Interpenetrationality

[davidbrainerd]

One of my motivations in asking this question, and starting this thread, was to counter the widely held misconception (obviously not one that is widely held here) that "Hinayana" (since people who hold this misconception would use that term for Theravada) is reducible to simply substance dualism in its essential form. I have heard many people, who were unfortunately misinformed regarding Theravada, who say things like "It is the fatal mistake of the Sthaviravāda that they developed the curious doctrine that Nibbana and samsara are different realities existent in-and-of themselves" (my phrasing, but I have heard this said many times, in similar ways). One of my hopes would be that I would be able to witness some counter-argumentation against such a misconception.

Anyone not realizing that Nibbana and samsara are different realities existent in-and-of themselves is eternally damned to keep repeating the cycle of reincarnation in samsara (unless they figure it out in subsequent life).

And although I fully anticipate someone saying its horrible that I said that, I think it would be disingenuous of Mahayanana to complain about it considering that they explicitly say the goal of Mahayana is not to get to Nirvana but to reincarnate forever because to them Nirvana is only like a hotel where you go rest a bit before reincarnating again. So since they explicitly state that their goal is to be stuck in samsara forever, none should object that I believe their vehicle will accomplish that for them quite nicely, just like a truck with no rims will keep you in the same place and take you nowhere.

[tiltbillings]

they explicitly say the goal of Mahayana is not to get to Nirvana but to reincarnate forever because to them Nirvana is only like a hotel where you go rest a bit before reincarnating again. So since they explicitly state that their goal is to be stuck in samsara forever, none should object that I believe their vehicle will accomplish that for them quite nicely, just like a truck with no rims will keep you in the same place and take you nowhere.

All the Mahayanists say that?

[Coëmgenu]

Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun (Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism) was the Lusthaus book I referred to earlier. Sorry I did not put in the full name! One of his points is that both Tiantai and Hua-yen are influenced by, partially based on, or continue both Yogacara and Madhyamaka.

But also keep in mind that Zhiyi was writing before any Yogacara texts were even translated into Chinese. It was his successors who fought with the Huayan school and adopted some Yogacara influence.

We don't have a Hua-yen or Tientai criticism of Theravada because the Chinese were not very aware of its existence. Theravada was not among the 18 schools included amongst the Hinayana in the earlier Mahayana. Most probably as it did not exist yet! Hinayana is used almost exclusively in Chinese Buddhism to criticize a specific limited attitude by Mahayana practitioners. I think only 2 or so of the 18 schools called Hinayana ever made it to China and died out in India. So there would be no possibility of intellectual engagement.[/quote]What were the schools considered Hinayana and where does the list come from? This sort of blows my own theory about what Hinayana meant out of the water.

I understand that there are some sectarians who claim that Theravada would have been condemned as Hinayana, but that is just speculation and seems more a continuation of early Western confusion of Theravada with one of the 18 schools.

That Theravada=Hinayana at all seems to be a British contrivance of early Western Buddhology that caught on in Asia because they were so bamboozled by the technological achievements of Europe. I already cited this book in a different thread, but it deserves mention here too. One of the things it dealt with is how colonial powers built the contrived notions of Mahayana-as-pseudo-Protestant-reform, Theravada-as-Hinayana, and Theravada-as-original-Buddhism.

[Javi]

One of my motivations in asking this question, and starting this thread, was to counter the widely held misconception (obviously not one that is widely held here) that "Hinayana" (since people who hold this misconception would use that term for Theravada) is reducible to simply substance dualism in its essential form. I have heard many people, who were unfortunately misinformed regarding Theravada, who say things like "It is the fatal mistake of the Sthaviravāda that they developed the curious doctrine that Nibbana and samsara are different realities existent in-and-of themselves" (my phrasing, but I have heard this said many times, in similar ways). One of my hopes would be that I would be able to witness some counter-argumentation against such a misconception.

The issue here for people who make that argument is what is called in philosophy a category mistake.

