Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Exploring Theravāda's connections to other paths - what can we learn from other traditions, religions and philosophies?
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Nyana
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Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Nyana »

Hi pt1 & all,
pt1 wrote:I'll reply to this separately as it's not so much about practice but more about our interpretation of the texts, so here I don't mind a bit of an argument.
Ñāṇa wrote:
pt1 wrote:E.g. if he is really saying what you think he’s saying, then to me that goes directly against that SN sutta where the Buddha quite clearly says that aggregates which are anicca, dukkha and anatta, are said to exist by the wise, which imo is the same thing that the commentaries are saying on their own terms.
The sutta is SN 22.94 (S iii 138) Puppha Sutta. And the term translated as "it exists" is atthi, which doesn't have any realist connotations whatsoever. It could well be translated as "it is."
Thanks, that's the sutta. Yes, I think it's open to interpretation what "it exists" means. To me, when it's contrasted with non-existence of aggregates that are permanent, self, etc, it means that an aggregate (which is anicca, dukkha and anatta) is something that can be practically experienced in insight. I mean, if such an aggregate was just a concepts equivalent to that unicorn that Alex recently mentioned, then I don't think the Buddha would have the need to say that it exist, or even that "it is", as you say, because the unicorn obviously "is not" even though we can think it.
Ñāṇa wrote: It is very far from the ontological and realist implications of the commentarial "sabhāva."
Of course, different things can be read into the commentaries by different people. I personally feel that ascribing to commentaries various "realist, atomisitic, etc" interpretations are not correct. One particular quote I remember in this regard is from the MN tika that I saved from one of robertk's posts:
the majjhimanikaya tika (mulapariyaya sutta) has the following
to say. I use bhikkhu bodhi's translation p39.
It comments on the atthakatha which says "they bear their own
characteristics, thus they are dhammas."
The tika(subcommentary ) notes. "although there are no dhammas
devoid of their own characteristics this is said fro the purpose
of showing that mere dhammas endowed with their specific natures
devoid of such attributes as being etc... whereas such entities
as self, permanence or nature, soul, body etc are mere
misconstructions due to craving and views...and cannot be
discovered as ultinately real actualities, these dhammas
(ie.those endowed with a specific sabhava) can. these dhammas
are discovered as actually real actualties. And although there
IS NO REAL DISTINCTION between these dhammas and their
characteristics, still, in order to facilitate understanding,
the exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical
device.
Also they are borne, or they are discerned, known ,
acccording to their specific nature, thus they are dhammas"

To me this says at least two things:
1. sabhava is equivalent to the characteristics of a dhamma - individual and general characteristics.
2. practical experience of a dhamma is NO DIFFERENT to the experience of these characteristics.

So in my mind, this is absolutely identical to when the suttas say:
Form is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, etc for the rest of the aggregates, as well as anatta and dukha combinations.

which in commentarial speak equals to:
form = individual characteristic, impermanent = general characteristic, etc.

So, if considering both the suttas and commentaries in terms of describing a practical experience of insight, rather than engaging in some sort of philosophying, then imo they are speaking about the same practical experience.
I would propose that we discuss this issue by referencing relevant citations from the commentaries, as you have done here. In addition, it would also be useful to include references and citations from contemporary authorities on the Abhidhamma and the Mahāvihāra commentarial literature. This would include both scholars and meditation teachers such as the Burmese teachers who rely strictly on Mahāvihāra abhidhammika tenets ("scholar" and "meditation teacher" are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories).

In The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), Dr. Y. Karunadasa, an authoritative Sri Lankan Abhidhamma scholar, tells us that:
  • All the different modes of analysis and classification found in the Abhidhamma stem from a single philosophical principle, which gave direction and shape to the entire project of systematization. This principle is the notion that all the phenomena of empirical existence are made up of a number of elementary constituents, the ultimate realities behind the manifest phenomena. These elementary constituents, the building blocks of experience, are called dhammas. The dhamma theory is not merely one principle among others in the body of Abhidhamma philosophy but the base upon which the entire system rests.
It might be worth discussing to what degree the Mahāvihāra commentarial tenets are reliable and accurate references regarding the teaching of the Buddha (Buddhasāsana), particularly as it pertains to right view (sammādiṭṭhi), as right view is essential for right meditation (sammāsamādhi).

