Vipassanā: What Is Dissolution, Really?

[tiltbillings]

If regarded and investigated as "name and form", dissolution as it pertains to "matter" becomes a non-issue, since rupa is taken as "form" rather than "matter" or "body", and with that, any potential base for explicit or implicit philosophical views of atomic realism are short-circuited, thereby side-stepping many of the quotations posted in the original post which were deemed problematic.

What do you mean by form? And how does this taking rupa as form short circuit "atomic realism." And please define what you mean by "atomic realism," because I have no idea what you mean by it.

Since the SN IV 15]‘All’} is composed entirely of phassa, contact between sense base and sense object. We can only directly know phenomena within this ‘world of experience," and objective outside "reality" is not what is being talked about. So, do please explain a bit more what you are talking about.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Tilt,

What do you mean by form?

With regards to eye, it would be the discerned image.
With regards to ear, it would be the discerned sound.
With regards to body, it would be the discerned tactile sensation. etc.

And how does this taking rupa as form short circuit "atomic realism." And please define what you mean by "atomic realism," because I have no idea what you mean by it.

Realism relates to that which is said to (capital E) "Exist".
Atomic relates to the property of representing the smallest unit of indivisibility (e.g. kalapas).

Together, it is to say that tiny indivisible dhammas "Exist", and in the context of dissolution, that they alternate between "do not Exist", "Exist" and "do not Exist" in the smallest possible unitary duration of indivisible time (i.e. a "moment"). It is the classic commentarial Abhidhammic view of both cittas and matter (though it pronounces a different durational timeframe for each).

Taking rupa as "form" however, is to rightly discern it as a formation/sankhara, dependent upon avijja for its presence, and recognising that it arises in accordance with dependent origination, there will neither be the perception of "Exist" or "does not Exist". The same cannot be said for so-called objective physical matter, which is not understood as being dependent upon avijja for its presence, which cannot be known independently of the six-senses, and which is therefore not within loka or sabba.

We can only directly know phenomena within this ‘world of experience," and objective outside "reality" is not what is being talked about.

If someone is implicitly or explicitly adhering to the view of atomic realism, then "objective outside reality" (as well as "objective inside reality", for what it's worth) is precisely what they would be talking about...

The compendium of process-freed consciousness opens with a survey of the topography of the phenomenal world, charting the planes of existence and the various realms within each plane. (See Table 5.1). The author undertakes this survey before examining the types of process-freed consciousness because the external universe, according to the Abhidhamma, is an outer reflection of the internal cosmos of mind, registering in concrete manifest form the subtle gradations in states of consciousness. This does not mean that the Abhidhamma reduces the outer world to a dimension of mind in the manner of philosophical idealism. The outer world is quite real and possesses objective existence. The outer world is always a world apprehended by consciousness, and the type of consciousness determines the nature of the world that appears. Consciousness and the world are mutually dependent and inextriably connected to such an extent that the hierarchical structure of the realms of existence exactly reproduces and corresponds to the hierarchical structure of consciousness.

Because of this correspondence, each of the two, the objective hierarchy of existence and the inner gradation of consciousness, provides the key to understanding the other. The reason why a living being is reborn into a particular realm is because he has generated, in a previous life, the kamma or volitional force of consciousness that leads to the rebirth into that realm, and thus the final analysis all the realms of activity of existence are formed, fashioned, and sustained by the mental activity of living beings. At the same time these realms provide the stage for consciousness to continue its evolution in a new personality and under a fresh set of circumstances

Hence the benefit in consciously avoiding and side-stepping views which pertain to the existence and non-existence of dhammas, moments, cittas, kalapas, anything etc.

Meditation instructions however, which are based upon commentarial terminology, are inextricably intertwined with the consequences and implications that underpin that commentarial terminology, which is fine if the commentaries are entirely free of error and/or irrelevance.

Metta,
Retro.

[tiltbillings]

Greetings Tilt,

What do you mean by form?

With regards to eye, it would be the discerned image.
With regards to ear, it would be the discerned sound.
With regards to body, it would be the discerned tactile sensation. etc.

And that is what i would mean by it, and when I use, probably idiomatically, mind/body process that is would be exactly what I am referring to.

And how does this taking rupa as form short circuit "atomic realism." And please define what you mean by "atomic realism," because I have no idea what you mean by it.

Realism relates to that which is said to (capital E) "Exist".
Atomic relates to the property of representing the smallest unit of indivisibility (e.g. kalapas).