Basically we have three views:

A. Nibbana is the extinction of greed, hatred, delusion; also the fetters, the influxes, etc.
B. Nibbana and samsara are different realities existent in-and-of themselves
C. Nibbana is interpenetrated by everything else, including evil (such as greed, hatred, etc.)

Statement A is not making any metaphysical statement, it simply defines nibbana in an apophatic way. Statement B is attempting to understand the issue metaphysically (which the Buddha in the early texts refuses to do, and later Abhidharmists and Mahayana philosophers attempted to do). I think this is a kind of miscommunication and misunderstanding here, A does not entail B - they are different arguments about different topics. In the same vein, the rejection of B does not necessarily entail the affirmation of C.

I think this is the source of disagreement and why we keep going around in circles in this thread. Some Mahayanists seems to hold to that A entails B. And since B is unacceptable to them as per Nagarjuna (which is funny, because Nagarjuna was just a philosopher, not the Buddha) then they make move C. Of course, view C is not held by all Mahayanists, view C is not in Nagarjuna, or Vasubandhu for example. View C is a further elaboration of Nagarjuna's rejection of view B.

My view and I would say, the view of the early Buddhist texts, is that there is no need to posit view B or its opposite, because the Buddha states, as per the Malunkyaputta sutta and other suttas, that asking such questions are unhelpful and pointless to reaching the goal. So I would reject B, reject the opposite of B, and C as pointless questions. Using philosophical jargon, this is what is called epoché by the ancient Greek philosophers, or "suspension". I would say that the Buddha would simply ask us to suspend judgment on those kinds of unhelpful views.

I don't doubt that Zhiyi polemicized against whatever he considered to be "Hinayana" (I wont claim to have read everything he wrote, having only skimmed a meditation manual, and only starting to try to work my way through his corpus) but he seems to treat Hinayana more as a catch-all term for laziness in observing the precepts and heretical metaphysics, rather than a specific school of Buddhists in Sri Lanka who preserve an ancient text. Because I am curious, do you have some quotes on-hand of him polemicizing against sravakas in particular? Don't bother yourself to go digging though if you don't happen to have any immediately on-hand, I'm not calling you out on suspected misinformation or anything. I am sure I can research it on my own.

The Lotus Sutra is the equivalent of an Abhidharma in the Lotus tradition. For Lotus practitioners, Tiantai included, reciting the Lotus Sutra is a form of buddhānusmṛti, if that gives some context.

Actually my understanding is that he subsumes sravakas under Bodhisattvahood as per the Lotus sutra, so for him anyone practicing srvaka path is really secretly practicing Bodhisattvahood, even though they do not know it. In the Mohe Zhiguan I believe there are meditative contemplations on how the sravaka path is not the highest path. My sources for this are not primary though since this text has not been fully translated.

http://www.elibrary.ibc.ac.th/files/pri ... tation.pdf

[Caodemarte]

[

The issue here for people who make that argument is what is called in philosophy a category mistake.

Basically we have three views:

A. Nibbana is the extinction of greed, hatred, delusion; also the fetters, the influxes, etc.
B. Nibbana and samsara are different realities existent in-and-of themselves
C. Nibbana is interpenetrated by everything else, including evil (such as greed, hatred, etc.)

I think this is the source of disagreement and why we keep going around in circles in this thread. Some Mahayanists seems to hold to that A entails B. And since B is unacceptable to them as per Nagarjuna (which is funny, because Nagarjuna was just a philosopher, not the Buddha) then they make move C. Of course, view C is not held by all Mahayanists, view C is not in Nagarjuna, or Vasubandhu for example. View C is a further elaboration of Nagarjuna's rejection of view B.

