OK, I give up. If you're questioning a straightforward reading of Ven Nananda's words in the Nibbana Sermons I don't have any more to add.
I hope you are enjoying Ven Analayo's expositions and the discussions on the forum there. Perhaps you should present your arguments that Ven Nananda is overreaching there. Some relevant suttas have already been discussed somewhat, such as SN 12.68 (Kosambi sutta). https://suttacentral.net/en/sn12.68
Mike
Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Greetings Mike,
I wouldn't call your puthujjana nibbana theory "straightforward" by any stretch of the imagination, but if you're unwilling to defend or substantiate such a bizarre and radical concept with anything from the suttas, or even the Abhidhamma, then so be it.
Metta,
Paul.
I wouldn't call your puthujjana nibbana theory "straightforward" by any stretch of the imagination, but if you're unwilling to defend or substantiate such a bizarre and radical concept with anything from the suttas, or even the Abhidhamma, then so be it.
Metta,
Paul.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Hi Paul,
Clearly we understand Ven Nananda's sermons completely differently. In my posts I have merely summarised my understanding of the sermons, which has been helped by the clarifications from Ven Analayo and other course participants. I have no interested in responding to your snide comments about "puthujjana nibbana theory " and "bizarre and radical concepts", so let's just agree that we disagree on our understanding of the words of Ven Nananada and the Buddha.
Mike
Clearly we understand Ven Nananda's sermons completely differently. In my posts I have merely summarised my understanding of the sermons, which has been helped by the clarifications from Ven Analayo and other course participants. I have no interested in responding to your snide comments about "puthujjana nibbana theory " and "bizarre and radical concepts", so let's just agree that we disagree on our understanding of the words of Ven Nananada and the Buddha.
Mike
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Not sure when they made these Nibbāna Lectures of Bhikkhu Anālayo available, but here they are:
https://www.bcbsdharma.org/resources/bh ... -lectures/
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Thanks JiWe2JiWe2 wrote: ↑Wed Oct 04, 2017 3:40 pm Not sure when they made these Nibbāna Lectures of Bhikkhu Anālayo available, but here they are:
https://www.bcbsdharma.org/resources/bh ... -lectures/
Already in the first lecture, I have a hard time with how Analayo, reduces the meaning of Nāma.
Reducing nāma to "naming" is, I believe, to reduce nāma to just what it has become when it reaches satta - that is to say, when there is a descent of nāma-rūpa in saḷāyatana; and further, when nāma reaches satta proper.
However, Nāma must also encompass the immaterial khandhas.
One must adress the all Nāma shebang.
Analayo agrees that there is an immaterial side to nāma; but he seems to adress the Nikāyas' definition of it; and does not take much, the Āgamas' definition into account.
And I should insist again: "they are not at all conflictual - but just complementary".
Understanding such an evident fact, is a real improvement in the understanding of the Teaching.
I have explained that here - https://justpaste.it/1bzye.
It has to do with understanding the meaning of: "Consciousness turns back; it goes no further than name-and-form" in SN 12.65 - But it explains very straightforwardly what Nāma is exactly - and the changes in its nature, along the all process (of nāma).
I strongly advise people to read it thoroughly and seriously.
All of it, is based on suttas with parallels.
The Āgamas' definition addresses the nature of nāma in the Nāma-Rūpa nidāna proper; as well as what it becomes, when it descends in saḷāyatana.
While the Nikaya's definition addresses what nāma becomes, when it reaches satta proper - that is to say contact & the following.
The "naming" process is definitely more tied up with the components in that latter definition of the Nikāyas (and with mano). But it is not what nāma means at large; or even more restrictively in satta.
--------
I have also a hard time with absolutely pairing Nāma and Akkheyya in Analayo's first lecture - that is to say, this:
And thisNāmaṃ sabbaṃ anvabhavi,
nāmā bhiyyo na vijjati,
nāmassa ekadhammassa,
sabbeva vasamanvagū.
Name has conquered everything,
There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name."
Akkheyyasaññino sattā,
akkheyyasmiṃ patiṭṭhitā,
akkheyyaṃ apariññāya,
yogam āyanti maccuno.
Beings are conscious of what can be named (?),
They are established on the nameable,
By not comprehending the nameable things,
They come under the yoke of death."
(Analayo ?)
SN 1.20
“Beings who perceive what can be expressed
Become established in what can be expressed.
Not fully understanding what can be expressed,
They come under the yoke of Death.
