The role of intention in Buddhist morality.

[Miguel]

This is a question I originally made on a thread (https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.p ... 80#p426680) in the Ordination and Monastic Life sub-forum, where we discussed, after a question of mine, about why monks are not allowed to grow their own food. I quote my own words from an original post there, after Ven. Bhikkhu Pesala suggested me to make this question here instead.

From a Buddhist perspective, is the intention, and, extensively, will, considered as relevant to moral judgement?

Some time ago, I read a tract you wrote, Bhante, titled The Way Down to Hell is Easy, and was left with some questions. For I see that one of the foundamental principles of morality is the one expressed in the Baghavad Gita, 2:47: "Set thy heart upon thy work, but never on its reward.
Work not for a reward; but never cease to do thy work." Considering Hell and Heaven as existent would not make moral commandments into mere prudential ones? That is to say: if a man behaved morally to avoid going to Hell, how can that be true moral behaviour if he is not truly acting by his own free will but under a certain coercive threat? Same thing in the case of Heaven: how could he be called good or wise when he is just looking after his own self-interest as any other living creature?

More so, even if we don't consider Heaven or Hell relevant (which is different of making assertions about their existence), do intentions matter in Buddhist moral judgment? You say that in practicing euthanasia on a parent one becomes guilty of his or her death, and something similar expresses Ven. Thanissaro Bhikkhu in his Code when he talks about a monk who recommended a method of euthanasia to a criminal whose feets and hands had been cut in punishment and so became guilty of a pārājika offence; or when after that he tells the story of a monk who made an executioner kill his victims mercifully, with a single blow, instead of torturing them first, and was also defeated. It is clear that, at least, in the third case, there was no evil intention, and that indeed was a very praiseworthy one: mercy. How can these be offences considering the intentions behind them?

And, if intentions doesn't matter, then what's the difference between this kind of ethics and mere ritual, where one just has to behave in certain way? A robot programmed to do so would then be worthy of the epithets good, wise, or just?

Here is a more thorough analysis of the issue: http://www.friesian.com/moral-2.htm

[Bhikkhu Pesala]

From a Buddhist perspective, is the intention, and, extensively, will, considered as relevant to moral judgement?

It is intention that the Buddha calls kamma, but there are other factors that affect how powerful the kamma is.

Considering Hell and Heaven as existent would not make moral commandments into mere prudential ones?

It is prudent to abstain from evil deeds like killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, wrong speech, and intoxication, even if the motive is selfish. The two wholesome mental states of shame (hiri) and fear (ottappa) of wrong-doing are known as "the guardians of the world."

It is clear that, at least, in the third case, there was no evil intention, and that indeed was a very praiseworthy one: mercy. How can these be offences considering the intentions behind them?

It is not clear at all, which is why many believe that mercy killing, abortion, animal experimentation, exterminating vermin, etc., are compassionate acts. You will find many long and heated debates on these topics, because the intention is not clearly seen for what it is — one motivated by ill-will. At the moment of killing, the intention is not wholesome, and is therefore not praiseworthy.

Mercy killing is still the unwholesome deed of killing living beings.

And, if intentions doesn't matter, then what's the difference between this kind of ethics and mere ritual, where one just has to behave in certain way? A robot programmed to do so would then be worthy of the epithets good, wise, or just?

Intentions do matter, but anyone who is not a saint will not be free from self-view, and therefore not completely selfless in his or her actions.

Wholesome deeds such as generosity and morality can be classed as inferior, medium, and superior. A gift given for the sake of praise and status in this very life is inferior; one given firmly believing in the law of kamma and expecting good results such as wealth and status in future existences is medium; one given for the sake of relinquishing all attachment with one's sights firmly set on the attainment of nibbāna (the cessation of craving) is superior. The same principle applies to all other wholesome deeds too such as paying homage, serving others, teaching the Dhamma, meditating, etc.

The point is that even "inferior" wholesome deeds are still beneficial and wholesome. They should be encouraged. Later, when someone gains deeper understanding of the law of kamma, their wholesome deeds will become more altruistic, and therefore more effective in leading towards the goal of the spiritual life.