I would say that the Buddha would simply ask us to suspend judgment on those kinds of unhelpful views.
I don't doubt that Zhiyi polemicized against whatever he considered to be "Hinayana" (I wont claim to have read everything he wrote, having only skimmed a meditation manual, and only starting to try to work my way through his corpus)

Huayen and Tientai would have no problem with A if you understand the word "extinction" to mean "liberation from" done by seeing through to reality rather than as the literal destruction of separate objects not in relationships with the rest of reality ( if they were you could not affect them and vice versa by definition). For them, this is only possible if things interpenetrate, which means in this usage that all dharmas and things are dependently arising with everything caused by (and causing) everything else .Heart Sutra puts it form is no different from emptiness, emptiness is no different from form. As I mentioned earlier, this all has a soteriological purpose and is meant to be a helpful and true clarification. It is meant to steer you away from the traps, one of which is thinking emptiness is a thing. It is not meant as another view to be attached to. So if you find this particular raft too heavy, by all means ignore it.

Personally I am not trying to tell anyone this or that is valid or not, just to clarify what the views actually are. It will be helpful when
Paul Swanson's complete translation of Zhiyi's Mohe Zhiguan is published (at least in theory) in 2017.

[Javi]

if you understand the word "extinction" to mean "liberation from" done by seeing through to reality

But that is not what extinction means, extinction, cessation is not anywhere near the same range of meaning as 'seeing through'. In the nibbana of the early texts, there is clearly no greed hatred and delusion.

...rather than as the literal destruction of separate objects not in relationships with the rest of reality ( if they were you could not affect them and vice versa by definition).

Greed hatred and delusion are not separate objects not in relationships with the rest of reality. This is again, another conflation of view A with view B.

[tiltbillings]

if you understand the word "extinction" to mean "liberation from" done by seeing through to reality

But that is not what extinction means, extinction, cessation is not anywhere near the same range of meaning as 'seeing through'. In the nibbana of the early texts, there is clearly no greed hatred and delusion.

Would you be kind enough to expand a bit on what you are saying here. It is not very clear.

[davidbrainerd]

they explicitly say the goal of Mahayana is not to get to Nirvana but to reincarnate forever because to them Nirvana is only like a hotel where you go rest a bit before reincarnating again. So since they explicitly state that their goal is to be stuck in samsara forever, none should object that I believe their vehicle will accomplish that for them quite nicely, just like a truck with no rims will keep you in the same place and take you nowhere.

All the Mahayanists say that?

Maybe not. But sometimes I wonder if for those who don't say it not saying it might be only a "skillfull means."

[Phena]

Javi wrote:
One of my motivations in asking this question, and starting this thread, was to counter the widely held misconception (obviously not one that is widely held here) that "Hinayana" (since people who hold this misconception would use that term for Theravada) is reducible to simply substance dualism in its essential form. I have heard many people, who were unfortunately misinformed regarding Theravada, who say things like "It is the fatal mistake of the Sthaviravāda that they developed the curious doctrine that Nibbana and samsara are different realities existent in-and-of themselves" (my phrasing, but I have heard this said many times, in similar ways). One of my hopes would be that I would be able to witness some counter-argumentation against such a misconception.



The issue here for people who make that argument is what is called in philosophy a category mistake.

Basically we have three views:

A. Nibbana is the extinction of greed, hatred, delusion; also the fetters, the influxes, etc.
B. Nibbana and samsara are different realities existent in-and-of themselves
C. Nibbana is interpenetrated by everything else, including evil (such as greed, hatred, etc.)

Statement A is not making any metaphysical statement, it simply defines nibbana in an apophatic way. Statement B is attempting to understand the issue metaphysically (which the Buddha in the early texts refuses to do, and later Abhidharmists and Mahayana philosophers attempted to do). I think this is a kind of miscommunication and misunderstanding here, A does not entail B - they are different arguments about different topics. In the same vein, the rejection of B does not necessarily entail the affirmation of C.