(Bodhi)
Men, 'ware alone of what is told by names,
Take up their stand on what is so expressed.
If this they have not rightly understood,
They go their ways under the yoke of death.
(Mrs. Rhys Davids)
Perceiving in terms of signs,
beings take a stand on signs.
Not fully comprehending signs, they
come into the bonds of death.
(Thanissaro)
Beings who perceive the expressible [what can be expressed]
Are established in the expressible.
Not fully understanding the expressible,
They go under the yoke of death.
(Piya Tan)
The SĀ 1078 & the SA2 17 parallels have the same Chinese formulation:
眾生隨愛想,
以愛想而住,
以不知愛故,
則為死方便。
Whoever says that the signs
arising from name-and-form (?) do truly exist,
know that this person
is on the road of death.
SA2 17
(Bingenheimer)
-----
I have a hard time with Bingenheimer's translation.
The literal translation in the Chinese -> English look-up, on suttacentral, gives the following:
In accord with the arising of desire (愛) for ideation (想),
And by mean of the abinding in this desire for ideation,
One does not know the reason for this desire
And directly goes to death.
This is much more in line with the suttas.
For we know from the suttas with parallels, in accord with modern linguistics, that the vaca process is the following:
Vitakka (ideation - abstract thoughts) >> Vicāra (concretism [representation of an abstract idea in concrete terms] - concrete thoughts] - and vaca (word).
"Abstract thought" and "concretism" are my own translations - however based on a study of the words vitakka & vicāra in the suttas with parallels.
Earlier having abstractly thought, and mentally concretizing that thought, someone breaks into a word (speech); therefore vitakka & vicāra are verbal determinations.
Pubbe kho āvuso visākha vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācaṃ bhindati. Tasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro.
SN 41.6
And all the latter shows that the "naming" process has more to do with the vaca process (vitakka>>vicāra>>vaca), than with nāma - of which it is just a part in satta.
In Pali, Akkheyya is the gerund of akkhāti (in SN 1.20 above)
Akkhāti,[ā + khyā]
- to declare, tell.
Note that the root √Khyā to which Akkheyya is bound, has a late meaning of "told" in the Sanskrit texts. While it has an underlying meaning of reckoning & appearing - like in संख्या saṃkhyā [ saṃ-√ khyā ] = to appear along with (RV. VS. ); and to reckon (ŚBr. MBh.).“For the sake of leading us across the flood
You **told** about the path with its many aspects.
oghassa nittharaṇatthaṃ,
anekavihitaṃ maggaṃ akkhāsi (Aor.)
SN 8.8
Being asked, **tell** it to me.
taṃ me akkhāhi (Imper.) pucchito”ti
SN 1.42 & SN 2.17
In the case of pleasant progress with quick comprehension, progress **is told** (to be) excellent on account of both pleasantness and quick comprehension.
Tatra, bhante, yāyaṃ paṭipadā sukhā khippābhiññā, ayaṃ pana, bhante, paṭipadā ubhayeneva paṇītā akkhāyati sukhattā ca khippattā ca.
DN 28
The translation Akkheyyasaññino sattā might then be:
Beings who perceive what can appear (reckon >> judge to be probable >> deem to be >> think about in a particular way).
instead of:
Beings who perceive what can be expressed
And the all strophe becomes:
Beings who perceive what deems to be
Become established in what they judge to be probable.
Not fully understanding what is thought about in a particular way,
They come under the yoke of Death.
In this context, khyā does not have the underlying meaning of "telling - but "reckoning", I suppose.
Voila!
Metta
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Thank you for the detailed analysis, ToVincent.
However, you seem to over-attributing the ideas to Bhikkhu Analayo:
Mike
However, you seem to over-attributing the ideas to Bhikkhu Analayo:
The lectures contain verbatim renderings of Bhikhu Ñāṇananda's English translations of his original sermons. Bhikkhu Analyayo adds some additional background information and explanation, and modern translations of the Pali suttas, and parallels in some cases.Already in the first lecture, I have a hard time with how Analayo, reduces the meaning of Nāma...
