"Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

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pulga
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by pulga »

aflatun wrote: So to take a mundane example, if I'm looking at a chair and thinking about how repulsive it is, as a puthujjana I'm occupied with what I see standing behind the experience and appearing to me (and with the "me" that the thing is appearing to), and I am not then aware of the fact that both of these things are merely aspects of the entire experience as such?
I think you’re correct. Experience can be broken down into a foreground, a diverse background, and an intuitive whole which encompasses both foreground and background and constitutes the meaning of any given experience. And as you pointed out: the foreground always presents itself before one or more of the inner-bases that are also a part of the background that the puthujjana appropriates as "mine".

From Ven. Ñanavira’s letter to Hon. L. Samaratunga:
My past experiences of A are the (mental) associations that the sight of A now has for me. If I now see a chair I automatically have at the same time certain images, either implicit or explicit (in which latter case we call them 'memories'), of myself sitting on things like A or of seeing other people sitting on them. The actual sight of a chair, together with an accompanying image of sitting on one, enables me to say — without any hesitation at all, without any rational act of inference whatsoever — 'This is for sitting on'. The (negative) image of sitting is given together with the (positive) sight of a chair, and determines the chair for what it is. An act of inference is only involved if the object with which we are faced is unfamiliar (i.e. we have no past experience of it, and present images arising in association with it are in adequate to determine it); and in this case we have to set in motion the complicated machinery of thinking about it, or perhaps we may even have to acquire the necessary 'past experiences' by experimenting with it. But even in such a case as this, the inadequacy of our images associated with the actual sight of the object are enough to determine it immediately as 'strange object, to be treated with caution'. In other words, even when we resort to inference to determine an object, it has already been determined (as 'requiring investigation') by negatives (i.e. images) given in immediate experience together with the positive object. [L.51]
As I understand it, the whole of what we take be our self is the all-encompassing, intuited, and immediate experience of experience itself. Change is manifest within that whole, but given the commonality of any such change the whole itself remains unchanged. And “remains” is the key word here, in that in the whole’s duration we see it as transcendent and independent from the parts that it depends upon for its presence, i.e. its existence. As subordinate wholes, parts vanish -- but as parts of a greater whole they linger from within as images. What a thing is -- i.e. its meaning -- is derived holistically from the top down, cf. footnote 21 of Ven. Nyanamoli's essay -- while its existence is derived from the bottom up.

aflatun wrote:On a related note then, what exactly is the "being of things" being referred to? Does he have "Bhava" in mind when he's saying this?
I believe the "being of things" is their presence. Bhava is associated with the being of a self. Cf. Ven. Ñanavira's Shorter Note on Vinnana:
Consciousness (vinnana) can be thought of as the presence of a phenomenon, which consists of nama and rupa. Namarupa and vinnana together constitute the phenomenon 'in person' — i.e. an experience (in German: Erlebnis). The phenomenon is the support (arammana — see first reference in [c] below) of consciousness, and all consciousness is consciousness of something (viz, of a phenomenon). Just as there cannot be presence without something that is present, so there cannot be something without its being to that extent present — thus vinnana and namarupa depend on each other (see A Note On Paticcasamuppada §1 7). 'To be' and 'to be present' are the same thing. But note that 'being' as bhava, involves the existence of the (illusory) subject, and with cessation of the conceit (concept) '(I) am', asmimana, there is cessation of being, bhavanirodha. With the arahat, there is just presence of the phenomenon ('This is present'), instead of the presence (or existence) of an apparent 'subject' to whom there is present an 'object' ('I am, and this is present to [or for] me', i.e. [what appears to be] the subject is present ['I am'], the object is present ['this is'], and the object concerns or 'belongs to' the subject [the object is 'for me' or 'mine'] — see Phassa & Atta); -- Ven. Ñanavira (Shorter Note: Vinnana)
"Dhammā=Ideas. This is the clue to much of the Buddha's teaching." ~ Ven. Ñanavira, Commonplace Book
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aflatun
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

chownah wrote:
aflatun wrote: @chownah thank you kindly for trying to engage these issues! While I believe *some* version of what you're describing is actually correct and in line with what NN is saying (meaning, *some* version of transcendental idealism, though I take issue with both Kant and Schopenhauer on this in various ways, despite the fact that they're two of my main contemporary western philosophical influences), I'm not sure if what you said specifically answers my queries regarding NN language in the cited passages? It's OK if it doesn't of course, as I realize you were just trying to help and its much appreciated. But I don't want to totally misunderstand your post so feel free to elaborate or correct me!
Yeah, what I wrote does not answer your questions and I knew it didn't when I posted. I was mostly thinking that perhaps it would be something that might hint at some connection to your questions.
Actually, you asked quite a few questions and I was thinking of replying to one or the other of them as I don't have the energy or time to answer all of them especially since you seem to have a very philosophically oriented view....and in my experience responding to a philosopical view is a very long and detail oriented undertaking which I seldom have the energy, time, and patience for. So, I wanted to say something so I averaged out my replies and ended up with somthing that doesn't really apply anywhere!...oh well!....I'm glad you take it in stride.
In difficult subjects like what you bring, I like to take a small bite and try to clarify that before moving on to another bite. So for this post I will point out your last question: "what exactly is the "being of things" being referred to? Does he have "Bhava" in mind when he's saying this?" I don't do much pali and don't know what bhava is but I think you can find the answer to this question in the article at or around this excerpt:
“We do not know what ‘Being’ means. But even if we ask, ‘What is “Being”?’, we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact.

