Dhamma Wheel Buddhist Forum

Hi all,

Could someone explain to me if Theravada looks at the nature of reality in much the same way as the Tibetan schools do - ie Nargajuna and the Prasangikas. I see this as critical in the path to liberation - everything we experience is illusory and has no real substance, like a dream. Surely the realisation of this is fundamental to enlightenment. I dont see (in my limited experience) that Theravada has any analytical meditation process on Emptiness...or am I off the mark?

Thanks,

Tony...

ashtanga wrote:Hi all,

Could someone explain to me if Theravada looks at the nature of reality in much the same way as the Tibetan schools do - ie Nargajuna and the Prasangikas. I see this as critical in the path to liberation - everything we experience is illusory and has no real substance, like a dream. Surely the realisation of this is fundamental to enlightenment. I dont see (in my limited experience) that Theravada has any analytical meditation process on Emptiness...or am I off the mark?

Thanks,

Tony...

Nagarjuna does not say things are illusions, but are like illusions. The Theravada Pali suttas state:

Form is like a mass of foam
And feeling - but an airy bubble.
Perception is like a mirage
And formations a plantain tree.

Consciousness is a magic-show,
A juggler's trick entire,
All these similes were made known
By the 'Kinsman-of-the-Sun." S.III.142.

As for meditaion, vipassana is a practice for seeing the interdependent rise and fall of what it is the we are/expereince.

As for dhammas, the "ultimate things," what kind of "ultimate things" are they? Piatigorsky, in his studies of the Theravadin Abhidhamma Pitaka texts (THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT 1984, 181) points out dharmas are not substances; they are not 'things' in and of themselves:

We simpy cannot say that 'a dharma is... (a predicate follows)', because a dharma, in fact, 'is' no thing, yet [it is] a term denoting (not being) a certain relation or type of relation to thought, consciousness or mind. That is, dharma is not a concept in the accepted terminological sense of the latter, but a purely relational notion.

ashtanga wrote:I dont see (in my limited experience) that Theravada has any analytical meditation process on Emptiness...or am I off the mark?

For non-mahayana it is utterly nihilistic to say that, an apple for example, does not come from its own side.

Of course it comes from its own side! It is made up of fundamental particles (ie. ultimates). If it wasn't, there would be nothing to appear to your eye sense power. Since nothing could appear to your eye sense power, an eye sense consciousness is impossible. And of course you could never cognize apples with your mental consciousness.

Interestingly Mind-Only calls Madhyamika nihilistic because they over-negate reality. Lower Madhyamika calls 'Higher' Madhyamika nihilistic because they over-negate reality. 'Higher' Madhyamika asserts that all other schools have grosser and grosser dualistic appearance.

5heaps wrote:

ashtanga wrote:I dont see (in my limited experience) that Theravada has any analytical meditation process on Emptiness...or am I off the mark?

For non-mahayana it is utterly nihilistic to say that, an apple for example, does not come from its own side.

Of course it comes from its own side! It is made up of fundamental particles (ie. ultimates).

Of course for the Theravada those "fundamental particle" are not self existing things and "exist" dependent upon conditions.

tiltbillings wrote:

5heaps wrote:

ashtanga wrote:I dont see (in my limited experience) that Theravada has any analytical meditation process on Emptiness...or am I off the mark?

For non-mahayana it is utterly nihilistic to say that, an apple for example, does not come from its own side.

Of course it comes from its own side! It is made up of fundamental particles (ie. ultimates).

Of course for the Theravada those "fundamental particle" are not self existing things and "exist" dependent upon conditions.

Yep, and hopefully no buddhist system will ever live to assert that things could be self existing in this way (ie. as non dependent arisings, as being able to endure for a second moment through their own accord).

5heaps wrote:

tiltbillings wrote:Of course for the Theravada those "fundamental particle" are not self existing things and "exist" dependent upon conditions.

Yep, and hopefully no buddhist system will ever live to assert that things could be self existing in this way (ie. as non dependent arisings, as being able to endure for a second moment through their own accord).

Well... not quite the same as an apple, but the sarvativada abhidharma states that space is unconditioned. =)

seanpdx wrote:

5heaps wrote:

tiltbillings wrote:Of course for the Theravada those "fundamental particle" are not self existing things and "exist" dependent upon conditions.

Yep, and hopefully no buddhist system will ever live to assert that things could be self existing in this way (ie. as non dependent arisings, as being able to endure for a second moment through their own accord).

Well... not quite the same as an apple, but the sarvativada abhidharma states that space is unconditioned. =)

No problem, 'things' means conditioned things, meaning objects produced through causes and conditions. Therefore space never could have the problem of enduring for a second moment of its own accord, because it never had a first moment.

Hi ashtanga
I second Tilt's statements above.
I would also like to add to the verses he reproduced with this fine verse from the Dhammapada, reprinted in the Visuddhimagga which touches on the subject of 'emptimess and 'illusion'

And he who looks upon the world
As one who looks upon a bubble,
As one who looks upon a mirage,
Is out of sight of Death the King

-- Dhp 170 in Vism XXI, 27

kind regards

Ben

The Theravada position is a lot like the Sautrantikas, but not the Vaibhasika / Sarvastivadins.
This Theravada / Sautrantika position is in turn similar to, but not identical with, the basic Madhyamaka.
However, the Madhyamaka, especially if it is read through Mahayana sutras (which is almost always the case) has some other ideas, besides.