Specifically, it seems that there are three interrelated principles that are central to the Mahāvihāra commentarial view:
  • 1.the dhamma theory (dhammavāda)
    2.the theory of radical momentariness (khaṇavāda)
    3.the theory of two truths (sammutisacca & paramatthasacca)
Again, I would suggest that referencing and citing contemporary abhidhammika authorities is one way of avoiding misrepresenting the commentarial tradition as it is presently understood and taught.

Anything that you or any other member may wish to add is welcome. :)

Geoff
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings Geoff,
Ñāṇa wrote:Specifically, it seems that there are three interrelated principles that are central to the Mahāvihāra commentarial view:
  • 1.the dhamma theory (dhammavāda)
    2.the theory of radical momentariness (khaṇavāda)
    3.the theory of two truths (sammutisacca & paramatthasacca)
Again, I would suggest that referencing and citing contemporary abhidhammika authorities is one way of avoiding misrepresenting the commentarial tradition as it is presently understood and taught.
You set tough criteria here... tough criteria that I suspect will at some point throughout the topic probably waltz out the window. In the meantime though, here's the following comments from Bhikkhu Bodhi, a contemporary Abhidhammika authority, which relate to all three of the above.
Bhikkhu Bodhi, in response to thhe writings of Nanavira Thera wrote:Like Ven. ~Naa.naviira, I take as the sole ultimate authority for interpretation of the Dhamma the Buddha's discourses as found in the four main Nikaayas and in the older strata of the Khuddaka Nikaaya. I share with Ven. ~Naa.naviira the view that these books can be considered the most trustworthy record of the Buddha's teachings, and hence should be turned to as the final court of appeal for resolving questions about the correct interpretation of the Dhamma.
...

We must certainly accept the findings of scientific scholarship regarding the dating of the canonical and post-canonical texts, and should recognize that Theravaada doctrine has evolved in several strata through the Abhidhamma, the Commentaries, and the later exegetical works.
...

I also believe that the Commentaries take unnecessary risks when they try to read back into the Suttas ideas deriving from tools of interpretation that appeared perhaps centuries after the Suttas were compiled.
All three of these notions you list above make no appearance in the Suttas, and thereby fall into the "ideas deriving from tools of interpretation" category.
Ñāṇa wrote:It might be worth discussing to what degree the Mahāvihāra commentarial tenets are reliable and accurate references regarding the teaching of the Buddha (Buddhasāsana), particularly as it pertains to right view (sammādiṭṭhi), as right view is essential for right meditation (sammāsamādhi).
Indeed. Thank you for clearly enunciating how this is not a case of "pointless posturing that proves nothing and simply derails communication".

Metta,
Retro. :)
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by mikenz66 »

retrofuturist wrote:
Ñāṇa wrote:It might be worth discussing to what degree the Mahāvihāra commentarial tenets are reliable and accurate references regarding the teaching of the Buddha (Buddhasāsana), particularly as it pertains to right view (sammādiṭṭhi), as right view is essential for right meditation (sammāsamādhi).
Indeed. Thank you for clearly enunciating how this is not a case of "pointless posturing that proves nothing and simply derails communication".
Yes, I'd be interested in seeing a coherent exposition on some of these issues and how they might actually make a difference to practical matters.