However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified. [2] "

The same is to be said for the even more complex categories of the puthujjana’s world, such as ‘actions’, ‘choices’, notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and similar. They are not exempt from the phenomenological nature of things. Good or bad, skilful or not, these things manifest in one’s experience, and as such: they are real.
I have made bold a quote from heidiger here is the reference:
[2] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by J. Macquarrie and E.S. Robinson. London: SCM Press, 1962, p. 25.

You might want to read what comes before this for clarification....in a nutshell, it seems to be saying that what manifests in one's experience is "real" or has "being". This might also be related to your first bolded quote which is "Because of these inauthentic attitudes, which are nevertheless normal attitudes of the puthujjana‘s everyday life, it would be correct to say that for him things don’t even exist, in a correct sense of that word.".....but for me this only makes sense if it is edited to read "Because of these inauthentic attitudes, which are nevertheless normal attitudes of the puthujjana‘s everyday life, it would be correct to say that he does not know what constitutes existence, in a correct sense of that word." My change of wording probably has some ramifications philosophically but I mostly just ignore that and accept that either way it makes sense and I just prefer one way while the other is perhaps preferred by others....to me they both point to the same salient feature.
Again, this might not address what you are looking for.
I guess SDC will be coming on soon and I'll eaves drop and maybe learn something.
chownah
You're right on all counts. I tend to shotgun questions (sorry!) and do have a philosophically oriented approach (for better or as I often think, for worse), but nevertheless I greatly appreciated and appreciate your engagement with me on this subject

Thank you for bringing my attention to the Heidegger quote. I think I understood the general gist of it when reading the paper, however where I started slipping was over the meaning of exists "in a correct sense of the word." I took correct as "something that appears" but had some doubts because of the association in my mind with 'bhava' which of course is not correct (I'm defining correct here as what the Buddha would experience). I think what I'm getting at (or confusing) will be further unpacked in my subsequent replies to SDC and pulga...
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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aflatun
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

SDC wrote:Hi aflatun, All,
aflatun wrote:So to take a mundane example, if I'm looking at a chair and thinking about how repulsive it is, as a puthujjana I'm occupied with what I see standing behind the experience and appearing to me (and with the "me" that the thing is appearing to), and I am not then aware of the fact that both of these things are merely aspects of the entire experience as such?
So unfortunately nanavira.org is down and I cannot quote from Ven. Ñāṇavīra’s letters directly, but below is a letter from Ven. NN’s book Meanings where he references what I think would be helpful here. Hopefully n.org is back soon so you can look at it for comparison:
Ven. N. Ñāṇamoli, Letters to Mathias – N41, page 146-147 wrote:To refer you to the example of Bāhiya, which Ven. Ñāṇavīra mentions in one of his letters, if you can look up the discussion about the difference between “here,” “yonder” and “there.” When I talk of the independent aggregates, that pertains to the level of “there.” However, when you mentioned the “world” in your last letter, I had an impression that that pertained more to the level of “yonder.”(Please feel free to correct me if I am wrong.) Clarifying the difference between these terms is crucial (again you can read Ven. Ñāṇavīra’s account of it). “There” is our experience, as a whole, i.e. the five-(holding)-aggregates. “Here” and “yonder,” on the other hand, are something which can be distinguished within that “there,” and only once (and while) “there” is manifested.
(For some additional food for thought, here is the sutta from Udāna that he is referring to; take note of “that by which” in relation to “in that place” in relation to “neither here nor yonder nor between the two”.):
When, Bāhiya, for you, in the seen there shall be just the seen…cognized, then, Bāhiya, you (will) not (be) that by which;

[W]hen, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) that by which, then, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place;

[W]hen, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place, then, Bāhiya, you (will) neither (be) here nor yonder nor between the two: just this is the end of suffering. Ud 1.10
(emphasis added)

