Bhikkhus, what exists by clinging to what, by adhering to what does view of self arise? … When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, view of self arises. When there is feeling…perception…voltional formations…consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, view of self arises. … Seeing thus… He understands: …there is no more for this state of being. – SN III 185-6.
Monks, whatever contemplatives or priests who assume in various ways when assuming a self, all assume the five clinging-aggregates, or a certain one of them. Which five? There is the case where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person -- who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for men of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma -- assumes form (the body) to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form.... Owing to the fading of ignorance and the arising of clear knowing, (the thoughts) -- 'I am,' 'I am this,' 'I shall be,' 'I shall not be,' 'I shall be possessed of form,' 'I shall be formless,' 'I shall be percipient (conscious),' 'I shall be non-percipient,' and 'I shall be neither percipient nor non-percipient' -- do not occur to him." SN III 46
It is impossible, it cannot come to pass that a man possessed of (right) view should treat any dhamma as self [atta] – this situation does not occur. MN iii 64
‘”I am’ is derivative upon form … perception … feelings … volitional formation … consciousness’ – S XXII 83/iii 105
‘Bhikkhus, self and self’s property being unapprehendable as true and established, then would not this view “This is self, this the world: after death I shall be permanent, … endure as long as eternity” be the pure perfection of a fool’s idea?’ ‘How not, lord? It would be pure perfection of a fool’s idea.’ MN 22 I 138
"But who, Venerable One, is it that feels?" "This question is not proper," said
the Exalted One. I do not teach that there is one who feels. If, however, the
question is put thus: 'Conditioned through what does feeling arise?' then the
answer will be 'Through sense impressions as a condition feeling [arises]; with
feeling as a condition, craving [arises]." SN II 13
And of interest from the Chinese Madhyama Agama:
“ ‘The self, the self,’ bhikshus, thinks the untaught worldling, misapprehending concepts. But there is no self and what belongs to self. This suffering, arising, arises; this suffering, ceasing, ceases. Samskaras, arising, arise, samskaras ceasing, cease.”
(MA, 62, 498b).
As for the Nikaya quotes, where can you see the statement "There is no self" by the Buddha?
As for the Chinese, I don't know Chinese yet, to verify the translation.
Anyway, why are you providing quotes? Are you trying to assert any of the two positions, "There is a self" or "There is not a self"?
Bhikkhus, what exists by clinging to what, by adhering to what does view of self arise? … When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, view of self arises. When there is feeling…perception…voltional formations…consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, view of self arises. … Seeing thus… He understands: …there is no more for this state of being. – SN III 185-6.
Monks, whatever contemplatives or priests who assume in various ways when assuming a self, all assume the five clinging-aggregates, or a certain one of them. Which five? There is the case where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person -- who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for men of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma -- assumes form (the body) to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form.... Owing to the fading of ignorance and the arising of clear knowing, (the thoughts) -- 'I am,' 'I am this,' 'I shall be,' 'I shall not be,' 'I shall be possessed of form,' 'I shall be formless,' 'I shall be percipient (conscious),' 'I shall be non-percipient,' and 'I shall be neither percipient nor non-percipient' -- do not occur to him." SN III 46
It is impossible, it cannot come to pass that a man possessed of (right) view should treat any dhamma as self [atta] – this situation does not occur. MN iii 64
‘”I am’ is derivative upon form … perception … feelings … volitional formation … consciousness’ – S XXII 83/iii 105
‘Bhikkhus, self and self’s property being unapprehendable as true and established, then would not this view “This is self, this the world: after death I shall be permanent, … endure as long as eternity” be the pure perfection of a fool’s idea?’ ‘How not, lord? It would be pure perfection of a fool’s idea.’ MN 22 I 138
"But who, Venerable One, is it that feels?" "This question is not proper," said
the Exalted One. I do not teach that there is one who feels. If, however, the
question is put thus: 'Conditioned through what does feeling arise?' then the
answer will be 'Through sense impressions as a condition feeling [arises]; with
feeling as a condition, craving [arises]." SN II 13
And of interest from the Chinese Madhyama Agama:
“ ‘The self, the self,’ bhikshus, thinks the untaught worldling, misapprehending concepts. But there is no self and what belongs to self. This suffering, arising, arises; this suffering, ceasing, ceases. Samskaras, arising, arise, samskaras ceasing, cease.”