I think this is the source of disagreement and why we keep going around in circles in this thread. Some Mahayanists seems to hold to that A entails B. And since B is unacceptable to them as per Nagarjuna (which is funny, because Nagarjuna was just a philosopher, not the Buddha) then they make move C. Of course, view C is not held by all Mahayanists, view C is not in Nagarjuna, or Vasubandhu for example. View C is a further elaboration of Nagarjuna's rejection of view B.

My view and I would say, the view of the early Buddhist texts, is that there is no need to posit view B or its opposite, because the Buddha states, as per the Malunkyaputta sutta and other suttas, that asking such questions are unhelpful and pointless to reaching the goal. So I would reject B, reject the opposite of B, and C as pointless questions. Using philosophical jargon, this is what is called epoché by the ancient Greek philosophers, or "suspension". I would say that the Buddha would simply ask us to suspend judgment on those kinds of unhelpful views.

Javi. The Mahayana sometimes puts forward some interesting ideas that may be helpful at particular times, but more often than not I find they stray into the very territory the Buddha advises us not to go, of which your above example illustrates very well. Now I'm sure the Mahayana believe that exploring this territory and further elaboration is an advancement, an evolution, but I would suggest the real wisdom is not to complicate things by avoiding this temptation.

[tiltbillings]

they explicitly say the goal of Mahayana is not to get to Nirvana but to reincarnate forever because to them Nirvana is only like a hotel where you go rest a bit before reincarnating again. So since they explicitly state that their goal is to be stuck in samsara forever, none should object that I believe their vehicle will accomplish that for them quite nicely, just like a truck with no rims will keep you in the same place and take you nowhere.

All the Mahayanists say that?

Maybe not. But sometimes I wonder if for those who don't say it not saying it might be only a "skillfull means."

Do you spend a lot wondering about this stuff?

That aside, the interesting thing is that for a number of the schools, the sutras play a secondary or tertiary role. In the Tibetan schools it is the carefully worked out Lamrim literature that is central. The Mahayana sutras that are held to be of importance will vary from schools to school, and I am sure I am not saying anything you do not know. I am also writing this with other readers in mind.

Anyway, these sutras will be used in the Lamrim literature in a supporting role. So, the sutras that talk about arhats going to Hotel Nirvana until the Bodhisattva bus comes to pick them up to set them on the truly true path may not be important to one school while it may be a significant point for others. Taking someone such as Dogen, I cannot say that I have ever read or heard anything like Hotel Nirvana in his teachings. It might be there but it hardly front and center.

In the Kagyu lamrim The Jewel Ornament of Liberation by Gompopa (I favor the translation by Herbert Guenther), I am not sure that the Hotel Nirvana version of things is there, nor do I recall it in Śāntideva's compendium of Mahayana, the Śikṣāsamuccaya or in his Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra. It might be there, but I don't recall it being there, but then right now I am too damned lazy to look.

But all that aside, I have no problem with beating the crap out of applying the Mahayinist polemical term hinayana (and all the baggage assigned to that that vehicle) to the Theravada. I have delightfully done so at length on the belly-up E-Sangha. I am, however, not going to dismiss the Mahayana out of hand. I have known too many Mahayana teachers and practitioners that were people of no small insight and compassion.

The history of the Mahayana is really interesting, particularly the when looking at a text such the Ugraparipṛcchā Sūtra. " It also does not mention any other central Mahayana doctrines or place its teachings in opposition to what would later be classified as "Śrāvakayāna" teachings. Because of this, scholars such as Jan Nattier believe it dates to an early period in the development of Mahayana Buddhism."* No "hinayana" in that text or other really early Mahayana texts. It is likely with the Lotus Sutra that the concept of Mahayana was somewhat redefined and put into opposition to the hinayana, those who were not agreeing with the Mahayana.

So much more could be said, but to keep it short, once the idea of hinayana vs Mahayana was introduced, the bodhisattva ideal became a doctrine of opposition, showing how more wise, how much more compassionate the Mahayanists are in opposition to those poor saps who are only looking out for themselves, which it was not in the early texts such as Ugra.