As Ven. NN has said, distinguishing between “here”, “yonder” and “there” is pretty important, and a reading of Ñāṇavīra’s thoughts will make it even clearer. (If I have time tonight, I will pull the book off the shelf and write it out.) Also, an understanding of the relationship of general and particular - other times referred to as background/foreground or peripheral/actual or universals/particulars - is going be helpful here. This is also what Ñāṇavīra is pointing to when he uses the words immediacy and reflexion (these terms refer more to a mode of attending particular and general). In my understanding “here” and “yonder” are spatial references to the particular/actual/foreground aspects and, as you suggested, those things are implicit in a more general thing, i.e. the experience-as-a-whole (“there”); it is peripheral/universal, it is the background.
aflatun wrote:On a related note then, what exactly is the "being of things" being referred to? Does he have "Bhava" in mind when he's saying this?
Yes.
Appearance and Existence wrote: Only with the development of the rudimentary notions of authenticity, through the practice of mindfulness and restraint and reflection, can a puthujjana begin to notice, little by little, the nature of his experience as a whole—phenomena can start to appear. It is only in this way that one can understand what is meant by the ‘being’ of things, which is nothing fundamentally different than the ‘being’ of myself.[14]
  • Footnote 14: A reader might notice here the discrepancy between what I’ve just said and the views one can find in Heidegger’s or Sartre’s works. These philosophers maintain the notion (in different degrees) of the separation between my being, i. e. the ‘I’, and being of things, the objects of the experience which ‘I’ encounters. For example Sartre developed a fundamental division of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, which he then tried, and consequently failed, to reconcile in Being and Nothingess. In-itself is not more real than for-itself, (i. e. ‘me’ or ‘[my] consciousness’), and the reverse is also true; in order for it to exist it requires for-itself, as much as for-itself requires the in-itself. And it is not possible, in good faith, to think of or regard the in-itself independently of consciousness, nor consciousness independently of the in-itself, not even in one’s imagination. ‘Matter’, rūpa, needs consciousness in order to find its footing in appearance, without it, it is inconceivable. (Cf. the mutually dependent relationship between nāmarūpa and viññāṇa.) In brief: whenever there are things, there is me; whenever there is me, there are things. (Hence one has to understand sabbe dhamma anatta—all things are not-self.) Whether it is ‘being’ of things that we are looking at, or my ‘being’, the point is that there is ‘being’— bhava is there. This is also why, the reader will notice I use ‘existence’ and ‘being’ interchangeably. Whether it is ‘mine’, or not, whether it is personal or impersonal, large or small, visible or invisible, far or near, any ‘being’ whatsoever means that bhava is there; it is, it exists. As long as that is the case, ‘I’ (or at least some degree of the conceit ‘I am’) will be present.
(emphasis added)

A terrific little essay on "Being": https://pathpress.wordpress.com/2016/11 ... -of-being/

A bit of a disclaimer: It is no secret these threads can often get hairy. It seems to come with the territory. But I do think aflatun and Mike have made a good point: let's try to get to the point of what the interpretations are saying before we jump right to comparisons with other interpretations.
Thank you for coming by SDC! Your explanation of general/particular, background/foreground, peripheral/actual, immediacy/reflexion. When reading the venerables who write from this perspective I would often get lost precisely in these terms, I think I had a few of them backwards in certain contexts, but that really helps thank you. So in the passage you quoted:
When, Bāhiya, for you, in the seen there shall be just the seen…cognized, then, Bāhiya, you (will) not (be) that by which;

[W]hen, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) that by which, then, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place;

[W]hen, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place, then, Bāhiya, you (will) neither (be) here nor yonder nor between the two: just this is the end of suffering. Ud 1.10
I think I understand you're saying "here" and "yonder" correspond to foreground/actual. Does "there" have an equivalent in the passage on this reading? And from this point of view what does "that by which" correspond to?

(Its a bummer that nanavira.org is down right now, but perhaps a blessing in disguise as it will force me to focus on the paper at hand)

Putting together Footnote 14 with what comes later:
The Teaching tells him that 'existence' cannot be conceived anywhere apart from 'appearance', but also that it is not 'appearance' as such; furthermore, and even more importantly, it also tells him that 'existence' does not depend on 'appearance' directly, it depends on the 'assumption' (upādāna)22 in regard to that which appears,23 and this means nothing else then that the appearance, for its appearing, does not require existence at all—it is actually better without it.
I'm understanding this as saying in the final analysis that whether its the existence of "subject" or the existence of "object," or "me" and "not-me," "I" and "thing" that is being considered, both depend on the 'assumption.' And so when the puthujjana begins to understand things correctly, as he approaches the way in which things exist in the appropriate sense of the word, he's beginning to understand that they exist in so far as they are grasped, under subjection, etc (which in turn depends on the presence of an appearance to begin with). Is that right? "The puthujjana understands that if anything is to exist, it has to appear" but that does not mean that it has to exist if it appears?

(If the above is correct, I think my confusion was in taking "exists in the appropriate sense of the word" as referring to how "things really are," that is, how the Buddha would see them. Then again I may have introduced another mess with a possible misunderstanding above :rofl: )
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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aflatun
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

pulga wrote:
aflatun wrote: So to take a mundane example, if I'm looking at a chair and thinking about how repulsive it is, as a puthujjana I'm occupied with what I see standing behind the experience and appearing to me (and with the "me" that the thing is appearing to), and I am not then aware of the fact that both of these things are merely aspects of the entire experience as such?
I think you’re correct. Experience can be broken down into a foreground, a diverse background, and an intuitive whole which encompasses both foreground and background and constitutes the meaning of any given experience. And as you pointed out: the foreground always presents itself before one or more of the inner-bases that are also a part of the background that the puthujjana appropriates as "mine".

