Can we apply Yamaka Sutta to Puthujana?

[Nicolas]

the view "I have no self" is just as much a doctrine of self as the view "I have a self"

Alagaddupama Sutta

Indeed. "I have" implies self-view.
Sidenote: the part relating to "I have no self" is from MN 2, not MN 22. Ven. Ṭhānissaro is referring to the former in his introduction to the latter.

‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;

"The view ‘my self doesn’t exist absolutely’ arises and is taken as a genuine fact." (Sujato)
"The view ‘no self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established." (Bodhi)
"The view I have a self arises in him as true & established." (Ṭhānissaro)

"me attā" = "my self". The problem here is with "my", "my self", "I have", "for me", which are all still self-views.

"I am X" or "I have X" (where X is "self" or "no self" or anything else) = self-view
"I have a self that is eternal" = eternalism
"I have a self that will be destroyed" = annihilationism

[cappuccino]

if one were to cling to the view that there is no self, one would be creating a very subtle sense of self around that view

Thanissaro

[DooDoot]

if one were to cling to the view that there is no self, one would be creating a very subtle sense of self around that view

Thanissaro

Not if "self" is properly defined, as follows:

This world is burning.
Afflicted by contact,
it calls disease a 'self.'

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

Nor is he resolved on 'my self.' He has no uncertainty or doubt that just stress, when arising, is arising; stress, when passing away, is passing away.

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word 'chariot' is used,
So, when the aggregates are present,
There's the convention 'a being.

It's only suffering that comes to be,
Suffering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suffering comes to be,
Nothing but suffering ceases.

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .bodh.html

[Bundokji]

I think the sutta is teaching us how self view leads to wrong conclusions. When Yamaka associated ending the defilement with annihilation upon death, he somehow revealed that in his mind, self view exists and gets annihilated upon enlightenment.

To answer Sarath's question: both the puthujana and the Arahant are ultimately empty of self. The former, however, did not go beyond Kamma, so he believes the conventional to be ultimate while the Arahant has successfully freed himself from this delusion.

The above does not manifest itself as annihilation or continuation of the self upon death, but as suffering. The Arahant will not try to grasp to the reality of the senses hence he does not suffer, the puthujana does.

[Zom]

if one were to cling to the view that there is no self, one would be creating a very subtle sense of self around that view
Thanissaro

This is true only in a case when someone with a self-view says: "There is no self". As a result he gets: "My self has no self", which leads him not to a subtle sense of self as (eternalist) Thanissaro says, but to "more perplexion and bewilderment", as Buddha says (speaking exactly about this situation).

[budo]

The sutta points out that Yamaka's view is wrong because there is no such thing as an arahant "entity" to be annihilated and destroyed, it is simply the aggregates (which are anicca & dukkha) which cease and end. There is no arahant "entity" connected to the aggregates or disconnected to the aggregates; there is no such "entity" anywhere, so there is no arahant "entity" to be annihilated or destroyed at the break-up of the body.

The puthujjana imagines a "self", an "entity" connected to the aggregates, and through this ignorance, identification, and craving, there is picking up of another configuration of the aggregates after the break-up of the body, and self-perpetuation of the ignorance, identification, and craving. The sutta applies to the puthujjana in the sense that there is ultimately no "entity" that dies, but also doesn't apply in the sense that there is perpetuation of ignorance, identification, and craving; perpetuation of the illusion of identity -- and so still perpetuation of dukkha; perpetuation. It is like a self-fulfilling prophecy (pun intended).

The only thing that can be destroyed that's false is the perception which is rooted in ignorance. Hence DN9 sutta, cessation of perception and intention.

The aggregates are never destroyed either, only their form is reconfigured.

You can't destroy something that doesn't exist, hence there is no physical "self" that can be destroyed.

[DooDoot]

The sutta points out that Yamaka's view is wrong because there is no such thing as an arahant "entity" to be annihilated and destroyed, it is simply the aggregates (which are anicca & dukkha) which cease and end. There is no arahant "entity" connected to the aggregates or disconnected to the aggregates; there is no such "entity" anywhere, so there is no arahant "entity" to be annihilated or destroyed at the break-up of the body.

The puthujjana imagines a "self", an "entity" connected to the aggregates, and through this ignorance, identification, and craving, there is picking up of another configuration of the aggregates after the break-up of the body

Above makes it sound like "identification" and "picking up" (upādiyati in MN 144) are different things.

Yo kho sāriputta,imañca kāyaṃ nikkhipati. Aññaṃ ca kāyaṃ upādiyati, tamahaṃ saupavajjo'ti vadāmi.

MN 144

and self-perpetuation of the ignorance, identification, and craving.

Also, the above makes it sounds like "puthujjana" and "self-perpetuation" is a "self" that "picks up" another configuration of the aggregates.

The sutta applies to the puthujjana in the sense that there is ultimately no "entity" that dies, but also doesn't apply in the sense that there is perpetuation of ignorance, identification, and craving; perpetuation of the illusion of identity -- and so still perpetuation of dukkha; perpetuation. It is like a self-fulfilling prophecy (pun intended).

The sutta ultimately concludes with an answer to the original question, namely: "Each aggregate is impermanent & unsatisfactory and what is impermanent & unsatisfactory comes to an end". The answer in the sutta actually does not mention if the aggregates are undefiled or not. Its only the (wrong) question that mentions an undefiled arahant. Are you saying if the life of a puthujjana ends, it cannot be viewed as merely the ending of aggregates ? For example, if the life of my mother or father end, how can I extinguish sorrow if I don't view those aggregates (conventionally called "mother" & '"father") as mere impermanent not-self aggregates?

If there is the view "mother" & "father" are "puthujjana mother & father" then this sounds like a "self-view". Then with this view, arises other views, such as: "I remember when my mother hit me as a child with a stick. Will she be reborn in hell because of her anger & violence towards me?" Then the mind will start to worry about the rebirth of puthujjana mother & puthujjana father. How can suffering end in this situation?

[Nicolas]

[...]

Agreed! What I was trying to say is that the puthujjana is stuck, and that the self-view perpetuates itself; belief in the illusion perpetuates the illusion.