Khristos Nizamis
http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documen ... 2_2012.pdfInvestigating the Pāli suttas, compiled prior to the development of Abhidhamma,
from a phenomenological perspective reveals an internally coherent
and consistent doctrine/theory whose crucial theme is the intentionality
and subjectivity of consciousness. Reductive interpretations tend to interpret
the basic Buddhist principle of ‘nonself ’, and its correlative repudiation
of the concept/conceit ‘I am’, as entailing a rejection of any genuine
(phenomenological) meaningfulness for the term ‘I’ as a legitimate expression
of subjectivity, intentionality, and consciousness. Indeed, it is occasionally
even claimed that Buddhas and Arahants cannot possess subjective
intentional consciousness at all. In the following relections, then, a few key
aspects of an alternative (phenomenological) perspective upon early Pāli
Buddhism are introduced and sketched out, whereby it is argued that the
presence of subjective intentional consciousness, even in the case of Buddhas
and Arahants, is not only presupposed by the suttas, and is not only
quite unproblematic for early Buddhist doctrine/theory, but is also actually
of fundamental importance for the very possibility of Buddhist truth and
practice. Thus, early Buddhist doctrine/theory is not only nonreductive;
it also eminently invites a deep dialogue with, and a serious and detailed
interpretation from the perspective of, Transcendental Phenomenology.