Mike
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings Mike,
mikenz66 wrote:Yes, I'd be interested in seeing a coherent exposition on some of these issues and how they might actually make a difference to practical matters.
I might have some things to share later on, regarding matters which (to quote Geoff) "pertains to right view (sammādiṭṭhi), as right view is essential for right meditation (sammāsamādhi)"... thereby evidently falling into the category of (to quote you) "practical matters" (i.e. pertaining to the Noble Eightfold Path). If you disagree that Right View is a "practical matter", please speak now (or forever hold your peace?)
MN 117: Maha-cattarisaka Sutta' wrote:Right view is the forerunner. And how is right view the forerunner? In one of right view, right resolve comes into being. In one of right resolve, right speech comes into being. In one of right speech, right action... In one of right action, right livelihood... In one of right livelihood, right effort... In one of right effort, right mindfulness... In one of right mindfulness, right concentration... In one of right concentration, right knowledge... In one of right knowledge, right release comes into being. Thus the learner is endowed with eight factors, and the arahant with ten.
MN 117: Maha-cattarisaka Sutta' wrote:"One tries to abandon wrong view & to enter into right view: This is one's right effort. One is mindful to abandon wrong view & to enter & remain in right view: This is one's right mindfulness. Thus these three qualities — right view, right effort, & right mindfulness — run & circle around right view."
However, I shan't be "referencing and citing contemporary abhidhammika authorities", so I shall refrain from making such contributions until such time as others have extended the scope of inquiry beyond this limited range.

Metta,
Retro. :)
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Nyana »

pt1 wrote:
Ñāṇa wrote: It is very far from the ontological and realist implications of the commentarial "sabhāva."
Of course, different things can be read into the commentaries by different people. I personally feel that ascribing to commentaries various "realist, atomisitic, etc" interpretations are not correct.
In The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma (p. 20), Dr. Karunadasa states:
  • What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas is a critical realism, one which recognizes the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
And on page 22 he tells us that:
  • [A] dhamma is a truly existent thing (sabhavasiddha)
And on page 14:
  • The description of dhammas as paramattha means ... objective existence.... [T]he ultimate irreducible data of cognition are the subjective counterparts of the ultimate irreducible data of objective existence.
And so according to Dr. Karunadasa, the dhamma theory, which is the basis for the entire abhidhammika project: (1) is realist, and this is because (2) dhamma-s have ontological primacy as truly existent objective things independent of cognition.

Later I will offer some commentarial citations which may hopefully support Dr. Karunadasa's analysis of the dhamma theory.... But that's all I have time for at present.

All the best,

Geoff
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Paññāsikhara »

Prof Y Karunadasa's new book should be published soon, within a couple of months. He has polished his understanding of the Abhidhamma and Mahavihara commentaries over the years, and the newest version will include more context for their teachings, ie. with respect to the teachings of other Buddhist systems, and the Abhidhamma / Abhidharma movement as a whole (not just that found presently in Pali).
My recently moved Blog, containing some of my writings on the Buddha Dhamma, as well as a number of translations from classical Buddhist texts and modern authors, liturgy, etc.: Huifeng's Prajnacara Blog.
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Nyana »

Paññāsikhara wrote:Prof Y Karunadasa's new book should be published soon, within a couple of months. He has polished his understanding of the Abhidhamma and Mahavihara commentaries over the years, and the newest version will include more context for their teachings, ie. with respect to the teachings of other Buddhist systems, and the Abhidhamma / Abhidharma movement as a whole (not just that found presently in Pali).
Hello Ven. Huifeng,

The BPS Wheel publication of The Dhamma Theory was published in 1996, thirty years after the publication of his doctoral thesis. Are you suggesting that it isn't representative of his current understanding?

Best wishes,

Geoff
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by tiltbillings »

Ñāṇa wrote:Are you suggesting that it isn't representative of his current understanding?
It happens that scholars can radically change their how they see things. David Kaluphana's ideas about Nagarjuna is a nice example. Any way, it will be interesting to see if that is the case with Karunadasa.
>> Do you see a man wise [enlightened/ariya] in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<< -- Proverbs 26:12

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Alex123 »

Hello Geoff, and all,
Ñāṇa wrote: Hi Alex,

It's quite simple. The criteria is explicitly stated in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta. The four great references (mahāpadesā) clearly explain that concerning issues regarding the clarification or authenticity of Dhammavinaya, the dhamma of the sutta-s and the rules of the vinaya are the sole authority. Any commentary or interpretation of dhamma needs to be verified by tracing it back to the sutta-s.