[binocular]

For I see that one of the foundamental principles of morality is the one expressed in the Baghavad Gita, 2:47: "Set thy heart upon thy work, but never on its reward. Work not for a reward; but never cease to do thy work."

I'm not sure this instruction from the Bhagavad Gita is consistent with Buddhism, though. I've never heard of such an instruction in the Pali Canon; instead, all are goal-oriented (whether it's a lesser or higher goal).

The Bhagavad Gita is a theistic text; according to it, one is supposed to do all one's work for God, dedicate it to God; one is supposed to work in order to please God, as opposed to working to please oneself (which would be evidenced in one's hoping for a reward). So someone who indeed just works, even without hoping for a reward, if they don't do this work for the sake of pleasing God, they are working against the instruction in the Bhagavad Gita.
So that instruction you quoted, even though it seems general and common-sensical enough, isn't actually so, but is very specific to a particular context.

Considering Hell and Heaven as existent would not make moral commandments into mere prudential ones? That is to say: if a man behaved morally to avoid going to Hell, how can that be true moral behaviour if he is not truly acting by his own free will but under a certain coercive threat? Same thing in the case of Heaven: how could he be called good or wise when he is just looking after his own self-interest as any other living creature?

Two things here:

One: Why should looking after one's own self-interest _necessarily_ have to be a bad thing? Can you explain? It's quite common (in the West) to automatically assume that self-interest is somehow bad or immoral -- which is all the more reason to look into this assumption.

Two: It depends on what the person sees as the goal of their life. Is it a good/better rebirth, or an end of rebirth altogether? On this depends what their intentions will be.
If a person wants a good/better rebirth, then what is wrong with utilitarian reasoning?

More so, even if we don't consider Heaven or Hell relevant (which is different of making assertions about their existence), do intentions matter in Buddhist moral judgment?

Intentions are central. It is a complex topic, though.

You say that in practicing euthanasia on a parent one becomes guilty of his or her death, and something similar expresses Ven. Thanissaro Bhikkhu in his Code when he talks about a monk who recommended a method of euthanasia to a criminal whose feets and hands had been cut in punishment and so became guilty of a pārājika offence; or when after that he tells the story of a monk who made an executioner kill his victims mercifully, with a single blow, instead of torturing them first, and was also defeated. It is clear that, at least, in the third case, there was no evil intention, and that indeed was a very praiseworthy one: mercy.
How can these be offences considering the intentions behind them?

Could you explain why you think that those acts were acts of mercy?

[Miguel]

Bhante:

It is not clear at all, which is why many believe that mercy killing, abortion, animal experimentation, exterminating vermin, etc., are compassionate acts. You will find many long and heated debates on these topics, because the intention is not clearly seen for what it is — one motivated by ill-will. At the moment of killing, the intention is not wholesome, and is therefore not praiseworthy.

Mercy killing is still the unwholesome deed of killing living beings.

You touched two essential points here. First is the fact that is not the same thing to practice euthanasia than to, let's say, make experiments on animals, to take one of your examples. I would say that these two things are different, because even if both imply the material act of producing a death, and even if it could be argued that both are done with the final aim of reducing suffering (now, in the first case; in a distant future and through the results of experimentation, in the second), the latter is a violent act, while the former is not one. For in the case of euthanasia, a doctor is not acting against the free will of the patient, but rather in accordance to it: he is doing so according to the conscious decision of an adult of ending a painful life. In the case of animal experimentation, however, the experimenter is going explicitly against the (maybe as free as ours) will of the captive animals in which he performs his painful experiments.

Second, there is this argument in the page of the link you posted:

On seeing the unbearable pain of a patient, the first intention is to relieve him or her from suffering, but if we practise euthanasia, the second and last intentions will be those of killing. The last volition determines whether it is an offence of killing a living being. This is in accordance with the Commen­tary on the Peta Vatthu.