Together, it is to say that tiny indivisible dhammas "Exist", and in the context of dissolution, that they alternate between "do not Exist", "Exist" and "do not Exist" in the smallest possible unitary duration of indivisible time (i.e. a "moment"). It is the classic commentarial Abhidhammic view of both cittas and matter (though it pronounces a different durational timeframe for each).

Let us not forget that the dhammas "exist" dependent upon conditions and are what we experience/perceive and are nowhere other than in the matrix of the ALL.

Taking rupa as "form" however, is to rightly discern it as a formation/sankhara,

That is a matter of definition.

Taking rupa as "form" however, is to rightly discern it as a formation/sankhara, dependent upon avijja for its presence, and recognising that it arises in accordance with dependent origination, there will neither be the perception of "Exist" or "does not Exist". The same cannot be said for so-called objective physical matter, which is not understood as being dependent upon avijja for its presence, which cannot be known independently of the six-senses, and which is therefore not within loka or sabba.

One does not need objective physical matter.

We can only directly know phenomena within this ‘world of experience," and objective outside "reality" is not what is being talked about.

If someone is implicitly or explicitly adhering to the view of atomic realism, then "objective outside reality" (as well as "objective inside reality", for what it's worth) is precisely what they would be talking about...

The compendium . . . .

Hence the benefit in consciously avoiding and side-stepping views which pertain to the existence and non-existence of dhammas, moments, cittas, kalapas, anything etc.

Assuming that this paragraph is the only way of talking about these things. I am not, however, thrilled with Ven B’s analysis, but interestingly dhamma follower did present a different point of view as does the VM.

Meditation instructions however, which are based upon commentarial terminology, are inextricably intertwined with the consequences and implications that underpin that commentarial terminology, which is fine if the commentaries are entirely free of error and/or irrelevance.

I wonder where that puts Ven Nanananda, whose practice is very much in line with Mahasi Sayadaw.

[tiltbillings]

I imagine that there must be something perceived to be important in these issues, or there wouldn't be so many posts trying to convince people that they (the people) are doing their practice wrong, or thinking about it wrong, and should switch to something else, or think differently.

I don't see anyone here trying to convince you of anything.

As far as I'm concerned, the fundamental teachings of the Pāli dhamma are the only thing worth discussing. Period. Anything other than these fundamental teachings is unnecessary and should be cleared from the path lest it impede what is important.

Kind of seems you are on a mission here.

[tiltbillings]

A perception of momentariness without momentary dhammas is nonsense.

And you have not at all addressed what I said.

Already addressed: A perception of momentariness without discrete momentary dhammas is nonsense.

But that still does not address what i said.

But by gawd, if that is the case, you certainly are spending a great deal of time trying to beat-up all of these unimportant things with this scorched-earth approach of yours, and in the process refusing to address the most central aspect of all this at all.

Once again, if you find any value in the theory of momentariness then by all means knock yourself out chasing those momentary dhammas.

Again, side stepping what I have addressed which are the serious implications in this line of argument you are making.

Maybe it is time for you to move on here.

Maybe it's time for you to quit accusing people who don't agree with you of engaging in a "scorched-earth approach."

Your own words:

But let me be crystal clear: There is no mention of a doctrine of momentariness, either explicitly or implicitly, in the suttas, and anyone who reads such a doctrine into the suttas is reading later interpretations into this strata of material. Moreover, there is nothing esoteric, mysterious, or hidden about impermanence. Your body will surely die. My body will surely die. Death could occur at any time. And mental processes are subject to even greater change, alteration, and passing away than the body. This recognition is stark and sobering. This is what is important to understand, not some pseudo theory of momentariness with all of it's conceptual proliferation.

Obviously there is no compromise, no room for finding a common basis. This “doctrine of momentariness” is to be rejected and to be shown to be totally wrong, as you further state:

As far as I'm concerned, the fundamental teachings of the Pāli dhamma are the only thing worth discussing. Period. Anything other than these fundamental teachings is unnecessary and should be cleared from the path lest it impede what is important. The recognition of unattractiveness (asubhasaññā) is important. The recognition of death (maraṇasaññā) is important. The recognition of impermanence (aniccasaññā) is important. The recognition of dispassion (virāgasaññā) is important. The theory of momentariness is not important. The theory of two truths is not important. And any other novel ideas that Buddhaghosa introduced to Theravāda commentary are not important. Moreover, if one isn't tied to the thought-world of the Visuddhimagga, then Burmese Vipassanā doesn't really have much to offer that's especially interesting or important.

Your words: Anything other than these fundamental teachings is unnecessary and should be cleared from the path lest it impede what is important. No compromise, no attempt at any sort on conciliation; just cleared from the path. And by implication, you seem to be saying that the Burmese vipassana traditions, the VM and the momentary doctrine are incapable of leading to insight into the Dhamma. It all sounds rather severe to me, but I could be wrong, of course.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

One does not need objective physical matter.