The Mahāvihāra claim that the dhamma referred to in the mahāpadesā includes the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, and that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka was spoken by the Buddha (excepting the Kathāvatthu), cannot be sustained because the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, as well as the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikāya, are all post-schismatic sectarian compositions which couldn't have existed at the time of the Buddha's parinibbāna.
The composition of 5 Nikayas was also "post historical Buddha" done by the Theras...

Also we need to know what exactly was meant by the "suttas". Material found in Sutta-Pitaka? Or suttas as opposed to veyykarana, jataka, and so on.
And if we include veyykarana, then why can't Abhidhamma be part of it?


As for comparing a" certain interpretation " of the suttas with the suttas, what I have found is that sometimes a sutta can be interpreted in different ways. And who knows which interpretation is right.


With metta,

Alex
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Alex123 »

On sabhāva:

This is my understanding of it: Different phenomena have different induvidial characteristics. Otherwise how can you distinguish lets say (lobha) vs dislike (dosa)? They each have their own unique characteristic, unique nature (sa bhāva). While an idea of "a unicorn" has different level of truth, than idea of "this horse", they both have one thing in common. They depend on mind to express the idea. Recognition of "unicorn, horse, etc" is sanna, a trully existing momentary reality.


The issue of lets say momentariness is implied in the suttas:
Ex: The Bahiya going from good worldling to an Arahant within seconds. To me this implies that 4 paths and 4 fruits can be momentary.

The case of suicide monks (Channa, Vakkali, Godhika). If it is true that an aryan cannot commit suicide, then they would have to go through 4 paths and 4 fruits in a matter of seconds (or even a split second) after they cut their juggular vein.

In AN book of 1s there are many quotes that factors of N8P and 37 factors of awakening can last as long as a fingersnap.



IMHO,


With metta,

Alex
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Nyana »

Hi Alex,
Alex123 wrote:
Ñāṇa wrote:It's quite simple. The criteria is explicitly stated in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta. The four great references (mahāpadesā) clearly explain that concerning issues regarding the clarification or authenticity of Dhammavinaya, the dhamma of the sutta-s and the rules of the vinaya are the sole authority. Any commentary or interpretation of dhamma needs to be verified by tracing it back to the sutta-s.

The Mahāvihāra claim that the dhamma referred to in the mahāpadesā includes the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, and that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka was spoken by the Buddha (excepting the Kathāvatthu), cannot be sustained because the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, as well as the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikāya, are all post-schismatic sectarian compositions which couldn't have existed at the time of the Buddha's parinibbāna.
why can't Abhidhamma be part of it?
Because of the two reasons already supplied:
Ñāṇa wrote:If the compositions of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, etc., were extant at that time, and were considered to have been spoken by the Buddha, then (1) all of the early Nikāya sects would have very similar abhidhamma compositions (just as they have very similar sutta compositions); and (2) all of the early Nikāya sects would have unquestionably considered their own abhidhamma collections to have been spoken by the Buddha. Neither of these are the case. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikāya are all post-schismatic sectarian compositions.
Alex123 wrote:As for comparing a" certain interpretation " of the suttas with the suttas, what I have found is that sometimes a sutta can be interpreted in different ways. And who knows which interpretation is right.
Any interpretation should be supported by what the sutta-s actually state on the matter in question.
Alex123 wrote:On sabhāva:

