Why can't conceit and wrong view arise together?

Discussion of Abhidhamma and related Commentaries
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sma
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Re: Why can't conceit and wrong view arise together?

Post by sma »

But if one citta is separated from another not by seconds, but milliseconds, microseconds, or even nanoseconds, then it doesn't matter that wrong view and conceit have to arise together simultaneously on the same nanosecond, does it?
I know this, it is just like computer multitasking
Computers have the ability to switch quicky from task to task, and thus fool us into thinking the computer is doing all the tasks simultaneusly.

It's easy for me to understand that vicikīcchā and adhimokkha cannot arise together, because they are imcompatible. To stipulate that conceit and wrong view cannot arise together is really beyond my understanding. :|
santa100
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Re: Why can't conceit and wrong view arise together?

Post by santa100 »

I think the confusion is in the word "together". You'll have to be more explicit in what sense do you mean: do you mean "simultaneously together" (time-wise), or "collectively together" (space-wise)? CMA only rejects the "simultaneous" part for the reasons already provided on pages 95 and 96. And back to my previous point, if they're micro or nanoseconds apart, would our primitive mind be able to see them as simultaneous or not? If not, what is the use of insisting on their simultaneity? Why not dedicate the time and effort to develop jhanas to a whole new level so that one can see and verify the CMA's claim for himself? After all, at our current level, we can discuss all the deep Abhidhamma stuff to death and there's still no way to know for sure one way or another. Without actually getting out of the water, deep-sea fishes can only speculate about the smell, color, or taste of the air...
SarathW
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Re: Why can't conceit and wrong view arise together?

Post by SarathW »

I think the confusion is in the word "together".
Perhaps this is a more plausible explanation.
Perhaps the conceit will arise only when you have the wrong view.
“As the lamp consumes oil, the path realises Nibbana”
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Dhammanando
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Re: Why can't conceit and wrong view arise together?

Post by Dhammanando »

sma wrote: Sat May 19, 2018 10:10 am But according to the definition of "wrong view", when she's occupied with comparing herself with another, she is seeing things in a distorted way (i.e., accompanied by wrong view). Am I correct? :?:
Sure. But that two cetasikas happen to have one thing in common with each other doesn't make them the same cetasika nor does it mean that they can be simultaneously present.

Seeing things in a distorted way is what the Christian was doing before she proceeded to conceive herself in a way contrary to fact. But whereas seeing things in a distorted way is an essential feature of diṭṭhi, it is only an accidental feature of māna. What is called māna may occur either as yāthāva-mānā, “conceits that conceive in accordance with fact” or as ayāthāva-mānā, “conceits that conceive contrary to fact”. Of the nine kinds of conceit, three are yāthāva-mānā:

1. The conceit “I am superior to him” conceived by one who is in fact superior.
2. The conceit “I am equal to him” conceived by one who is in fact equal.
3. The conceit “I am inferior to him” conceived by one who is in fact inferior.

While the other six are ayāthāva-mānā:

1. The conceit “I am superior to him” conceived by one who is in fact equal.
2. The conceit “I am superior to him” conceived by one who is in fact inferior.
3. The conceit “I am equal to him” conceived by one who is in fact superior.
4. The conceit “I am equal to him” conceived by one who is in fact inferior.
5. The conceit “I am inferior to him” conceived by one who is in fact superior.
6. The conceit “I am inferior to him” conceived by one who is in fact equal.
sma wrote: Sat May 19, 2018 10:10 am In any moment when she's occupied with comparing herself with another, then she's not occupied with thinking about Christian eschatology.

According to the same logic, mental factors can only arise one after another too.
Saññā and cetanā are also different mental activities, how can they arise together?
They perform different functions, but these functions are not incompatible with each other in the way that those of diṭṭhi and māna are.
sma wrote: Sat May 19, 2018 10:10 amAnd also, how can vittaka and vicāra arise together?......
Why would they not be able to arise together?
sma wrote: Sat May 19, 2018 10:10 amHow can some mental factors arise together while others can not? What makes the difference?
There is no general answer to this. Rather, it's a question would need to be addressed on a case by case basis. In some cases it's very easy to understand why two cetasikas couldn't arise together, e.g., sloth with restlessness, or sympathetic joy with envy, or wisdom with delusion. In other cases we need to give careful attention to all four items in the cetasika's fourfold description, i.e. not just its characteristic but also its function, manifestation and proximate cause.
Rūpehi bhikkhave arūpā santatarā.
Arūpehi nirodho santataro ti.


“Bhikkhus, the formless is more peaceful than the form realms.
Cessation is more peaceful than the formless realms.”
(Santatarasutta, Iti 73)
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sma
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Re: Why can't conceit and wrong view arise together?

Post by sma »

Dhammanando wrote: Sun May 20, 2018 12:08 pm
Thank you Bhante for your patience and kindness.
You are really helpful in strengthening and deepening my study.
:bow:
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Volo
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Re: Why can't conceit and wrong view arise together?

Post by Volo »

sma wrote: Fri May 18, 2018 1:24 pm Why is it stated in Abhidhamma that these two cannot arise together?
I would simply say, they take different objects. All cetasikas associated with a particular citta should take the same object. Let's say a Christian thinks: "I will exist forever after death in the paradise" this thought becomes an object of the corresponding citta, which would have ditthi as one of the associated cetasikas. In order to have conceit he would need to think something like: "I'm better than buddhist", then māna it's there. He cannot think two types of thoughts simultaneously. In the first thought there is no comparing oneself with the others, which is necessary for conceit, in the second - no view of ethernalism, etc necessary for views. Does this make sense?
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