present. Although each principle seems simple, the fact that they interact makes their consequences very complex [§10].
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Ven T interprets
idappaccayatā’s limb #1 and limb #3 as connoting contemporaneity of states within a relationship. Following this interpretation, the skilfull states in
bhavana must always be sustained by the constant presence of intention, directed towards its tasks. If the intention were absent, then in Ven T’s model, the
bhavana has lost the plot.
You can see this model manifest in his translation of an important passage from AN 6.63 –
"Intention, I tell you, is kamma. Intending, one does kamma by way of body, speech, & intellect."
This is easily recognisable and citable by many here, as what distinguishes the Buddhist model of ethics versus that of the Vedas and Jains.
I would say that Ven T’s explanation of
idappaccayatā is unsatisfactory. There are several reasons, but I will focus on 3.
Firstly, from a grammatical point of view, limbs #1 and #3 are structured in a special construction –
imasmiṃ sati, idaṃ hoti
imasmiṃ asati, idaṃ na hoti
This is one of the 2 kinds of locative absolute constructions. This form is made up of
sati/
asati, the locative of
santo.
Santo is the present participle of
atthi (“there is”). Generally, while present participles are used to indicate contemporaneity, in this locative absolute construction, it has no temporal value, unlike locative absolutes constructed with past participles.
Secondly, many grammars ascribe to this locative absolute the function of identifying “cause”. In this case, the translation will not show a temporal relationship, but will read like this –
Because this is, that is.
Because this is not, that is not.
In the Prakrit and Sanskrit formulations of
idappaccayatā that have been translated into Chinese, the translators also understood the locative absolute to mean cause or reason, using the word “
from” instead.
Finally, Ven T’s interpretation of the 1st and 3rd limbs are inconsistent with a pair of suttas in SN 12.49 and SN 12.50, both of which are unfortunately not translated by Ven T. This is what SN 12.50 says –
Atha kho, bhikkhave, sutavato ariyasāvakassa aparappaccayā ñāṇamevettha hoti— ‘imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati. Avijjāya sati saṅkhārā honti; saṅkhāresu sati viññāṇaṃ hoti; viññāṇe sati nāmarūpaṃ hoti; nāmarūpe sati saḷāyatanaṃ hoti; saḷāyatane sati phasso hoti; phasse sati vedanā hoti; vedanāya sati taṇhā hoti; taṇhāya sati upādānaṃ hoti; upādāne sati bhavo hoti; bhave sati jāti hoti; jātiyā sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hotī’ti. So evaṃ pajānāti— ‘evamayaṃ loko samudayatī’ti.
It should be immediately obvious to the Pali reader that whether you intend the 1st limb or the 2nd limb, the locative absolute represents both. Any temporal implication to
idappaccayatā is completely absent, thereby confirming what the grammars say about
imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, namely that it illustrates a principle of causation, not a temporal one.
Unfortunately, Ven T allows his synchronic interpretation to colour some of his interpretations. I gave as an example his translation of AN 6.63, where he says –
"Intention, I tell you, is kamma. Intending, one does kamma by way of body, speech, & intellect."
The synchronic interpretation creeps in, where his choice of the word “intending” implies the contemporaneity of intention and kamma.
The Pali says this –
Cetanāhaṃ, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmi. Cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti— kāyena vācāya manasā.
Intention, I say, is kamma. Having intended, one does kamma by way of body, speech and mind.
The absolutive
cetayitvā bears the most common sense of “having done something”. Although it is rare, you could read the absolutive as connoting synchronicity between 2 actions/verbs. But, should such a rare usage be applied to AN 6.63? Note that Ven T does not translate the absolutive in this manner, when he translates a very similar passage from MN 44 –
Pubbe kho, āvuso visākha, vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācaṃ bhindati, tasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro.
Having first directed one's thoughts and made an evaluation, one then breaks out into speech. That's why directed thought & evaluation are verbal fabrications.
It looks to me that Ven T has imported his understanding of Dependant Origination to
bhavana. I am of the view that the synchronicity principle is not inherent in the 1st and 3rd limbs of
idappaccayatā and there is therefore no doctrinal basis for Ven T’s insistence that intention must always be present in order for the
bhavana or meditation or whatever to proceed. A prior intention, done skilfully, can be sufficient to provide the impulse and the momentum for an action to start and to persist, even if the original intention has subsided.