Now the point of all this is this: I look at the towering bodhisattva structures of the Mahayana as “skillful means.” And if one buys into it, it is really very inspiring, but if one really does the practice, I don’t think they are going end up any place different from where the Theravadins ends up.

[Javi]

if you understand the word "extinction" to mean "liberation from" done by seeing through to reality

But that is not what extinction means, extinction, cessation is not anywhere near the same range of meaning as 'seeing through'. In the nibbana of the early texts, there is clearly no greed hatred and delusion.

Would you be kind enough to expand a bit on what you are saying here. It is not very clear.

Any state of 'seeing through' that has not lead to the ending of the three Poisons and the fetters, such that they are still somehow said to be contained or present in that state, cannot be nibbana as outlined in the early texts but some other concept. If nibbana is defined by the ending of these things, by cutting them off at the root, they cannot still be present and interpenetrate nibbana.

[Caodemarte]

if you understand the word "extinction" to mean "liberation from" done by seeing through to reality

But that is not what extinction means, extinction, cessation is not anywhere near the same range of meaning as 'seeing through'. In the nibbana of the early texts, there is clearly no greed hatred and delusion.....Greed hatred and delusion are not separate objects not in relationships with the rest of reality. This is again, another conflation of view A with view B.

My understanding is that full extinction and cessation of the passions and "defilements" is read in Theravada and by most Mahayana Buddhist sects as freedom from attachment to them. This ends their power over you (please read "you" as the generic "you"). My understanding is that "extinction," comes about as awakening, as seeing through much as obsessions or neurosis can be "extinguished" by the patient seeing through them, understanding their causes and delusionary nature, in the movie version of psychoanalysis. If the patient persists in seeing his/her mental problems as something external and "real" or cannot bring to light the causes the patient does not extinguish the problems. Once seen through the neurosis disappears (usually gradually as the old habit energy dissipates) and is extinguished. So "seeing through" them is their extinction. Part of this undoubtedly comes from generic Buddhist practice. I believe most Thervada teachers that I know of (ok, a limited group) would say a mediator only has limited success in trying to extinguish passions by suppression, trying to dig them out, or hatred of those passion (anger at anger for example). Most people have much better success if they simply observe their passions and see their nature, eventually extinguishing them by seeing them through and really understanding their nature (impermanent, etc.)., the more you see through the more they vanish. If they lose their power over you (given to them by your attachment). Their complete extinction by complete seeing through is not different than enlightenment which is not different than Nirvana.

If you are not positing separate objects, if you believe that the passions "exist" in relationship with the rest of reality, are caused, and act as causes as well (in short, are empty and have no self-nature) the implication for Hua-yen (and Tientai) would be that you are acknowledging that they are "contained" by everything else. To paraphrase Fa-tsang, the form of a gold lion statue cannot be separated from the gold or vice versa. If you try you may end up with a mass of gold or a plan of a statue, but no statute. The form and material "contain" or "reflect" each other in the sense we are using this word here. You don't want to say the form and the material are different because you can't separate them, but you also don't want to say they are the same. Similarly you don't want to say that noumena and phenomena can be separated or that the passions are not also Nirvana/Enlightenment/Buddha Nature, etc. (or that there is some kind of monistic soup out there either) if you are a good Mahayanist).

Chinese Zen (a good Huayen, Tientai, Yogacara school) was always talking about "severing the life root" (fundamental ignorance of reality), However, as is made clear repeatedly, - if other than conventionally - you see it as present or absent, severed or not severed, you are positing a false separate nature for it and assuming a false separate nature of time (it was whole before, now it is absent; it is eternally present or absent, etc.).

Now this all may be wrong, but that is how I understand that view. So the question remains: is there a similar thought or analogy in Theravada? Theravada obviously accepts dependent co-arising. Does it ever use the Indra's web analogy (Hindu philosophies also used this analogy)?

[tiltbillings]

Interpenetrationality. Damdifino what this word is supposed to mean in a practical sense.