(MA, 62, 498b).
As for the Nikaya quotes, where can you see the statement "There is no self" by the Buddha?
As for the Chinese, I don't know Chinese yet, to verify the translation.
Anyway, why are you providing quotes? Are you trying to assert any of the two positions, "There is a self" or "There is not a self"?
The point is that any notion of -- sense of -- self that we might have, as the Buddha clearly states, is derived from the khandhas. There is no independent, self existing permanent self to be found in our experience. Dhp: Sabbe dhammā anattā'. We can look at this greater detail if you wish.
>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<< -- Proverbs 26:12
This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.
“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723
tiltbillings wrote:And what you mean by atta? How did the Buddha define atta?
I define atta as the reflexive pronoun whose realization constitutes nibbana.
However what most people call "I" is not the real "I". What is "not I" is called anatta. Clinging to anatta thinking it is atta is the surest way to not attain nibbana.
What I've just said is Buddhism.
What you've just said is your version of Buddhism. The fact that you aren't even willing to admit this is just pure, unadulterated hubris.
My "psychoanalysis" says that this hubris depends on and is conditioned by your estimation of yourself as an arahant. Drop that designation and you might begin to see where pride begins.
I think it will be for your own good and for the good of others if you drop that designation. I think it's in your own best interest to drop that designation. I think your understanding of the Dhamma will increase, not decrease, if you drop that designation.
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato samma sambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato samma sambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato samma sambuddhassa
tiltbillings wrote:The point is that any notion of -- sense of -- self that we might have, as the Buddha clearly states, is derived from the khandhas. There is no independent, self existing permanent self to be found in our experience. Dhp: Sabbe dhammā anattā'. We can look at this greater detail if you wish.
I agree with the first sentence. That's what I said earlier.
tiltbillings wrote:The point is that any notion of -- sense of -- self that we might have, as the Buddha clearly states, is derived from the khandhas. There is no independent, self existing permanent self to be found in our experience. Dhp: Sabbe dhammā anattā'. We can look at this greater detail if you wish.
I agree with the first sentence. That's what I said earlier.
I don't take a stance on the second one.
Keep in mind that the Dhamma plays itself in our experience:
"It is in this very fathom-long physical frame with its perceptions and mind, that, I declare, lies the world, and the arising of the world, and the cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the world."[26]
26.The import of this significant declaration can be understood in the context of those suttas in which the Buddha defines the concept of the world. The 'world,' for the Buddha, arises in the six sense-spheres (See above Note 21). Hence its cessation too, is to be experienced there, in the cessation of the six sense-spheres (salaayatananirodha). "I will teach you, monks, how the world comes to be and passes away... What monks, is the arising of the world? Dependent on eye and forms, arises visual consciousness. The concurrence of the three is contact. Conditioned by contact is feeling. Conditioned by feeling, craving. Conditioned by craving, grasping. Conditioned by grasping, becoming. Conditioned by becoming, birth. And conditioned by birth, arise decay, death, grief lamentation, suffering, despair. This is the arising of the world.
And what, monks, is the passing away of the world? Dependent on the eye and forms arise visual consciousness. The concurrence of the three is contact. Conditioned by contact is feeling. Conditioned by feeling is craving. By the utter fading away and cessation of that craving, grasping ceases, by the ceasing of grasping, becoming ceases, by the ceasing of becoming birth ceases, by the ceasing of birth, decay-and-death, grief, lamentation, suffering, despair, cease. Such is the ceasing of this entire man of Ill.