From Ven. Ñanavira’s letter to Hon. L. Samaratunga:
My past experiences of A are the (mental) associations that the sight of A now has for me. If I now see a chair I automatically have at the same time certain images, either implicit or explicit (in which latter case we call them 'memories'), of myself sitting on things like A or of seeing other people sitting on them. The actual sight of a chair, together with an accompanying image of sitting on one, enables me to say — without any hesitation at all, without any rational act of inference whatsoever — 'This is for sitting on'. The (negative) image of sitting is given together with the (positive) sight of a chair, and determines the chair for what it is. An act of inference is only involved if the object with which we are faced is unfamiliar (i.e. we have no past experience of it, and present images arising in association with it are in adequate to determine it); and in this case we have to set in motion the complicated machinery of thinking about it, or perhaps we may even have to acquire the necessary 'past experiences' by experimenting with it. But even in such a case as this, the inadequacy of our images associated with the actual sight of the object are enough to determine it immediately as 'strange object, to be treated with caution'. In other words, even when we resort to inference to determine an object, it has already been determined (as 'requiring investigation') by negatives (i.e. images) given in immediate experience together with the positive object. [L.51]
As I understand it, the whole of what we take be our self is the all-encompassing, intuited, and immediate experience of experience itself. Change is manifest within that whole, but given the commonality of any such change the whole itself remains unchanged. And “remains” is the key word here, in that in the whole’s duration we see it as transcendent and independent from the parts that it depends upon for its presence, i.e. its existence. As subordinate wholes, parts vanish -- but as parts of a greater whole they linger from within as images. What a thing is -- i.e. its meaning -- is derived holistically from the top down, cf. footnote 21 of Ven. Nyanamoli's essay -- while its existence is derived from the bottom up.

aflatun wrote:On a related note then, what exactly is the "being of things" being referred to? Does he have "Bhava" in mind when he's saying this?
I believe the "being of things" is their presence. Bhava is associated with the being of a self. Cf. Ven. Ñanavira's Shorter Note on Vinnana:
Consciousness (vinnana) can be thought of as the presence of a phenomenon, which consists of nama and rupa. Namarupa and vinnana together constitute the phenomenon 'in person' — i.e. an experience (in German: Erlebnis). The phenomenon is the support (arammana — see first reference in [c] below) of consciousness, and all consciousness is consciousness of something (viz, of a phenomenon). Just as there cannot be presence without something that is present, so there cannot be something without its being to that extent present — thus vinnana and namarupa depend on each other (see A Note On Paticcasamuppada §1 7). 'To be' and 'to be present' are the same thing. But note that 'being' as bhava, involves the existence of the (illusory) subject, and with cessation of the conceit (concept) '(I) am', asmimana, there is cessation of being, bhavanirodha. With the arahat, there is just presence of the phenomenon ('This is present'), instead of the presence (or existence) of an apparent 'subject' to whom there is present an 'object' ('I am, and this is present to [or for] me', i.e. [what appears to be] the subject is present ['I am'], the object is present ['this is'], and the object concerns or 'belongs to' the subject [the object is 'for me' or 'mine'] — see Phassa & Atta); -- Ven. Ñanavira (Shorter Note: Vinnana)

Thank you for joining the party pulga. As a former lurker on this forum I greatly enjoyed your posts and am very happy to see you here!

Regarding your statement: "Experience can be broken down into a foreground, a diverse background, and an intuitive whole which encompasses both foreground and background and constitutes the meaning of any given experience."

I think the impression I got from SDC's post is that there are two terms to consider, foreground and background, and you seem to be implying a third more general term "intuitive whole." Is the intuitive whole redundant with respect to background, or is simply a higher level of generality?

I'm likely mixing things up here, but is the way you parse "being of things" vs. bhava distinct from the way Ven. NN is using the terms? As I think might be clear in my prior post to SDC, I was reading "being of things" as being tantamount to their being assumed. On a related note, in your understanding then is Bhava something that cannot be applied to the "object" in any meaningful way? Again my impression in the prior post was that it equally applies to subject and object and is reliant on the 'assumption.'

Perhaps Ven. NN and Nanavira have different conventions with respect to the word existence or being?
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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aflatun
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

http://nanavira.org/

Just an FYI, the site seems to be back up

:reading:
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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SDC
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by SDC »

aflatun wrote:So in the passage you quoted:
When, Bāhiya, for you, in the seen there shall be just the seen…cognized, then, Bāhiya, you (will) not (be) that by which;

[W]hen, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) that by which, then, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place;

[W]hen, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place, then, Bāhiya, you (will) neither (be) here nor yonder nor between the two: just this is the end of suffering. Ud 1.10
I think I understand you're saying "here" and "yonder" correspond to foreground/actual. Does "there" have an equivalent in the passage on this reading? And from this point of view what does "that by which" correspond to?
In my understanding, “that by which” is referring to the subject. The “subject”(me) is held as that by which there is “the seen…cognized”, i.e. as the reason for “the seen…cognized”. When the subject is not that by which, the subject will not be “here”- “here” as - or with - the six-sense base (I read a variation of this last sentence somewhere recently and cannot recall where). I think it is safe to say that “there” is the landscape within which “here” and “yonder” are discerned. Also important to note what Ven. NN points out about “there”: “…only once (and while) “there” is manifested.” The appearance of “there” is not particular. It can become particular – and I paraphrasing Ven. NN here – in that an over-attending to the background, makes it foreground, i.e. general is no longer general. It is now “in front”. (Keep in mind that if I completely understood this verse I would an arahant just like Bahiya. So, a grain of salt please.)