This is my understanding of it: Different phenomena have different induvidial characteristics. Otherwise how can you distinguish lets say (lobha) vs dislike (dosa)? They each have their own unique characteristic, unique nature (sa bhāva). While an idea of "a unicorn" has different level of truth, than idea of "this horse", they both have one thing in common. They depend on mind to express the idea. Recognition of "unicorn, horse, etc" is sanna, a trully existing momentary reality.
In Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (p. 122), Noa Ronkin says:
  • The early Abhidhamma dhamma analysis also intends to ascertain that every psychophysical event is knowable and nameable, and that the words and concepts employed in the systematic discourse that is thus developed uniquely define their corresponding referents. In this respect the dhamma analysis … paves the way for conceptual realism – a worldview that is based on the notion of truth as constituted by a correspondence between our concepts and statements, on the one hand, and the features of an independent, determinate reality, on the other hand.
But reified individuation is part of the problem, not the solution. It doesn’t matter if that individuation is the view of self-identity (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) or the reified individuation of truly existing things (sabhāvasiddhā). In either case, such individuation is rooted in ignorance of dependent arising. Visuddhimaggamahāṭīkā (Be CSCD 1 343):
  • [Conditioned dhammas] individual essences (sabhāva) have rise and fall and change. Herein, conditioned dhammas' arising owing to causes and conditions, their coming to be after non-existence, their acquisition of an individual self (attalābha), is 'rise'. Their momentary cessation when arisen is 'fall'. Their changedness due to aging is 'change'.
Here we have dhamma-s being born acquiring individuation, then aging, and finally ceasing. All in light-speed succession. The entire formulation of what is supposedly ultimately real has no reality other than mere conceptual designation (paññatti). It references no ultimate location or basis of designation. This proposition of radical momentary individuation is no more “real” than a unicorn. Sn 3.12: Dvayatānupassanā Sutta:
  • Entrenched in name and form,
    They conceive that “This is true.”

    In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,
    It turns out other than that.
    For that is what is false about it.
    Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.

    But nibbāna does not have a false nature.
    That the noble ones truly know.
    Through fully comprehending the truth,
    They are without hunger, quenched.
In short, no dhamma can be individuated without two key links of dependent arising: consciousness, and name (i.e. intention, attention, contact, feeling, apperception) & form. And these two links are what enable one to fabricate a “world” of ongoing dissatisfaction. SN 35.116: Lokantagamana Sutta:
  • Monks, I say that the end of the world cannot be known, seen, or reached by traveling. Yet, I also say that without reaching the end of the world there is no making an end to suffering....

    That in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world (lokasaññī hoti), a conceiver of the world (lokamānī) – this is called the world in the Noble One’s Discipline. And what, friends, is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world?

    The eye is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world.

    The ear… The nose… The tongue… The body…

    The mind is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world.
Alex123 wrote:The issue of lets say momentariness is implied in the suttas:
Ex: The Bahiya going from good worldling to an Arahant within seconds. To me this implies that 4 paths and 4 fruits can be momentary.

The case of suicide monks (Channa, Vakkali, Godhika). If it is true that an aryan cannot commit suicide, then they would have to go through 4 paths and 4 fruits in a matter of seconds (or even a split second) after they cut their juggular vein.

In AN book of 1s there are many quotes that factors of N8P and 37 factors of awakening can last as long as a fingersnap.
These examples have nothing to do with the theory of radical momentariness.

All the best,

Geoff
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by Alex123 »

Ñāṇa wrote:Hi Alex,

In Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (p. 122), Noa Ronkin says:
  • The early Abhidhamma dhamma analysis also intends to ascertain that every psychophysical event is knowable and nameable, and that the words and concepts employed in the systematic discourse that is thus developed uniquely define their corresponding referents. In this respect the dhamma analysis … paves the way for conceptual realism – a worldview that is based on the notion of truth as constituted by a correspondence between our concepts and statements, on the one hand, and the features of an independent, determinate reality, on the other hand.
What is the problem with that? How can mental event be unknowable? Didn't the Buddha in the sutta define 5 aggregates, 12 bases, 18 elements, 108 feelings and so on? If 108 feelings are indistinguishable, then why did the Buddha bother to tell them? How can different elements in Dependent Origination be indistinguishable? Of course they have different referents and are different elements with different natures.


As to "conceptual realism" it depends what is meant. Maybe it is misinterpretation of Abh, Comy?