Recall that from the perspective of the Buddha’s teachings in the Pali, the ‘All’ {SN IV 15} is composed entirely of phassa, contact between sense base and sense object. We can only directly know phenomena within this ‘world of experience’, so from the Theravadin perspective, we cannot know whether there really exists a ‘brain’ or a ‘body’ apart from moments of intellectual consciousness, of seeing (the image of a brain), and so on. The discourses of the Pali describe an individual world of experience as composed of various mental and physical factors, nama and rupa. These two are not the separate, independent worlds that Rene Descartes envisioned.
"…the Buddha spoke of the human person as a psychophysical personality (namarupa). Yet the psychic and the physical were never discussed in isolation, nor were they viewed as self-subsistent entities. For him, there was neither a ‘material-stuff’ nor a ‘mental-stuff’, because both are results of reductive analyses that go beyond experience."53
The physical and mental aspects of human experience are continually arising together, intimately dependent on one another.
53 Kalupahana 1976: 73, refers to D.15{II,62}, where the Buddha speaks of both
physicality and mentality mutually dependent forms of contact (phassa).
Physicality is described as contact with resistance (pat.ighasamphassa),
mentality as contact with concepts (adhivacanasamphassa).
I'm sorry, I don't have anything further to add. All the lines of reasoning in which I have posted have finished.
I don't understand this statement.
It means, the purpose for which I posted has completed it's course. I have nothing further to add.
tiltbillings wrote:But answer at least one more question: Where does the practice take place if not in the realm of experience?
Ud 1.10 wrote:And since for you, Bāhiya, in what is seen there will be only what is seen, in what is heard there will be only what is heard, in what is sensed there will be only what is sensed, in what is cognized there will be only what is cognized, therefore, Bāhiya, you will not be with that; and since, Bāhiya, you will not be with that, therefore, Bāhiya, you will not be in that; and since, Bāhiya, you will not be in that, therefore, Bāhiya, you will not be here or hereafter or in between the two—just this is the end of suffering.
tiltbillings wrote:As for the deathlessness, this is not a standalone expression. Context is everything.
Context is irrelevant for the unconditioned. Context does not condition it.
You really do not understand. "deathlessness" is a concept used in the suttas by the Buddha. What he means by this is understood by looking at how he used the concept, and as been shown you already, how these terms are used by the Buddha are different from how they are used in the upanishadic context.
So it would be best to say something meaningful to explain why nibbana is called deathless which is the vedantic description of atta.
It would be a waste of time to say anything to you, since you'll just blow it off, but if we look at the textual contexts of the term amata, we see in the texts that use the term, that it refers to the arahant being free from death because she is no longer subject birth -- no further birth, no further death. Like any number of terms found in the brahmanical milieu, the Buddha took it over and gave it a radically different meaning. Kamma/karma is the best example of that.
Do give us the vedantic description of atman, since that is what you are pushing here.
>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<< -- Proverbs 26:12
This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.
“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723
tiltbillings wrote:... if we look at the textual contexts of the term amata, we see in the texts that use the term, that it refers to the arahant being free from death because she is no longer subject birth -- no further birth, no further death.
If amata as a descriptor of nibbana is really supposed to mean the arahant becomes physically birthless and deathless, why did the Buddha die after attaining nibbana?
If it is not supposed to mean physical birthlessness and deathlessness of the arahant, then it makes sense for the arahant to physcially die, and it would also make sense that the arahant would be physically reborn, and die again... and so on and so forth.
So then deathless nibbana becomes as illusory as the deathless atman.
tiltbillings wrote:... if we look at the textual contexts of the term amata, we see in the texts that use the term, that it refers to the arahant being free from death because she is no longer subject birth -- no further birth, no further death.
If amata as a descriptor of nibbana is really supposed to mean the arahant becomes physically birthless and deathless, why did the Buddha die after attaining nibbana?
