perkele wrote: ↑Sun Mar 04, 2018 7:47 pm
I will explain it quickly since you really want to know it seems but i cba going to look up sources. I was told that this Sub-Forum was moderated differently and therefore i assumed that moderators would figure it out themselves and moderate. How is this Sub-Forum different if it is exactly the same procedure i have to do here as elsewhere? Anyway i will not be stingy, it is not right no matter what forum etc.. Here is what i do not like:
The path is followed immediately by another state of supramundane consciousness known as the fruit (phala),
Followed implies "arising of" and not "the cessation of" this could be mitigated by context but it is not in this context.
which results from the path's work of cutting off defilements.
"Result" here also in line with Arising of Supramundane Consciousness. Viññanam anidassanam which Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi does not consider to be Nibbana;
Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi;
http://www.sbinstitute.com/sites/defaul ... evised.pdf
The sutta, if you look at it carefully, does not explicitly state that this “signless, boundless, all-luminous consciousness”is nibbāna itself. I don’t interpret it as being nibbāna itself, and I do agree with you that nibbāna is an unconditioned reality, without production, without alteration, without passing (see AN 3:47, I 152), a real dhamma that one actually sees and experiences with the attainment of path and fruition.
This is his view, absence of proof is not evidence of absence. This alone is enough to raise both eyebrows.
Also i quote him again from same work;
Venerable BB:
Dear BAW, The relationship between nibbāna and consciousness wasa topic of heated discussion among us Western monks in Sri Lanka, and our position in relation to this problemdivided us into opposing camps. Though I have pondered the issue for long years, I have to admit I don’t have a clear solution to the problem.
I would even challenge this and say that surely i would expect more than 2 camps.
Further;
Each path is followed by its own fruit,
This is ambiguous statement and i dont want to get into it but Is fruit Nibbana or Not is the main question and if is what is the Difference there, is it in the defilements they cut or are we talking about a fundamentally different types of Viññanam anidassanam or Nibbana (Maybe he is talking about the Eye of Wisdom?
). Further;
wherein for a few moments the mind enjoys the blissful peace of Nibbana before descending again to the level of mundane consciousness.
So The Mind enjoys peace of Nibbana for a few moments, as an elevated state of consciousness before the same mind descends to mundane levels.
Here he postulates Mind in Nibbana, Peace of Nibbana, Duration for Nibbana, multitude and arising of Nibbana.
I hope i have demonstrated now how Venerable Author seems to adhere to the doctrine of Nibbana in the Here&Now as explained here;
Brahmajāla Sutta: The All-embracing Net of Views Pt. 5. Doctrines of Nibbāna Here and Now (Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavāda): Views 58–62 DN 1
93. "There are, bhikkhus, some recluses and brahmins who maintain a doctrine of Nibbāna here and now and who, on five grounds, proclaim Nibbāna here and now for an existent being. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these honorable recluses and brahmins proclaim their views?
94. "Herein, bhikkhus, a certain recluse or a brahmin asserts the following doctrine or view: 'When this self, good sir, furnished and supplied with the five strands of sense pleasures, revels in them — at this point the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now.' In this way some proclaim supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being.
95. "To him another says: 'There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now. What is the reason? Because, good sir, sense pleasures are impermanent, suffering, subject to change, and through their change and transformation there arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. But when the self, quite secluded from sense pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, enters and abides in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by initial and sustained thought and contains the rapture and happiness born of seclusion — at this point, good sir, the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now.' In this way others proclaim supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being.
96. "To him another says: 'There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now. What is the reason? Because that jhāna contains initial and sustained thought; therefore it is declared to be gross. But when, with the subsiding of initial and sustained thought, the self enters and abides in the second jhāna, which is accompanied by internal confidence and unification of mind, is free from initial and sustained thought, and contains the rapture and happiness born of concentration — at this point, good sir, the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now.' In this way others proclaim supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being.
97. "To him another says: 'There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now. What is the reason? It is declared to be gross because of the mental exhilaration connected with rapture that exists there. But when, with the fading away of rapture, one abides in equanimity, mindful and clearly comprehending, and still experiencing happiness with the body, enters and abides in the third jhāna, so that the ariyans announce: "He abides happily, in equanimity and mindfulness" — at this point, good sir, the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now.' In this way some proclaim supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being.