It seems indeed a clever solution to the problem, but it is one that ultimately disregards causation. We could admit two things: (1) that for every effect there is a previous determinant cause, which is the position implicit in that argument, or (2) that for every effect are many causes entangled, which is a more correct approach to causality. There is said that a good thing was first wanted, and then a bad one, and because the doctor acts on the second moment he is behaving badly. But in the Aristotelian doctrine on causation, for, example, the four causes of an act work simultaneously:

- The material cause would be the patient that is alive, suffering, and asking for help to die.
- The formal cause would be the image of that patient dead, an thus no longer suffering.
- The efficient cause would be the doctor that causes his death.
- The final cause would be the aim of the doctor of stopping that suffering.

Thus, it is not so easy to say that in the moment that the doctor committed the act itself he was not aiming to a good end. This is how I see it.

But even if we accepted the first conception of causation ("one cause at a time"), the first an the second acts of volition of the doctor could hardly be considered unrelated and subject to different moral judgments. It is not so that the intention of killing actually arises from the first intention of relieving the patient from suffering?


Now, Binocular:

I'm not sure this instruction from the Bhagavad Gita is consistent with Buddhism, though. I've never heard of such an instruction in the Pali Canon; instead, all are goal-oriented (whether it's a lesser or higher goal).

The Bhagavad Gita is a theistic text; according to it, one is supposed to do all one's work for God, dedicate it to God; one is supposed to work in order to please God, as opposed to working to please oneself (which would be evidenced in one's hoping for a reward). So someone who indeed just works, even without hoping for a reward, if they don't do this work for the sake of pleasing God, they are working against the instruction in the Bhagavad Gita.
So that instruction you quoted, even though it seems general and common-sensical enough, isn't actually so, but is very specific to a particular context.

It is true that it is a theistic text to the extent in which it is Krishna who talks to Arjuna, and not some other human, but the true theistic content of the work doesn't starts until chapter seven. Before that, the conversation between the two of them verses on Karma yoga, which is not the same that the theistic practice of adoration and devotion (Bhakti yoga) explained by Krishna later, and is actually in some kind of contradiction, because while in 5:11 it is said about Karma yoga that "The yogīs, abandoning attachment, act with body, mind, intelligence, and even with the senses, only for the purpose of purification", in 11:55 then it is said about Bhakti yoga: "Those who make me the supreme goal of all their work and act without selfish attachment, who devote themselves to me completely and are free from ill will for any creature, enter into me."

But that's another topic. The fact is that 2:47 is not necessarily a theistic affirmation, although it is true that it can be debated whether is compatible with Buddhism or not. It is a beautiful phrase, anyway.

Now:

One: Why should looking after one's own self-interest _necessarily_ have to be a bad thing? Can you explain? It's quite common (in the West) to automatically assume that self-interest is somehow bad or immoral -- which is all the more reason to look into this assumption.

Two: It depends on what the person sees as the goal of their life. Is it a good/better rebirth, or an end of rebirth altogether? On this depends what their intentions will be.
If a person wants a good/better rebirth, then what is wrong with utilitarian reasoning?

There is nothing bad, off course! I didn't wanted to say that, and the confusion it's quite my fault. Let me introduce an interpolation in my previous words: "Same thing in the case of Heaven: how could he be called good or wise (and not call that way also an ant or a bird) when he is just looking after his own self-interest as any other living creature?" The issue that I wanted to propose was that, if every creature works looking after itself, even the smallest of animals and the most modest of all plants, how could only a human be called good or just and even deserve Heaven if he is in his intentions not doing anything different from what other creatures do?

In regard to why I stated that the acts I talked about where acts done on mercy, the main reason is my argumentation about death and the value of life in the post that opened our previous thread. To live or die does not matter, what matters is to suffer. Specially in the case of the monk and the executioner, since the death of the prisoners was already imminent, and the monk didn't acted in reference to that; to avoid or to produce it, but only to reduce the suffering in the lifespan that remained to them. In the case of the monk and the children who both practiced euthanasia, however, they both, it is true, accelerated or even produced the death, but in addition to the argument of mine that I just referenced, again I should bring my previous remarks on Ven. Pesala about what seem to me violent and non violent acts.