[Caodemarte]

What were the schools considered Hinayana and where does the list come from? This sort of blows my own theory about what Hinayana meant out of the water.

I understand that there are some sectarians who claim that Theravada would have been condemned as Hinayana, but that is just speculation and seems more a continuation of early Western confusion of Theravada with one of the 18 schools.

That Theravada=Hinayana at all seems to be a British contrivance of early Western Buddhology that caught on in Asia because they were so bamboozled by the technological achievements of Europe. I already cited this book in a different thread, but it deserves mention here too. One of the things it dealt with is how colonial powers built the contrived notions of Mahayana-as-pseudo-Protestant-reform, Theravada-as-Hinayana, and Theravada-as-original-Buddhism.

There were traditionally 18 schools involved in the early polemics. However, there are various lists with different numbers by different people that often overlap. From
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Buddhist_schools

"Noted Canadian Buddhist scholar A.K. Warder (University of Toronto) identifies the following eighteen early Buddhist schools (in approximate chronological order): Sthaviravada, Mahasamgha, Vatsiputriya, Ekavyavaharika, Gokulika (a.k.a. Kukkutika, etc.), Sarvastivada, Lokottaravada, Dharmottariya, Bhadrayaniya, Sammitiya, Sannagarika, Bahusrutiya, Prajnaptivada, Mahisasaka, Haimavata (a.k.a. Kasyapiya), Dharmaguptaka, Caitika, and the Apara and Uttara (Purva) Saila. Warder says that these were the early Buddhist schools as of circa 50 BCE, about the same time that the Pali Canon was first committed to writing and the presumptive origin date of the Theravada sect, though the term 'theravada' was not used before the fourth century CE (see Ajahn Sucitto, "What Is Theravada" (2012); see also A.K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, 3rd rev. ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), chapters 8 and 9"

From the same source a different list:


Sthaviravāda
Haimavata - First schism; referred to by Sarvāstivādins as "the original Sthavira School", but this school was only influential in the north of India.
Sarvāstivāda - First schism
Vatsīputrīya - Second schism
Dharmottarīya - Third schism
Bhadrayānīya - Third schism
Saṃmitīya - Third schism
Sannāgarika - Third schism
Mahīśāsaka- Fourth schism
Dharmaguptaka - Fifth schism
Kāśyapīya - Sixth schism
Sautrāntika - Seventh Schism
Mahāsāṃghika
Ekavyahārikas - First schism
Lokottaravāda - First schism
Gokulika - First schism
Bahuśrutīya - Second schism
Prajñaptivāda - Third schism
Caitika - Fourth schism
Apara Śaila - Fourth schism
Uttara Śaila - Fourth schism

[Javi]

My understanding is that full extinction and cessation of the passions and "defilements" is read in Theravada and by most Mahayana Buddhist sects as freedom from attachment to them.
...
Once seen through the neurosis disappears (usually gradually as the old habit energy dissipates) and is extinguished. So "seeing through" them is their extinction.

So you're saying there is the extinction of craving and attachment now according to this view? Which is it? Either it is ended, or it still exists in nibbana.

If you are not positing separate objects, if you believe that the passions "exist" in relationship with the rest of reality, are caused, and act as causes as well (in short, are empty and have no self-nature) the implication for Hua-yen (and Tientai) would be that you are acknowledging that they are "contained" by everything else.

This is a non sequitur, that is, 'it does not follow' that positing causality also posits that everything is contained in everything else. They are two different concepts. Nibbana is not a thing, it's not a metaphysical substance or noumenon. This metaphysical argumentation was said by the Buddha to be unhelpful.

Now this all may be wrong, but that is how I understand that view. So the question remains: is there a similar thought or analogy in Theravada? Theravada obviously accepts dependent co-arising. Does it ever use the Indra's web analogy (Hindu philosophies also used this analogy)?

AFAIK there is no such view in Theravada or any other of the early sutta literature (Agamas, etc).