There is an interesting verse from the Sutta Nipata that was referred to in another essay that touches on this:
Look at this world with its gods, enmeshed in the material and the mental, thinking not-self is self, it thinks, “This is truth”. In whatever terms they conceive it, it turns into something other than that." Snp 3.12
(emphasis added)

“In whatever terms they conceive” either the “material” or “mental” that which is conceived “turns into something other than that.” What I think this is saying is that whenever the background (something general) is over-attended, it is conceived, and that which is conceived is, all at once, no longer that background. So, keeping in mind the above verse, when you take view of the experience and attempt pin down the self, no matter what you “get” in that attempt, it will not be it. See, because the self is very general. In terms of “self-view”, the self is not seen, it is always that very background. Because not only is there the conceit “I am” but things, for one not free from self-view, are there “for me”. “For me” in the sense that “self” is understood to be enduring somewhere outside of experience, as the experiencer and/or as the reason for experience. So in other words, there is a tendency to “overshoot the mark” when trying to get a sense of “there”, and as a result you end up unknowingly involved with “here” and “yonder”. Obviously there is a push – basically craving forces one’s hand to identify the subject. How? By having the already assumed subject identify itself! So even when you pick up on this “sneakiness” you notice a pattern that is an infinite of an “always” more general notion of self encompassing whatever attempts one makes to step back from it (another very famous line from Ven. Ven. Ñāṇavīra which I cannot quote exactly so I won’t mess it up).
aflatun wrote:Putting together Footnote 14 with what comes later:
The Teaching tells him that 'existence' cannot be conceived anywhere apart from 'appearance', but also that it is not 'appearance' as such; furthermore, and even more importantly, it also tells him that 'existence' does not depend on 'appearance' directly, it depends on the 'assumption' (upādāna)22 in regard to that which appears,23 and this means nothing else then that the appearance, for its appearing, does not require existence at all—it is actually better without it.
I'm understanding this as saying in the final analysis that whether its the existence of "subject" or the existence of "object," or "me" and "not-me," "I" and "thing" that is being considered, both depend on the 'assumption.' And so when the puthujjana begins to understand things correctly, as he approaches the way in which things exist in the appropriate sense of the word, he's beginning to understand that they exist in so far as they are grasped, under subjection, etc (which in turn depends on the presence of an appearance to begin with). Is that right? "The puthujjana understands that if anything is to exist, it has to appear" but that does not mean that it has to exist if it appears?
I want to quote the verse that he quotes in that part of the essay:
The five assumed aggregates, friend Visākha, are not just assuming; but neither is there assumption apart from the five assumed aggregates. That, friend Visākha, in the five assumed aggregates which is desire-&-lust, that assumption is therein. - MN 44
I think what is being said here is that, first off: there will still be the five aggregates for the arahant, yet no longer the five-assumed-aggregates, (sometimes called “the five aggregates subject to clinging”). Secondly, that that assumption (upādāna) is not - for the puthujjana - anywhere other than in regards to the aggregates because of desire and lust. In other words, desire and lust in regards to the five aggregates is what maintains the assumption. (I’m out on a bit of limb here. I never gave that verse this sort of look before.) So it is not so much (perhaps not at all) that any of these things which are assumed to be the self have appeared, but the issue is in the appropriation of those things.
Feelings are Suffering wrote: One hopes that such attempt will ‘fill the gap’ within, but needless to say, that is impossible since the discrepancy is actually being constantly generated by the presence of taṇha, and not by the various objects in the world. – Ven. N. Ñāṇamoli
Then he goes on to quote this doozy. Such a terrific verse:
Thought and lust are a man’s sensuality,
Not the various things in the world;
Thought and lust are a man’s sensuality,
The various things just stand there in the world;
But the wise get rid of desire therein.

– A.VI 63/iii, 411
I’m super tired and am unable to assess this post’s coherency. I hope there is some.
“Life is swept along, short is the life span; no shelters exist for one who has reached old age. Seeing clearly this danger in death, a seeker of peace should drop the world’s bait.” SN 1.3
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by SDC »

aflatun wrote:http://nanavira.org/

Just an FYI, the site seems to be back up

:reading:
Sweet!
“Life is swept along, short is the life span; no shelters exist for one who has reached old age. Seeing clearly this danger in death, a seeker of peace should drop the world’s bait.” SN 1.3
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by pulga »

aflatun wrote:Just an FYI, the site seems to be back up
My crisis is over.
"Dhammā=Ideas. This is the clue to much of the Buddha's teaching." ~ Ven. Ñanavira, Commonplace Book
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by pulga »

aflatun wrote: Regarding your statement: "Experience can be broken down into a foreground, a diverse background, and an intuitive whole which encompasses both foreground and background and constitutes the meaning of any given experience."