[Bhikkhu Pesala]

We could admit two things: (1) that for every effect there is a previous determinant cause, which is the position implicit in that argument, or (2) that for every effect are many causes entangled, which is a more correct approach to causality. There is said that a good thing was first wanted, and then a bad one, and because the doctor acts on the second moment he is behaving badly. But in the Aristotelian doctrine on causation, for, example, the four causes of an act work simultaneously:

Aristotle was not an Omniscient Buddha, nor even a Buddhist. From A Discourse on Dependent Origination

The fourth aspect of Dependent Origination is the one- to-one correspondence between cause and effect (evaṃ dhammatā). Every cause leads only to the relevant effect; it has nothing to do with any irrelevant effects. In other words, every cause is the sufficient and necessary condition for the corresponding effect. This leaves no room for chance or moral impotency (akiriya-diṭṭhi). However, as the Visuddhimagga says, for those who misunderstand it, it provides the basis for rigid determinism (niyatavāda). Meditators clearly see the relationship of each effect to its cause, so they have no doubt about their one-to-one correspondence and the truth of moral responsibility.

If death were the end of suffering we should all commit suicide at once to avoid the suffering of old age, disease, and death. However, that it not the case. To remove suffering, one must remove the cause.

Anāthapiṇḍaka was fortunate to have the wise counsel of Venerable Sāriputta when he lay dying.

[binocular]

The fact is that 2:47 is not necessarily a theistic affirmation, although it is true that it can be debated whether is compatible with Buddhism or not. It is a beautiful phrase, anyway.

I don't think it's a beautiful phrase. Unless one believes that Sisyphus is happy pushing that rock up that hill for all eternity.

There is nothing bad, off course! I didn't wanted to say that, and the confusion it's quite my fault. Let me introduce an interpolation in my previous words: "Same thing in the case of Heaven: how could he be called good or wise (and not call that way also an ant or a bird) when he is just looking after his own self-interest as any other living creature?" The issue that I wanted to propose was that, if every creature works looking after itself, even the smallest of animals and the most modest of all plants, how could only a human be called good or just and even deserve Heaven if he is in his intentions not doing anything different from what other creatures do?

This is a problem that anthropocentrists face, but not everyone.

To live or die does not matter, what matters is to suffer.

To me, this sounds like a very strange stance.

Specially in the case of the monk and the executioner, since the death of the prisoners was already imminent, and the monk didn't acted in reference to that; to avoid or to produce it, but only to reduce the suffering in the lifespan that remained to them. In the case of the monk and the children who both practiced euthanasia, however, they both, it is true, accelerated or even produced the death, but in addition to the argument of mine that I just referenced, again I should bring my previous remarks on Ven. Pesala about what seem to me violent and non violent acts.

I agree with Ven. Pesala: If death (of the body) would be the end of suffering, then what you say holds (and we might just as well off ourselves and be done with suffering).

[Miguel]

Venerable Pesala:

Aristotle was not an Omniscient Buddha, nor even a Buddhist.

I'm afraid I cannot accept this as an argument: it is an appeal to authority, a magister dixit. What matters is if Aristotle was right, at least in his assertion of multiple simultaneous causes, not if he took refuge in the Triple Gems. And, because of how time and space relate to each other, we can figure out that he was indeed right in reference to individual objects, as in this case. Because objects in space are simultaneous (as their pure expressions are in geometry) while in time are successive (as their pure expressions are in arithmetics), but also because of that simultaneity any body in space is determined by the surrounding ones and at the same time determines them, thus eliminating independence. There can be no object in this world that doesn't relate to the rest of them. This all is so during the most brief moment possible in which time can be divided, changing then simultaneously in space on the following one, being the meaning of all this simple: causation among objects is interdependent, and thus complex, and thus necessarily multiple.