Mental states exist and are real, otherwise you wouldn't KNOW anything that you are reading right now.

Also the mental states can be distinguished from each other. Like is different from dislike. Merit is different from demerit. One of them always beneficial and another is always wrong. Is that so unbelievable? I find it harder to believe in some sort of nothingness without any distinction between A and not-A, A and B, etc.
But reified individuation is part of the problem, not the solution. It doesn’t matter if that individuation is the view of self-identity (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) or the reified individuation of truly existing things (sabhāvasiddhā). In either case, such individuation is rooted in ignorance of dependent arising. Visuddhimaggamahāṭīkā (Be CSCD 1 343):
A moment of greed is different from a moment of non-greed. I personally can't believe that greed and non-greed cannot be distinquished.

Here we have dhamma-s being born acquiring individuation, then aging, and finally ceasing.
Right. There are differences. We aren't existing in some undifferentiated whole.


All in light-speed succession. The entire formulation of what is supposedly ultimately real has no reality other than mere conceptual designation (paññatti). It references no ultimate location or basis of designation. This proposition of radical momentary individuation is no more “real” than a unicorn. Sn 3.12: Dvayatānupassanā Sutta:
  • Entrenched in name and form,
    They conceive that “This is true.”

    In whatever way (worldlings) conceive it,
    It turns out other than that.
    For that is what is false about it.
    Whatever is transitory certainly has a false nature.

    But nibbāna does not have a false nature.
    That the noble ones truly know.
    Through fully comprehending the truth,
    They are without hunger, quenched.
The conceiving is either about philosophical theories, self view or jhanas (see MN113)
http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/ ... isa-e.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;


In short, no dhamma can be individuated without two key links of dependent arising: consciousness, and name (i.e. intention, attention, contact, feeling, apperception) & form. And these two links are what enable one to fabricate a “world” of ongoing dissatisfaction. SN 35.116: Lokantagamana Sutta:
Right, these are 3 ultimate categories of (citta, cetasika and rupa).

These examples have nothing to do with the theory of radical momentariness.

All the best,

Geoff
They do. Mind doesn't need to remain in "frozen" state for a long time. It is the fastest thing that changes with no simile as to how fast it can change.

"I don't envision a single thing that is as quick to reverse itself as the mind — so much so that there is no feasible simile for how quick to reverse itself it is."
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Also please don't say that you believe in Sarvastivadin idea of unchanging dhammas. Past does not exist anymore, future does not yet exist, only present moment is. What has just happened does not exist NOW. The present moment ceases every moment and with more attention and the closer you look, the shorter it really is.


With metta,

Alex
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings Alex,
Alex123 wrote:
Ñāṇa wrote:In Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (p. 122), Noa Ronkin says:
  • The early Abhidhamma dhamma analysis also intends to ascertain that every psychophysical event is knowable and nameable, and that the words and concepts employed in the systematic discourse that is thus developed uniquely define their corresponding referents. In this respect the dhamma analysis … paves the way for conceptual realism – a worldview that is based on the notion of truth as constituted by a correspondence between our concepts and statements, on the one hand, and the features of an independent, determinate reality, on the other hand.
What is the problem with that?
The incompatibility of the section I've bolded above and the opening line from the Dhammapada.

Mind precedes all dhammas. Mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought. (Dhp 1)

Metta,
Retro. :)
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by tiltbillings »

retrofuturist wrote: The incompatibility of the section I've bolded above and the opening line from the Dhammapada.
Ona technical note: bold does not show up too well with the color scheme used here, particularly in a "quote" section.
Mind precedes all dhammas. Mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought. (Dhp 1)
All depends upon what dhamma means here.
>> Do you see a man wise [enlightened/ariya] in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<< -- Proverbs 26:12

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723
alan
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Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View

Post by alan »

Dhammapada is a beautiful work of poetry. But there are so many translations; it is hard to get a hold of a solid meaning.
The book I have here by Thanissaro says "Phenomena are preceded by the heart, ruled by the heart, made of the heart."

What is your take?
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