The Bodhisattva Ideal in Theravada

[Dexing]

Yogachara has been badly handled by any number of Mahayana sects.

Two excellent essays by an excellent scholar of the subject:

http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro-uni.htm" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

http://www.bu.edu/religion/faculty/bios ... 20crux.pdf" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Dan Lusthaus has his personal handling of Yogachara as well.

From the book; Mahayana Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations by Paul Williams:

For Dan Lusthaus Yogacara does not deny the real existence of matter independently of consciousness. This is not the place to detail disagreements with Lusthaus's approach, which shows a creative (re)interpretation that does not (to my mind) convince as a reading of what the Yogacara texts say.

Lambert Schmithausen has reviewed Lusthaus's book at length in a monograph (2005), and he argues that Lusthaus's reading and translation of key passages are simply not philologically supportable. Schmithausen (2005: 9-10) observes that 'Yogacara thought has traditionally been understood as advocating epistemological position that mind, or consciousness, does not...perceive or cognize anything outside itself, but rather cognizes only its own image of an object, and as propounding the ontological position that there are no entities, especially no material entities, apart from consciousness...This understanding was not invented by modern scholars but is in line with works of medieval Indian (and Tibetan) authors, both non-Buddhist and Buddhist'

Yogacara sources do indeed state that external matter simply does not exist, and what seems to be matter is simply the transformation of consciousness (e.g. from the Chengweishilun itself; Schmithausen 2005: 24; cf. 42). Moreover Schmithausen shows in passing (ibid.: 20-1, n.28) that Lusthaus's suggestion that the tathata, 'thusness', the true nature of things, is for the Chengweishilun simply a conceptual construct and hence not truly existent (thus making Yogacara ontologically no different here from Madhyamika), is also unconvincing. He points out (ibid.: 10) that the revision of this 'traditional interpretation' has arisen among scholars 'mainly from the Anglo-Saxon cultural sphere'. But he concludes (ibid.: 49) that, while not always found in fully-fledged form, the traditional understanding has not been fully undermined, and indeed he expresses his 'amazement at the emotional vehemence of their [i.e. the modern mostly Anglo-Saxon scholars'] criticism'.

'Is it', Schmithausen continues, 'merely because Yogacara thought as traditionally understood seems so counter-intuitive to modern Western common-sense that some scholars think they must "defend" the Yogacaras against such an understanding? But isn't this the same mode of procedure that scholars who worked when idealism was the dominant strand in Western philosophy are criticized for, viz. reading the presuppositions of one's own time and milieu into the old texts? It may be difficult to avoid doing this completely, but one can at least try one's best to understand the texts from within...and make sense of them on their own premises'.

[Dexing]

For example, Sarvastivada and Theravada have differing philosophies about the nature of phenomenal existence, but still take for granted the fundamental existence of phenomena at one point or another. It is this fundamental existence of phenomena that is challenged by the Mahayana schools, not the nature of how and when they might exist or cease to exist.

Not really. Neither of these schools posited any "fundamental existence of phenomena" in their Agamas / Nikayas, and there are some major differences in the later material, even if many of the words are similar.

Of course not 'inherent existence', but if external conditioned phenomena were not taken for granted, the teachings on the nature of existence of impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self would have nothing to stand on. What is impermanent? What is unsatisfactory? What is not-self?

That's why examining these characteristics is not even necessary from a Mahayana perspective where phenomenal existence is not taken for granted, but thoroughly deconstructed. Those teachings were designed to lessen attachment to sensory objects and sensations for the Small Vehicle on account of their three marks, but for Large Vehicle teachings there is simply nothing there from the beginning. So what are we attaching to?

[Paññāsikhara]

Something for nothing: Neither Lusthaus nor Schmithausen would categorically lump the Theravada under the Sarvastivada header. I personally think that Schmithausen is the superior philologist, that's what he was trained as, but not such a good philosopher, whereas Lusthaus is originally a philosopher, but if he messes up the philology then he doesn't have much to stand on. (And some people, myself included, have some issues with some of his readings of the *Vijnaptimatra-siddhi.)

Hope this doesn't sound too arrogant on my part,

Not at all. Your input here is greatly appreciated in helping put things into context.

I think it's part of my conditioning as a Dharma teacher, spending too much time marking essays and exams, so it becomes habit to point out where a student should head for understanding. Problem is, on the 'net, we usually don't know who the other guy or gal is. The automatic assumption of the "other" as a "student", is perhaps a fault on my part.

[Dexing]

As long as one is satisfied with the cessation of suffering associated with attachment to a personal self, Nirvana, as in the Arhat, then Bodhicitta cannot be developed as one rests in Nirvana

This is obviously not true. Nirvana is not the personal self of anyone. Also one can not rest in Nirvana, because there's no one there. And how there can be attachment to Nirvana, since it's the ending of ignorance and attachment ? attachment to it as a concept, may be, but not as an experience of ultimate reality.

