Moderator: Mahavihara moderator
However, that does not really address what I said here: viewtopic.php?f=19&t=19382#p271577 or here viewtopic.php?f=19&t=19382#p271678 .robertk wrote:"'The perception of not-self in what is stressful, when developed & pursued, is of great fruit, of great benefit. It gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its final end': Thus was it said, and in reference to this was it said.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html
sphairos wrote:Mkoll wrote: The message is quite clear: thinking about the self whether past, present, or future is inappropriate attention.
I totally agree that these are great quotes, but I'd like to note, perhaps, correct you, that the message is: thinking about the self or absence of self whether past, present, or future is inappropriate attention.
And what is meant of course is not "ordinary sense" self.
As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.
When he attends unwisely in this way, one of six views arises in him. The view ‘self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established; or the view ‘no self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established; or the view ‘I perceive self with self’ arises in him as true and established; or the view ‘I perceive not-self with self’ arises in him as true and established; or the view ‘I perceive self with not-self’ arises in him as true and established; or else he has some such view as this: ‘It is this self of mine that speaks and feels and experiences here and there the result of good and bad actions; but this self of mine is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and it will endure as long as eternity.’ This speculative view, bhikkhus, is called the thicket of views, the wilderness of views, the contortion of views, the vacillation of views, the fetter of views. Fettered by the fetter of views, the untaught ordinary person is not freed from birth, aging, and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain grief, and despair; he is not freed from suffering, I say.
There is very interesting sutta in SN 22.55 that would explain the Buddha's reluctance to deal with Vacchagotta's question on post-mortem non-existence, on the ground that it is too closely allied to the nihilists' position if He had replied in the affirmative to the question.
According to SN 22.81, the nihilists take the position -He may not regard form as self … or hold such an (eternalist) view, but he holds such a view as this: ‘I might not be, and it might not be for me; I will not be, (and) it will not be for me.’ That annihilationist view is a construction….
Na heva kho rūpaṃ attato samanupassati, na vedanaṃ … na saññaṃ… na saṅkhāre… na viññāṇaṃ attato samanupassati; nāpi evaṃdiṭṭhi hoti – ‘so attā so loko, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo’ti. ca kho evaṃdiṭṭhi hoti – ‘no cassaṃ no ca me siyā na bhavissāmi' na me bhavissati’ti. Yā kho pana sā, bhikkhave, ucchedadiṭṭhi saṅkhāro so.
Central to the nihilistic position is the bold text.
On the other hand, the Buddha takes the nihilist thesis and makes a subtle, but significant switch in SN 22.55 as follows -No c’assa no ca me siyā , na bhavissati na me bhavissati
“‘It might not be, and it might not be for me; it will not be, (and) there will not be for me
According to SN 22.55, resolving in such a manner leads to the abandoning of the lower fetters. So how is the ariyan conception different from the nihilistic one?
The nihilistic position is premised on the verb bhavissāmi actually having a self-referent, since it is in the 1st person singular. This leads to the translation "I will not be". On the other hand, the ariyan version uses the verb bhavissati, which is in the 3rd person singular. In such usage, it takes on an abstract/process oriented conception shorn of self-view, leading to the translation "It will not be".
The concern that the ariyan version could be easily mistaken for the nihilist version is suggested in SN 22.55 -Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling becomes frightened over an unfrightening matter. For this is frightening to the uninstructed worldling: ‘If there were not, there would not be for me; there will not be, (so) there will not be for me.’
BB has a fulsome discussion on this sutta. I follow BB is using the Ceylonese variant reading and not using the Burmese reading of SN 22.55 as its "no cassaṃ, no ca me siyā, nābhavissa, na me bhavissatī" appears to have suffered a textual loss.
sphairos wrote:Your argument concerning "bhavissati" makes no sense to me, because there still is "me (bhavissati)" = "I", "for me" etc. Also I suppose that it is simply a typo (there should be "na bhavissāmi" and "na bhavissati me")
"Clearly, in the Pali, the present tense construction is also used to indicate the future (see Warder, pp.12-13), and this coincides very neatly with the Annihilationist's view "no cassaṃ no ca me siyā na bhavissāmi' na me bhavissati", where cassam is the optative of ca which is used for forward-looking statements".
I'd like to ask: do you know Pāli?
Because there is no verb/verb root *ca in the Pāli canon (as well as in Sanskrit), and "cassaṃ" is just a conjunctive "ca" + first person singular optative form of the verb "asti"/atthi" (root "as"), and the presentation of your argument suggests that you don't understand this.
"Atthi" and "n'atthi" are categorical philosophical statements based on the static root *as ("asti/atthi"), which is the opposite to the dynamic *bhū ("hoti/bhavati"). "Atthi" and "n'atthi" never mean anything "future" in Pāli texts. For instance: "'natthi ayaṃ loko, natthi paro loko" ("'this world does not exist, the next world does not exist" (K.N. Jayatilleke's transl., D. I.55).
natthi dinnaṃ natthi yiṭṭhaṃ, natthi hutaṃ, natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko, natthi ayaṃ loko, natthi paro loko, natthi mātā, natthi pitā, natthi sattā opapātikā, natthi loke samaṇabrāmhaṇā sammaggatā sammāpaṭipannā ye imañca lokaṃ parañca lokaṃ sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedentīti.
There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. There is no fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this world, no next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn beings; no brahmans or contemplatives who, faring rightly and practicing rightly, proclaim this world and the next after having directly known and realized it for themselves.
As I suggested in the Introduction, wrong-views, expressed by the ideas of
uccheda and sassata-dihi, were considered in the early texts, to be particularly
destructive. These classifications have already been met in the discussion of
sakkāya-dihi. One explanation of these two views is the following from the
"To state that, ‘I have a self’ (atthi me attā vā) is the view of eternalism
(sassata-diṭṭhi) which assumes the existence of a self at all times. However,
to state ‘I have no self’ (n’ atthi me attā) is the view of annihilationism
(uccheda-diṭṭhi) because it assumes the annihilation of an existing being".136
This suggests that the view ‘there is no self’ is as much a wrong-view as the
view ‘there is a self’. To posit or deny a self are wrong-views. To say that right view
is the understanding of anattā is quite different".
P. Fuller. Notion of diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism. 2005. pp. 33, 38.
paccuppannameva atthīti gaṇhanto ucchedadiṭṭhi
[with] the view "truly existing, exists", there is a taking-up of Annihilationism
Those diṭṭhis are clearly defined in the Pāli texts:
"Sabbam atthi’ti kho, Kaccana, ayameko anto. ‘Sabbam natthi’ti ayam dutiyo anto". (also "atthitañ c'eva natthitañ ca", existence and non-existence (SN 12. 15))
""All exists", Kaccana, this is one exteme. "Nothing exists", this is second extreme".
As for Alagaddūpama, I think it is clear, that it is concerned with the brahmanic eternal divine self, of which the Buddha clearly disapproves.
But, still, despite everything, we all got to have a self-respect, as the Buddha says:
‘‘yāvakīvañca, bhikkhave, bhikkhū... hirimanā bhavissanti..., vuddhiyeva, bhikkhave, bhikkhūnaṃ pāṭikaṅkhā, no parihāni (Mahāparinibbānasutta, 139, Thai edition)
"Monks, as long as monks continue to have... self-respect... then they can be expected to prosper, not to decline". (Gethin's curious translation)
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 7 guests