I think the impression I got from SDC's post is that there are two terms to consider, foreground and background, and you seem to be implying a third more general term "intuitive whole." Is the intuitive whole redundant with respect to background, or is simply a higher level of generality?
From Ven. Ñanavira's letter to Hon. L. Samaratunga:
Try a simple experiment. Fix your gaze on some given object, A, in your room. Then, without shifting your gaze from A, ask yourself if anything else in the room is at that time visible to you. You will find that you can also see a number of other objects surrounding A, but less distinctly. These other objects, though visible at the same time as A, form, as it were, the background to A, which occupies the foreground or centre of attention. These are objects that are peripherally visible, whereas A is centrally visible, or, if you prefer, A is present whereas the other objects are, in a manner of speaking, partly absent—i.e. not present. But all these other objects, though they are not-A, are given in the same immediate experience as A. I do not think, if you carry out the experiment carefully, that you will conclude that all these peripherally—non-centrally—visible objects, which are negatives of the centrally visible A, are simply inferred from A. How can you possibly infer the bookshelf in the corner of the room from the pen lying on your desk? Emphasis added [L.44]
The intuitive whole is a singular thing of a higher level of generality that is present in one’s immediate experience: it is what the foreground and background have in common. This is the invariant under transformation that Ñanavira places such great emphasis on. It's by shifting our attention to this whole and keeping it there that we practice the mindfulness and awareness that is fundamental to the Buddha's Teaching, cf. Letter to Mr. Dias [L.2]. Once we understand how the whole itself endures we come to see how our awareness of it is itself intuited at a higher level, cf. Ñanavira's infinite hierarchy of consciousness [L.93]. This is what he is trying to explicate in the dynamic aspect of Fundamental Structure II; the aporia being how it comes to be that the whole endures despite its ontological contingency on the ephemeral part that manifests it.
aflatun wrote:Perhaps Ven. NN and Nanavira have different conventions with respect to the word existence or being?
I have to admit that I’m not really clear on this either. Footnote 14 of the essay seems to differ from Ven. Ñanavira's Note, so it's best to withhold comment until I have a better understanding of how he interprets the term.

Just as an aside(that no one should feel obliged to follow up on): the foreground and the multiple objects of the background can be said to be "coessential with" one another, i.e. they are of the same order of being. Coessential became the British Ñanamoli's preferred rendering of anubhūta, cf. his manuscript translation of Brahmanimantanikasutta (MN 49).
Last edited by pulga on Wed Feb 01, 2017 3:12 am, edited 1 time in total.
"Dhammā=Ideas. This is the clue to much of the Buddha's teaching." ~ Ven. Ñanavira, Commonplace Book
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by SDC »

pulga wrote:
aflatun wrote:Just an FYI, the site seems to be back up
My crisis is over.
Literally the funniest thing you have ever said.
“Life is swept along, short is the life span; no shelters exist for one who has reached old age. Seeing clearly this danger in death, a seeker of peace should drop the world’s bait.” SN 1.3
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

SDC wrote:
pulga wrote:
aflatun wrote:Just an FYI, the site seems to be back up
My crisis is over.
Literally the funniest thing you have ever said.
Hah!
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

Thank you for the replies gentlemen (I presume you're males, correct me if I'm wrong), I will digest and return later. If there's a possible difference in terminology with respect to "being" then that would be of interest, if nothing else I can desist in flogging myself for my :reading: confusion
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
User avatar
aflatun
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Location: Bay Area, CA

Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

SDC wrote:In my understanding, “that by which” is referring to the subject. The “subject”(me) is held as that by which there is “the seen…cognized”, i.e. as the reason for “the seen…cognized”. When the subject is not that by which, the subject will not be “here”- “here” as - or with - the six-sense base (I read a variation of this last sentence somewhere recently and cannot recall where). I think it is safe to say that “there” is the landscape within which “here” and “yonder” are discerned. Also important to note what Ven. NN points out about “there”: “…only once (and while) “there” is manifested.” The appearance of “there” is not particular. It can become particular – and I paraphrasing Ven. NN here – in that an over-attending to the background, makes it foreground, i.e. general is no longer general. It is now “in front”. (Keep in mind that if I completely understood this verse I would an arahant just like Bahiya. So, a grain of salt please.)
I think that's a lucid explanation, in fact it makes more sense to me than it has in other ways I've seen it explicated (meaning the "that by which", I believe going on memory its been rendered as "not in that" and "not by that").