Agreed - this is not what rupa (or in the context of this topic, dissolution of rupa) points to.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

It would be so much more interesting to hear about the advantages of that "something else".

Ironically, I gave you a "something else" (i.e. if we regard nama-rupa as name-and-form instead of mind-and-matter in the context of insight, then....), with a set of advantages in doing so, but all you perceived was someone trying to convince you of something, and rather than "hear about the advantages of that "something else"" you heard something else altogether - something which was never spoken.

Actually, you're reading far too much into what I said. I simply have trouble understanding your arguments...
I am, of course, quite happy with reading nama-rupa as name-and-form:

If regarded and investigated as "name and form", dissolution as it pertains to "matter" becomes a non-issue, since rupa is taken as "form" rather than "matter" or "body", and with that, any potential base for explicit or implicit philosophical views of atomic realism are short-circuited, thereby side-stepping many of the quotations posted in the original post which were deemed problematic.

So lets drop the philosophy then, since it's not relevant, as you say. What we observe is what we observe. What do we do with what we observe? As I understand it, I build up concentration and mindfulness and observe what is happening. And I observe sensations, feelings,thoughts, and sensations arising and disappearing with greater rapidity the more concentrated I get, roughly as described by teachers such as Sayadaw Mahasi. No need for some complex analysis to see that. Now, the interesting question is what should I be doing with that information. You see, the problem with this thread is that it's supposedly talking about vipassana, which has to do with what one is experiencing, but the discussion often seems to me to be always veering towards philosophical ideas that I can't see how to relate to experience and claims about how people practice that appear to have little to do with the instructions I know about.


Mike

[Nyana]

Already addressed: A perception of momentariness without discrete momentary dhammas is nonsense.

But that still does not address what i said.

It does. Your attempt to have it both ways is meaningless.

Obviously there is no compromise, no room for finding a common basis.

I already indicated where there can be a common basis. Beyond that, compromise only obscures. Acquiescing to untenable theories results in woolly-minded, vague, and muddled relativism. As I've previously mentioned, there is no need for consensus, nor should consensus even be desired.

This “doctrine of momentariness” is to be rejected

Yes.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Mike,

Well, in the context of the topic then, what does "dissolution" mean to you? Dissolution of what, exactly?

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

Well, in the context of the topic then, what does "dissolution" mean to you? Dissolution of what, exactly?

Stuff I observe (thoughts, feelings, whatever) arises, then it ceases. That's what I see, anyway... Isn't that normal?


Mike

[tiltbillings]

Already addressed: A perception of momentariness without discrete momentary dhammas is nonsense.

But that still does not address what i said.

It does. Your attempt to have it both ways is meaningless.

But it still does not address what I have said.

Obviously there is no compromise, no room for finding a common basis.

I already indicated where there can be a common basis. Beyond that, compromise only obscures. Acquiescing to untenable theories results in woolly-minded, vague, and muddled relativism. As I've previously mentioned, there is no need for consensus, nor should consensus even be desired.

If there can be a common basis, let us see it; give us something more than the negitivity of "clearing the path" of those things you think are impediments.

This “doctrine of momentariness” is to be rejected

Yes.

And in the process it looks like you are telling us that in these thing you think that should be cleared away and those things that you think that do not really have much to offer that's especially interesting or important there is no value in their practice, implying that they do not lead to any significant insight into the Dhamma. You have been asked about this more than once, and you do not deny that this is the implcation of your point of view in your path clearing argumentation.

[Nyana]

As I understand it, I build up concentration and mindfulness and observe what is happening.

If you were to follow the sutta exposition, concentration (samādhi) is used to develop singleness of mind (cittekaggatā) pertaining to one object basis (ārammaṇa), such as the breath or the recognition of unattractiveness, etc. The relationship between the development of the four applications of mindfulness (catunna satipaṭṭhānā bhāvanā) and integral meditative composure is presented in SN 47.4 Sāla Sutta:

• Come, friends, remain contemplating the body in the body, ardent, fully aware, unified, with a limpid mind, composed, with singleness of mind, in order to know the body as it really is. Remain contemplating feelings in feelings, ardent, fully aware, unified, with a limpid mind, composed, with singleness of mind, in order to know feelings as they really are. Remain contemplating mind in mind, ardent, fully aware, unified, with a limpid mind, composed, with singleness of mind, in order to know the mind as it really is. Remain contemplating phenomena in phenomena, ardent, fully aware, unified, with a limpid mind, composed, with singleness of mind, in order to know phenomena as they really are.