Suicide is a topic I mentioned in the other thread, where I said that although perhaps death would release us from sorrow it would also release us from the good and beautiful; noble things of this world, and that suffering doesn't nullifies its opposites. Any person should judge for itself if in its life the evils overcome the blessings (and the natural refusal to die), there lies the true liberty of human beings. No man has to endure his own life, and sometimes is even noble to die, as it was in Cato the Younger.


Binocular:

I don't think it's a beautiful phrase. Unless one believes that Sisyphus is happy pushing that rock up that hill for all eternity.

In any case, everyone has the right to disagree in aesthetic matters, but I find that Sisyphus is a bad example for this, because his figure was deliberately created as an archetype of futile effort. Can't one imagine instead a man being content with his own virtue and wisdom? Are these things, goodness and truth, not worthy of pursue as beautiful and noble things, as values in themselves?

This is a problem that anthropocentrists face, but not everyone.

This is hardly a fitting answer. In my question I'm exactly doing the opposite of being anthropocentric: I'm considering any living creature worthy of reward for the same motive, if we accept that motive as deserving a reward. Is that last thing what I don't do: I cannot consider morally commendable a motive that drives an lion to eat a children if he's starving. Nor I consider it intrinsically evil either, off course, for a lion is a lion and can only do what a lion does (a different case in human beings), just not worthy of something like Heaven. Which is, in turn, an objection to the existence of Heaven, or at least to the justice of its existence.

To me, this sounds like a very strange stance.

It is one! I said, back in our previous discussion, that it was indeed an unorthodox idea (a heretic one, for some), and now I think that such a word stays short. But what matters is if its true, or at least a source of reasonable doubts. Dead people don't seem to care for their deaths, and living people don't seem to care for their lives either except for when they feel fear, or are sick, or old, or imprisoned. It could be said in a broader sense that what matters to people are their feelings and sensations, of which sufferings are part. Caring for anything means exactly that: emotionally committing to the object in question, or being affected somehow by it. If you're unconscious about your life and unconscious about your death (one of the observable characteristics of the dead, and of most living, healthy people) you don't care about these things, so, for you, as experiences, they don't matter: they are merely the possibility and the impossibility of experience itself. If we care about being alive is not because we care about life itself, but about what we experience in it. One can ask anybody if they would cling to life if we offered to them one of eternal suffering, as in Sisyphus, and they would surely say no (or regret it if they said yes).

[binocular]

I'm afraid I cannot accept this as an argument: it is an appeal to authority, a magister dixit.

The standards of discourse in religion differ greatly from the standards of discourse in secular philosophy. And this here is a religious forum.

What matters is if Aristotle was right, at least in his assertion of multiple simultaneous causes, not if he took refuge in the Triple Gems.

That doesn't matter to everyone.

In any case, everyone has the right to disagree in aesthetic matters, but I find that Sisyphus is a bad example for this, because his figure was deliberately created as an archetype of futile effort.

Actually, I brought up Sisyphus because suicide was already mentioned -- and I want to connect it all to Camus' idea that it is possible for Sisyphus to be happy, and that we must imagine him happy. An idea I find reprehensive.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Myth_of_Sisyphus)

Can't one imagine instead a man being content with his own virtue and wisdom?

I would love to imagine that, but I can't. I think this being content with one's own virtue and wisdom is the holy grail in many cultures, but to me, it seems to be largely a fictional, literary, utopian ideal.

Are these things, goodness and truth, not worthy of pursue as beautiful and noble things, as values in themselves?

Up to a point, as long as a number of other factors in life (especially health and wealth) are also present.

This is a problem that anthropocentrists face, but not everyone.

This is hardly a fitting answer. In my question I'm exactly doing the opposite of being anthropocentric: I'm considering any living creature worthy of reward for the same motive, if we accept that motive as deserving a reward. Is that last thing what I don't do: I cannot consider morally commendable a motive that drives an lion to eat a children if he's starving. Nor I consider it intrinsically evil either, off course, for a lion is a lion and can only do what a lion does (a different case in human beings), just not worthy of something like Heaven. Which is, in turn, an objection to the existence of Heaven, or at least to the justice of its existence.