Regarding Ven. NN and the background/foreground distinction: I listened to one of his recorded talks lately where he was advising his listener that she shouldn't constantly make the background into the foreground, but leave the background as background. I'm going on memory here and possibly botching it, but I believe he was saying that the self can hide in various places and in this background in particular, hence the importance of keeping it in mind. I intended to revisit that recording in due time and start another thread because it was a fascinating talk, so I'll silence myself for now. Similar things alluded to by Pulga above as well I believe, and by you below:

SDC wrote:There is an interesting verse from the Sutta Nipata that was referred to in another essay that touches on this:
Look at this world with its gods, enmeshed in the material and the mental, thinking not-self is self, it thinks, “This is truth”. In whatever terms they conceive it, it turns into something other than that." Snp 3.12
(emphasis added)

“In whatever terms they conceive” either the “material” or “mental” that which is conceived “turns into something other than that.” What I think this is saying is that whenever the background (something general) is over-attended, it is conceived, and that which is conceived is, all at once, no longer that background. So, keeping in mind the above verse, when you take view of the experience and attempt pin down the self, no matter what you “get” in that attempt, it will not be it. See, because the self is very general. In terms of “self-view”, the self is not seen, it is always that very background. Because not only is there the conceit “I am” but things, for one not free from self-view, are there “for me”. “For me” in the sense that “self” is understood to be enduring somewhere outside of experience, as the experiencer and/or as the reason for experience. So in other words, there is a tendency to “overshoot the mark” when trying to get a sense of “there”, and as a result you end up unknowingly involved with “here” and “yonder”. Obviously there is a push – basically craving forces one’s hand to identify the subject. How? By having the already assumed subject identify itself! So even when you pick up on this “sneakiness” you notice a pattern that is an infinite of an “always” more general notion of self encompassing whatever attempts one makes to step back from it (another very famous line from Ven. Ven. Ñāṇavīra which I cannot quote exactly so I won’t mess it up).
There's something really deep and profound to me about all this that I don't think I can do justice to verbally just yet, but lets say something about it rings very true to my experience, especially with respect to formal meditation, but also general awareness.
aflatun wrote:Putting together Footnote 14 with what comes later:
The Teaching tells him that 'existence' cannot be conceived anywhere apart from 'appearance', but also that it is not 'appearance' as such; furthermore, and even more importantly, it also tells him that 'existence' does not depend on 'appearance' directly, it depends on the 'assumption' (upādāna)22 in regard to that which appears,23 and this means nothing else then that the appearance, for its appearing, does not require existence at all—it is actually better without it.
I'm understanding this as saying in the final analysis that whether its the existence of "subject" or the existence of "object," or "me" and "not-me," "I" and "thing" that is being considered, both depend on the 'assumption.' And so when the puthujjana begins to understand things correctly, as he approaches the way in which things exist in the appropriate sense of the word, he's beginning to understand that they exist in so far as they are grasped, under subjection, etc (which in turn depends on the presence of an appearance to begin with). Is that right? "The puthujjana understands that if anything is to exist, it has to appear" but that does not mean that it has to exist if it appears?
SDC wrote:I want to quote the verse that he quotes in that part of the essay:
The five assumed aggregates, friend Visākha, are not just assuming; but neither is there assumption apart from the five assumed aggregates. That, friend Visākha, in the five assumed aggregates which is desire-&-lust, that assumption is therein. - MN 44
I think what is being said here is that, first off: there will still be the five aggregates for the arahant, yet no longer the five-assumed-aggregates, (sometimes called “the five aggregates subject to clinging”). Secondly, that that assumption (upādāna) is not - for the puthujjana - anywhere other than in regards to the aggregates because of desire and lust. In other words, desire and lust in regards to the five aggregates is what maintains the assumption. (I’m out on a bit of limb here. I never gave that verse this sort of look before.) So it is not so much (perhaps not at all) that any of these things which are assumed to be the self have appeared, but the issue is in the appropriation of those things.
(Emphasis mine)

I think I was and am mostly understanding it in that way, with the exception that he doesn't seem to be differentiating between the existence of the "self" or the existence of anything else (object, etc) as it was written.

EDIT: To furbish an example, from the note already cited:
Whether it is 'mine', or not, whether it is personal or impersonal, large or small, visible or invisible, far or near, any 'being' whatsoever means that bhava is there; it is, it exists. As long as that is the case, ‘I’ (or at least some degree of the conceit ‘I am’) will be present.

Although from the broader context of the article self is the primary concern.

Nevertheless it raises the question for me, potential inconsistencies in the usage of the terms "being" or "existence" between Venerable NN and Nanavira aside, as to whether there is a relationship between my existence (bhava) and the "existence" imputed to "objects" for this school of thought.

(EDIT: It seems to be implied above that you cannot have one without the other. I can't have an existent apple without an existent "I" that it is "for.")

I assume that because I am, things appear to me, is this necessarily correlative with assuming that because others things are, they appear? When the former passes away does the latter? For Nanananda I think this is indeed the implication ("in the seen, just the seen") but I don't want to conflate things so I ask. I would assume as phenomenological thinkers they don't pay lip service to a reified thing in itself to begin with and the focus of the path is obviously "in here," but I wonder, especially based on the way some passages in the article are written.



Thank you as always SDC!
Last edited by aflatun on Fri Feb 03, 2017 4:12 am, edited 1 time in total.
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

pulga wrote:
aflatun wrote: Regarding your statement: "Experience can be broken down into a foreground, a diverse background, and an intuitive whole which encompasses both foreground and background and constitutes the meaning of any given experience."