98. "To him another says: 'There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now. What is the reason? It is declared to be gross because a mental concern, 'Happiness,' exists there. But when, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the disappearance of previous joy and grief, one enters and abides in the fourth jhāna, which is without pleasure and pain and contains purification of mindfulness through equanimity — at this point, good sir, the self attains supreme Nibbāna here and now.' In this way some proclaim supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being.
"This, bhikkhus, the Tathāgata understands... and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with reality would speak.
99. "It is on these five grounds, bhikkhus, that these recluses and brahmins who maintain a doctrine of Nibbāna here and now proclaim supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being. Whatever recluses or brahmins proclaim supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being, all of them do so on these five grounds or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.
"This, bhikkhus, the Tathāgata understands... and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with reality would speak.
100. "It is on these forty-four grounds, bhikkhus, that those recluses and brahmins who are speculators about the future and hold settled views about the future assert various conceptual theorems referring to the future. Whatever recluses or brahmins, bhikkhus, are speculators about the future, hold settled views about the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the future, all of them do so on these forty-four grounds or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.
"This, bhikkhus, the Tathāgata understands... and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with reality would speak.
101. "It is on these sixty-two grounds, bhikkhus, that those recluses and brahmins who are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, and speculators about the past and the future together, who hold settled views about the past and the future, assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future.
102. "Whatever recluses or brahmins, bhikkhus, are speculators about the past or speculators about the future or speculators about the past and the future together, hold settled views about the past and the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future, all of them do so on these sixty-two grounds or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.
103. "This, bhikkhus, the Tathāgata understands. And he understands: 'These standpoints, thus assumed and thus misapprehended, lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond.' He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not misapprehend. And because he is free from misapprehension, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
104. "These are those dhammas, bhikkhus, that are deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, which the Tathāgata, having realized for himself with direct knowledge, propounds to others; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with reality would speak.
V. The Round of Conditions and Emancipation from the Round
1. Agitation and Vacillation (Paritassitavipphandita)
105. Therein, bhikkhus, when those recluses and brahmins who are eternalists proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal — that is only the feeling of those who do not know and do not see; that is only the agitation and vacillation of those who are immersed in craving.
106. "When those recluses and brahmins who are eternalists in regard to some things and non-eternalists in regard to other things proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal — that too is only the feeling of those who do not know and do not see; that is only the agitation and vacillation of those who are immersed in craving.
107. "When those recluses and brahmins who are extensionists proclaim on four grounds the world to be finite or infinite —
108. "When those recluses and brahmins who are endless equivocators on four grounds resort to evasive statements and endless equivocation when questioned on this or that point —
109. "When those recluses and brahmins who are fortuitous originationists proclaim on two grounds the self and the world to originate fortuitously —
110. "When those recluses and brahmins who are speculators about the past and hold settled views about the past assert on eighteen grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the past —
111. "When those recluses and brahmins who maintain a doctrine of percipient immortality proclaim on sixteen grounds the self to survive percipient after death —
112. "When those recluses and brahmins who maintain a doctrine of non-percipient immortality proclaim on eight grounds the self to survive non-percipient after death —
113. "When those recluses and brahmins who maintain a doctrine of neither percipient nor non-percipient immortality proclaim on eight grounds the self to survive neither percipient nor non-percipient after death —
114. "When those recluses and brahmins who are annihilationists proclaim on seven grounds the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being —
115. "When those recluses and brahmins who maintain a doctrine of Nibbāna here and now proclaim on five grounds supreme Nibbāna here and now for an existent being —
116. "When those recluses and brahmins who are speculators about the future and hold settled views about the future assert on forty-four grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the future —
117. "When those recluses and brahmins who are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, speculators about the past and the future together, who hold settled views about the past and the future, assert on sixty-two grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future — that too is only the feeling of those who do not know and do not see; that is only the agitation and vacillation of those who are immersed in craving.
I hope you are satisfied because i really do not enjoy it nor do i want to spend my days doing this kind of basic text analysis.