You really do not read what is written, it would seem. The arahant that dies is no longer subject to further birth -- rebirth -- and not being reborn, the arahant does not die:
And what, monks, is the passing away of the world [the Third Noble Truth, nibbana]? Dependent on the eye and forms arise visual consciousness. The concurrence of the three is contact. Conditioned by contact is feeling. Conditioned by feeling is craving. By the utter fading away and cessation of that craving, grasping ceases, by the ceasing of grasping, becoming ceases, by the ceasing of becoming birth ceases, by the ceasing of birth, decay-and-death, grief, lamentation, suffering, despair, cease. Such is the ceasing of this entire mass of Ill." -- SN ii 73; CDB i 581.
"Then, monks, being subject myself to birth, seeing the drawbacks of birth, seeking freedom from birth, unexcelled rest from the yoke, Unbinding/nibbana, I reached freedom from birth, unexcelled rest from the yoke: Unbinding. Being subject myself to aging... illness... death... sorrow... defilement, seeing the drawbacks of aging... illness... death... sorrow... defilement, seeking freedom from aging, freedom from illness, freedom from death [amata], freedom from sorrow, unexcelled rest from the yoke, Unbinding, I reached the freedom from aging, freedom from illness, freedom from death [amata], freedom from sorrow, unexcelled rest from the yoke: Unbinding. Knowledge & vision arose in me: 'Unprovoked is my release. This is the last birth. There is now no further becoming.' MN 26
Furthermore, a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die, is unagitated, and is free from longing. He has nothing whereby he would be born. Not being born, will he age? Not aging, will he die? Not dying, will he be agitated? Not being agitated, for what will he long? It was in reference to this that it was said, 'He has been stilled where the currents of construing do not flow. And when the currents of construing do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.' MN (140) III 246
If it is not supposed to mean physical birthlessness and deathlessness of the arahant, then it makes sense for the arahant to physcially die, and it would also make sense that the arahant would be physically reborn, and die again... and so on and so forth. So then deathless nibbana becomes as illusory as the deathless atman.
The texts are quite clear on this matter.
Basically, the Buddha took the brahmanical term amrita and gave it a new meaning.
>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<< -- Proverbs 26:12
This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.
“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723
tiltbillings wrote:... if we look at the textual contexts of the term amata, we see in the texts that use the term, that it refers to the arahant being free from death because she is no longer subject birth -- no further birth, no further death.
If amata as a descriptor of nibbana is really supposed to mean the arahant becomes physically birthless and deathless, why did the Buddha die after attaining nibbana?
You really do not read what is written, it would seem. The arahant that dies is no longer subject to further birth -- rebirth -- and not being reborn, the arahant does not die
....
The texts are quite clear on this matter.
Basically, the Buddha took the brahmanical term amrita and gave it a new meaning.
Therefore you claim that according to the suttas, while the buddha claims to have already achieved "deathlessness", he didn't really achieve it until his death, and it was therefore just a "nibbana in waiting", hence he lied that he had already attained something that he was only going to attain at death?
Or does it mean the verifiable nibbana he achieved was not yet deathless (incapable of preventing his death), and different from another unverifiable but deathless nibbana that is attained at death?
Or was he saying something else that is being persistently misinterpreted by most Buddhists all along?
Last edited by bharadwaja on Sun Jun 15, 2014 8:54 am, edited 1 time in total.
bharadwaja wrote:
Therefore you claim that according to the suttas, while the buddha claims to have already achieved "deathlessness", he didn't really achieve it until his death, and it was therefore just a "nibbana in waiting", hence he lied that he had already attained something that he was only going to attain at death?
Or does it mean the verifiable nibbana he achieved was not yet deathless (incapable of preventing his death), and different from the unverifiable but deathless nibbana that is attained at death?
Or was he saying something else that is being persistently misinterpreted by most Buddhists all along?
Tilt already explained this to you bharadwaji.
When someone becomes an arahant they have already entered "the deathless".
Did you listen to the Ajahn Amaro talk I provided for you, by the way ?