Mike
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Sanskrit, Böhtlingk and Roth Grosses Petersburger Wörterbuch:
ākhyā (von khyā mit ā) f. Benennung, Name
khyā
— ā
— 4) "benennen, Jmd" oder "Etwas als Etwas bezeichnen" ; mit zwei acc.: saptasāmopagītaṃ tvām - ācakhyuḥ RAGH. 10, 22. pass. ŚAT. BR. 10, 5, 4, 4. 14, 4, 3, 32. bhavānhi jñānavijñānasaṃpannaḥ sarvavinmama. ākhyātaḥ śarabhaṅgeṇa R. 3, 11, 12. vināśastu candrasya ya ākhyāto mahāsuraḥ MBH. 1, 2674. sevā śvavṛttirākhyātā M. 4, 6. SĀṂKHYAK. 5. Citat beim Sch. zu ŚĀK. 80.
Google translation: "to name, or to denote/call something as something" (I have no real knowledge of any of these languages, lol)
also,,,
आख्या ākhyā
आख्या 2 P. 1 (a) To tell, say, inform, commu- nicate, narrate (usually with dat. of person); इमानि शुक्लानि यजूंषि वाजसनेयेन याज्ञवल्क्येनाख्यायन्ते Bṛi. Up.6.5.3. ते रामाय वधोपायमाचख्युर्विबुधद्विषः R.15.5,41,71,93;12.42, 91; आख्याहि मे को भवानुग्ररूपो Bg.11.31,18.63; Me.1; Ms.8.224,9.73, Y.1.66,2.65; sometimes with gen. of person; आख्याहि भद्रे प्रियदर्शनस्य Pt.4.15; केनाहं तवा- ख्यातः Mb. (b) To declare, announce, signify; धनुर्भृतो$- प्यस्य दयार्द्रभावमाख्यातम् R.2.11. -2 To call, denominate, name; सुवर्णबिन्दुरित्याख्यायते Māl.9; R.1.21, Ms.4.6. -3 To look at, count; to recite (Ved.). -Caus. (ख्यापयति) 1 To cause to tell or narrate. -2 To declare.
Apte, Vaman Shivaram. Revised and enlarged edition of Prin. V. S. Apte's The practical Sanskrit-English dictionary. Poona: Prasad Prakashan, 1957-1959. 3v.
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/apte/
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
The only reference as a pre-Bhuddist text in yours galore, is the reference to the Bṛi. Up.6.5.3.JiWe2 wrote:....
And it has the meaning of **explained**, as in:
"These white Yajuses (sacrificial formulas) are **explained** by Yājnavalkya".
Here **explained** means: "in his view". As in "what he deems to be".
Still no real "naming" into that.
Sorry.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
mikenz66 wrote: ↑Thu Oct 05, 2017 6:47 pm The lectures contain verbatim renderings of Bhikhu Ñāṇananda's English translations of his original sermons. Bhikkhu Analyayo adds some additional background information and explanation, and modern translations of the Pali suttas, and parallels in some cases.
Mike
I thought these were the words of Analayo.
Thanks Mike.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
No problem,
You can find the original transcriptions of the English translations (which were done by Analayo from Ñāṇananda's tapes) here:
http://seeingthroughthenet.net/books/ Nibbāna – The Mind Stilled
http://seeingthroughthenet.net/wp-conte ... NMS_LE.pdf
Mike
You can find the original transcriptions of the English translations (which were done by Analayo from Ñāṇananda's tapes) here:
http://seeingthroughthenet.net/books/ Nibbāna – The Mind Stilled
http://seeingthroughthenet.net/wp-conte ... NMS_LE.pdf
Mike
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Well, I liked it because I wanted to make my own interpretations of english possible.ToVincent wrote: ↑Thu Oct 05, 2017 7:45 pmThe only reference as a pre-Bhuddist text in yours galore, is the reference to the Bṛi. Up.6.5.3.JiWe2 wrote:....
And it has the meaning of **explained**, as in:
"These white Yajuses (sacrificial formulas) are **explained** by Yājnavalkya".
Here **explained** means: "in his view". As in "what he deems to be".
Still no real "naming" into that.
Sorry.
After reading/listening these parts about the little child...
...I thought that the english sutta translation of..."Now the child has recognised the rubber ball not by the name that the world has given it, but by those factors included under 'name' in nāma-rūpa, namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention."
"This shows that the definition of nāma in nāma-rūpa takes us back to the most fundamental notion of 'name', to something like its prototype. The world gives a name to an object for purposes of easy communication. When it gets the sanction of others, it becomes a convention."
"Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator also has to understand, however much he may be conversant with the conventional world. But if a meditator wants to understand this name-and-form world, he has to come back to the state of a child, at least from one point of view."
"Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conventional names, for the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a meditator makes use of those factors that are included under 'name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention."
-Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda
...meant something like this: perceiving things via their conventional names, or verbal expressions, is the problem, and that a meditator should go beyond it for insight and be conscious of, or perceive, the "real" nāma-rūpa, i.e. feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention etc.Akkheyyasaññino sattā,
akkheyyasmiṃ patiṭṭhitā,...
"Beings are conscious of what can be named,
They are established on the nameable,...
-Ñāṇananda
or
“Beings who perceive what can be expressed
Become established on what can be expressed....
-Bodhi
Is that an impossible/unlikely interpretation of the original pali?
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
What is a "real nāmarūpa"?JiWe2 wrote: ↑Thu Oct 05, 2017 9:08 pm .... perceiving things via their conventional names, or verbal expressions, is the problem, and that a meditator should go beyond it for insight and be conscious of, or perceive, the "real" nāma-rūpa, i.e. feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention etc.
What I meant to say is that reducing the meaning of "Nāma" to "naming" - which the latter is for me just a mere "vaca" process (a vacīsaṅkhāra); and therefore just a part of Nāma - which in this case, is taking place in satta (and not in the nāmarūpa nidāna, or in saḷāyatana in which the latter descends), seems to be quite reductive.
We have seen that nāma, from both the definitions of the Nikāyas & the Āgamas/Sanskrit texts, can be finally defined (without incompability) as:
Viññāṇa, saṅkhāra, vedanā and sañña - & - phasso, vedanā (proper to satta) , sañña (proper to satta), cetanā and manasikāro.
The latter (the things done with the mano - manasi-kṛ, [which does not always mean "attention"],) might, in satta, include thoughts and the all vaca shebang (aka "naming"). But that can't be called Nāma proper.
It is way too reductive to reduce Nāma to this process only.
"Vacīsaṅkhāra" would be a more approaching and appropriate way to define "naming".
Might this vacīsaṅkhāra be processed by the mano; it remains a synergy (saṅkhāra) - and that is just a component of Nāma.
I don't think I'll follow your lead; because I feel totally on another backdrop. Pardon me.
But sure!, a meditator should go through the all shebang of knowing better phasso >> vedanā (proper to satta) >> sañña (proper to satta) >> cetanā and >> manasikāro (and further/outside satta).
Just to understand better how there is a maintenance of consciousness. But "naming" is just one of the factors, for the maintenance of that consciousness.
Metta.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
The word 'satta' only exists in the nidana (link) of 'jati' ('birth'). Can you clarify what you mean here by 'satta'? You seem to be referring to "pāṇabhūtesu" ("living beings") rather than 'satta' (PTS Pali English Dictionary satta1 hanging, clinging or attached to).
This idea renders the Buddha an imperfect teacher, that is, that the Dhamma is not 'svakhato bhagavata dhammo' ('well-spoken').However, Nāma must also encompass the immaterial khandhas. One must adress the all Nāma shebang.
Analayo agrees that there is an immaterial side to nāma; but he seems to adress the Nikāyas' definition of it; and does not take much, the Āgamas' definition into account.
And I should insist again: "they are not at all conflictual - but just complementary".
The Agamas were composed after the Buddha and obviously includes centuries of distorted transmissions & interpretations. I think your ideas about "satta" are different to the Pali suttas but are similar to later views of dependent origination, which the Agamas appear to also be. The link you provided seems to hold to common view of re-linking consciousness or the 'descent' ('reincarnation') of a 'being'; which is not anything conclusive but merely an intepretation.The Āgamas' definition addresses the nature of nāma in the Nāma-Rūpa nidāna proper; as well as what it becomes, when it descends in saḷāyatana. While the Nikaya's definition addresses what nāma becomes, when it reaches satta proper - that is to say contact & the following.
I think this above is an example of how Buddhism changed from the original, which would included DN 15 as a later addition.The "naming" process is definitely more tied up with the components in that latter definition of the Nikāyas (and with mano). But it is not what nāma means at large; or even more restrictively in satta.
This translation has no coherent meaning.I have also a hard time with absolutely pairing Nāma and Akkheyya in Analayo's first lecture - that is to say, this:Nāmaṃ sabbaṃ anvabhavi,
nāmā bhiyyo na vijjati,
nāmassa ekadhammassa,
sabbeva vasamanvagū.
Name has conquered everything,
There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name."