Again, this is still a problem of the anthropocentrist. It's anthropocentrism that asserts the superiority of man -- and yet it cannot justify it, as you illustrate above: if man looks only after his self-interest, just like animals do, then how it is possible to say that man is better than animals, or deserving of heaven for doing things that animals do as well or with intentions that anials do them (as much as we can assume that is so).

living people don't seem to care for their lives either except for when they feel fear, or are sick, or old, or imprisoned.

Or maybe it just seems that way.

It could be said in a broader sense that what matters to people are their feelings and sensations, of which sufferings are part. Caring for anything means exactly that: emotionally committing to the object in question, or being affected somehow by it.

You mean like the two meanings of the word "passion", one being 'eagerness; energetic committment', and the other 'suffering'?

If you're unconscious about your life and unconscious about your death (one of the observable characteristics of the dead, and of most living, healthy people)

I haven't observed that, though. I think things are more complex than that. I don't think people are that flat and shallow as you suggest they are.

One can ask anybody if they would cling to life if we offered to them one of eternal suffering, as in Sisyphus, and they would surely say no (or regret it if they said yes).

Or maybe they'd reply that such a thing is not yours to offer, and go their way.

[binocular]

I'm afraid I cannot accept this as an argument: it is an appeal to authority, a magister dixit.

The standards of discourse in religion differ greatly from the standards of discourse in secular philosophy.

What I mean by this is that in religious discourse, it is common to defend stances the truthfulness of which one has not verified for oneself, but which one takes on faith.

And as always, not all appeals to authority are fallacious. Some are, some aren't.

[Miguel]

I see, Binocular. Perhaps this is a thread that at the end will remain untied. Just a couple of final remarks:

Again, this is still a problem of the anthropocentrist. It's anthropocentrism that asserts the superiority of man -- and yet it cannot justify it, as you illustrate above: if man looks only after his self-interest, just like animals do, then how it is possible to say that man is better than animals, or deserving of heaven for doing things that animals do as well or with intentions that animals do them (as much as we can assume that is so).

So, in Buddhism, animals can go to Heaven(s) or be reborn in higher states? That would be actually quite nice. I've always found the despise of most religions for the rest of the creatures besides humans something intolerable.

You mean like the two meanings of the word "passion", one being 'eagerness; energetic committment', and the other 'suffering'?

Exactly like that, well said.

I haven't observed that, though. I think things are more complex than that. I don't think people are that flat and shallow as you suggest they are.

When I said conscious, I meant truly conscious, not just rationally conscious. It's like when people say "Oh, well, yes, I know I'll die someday" but when confronted to a close death or to the sight of it they are paralyzed and terrified: they rationally know (as an abstract thought) that they will die, but it's not like they truly understood that everything must die. It's the same case here, when healthy people, if you ask them, know, off course, that they are alive, but in most cases it's not like they truly feel (feeling=caring) the life on themselves -- they are mostly occupied with everyday things, which fill those lives. It's when they are sick or find sickness a true possibility that they start caring.

Or maybe they'd reply that such a thing is not yours to offer, and go their way.

Most people actually like to answer to that kind of mental experiments, although they could also reply that, off course. That was kind of a Zen answer, actually: they could also hit me in the head with a bamboo cane and say "Practice! Practice! Practice and you will stop asking silly questions!".

[binocular]

So, in Buddhism, animals can go to Heaven(s) or be reborn in higher states? That would be actually quite nice. I've always found the despise of most religions for the rest of the creatures besides humans something intolerable.

Since at least traditionally in some forms of Buddhism, there is the teaching of serial rebirth across different species, the kind of anthropocentrism that one can find in, for example, Christianity or secular humanism doesn't exist.

Most people actually like to answer to that kind of mental experiments, although they could also reply that, off course. That was kind of a Zen answer, actually: they could also hit me in the head with a bamboo cane and say "Practice! Practice! Practice and you will stop asking silly questions!".

For now, these are your questions. You shouldn't just ignore that.

[Miguel]

Off course, Binocular. That was just me trying to make a (bad) joke.