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63. So it is because suffering ceases only through the cessation of its origin
that, when teaching the cessation of suffering, the Blessed One therefore taught
the cessation of the origin. For the Perfect Ones behave like lions.15 When they
make suffering cease and when they teach the cessation of suffering, they deal
with the cause, not the fruit. But the sectarians behave like dogs. When they
make suffering cease and when they teach the cessation of suffering, by teaching
devotion to self-mortification, etc., they deal with the fruit, not the cause. This, in
the first place, is how the motive for teaching the cessation of suffering by means
of the cessation of its origin should be understood.
64. This is the meaning. Of that same craving: of that craving which, it was said,
“produces further becoming,” and which was classed as “craving for sense
desires” and so on. It is the path that is called fading away; for “With the fading
away [of greed] he is liberated” (M I 139) is said. Fading away and cessation is
cessation through fading away. Remainderless fading away and cessation is cessation
through fading away that is remainderless because of eradication of inherent
tendencies. Or alternatively, it is abandoning that is called fading away; and so
the construction here can be regarded as “remainderless fading away,
65. But as to meaning, all of them are synonyms for Nibbána. For in the ultimate
sense it is Nibbána that is called “the noble truth of the cessation of suffering.”
But because craving fades away and ceases on coming to that,16 it is therefore
called “fading away” and “cessation.” And because there comes to be the giving
up, etc., of that [craving] on coming to that [Nibbána], and since there is not even
one kind of reliance here [to be depended upon] from among the reliances
consisting in the cords of sense desires, etc., it is therefore called giving it up,
relinquishing it, letting it go, not relying on it.
66. It has peace as its characteristic. Its function is not to die; or its function is
to comfort. It is manifested as the signless; or it is manifested as nondiversification.17
[DISCUSSION ON NIBBÁNA]
67. [Question 1] Is Nibbána non-existent because it is unapprehendable, like
the hare’s horn?
[Answer] That is not so, because it is apprehendable by the [right] means. For
it is apprehendable [by some, namely, the nobles ones] by the [right] means, in
other words, by the way that is appropriate to it, [the way of virtue, concentration,
and understanding]; it is like the supramundane consciousness of others, [which
is apprehendable only by certain of the Noble Ones] by means of knowledge of
penetration of others’ minds. Therefore it should not be said that it is non-existent
because unapprehendable; for it should not be said that what the foolish ordinary
man does not apprehend is unapprehendable.
68. Again, it should not be said that Nibbána does not exist. Why not? Because
it then follows that the way would be futile.  For if Nibbána were nonexistent,
then it would follow that the right way, which includes the three
aggregates beginning with virtue and is headed by right understanding, would
be futile. And it is not futile because it does reach Nibbána.
[Q. 2] But futility of the way does not follow because what is reached is absence,
[that is, absence of the five aggregates consequent upon the cutting off of the
[A.] That is not so. Because, though there is absence of past and future
[aggregates], there is nevertheless no reaching of Nibbána [simply because of
[Q. 3] Then is the absence of present [aggregates] as well Nibbána?
[A.] That is not so. Because their absence is an impossibility, since if they are
absent their non-presence follows. [Besides, if Nibbána were absence of present
aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of excluding the arising of the Nibbána
element with result of past clinging left, at the path moment, which has present
aggregates as its support.
[Q. 4] Then will there be no fault if it is non-presence of defilements [that is
[A.] That is not so. Because it would then follow that the noble path was
meaningless. For if it were so, then, since defilements [can be] non-existent also
before the moment of the noble path, it follows that the noble path would be
meaningless. Consequently that is no reason; [it is unreasonable to say that
Nibbána is unapprehendable, that it is non-existence, and so on].
69. [Q. 5] But is not Nibbána destruction, because of the passage beginning,
“That, friend, which is the destruction of greed … [of hate … of delusion … is
Nibbána]?” (S IV 251).
[A.] That is not so, because it would follow that Arahantship also was mere
destruction. For that too is described in the [same] way beginning, “That, friend,
which is the destruction of greed … of hate … of delusion … is Arahantship]” (S
And what is more, the fallacy then follows that Nibbána would be temporary,
etc.; for if it were so, it would follow that Nibbána would be temporary, have the
characteristic of being formed, and be obtainable regardless of right effort; and
precisely because of its having formed characteristics it would be included in
the formed, and it would be burning with the fires of greed, etc., and because of
its burning it would follow that it was suffering.
[Q. 6] Is there no fallacy if Nibbána is that kind of destruction subsequent to
which there is no more occurrence?
[A.] That is not so. Because there is no such kind of destruction. And even if
there were, the aforesaid fallacies would not be avoided.
Also because it would follow that the noble path was Nibbána. For the noble
path causes the destruction of defects, and that is why it is called “destruction”;
and subsequent to that there is no more occurrence of the defects.
70. But it is because the kind of destruction called “cessation consisting in
non-arising,” [that is, Nibbána,] serves figuratively speaking as decisive-support
[for the path] that [Nibbána] is called “destruction” as a metaphor for it.
[Q. 7] Why is it not stated in its own form?
[A.] Because of its extreme subtlety. And its extreme subtlety is established because
it inclined the Blessed One to inaction, [that is, to not teaching the Dhamma (see M
I 186)] and because a Noble One’s eye is needed to see it (see M I 510).
71. It is not shared by all because it can only be reached by one who is possessed
of the path. And it is uncreated because it has no first beginning.
[Q. 8] Since it is, when the path is, then it is not uncreated.
[A.] That is not so, because it is not arousable by the path; it is only reachable,
not arousable, by the path; that is why it is uncreated. It is because it is uncreated
that it is free from ageing and death. It is because of the absence of its creation
and of its ageing and death that it is permanent. 
72. [Q. 9] Then it follows that Nibbána, too, has the kind of permanence [claimed]
of the atom and so on.
[A.] That is not so. Because of the absence of any cause [that brings about its
[Q. 10] Because Nibbána has permanence, then, these [that is, the atom, etc.]
are permanent as well.
[A.] That is not so. Because [in that proposition] the characteristic of [logical]
cause does not arise. [In other words, to say that Nibbána is permanent is not to
assert a reason why the atom, etc., should be permanent]
[Q. 11] Then they are permanent because of the absence of their arising, as
[A.] That is not so. Because the atom and so on have not been established as facts.
73. The aforesaid logical reasoning proves that only this [that is, Nibbána] is
permanent [precisely because it is uncreated]; and it is immaterial because it
transcends the individual essence of matter.
The Buddhas’ goal is one and has no plurality. But this [single goal, Nibbána,]
is firstly called with result of past clinging left since it is made known together
with the [aggregates resulting from past] clinging still remaining [during the
Arahant’s life], being thus made known in terms of the stilling of defilement
and the remaining [result of past] clinging that are present in one who has
reached it by means of development. But [secondly, it is called without result of
past clinging left] since after the last consciousness of the Arahant, who has
abandoned arousing [future aggregates] and so prevented kamma from giving
result in a future [existence], there is no further arising of aggregates of existence,
and those already arisen have disappeared. So the [result of past] clinging that
remained is non-existent; and it is in terms of this non-existence, in the sense
that “there is no [result of past] clinging here” that that [same goal is called]
without result of past clinging left (see It 38).
74. Because it can be arrived at by distinction of knowledge that succeeds
through untiring perseverance, and because it is the word of the Omniscient
One, Nibbána is not non-existent as regards individual essence in the ultimate
sense; for this is said: “Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade,
an unformed” (It 37; Ud 80).18