All are "illusory" (like illusion, mayopama), but they don't quite mean the same thing.
Likewise for "empty", too.

Paññāsikhara wrote:This Theravada / Sautrantika position is in turn similar to, but not identical with, the basic Madhyamaka.

In line with ashtanga's question, in what way are they similar?

I can give 1000 reasons why they are completely dissimilar, without explicitly relying on the fact that for 2000 years Sautrantika has laughed at Arya Nagarjuna etc for simply being nihilist.

Hi all,

Not sure how Nargajuna could be seen as nilhistic(?) As there is nothing that exists inherently, independently without relying upon anything else (ad nauseum) then our experiences of inherent existence (which is how we experience all phenomena) must be illusory.

This isn't nilhistic, its just true...

ashtanga wrote:This isn't nilhistic, its just true...

Well, there's a way of testing it.

What caused the death of almost 300,000 people by tsunami?

Mahayana emptiness asserts that the wave that crushes you is devoid of arising from a separate karmic seed than the subject consciousness that is experiencing it. This is outright nihilism to a non-Mahayanist, who further calls it meaningless drivel because, as everyone knows, and which Shravaka Aryas confirm, physical things are dependent about physical cause and effects (ie. based on findable physical ultimates, or some lesser explanation).

5heaps wrote:

ashtanga wrote:This isn't nilhistic, its just true...

Well, there's a way of testing it.

What caused the death of almost 300,000 people by tsunami?

Mahayana emptiness asserts that the wave that crushes you is devoid of arising from a separate karmic seed than the subject consciousness that is experiencing it. This is outright nihilism to a non-Mahayanist, who further calls it meaningless drivel because, as everyone knows, and which Shravaka Aryas confirm, physical things are dependent about physical cause and effects (ie. based on findable physical ultimates, or some lesser explanation).

The Mahayana [read Tibetan scholastic Madhyamaka] jargon is a pain in the ass.

You might want to put this into clear, concise English, given that majority here are not versed in Mahayana jargon. Also, you want to take some time to unpack the following so we know what actually is and who actually is that is being referred to here: ". . . which Shravaka Aryas confirm, physical things are dependent about physical cause and effects (ie. based on findable physical ultimates, or some lesser explanation)."

tiltbillings wrote:The Mahayana [read Tibetan scholastic Madhyamaka] jargon is a pain in the ass.

Uhhh, you don't know the half of it. Try dealing with each english scholar (ie. Dr Berzin, Dr Hopkins, Geshe Michael Roach, etc) each using their own unique english translations for the same ideas. You spend half your time working out what they're trying to refer to with the word they have chosen to use (until you understand the ideas very well and can recognize the meaning of the word based from how its being used - which takes years. Or until you learn tibetan well, which is much quicker). But, I really did try to talk as plainly as possible when giving the example.

I'll try to elaborate further. For example, the tactile sense consciousness of the body sense power and the object of that consciousness are devoid (empty) of arising from different sources (ie. they have a common natal source). In other words, although there is a subject and object, and an interaction between subject and object, they are the same essential nature.

This is very different to the, much more normal idea, that they ARE different natures, and that this must necessarily be the case in order to cognize a taxi. For example, if the taxi wasn't there you couldn't see it. How is it there? Well, a physical taxi is there through its physical causes and conditions, ultimately reducible down to its indivisible particles, which are also there. (Furthermore, Aryas, Arhats and Buddhas cognize these indivisible particles [and indivisible moments of mind], because that's for example how they gain powers over the elements, and their liberation from the cycle.) In other words if you accept this senseless mahayana emptiness stuff you not only negate taxis, you not only negate external indivisible particles, but you even negate nirvana - and what could possibly be more terrible than that?

5heaps wrote: Uhhh, you don't know the half of it. Try dealing with each english scholar (ie. Dr Berzin, Dr Hopkins, Geshe Michael Roach, etc) each using their own unique english translations for the same ideas.

Hopkins' poly syllabic use of English is abysmal. I could not take Roach seriously if my life depended upon it.

I'll try to elaborate further. For example, the tactile sense consciousness of the body sense power and the object of that consciousness are devoid (empty) of arising from different sources (ie. they have a common natal source). In other words, although there is a subject and object, and an interaction between subject and object, they are the same essential nature.

Common natal source means what?

Well, a physical taxi is there through its physical causes and conditions, ultimately reducible down to its indivisible particles, which are also there. (Furthermore, Aryas, Arhats and Buddhas cognize these indivisible particles [and indivisible moments of mind], because that's for example how they gain powers over the elements, and their liberation from the cycle.) In other words if you accept this senseless mahayana emptiness stuff you not only negate taxis, you not only negate external indivisible particles, but you even negate nirvana - and what could possibly be more terrible than that?

[/quote] Indivisible particles? Who holds that view?

Some of this is word games. What, in fact, are you "negating?"