I think the impression I got from SDC's post is that there are two terms to consider, foreground and background, and you seem to be implying a third more general term "intuitive whole." Is the intuitive whole redundant with respect to background, or is simply a higher level of generality?
From Ven. Ñanavira's letter to Hon. L. Samaratunga:
Try a simple experiment. Fix your gaze on some given object, A, in your room. Then, without shifting your gaze from A, ask yourself if anything else in the room is at that time visible to you. You will find that you can also see a number of other objects surrounding A, but less distinctly. These other objects, though visible at the same time as A, form, as it were, the background to A, which occupies the foreground or centre of attention. These are objects that are peripherally visible, whereas A is centrally visible, or, if you prefer, A is present whereas the other objects are, in a manner of speaking, partly absent—i.e. not present. But all these other objects, though they are not-A, are given in the same immediate experience as A. I do not think, if you carry out the experiment carefully, that you will conclude that all these peripherally—non-centrally—visible objects, which are negatives of the centrally visible A, are simply inferred from A. How can you possibly infer the bookshelf in the corner of the room from the pen lying on your desk? Emphasis added [L.44]
The intuitive whole is a singular thing of a higher level of generality that is present in one’s immediate experience: it is what the foreground and background have in common. This is the invariant under transformation that Ñanavira places such great emphasis on. It's by shifting our attention to this whole and keeping it there that we practice the mindfulness and awareness that is fundamental to the Buddha's Teaching, cf. Letter to Mr. Dias [L.2]. Once we understand how the whole itself endures we come to see how our awareness of it is itself intuited at a higher level, cf. Ñanavira's infinite hierarchy of consciousness [L.93]. This is what he is trying to explicate in the dynamic aspect of Fundamental Structure II; the aporia being how it comes to be that the whole endures despite its ontological contingency on the ephemeral part that manifests it.
aflatun wrote:Perhaps Ven. NN and Nanavira have different conventions with respect to the word existence or being?
I have to admit that I’m not really clear on this either. Footnote 14 of the essay seems to differ from Ven. Ñanavira's Note, so it's best to withhold comment until I have a better understanding of how he interprets the term.

Just as an aside(that no one should feel obliged to follow up on): the foreground and the multiple objects of the background can be said to be "coessential with" one another, i.e. they are of the same order of being. Coessential became the British Ñanamoli's preferred rendering of anubhūta, cf. his manuscript translation of Brahmanimantanikasutta (MN 49).
Thank you for the explanation of intuitive whole and all the rest, that makes sense to me. I'm particularly interested in retrying my hand at fundamental structure with what you wrote in mind, as the first and only time I tried to delve into that I felt like I was going to stroke out :rolleye: haha!

I'm keen on exploring how this all pans out in the practice of mindfulness and awareness for Nanavira and NN, so I'm glad you point out that connection, but as I said above I'll save my bumblings for another thread for now, although I'm all ears. Are there particular places Venerable Nanavira touches on becoming aware of this whole in the context of practice? (I really enjoyed the letter on awareness you linked, thank you. Unless I misunderstood it it seemed more directed at being aware of, or reflecting on, what one is doing? Which I'm assuming is related but I didn't get a sense of explicit connection)

Is it just me or does venerable Nanavira have a wonderfully dry sense of humor or is he being serious here?
In the second place, awareness is cooling and is directly opposed to the passions (either lust or hate), which are heating (this has no connexion with the mysterious qualities that are inherent in Oriental food, but missing from food in the West).
:jumping:
Thank you Pulga!

(Hopefully I'll get around to learning about that Pali word and its significance in the way British Nanamoli translates, thank you for that!)
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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Re: "Appearance and Existence" by Ven. Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli

Post by aflatun »

perhaps related to my mucking about above, regarding the correlativity of an existent "subject" that stands behind experience and the existent "objects" that appear to it through experience:

The puthujjana takes for granted that 'I am' is the fundamental fact, and supposes that 'things are mine (or concern me) because I am'. The ditthisampanna sees that this is the wrong way round. He sees that there is the conceit (concept) '(I) am' because 'things are mine'. With perception of impermanence, the inherent appropriation subsides; 'things are mine' gives place to just 'things are' (which things are still significant—they point to or indicate other things—, but no longer point to a 'subject'); and 'I am' vanishes. With the coming to an end of the arahat's life there is the ending of 'things are'. While the arahat still lives, then, there continue to be 'objects' in the sense of 'things'; but if 'objects' are understood as necessarily correlative to a 'subject', then 'things' can no longer be called 'objects'.
(emphasis mine)

http://www.nanavira.org/index.php/notes ... tes/phassa
"People often get too quick to say 'there's no self. There's no self...no self...no self.' There is self, there is focal point, its not yours. That's what not self is."

Ninoslav Ñāṇamoli
Senses and the Thought-1, 42:53

"Those who create constructs about the Buddha,
Who is beyond construction and without exhaustion,
Are thereby damaged by their constructs;
They fail to see the Thus-Gone.

That which is the nature of the Thus-Gone
Is also the nature of this world.
There is no nature of the Thus-Gone.
There is no nature of the world."

Nagarjuna
MMK XXII.15-16
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