Who said Nirvana is a personal self? I mean the "cessation of suffering associated with attachment to a personal self" is an Arhat's Nirvana.

I also didn't say attachment to Nirvana, but simply seeing no necessity for continuing. An Arhat has completed the task... of an Arhat. That is what I mean by resting in Nirvana- meaning not continuing on the Bodhisattva path. Talk about "one cannot rest in Nirvana, because there's no one there" is redundant and unnecessary. Don't correct me for using "I" in this reply.

Do you mean there's a higher reality than Nirvana ? Or two different kinds of Nirvana ?
Then Nirvana (whether arahant's or boddhisatva's ) would not be the ultimate reality.

Nirvana is simply the cessation of suffering associated with attachment to a personal self. From a Mahayana perspective it is not seeing the true face of reality. It is not anuttara-samyak-sambodhi.

[Paññāsikhara]

The original question was viz the status of "arhats", not about "reality". Let's keep on track, huh?

Let's just take one very simple question about "arhats", and whether or not they can "regress".
What does the Sarvastivada say about this?
What does the Theravada say about this?

And, in a similar vein, about the "sotaapanna", and their "regression" or absence thereof.
What does the Sarvastivada say about this?
What does the Theravada say about this?

According to what these schools say about themselves, that is. ie. citing their own texts on their own position.

Finding answers to these questions, we may then ask: Is it accurate to consider that the views of the Theravadins can be glossed over with the Sarvastivadin theses?

We may wish to inquire further, as to other schools such as the Mahasamghikas, Vatisputriyas / Pudgalavadins, Sammitiyas, Mahisasakas, etc. and whether or not they can be subsumed under the "Hinayana" positions according to the *Vijnaptimatra-siddhi.

Likewise too, the various reasons for "regression" or absence of "regression".

These are some pretty clear cut questions, that should shed some light on the issue at hand.

[Brizzy]

Given that I am a bit of a sucker for only wanting to hear what the Buddha actually taught :cookoo: and that the first four Nikayas are accepted in most schools as the authentic words of the Buddha -

Can anybody point to a sutta that mentions the "Bodhisatta path"?

I think it is really important that the numerous traditions and there fanciful philosophies that have developed, should not be taken to seriously. (This includes Theravada & Mahayana). If everybody could agree on these "real" teachings (without commentarial input) then Buddhism might become a more liveable & practical path. The "real" teachings become more accessible and understandable when they are seperated from tradition/commentary and plain fantasy.

[Paññāsikhara]

Given that I am a bit of a sucker for only wanting to hear what the Buddha actually taught :cookoo: and that the first four Nikayas are accepted in most schools as the authentic words of the Buddha -

Can anybody point to a sutta that mentions the "Bodhisatta path"?

I think it is really important that the numerous traditions and there fanciful philosophies that have developed, should not be taken to seriously. (This includes Theravada & Mahayana). If everybody could agree on these "real" teachings (without commentarial input) then Buddhism might become a more liveable & practical path. The "real" teachings become more accessible and understandable when they are seperated from tradition/commentary and plain fantasy.

If you take "the first Nikayas" as "accepted in most schools as the authentic words of the Buddha", then I'd point to an Ekottara Agama text (Agama ~~ Nikaya) which mentions a discussion between the Buddha, his disciple Maitreya, and Ajita, in which Maitreya makes vows to become a Buddha.

Of course, one may argue that this is a later addition. But then one would have to ask, based on what criterion?

Beware of circular arguments of: "It's earlier because it's in the Nikayas." "But the bodhisattva path is in the Nikayas." "But that was added later." "How do you know?" "Because it doesn't match what should be in the Nikayas." "How do you know what should be in the Nikayas?" "By removing the later additions?" "But how do you know what are the later additions?" "Those things which don't match what are in the Nikayas, or course!"



Of course, there is more to it than this. But if we wish to have a sound and rational basis for establishing such a position, going around calling the things that don't match what is "real" as "fantasy" is a bit over the top.

Brizzy: Do you know if all the Nikaya suttas are "real"? If so how? If not, how do you know which are not "real"? And vice versa for those which as "fantasy".

[Dan74]

Given that I am a bit of a sucker for only wanting to hear what the Buddha actually taught :cookoo: and that the first four Nikayas are accepted in most schools as the authentic words of the Buddha -

Can anybody point to a sutta that mentions the "Bodhisatta path"?

I think it is really important that the numerous traditions and there fanciful philosophies that have developed, should not be taken to seriously. (This includes Theravada & Mahayana). If everybody could agree on these "real" teachings (without commentarial input) then Buddhism might become a more liveable & practical path. The "real" teachings become more accessible and understandable when they are seperated from tradition/commentary and plain fantasy.

What I follow is a very livable and practical path, Brizzy. I don't make claims about what the Buddha did or did not teach, not having been personally present, nor would I denigrate later enlightened teachers by calling their work "fanciful philosophies" that "should not be taken" seriously. The Buddha's own life example should perhaps be followed as well.