The mental qualities of remaining ardent (ātāpī) and fully aware (sampajāna), which are standard in the descriptions of integral mindfulness, are here directly related to remaining unified (ekodibhūtā), with a limpid mind (vippasannacittā), composed (samāhitā), with singleness of mind (ekaggacittā). All of these latter terms indicate the onset of integral meditative composure.

So to develop the applications of mindfulness, first one picks one of the meditation subjects as object support (i.e. kāyānupassanā, such as mindfulness of breathing, or recognition of the unattractiveness of the 31 body parts, or cemetery contemplation, etc.), then abandons carnal joy and pleasure and develops non-carnal joy and pleasure (i.e. vedanānupassanā), and recognizes the difference between limited and afflicted states of mind vs. expansive states of mind (i.e. cittānupassanā), and engages in the appropriate categories of phenomena to (a) abandon any further occurrences of hindrances, and (b) develop insight (i.e. dhammānupassanā).

And I observe sensations, feelings,thoughts, and sensations arising and disappearing with greater rapidity the more concentrated I get

Are they really arising and disappearing with greater rapidity? Do you actually generate a greater quantity of feelings or thoughts the more concentrated you get?

You see, the problem with this thread is that it's supposedly talking about vipassana, which has to do with what one is experiencing, but the discussion often seems to me to be always veering towards philosophical ideas that I can't see how to relate to experience and claims about how people practice that appear to have little to do with the instructions I know about.

The "philosophical ideas" such as the doctrine of momentariness and the realist epistemology of unique particulars and so on, are inextricably tied to the Visuddhimagga and post-Visuddhimagga thought-world. It makes no sense at all to accept the the stages of insight knowledge as they're presented in the Visuddhimagga and further elaborated in later commentaries without accepting these embedded views.

[tiltbillings]

Are they really arising and disappearing with greater rapidity? Do you actually generate a greater quantity of feelings or thoughts the more concentrated you get?

Thoughts? Not as much, given the function of concentration, but as concentrated awareness becomes more refined one can see in finer detail that what is being perceived is not static, like looking at a fire or feeling the wind blowing through one's hair. It would be hard not to call the observed constant "movement" change, swelling and ebbing, rising and falling. It is not a matter of greater quantity; it is a matter of a greater awareness of what is happening in finer detail. What is happening at any moment is a great deal busier than we assume.

[tiltbillings]

The "philosophical ideas" such as the doctrine of momentariness and the realist epistemology of unique particulars and so on, are inextricably tied to the Visuddhimagga and post-Visuddhimagga thought-world. It makes no sense at all to accept the the stages of insight knowledge as they're presented in the Visuddhimagga and further elaborated in later commentaries without accepting these embedded views.

These four msgs in this order might be of interest to those who are closely following the twists and turns of this:

http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... 60#p156913

http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... bc#p156987

http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... bc#p156988

http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... bc#p157019

[Nyana]

It would be hard not to call the observed constant "movement" change, swelling and ebbing, rising and falling.

Change and alteration of what persists do not entail the "constant perishing of phenomena" or "incessant dissolution." To arrive at this latter conclusion requires belief in a view of discrete dhammas subject to momentary arising, subsistence, and dissolution.

Ledi Sayādaw, A Manual of the Excellent Man:

• In the ultimate sense, however, new psychophysical phenomena arise only after the old phenomena have perished, which is death. This constant perishing of phenomena is also called cessation (nirodha) or dissolution (bhaṅga). It is only when one discerns the ultimate truth of this cessation of phenomena that one gains insight.

Mahāsi Sayādaw, The Great Discourse on the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta:

• The yogī perceives that all the nāmas, rūpas which manifest themselves at the moment of seeing, hearing etc., are undergoing instant dissolution and are, therefore, transient.... When the yogī comes to the bhaṅga stage, during the interval of one cycle of rising and falling, numerous moments of dissolution will be seen to flit by. The material body of rising and falling, being subjected to incessant dissolution is indeed not permanent.

And one doesn't have to look too far to find this view spelled out in detail. For example, the Visuddhimaggamahāṭīkā:

• [Conditioned dhammas] individual essences (sabhāva) have rise and fall and change. Herein, conditioned dhammas' arising owing to causes and conditions, their coming to be after non-existence, their acquisition of an individual self (attalābha), is 'rise'. Their momentary cessation when arisen is 'fall'. Their changedness due to aging is 'change'.

So here we have discrete momentary dhammas acquiring individual selves, then aging, then dying. In other words, the "constant perishing of phenomena."