This translation is terrible.And this(Analayo ?)Akkheyyasaññino sattā,
akkheyyasmiṃ patiṭṭhitā,
akkheyyaṃ apariññāya,
yogam āyanti maccuno.
Beings are conscious of what can be named (?),
They are established on the nameable,
By not comprehending the nameable things,
They come under the yoke of death."
SN 1.20
And all the latter shows that the "naming" process has more to do with the vaca process (vitakka>>vicāra>>vaca), than with nāma - of which it is just a part in satta.
Yes. SN 5.10 states "conventions" or "names" are "satta". SN 23.2 states clinging is "satta". But I have never read in Pali suttas where nama-rupa is "satta" but I have not read 100% of the Pali suttas. DN 15 seems to say 'nama' is 'naming' but this seems to follow the traditional Brahmanistic idea of nama-rupa. What is your opinion about DN 15 and how it is different to SN 12.2?
There is always an official executioner. If you try to take his place, It is like trying to be a master carpenter and cutting wood. If you try to cut wood like a master carpenter, you will only hurt your hand.
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/paticcasamuppada
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/anapanasati
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/paticcasamuppada
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/anapanasati
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
Ñāṇananda here seems to be saying "recognising" the ball is occurring before sense contact; which seems contrary to MN 18:JiWe2 wrote: ↑Thu Oct 05, 2017 9:08 pm"Now the child has recognised the rubber ball not by the name that the world has given it, but by those factors included under 'name' in nāma-rūpa, namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention."
"This shows that the definition of nāma in nāma-rūpa takes us back to the most fundamental notion of 'name', to something like its prototype. The world gives a name to an object for purposes of easy communication. When it gets the sanction of others, it becomes a convention."
"Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator also has to understand, however much he may be conversant with the conventional world. But if a meditator wants to understand this name-and-form world, he has to come back to the state of a child, at least from one point of view."
"Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conventional names, for the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a meditator makes use of those factors that are included under 'name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention."
-Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda
The word 'nama' within 'namati' is found in MN 19 & refers to a 'mental inclination' or 'bent':Dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one objectifies. MN 18
Whatever a monk keeps pursuing with his thinking & pondering, that becomes the inclination of his mind. MN 19
There is always an official executioner. If you try to take his place, It is like trying to be a master carpenter and cutting wood. If you try to cut wood like a master carpenter, you will only hurt your hand.
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/paticcasamuppada
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/anapanasati
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/paticcasamuppada
https://soundcloud.com/doodoot/anapanasati
Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda
My quote above was just some parts I copied from the first sermon. The story starts like this:DooDoot wrote: ↑Fri Oct 06, 2017 3:13 amÑāṇananda here seems to be saying "recognising" the ball is occurring before sense contact; which seems contrary to MN 18 [...]JiWe2 wrote: ↑Thu Oct 05, 2017 9:08 pm"Now the child has recognised the rubber ball not by the name that the world has given it, but by those factors included under 'name' in nāma-rūpa, namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention."
"This shows that the definition of nāma in nāma-rūpa takes us back to the most fundamental notion of 'name', to something like its prototype. The world gives a name to an object for purposes of easy communication. When it gets the sanction of others, it becomes a convention."
"Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator also has to understand, however much he may be conversant with the conventional world. But if a meditator wants to understand this name-and-form world, he has to come back to the state of a child, at least from one point of view."
"Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conventional names, for the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a meditator makes use of those factors that are included under 'name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention."
-Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda
So there was plenty of sense contact before "recognition".Well, this seems lucid enough as a definition but let us see, whether there is any justification for regarding feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention as 'name'. Suppose there is a little child, a toddler, who is still unable to speak or understand language. Someone gives him a rubber ball and the child has seen it for the first time. If the child is told that it is a rubber ball, he might not understand it. How does he get to know that object? He smells it, feels it, and tries to eat it, and finally rolls it on the floor. At last he understands that it is a plaything. Now the child has recognised the rubber ball...etc
https://www.bcbsdharma.org/wp-content/u ... a-01-1.pdf
My selection was only about the difference between non-verbalized recognition (nāma as feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention) and recognition based on language (nāma as a name-for-a-thing). ToVincent mentioned sanskrit form ākhyā and I thought that in its one dictionary meaning "to denote/call something as something" it might be related to the latter kind of recognition, but perhaps such meanings came later, after the time of the Buddha and the suttas.