If you are truly content and happy with Buddhadhamma that you practice, why come and put down what other people do?

[tiltbillings]

As usual, Dexing, you ignore my direct responses to your statements:

Why are you here? To learn about the Theravada, or is it, as it seems, to evangelize for your school of the Mahayana?

To discuss the Bodhisattva path in relation to Theravada, which is included in the Mahayana perspective of "Small Vehicle" teachings. You can't speak about the Bodhisattva path without speaking of Mahayana, as you yourself have said that it is a Mahayana path not taught by the Buddha.

Of course Theravadin can talk about the bodhisatta path without any reference to the Mahayana, given that after the death of the Buddha - before the rise of the Mahayana - the basic of the bodhisatta path were developed and already in place; these are the basics the Mahayana used in their developing of their ideas about the bodhisattva. The Theravadin path of the bodhisatta is spelled out in the Uttama Purisa Dīpanī - A Manual of the Excellent Man http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=40" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; and in that there is no need for the later Mahayana notions of the bodhisattva path. The Theravada is not included in the Mahayana's polemical hinayana stuff.

That's why this is in the Dhamma free-for-all section, although ironically Mahayana views are not welcome when discussing Mahayana teachings here.

There is nothing wrong with discussing Mahayana views here. There are a number of Mahayanists who regularly post here. What is an annoyance - and is going to attract negative attention - is the Mahayanist who tells Theravadins what the Theravadins views are based upon the Mahayana hermeneutical structures - and never mind what the Theravadins have say for themselves, about themselves.

The suttas do not support of your position about the Theravada, but having read all of your stuff todate, it looks like nothing will count against your position.

Many people on here, including yourself have already shown that it does. That is, that it takes phenomena as existing temporarily due to Causes & Conditions and therefore lacking a self-sustaining substance. Everyone here has agreed that is a basic teaching of Theravada.

I never said it like that. Also, I'll listen Nagarjuna before you: Nagarjuna:

"The teaching of the Mahayana of non-production and of extinction in the Hinayana are the same emptiness [since they show that inherent existence] is extinguished, and that nothing [inherently existent] is produced." THE PRECIOUS GARLAND, trans by J. Hopkins, vs 386, p 75

And again:

"If emptiness and the great nature of a Buddha are viewed with reason, how could what is taught in the two vehicles be of unequal value for the wise?" - Preng pa verse 387 Hopkins translations, THE PRECIOUS GARLAND AND THE SONG OF FOUR MINDFULLNESSES, page 75

[Dexing]

The original question was viz the status of "arhats", not about "reality". Let's keep on track, huh?

What original question was that? Thought we were talking about the Bodhisattva Ideal (i.e. to reach full Buddhahood, rather than Arhatship) in Theravada, which would require some discussion on "reality" between Mahayana and Theravada teachings.

This topic keeps getting pulled in other directions. I've only been making one point in this entire thread about the different views of the nature of reality from Mahayana and Theravada, which no one has been able to disprove with Sutta reference, although they just say I'm wrong.

That being Theravada holds the 3 marks of existence of impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self. While Mahayana holds that such things marked as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self by schools such as Theravada are not even real from the start. Take for example, the Five Aggregates.

I've already given plenty of scriptural sources for both statements. Again, many have simply said "wrong" without supporting themselves here.

[Paññāsikhara]

The original question was viz the status of "arhats", not about "reality". Let's keep on track, huh?

What original question was that? Thought we were talking about the Bodhisattva Ideal (i.e. to reach full Buddhahood, rather than Arhatship) in Theravada, which would require some discussion on "reality" between Mahayana and Theravada teachings.

This topic keeps getting pulled in other directions. I've only been making one point in this entire thread about the different views of the nature of reality from Mahayana and Theravada, which no one has been able to disprove with Sutta reference, although they just say I'm wrong.

That being Theravada holds the 3 marks of existence of impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self. While Mahayana holds that such things marked as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self by schools such as Theravada are not even real from the start. Take for example, the Five Aggregates.

I've already given plenty of scriptural sources for both statements. Again, many have simply said "wrong" without supporting themselves here.

The original discussion between the two of us, here. I was questioning whether or not you actually knew what the Theravada said, or if you just accepted what other schools said about "Hinayana", and projected it onto the Theravada, not caring whether or not this what they themselves said.

The issue of regression of arahats is very closely related to all forms of realization theory. Think of it as gotra-vada.
Do you want to try those questions. They are pretty easy. Yes or no / regress or non-regress - will work for them. Go on. Give it a try.

[Dexing]

"The teaching of the Mahayana of non-production and of extinction in the Hinayana are the same emptiness [since they show that inherent existence] is extinguished, and that nothing [inherently existent] is produced." THE PRECIOUS GARLAND, trans by J. Hopkins, vs 386, p 75

Of course. No "objective existence" contains no "inherent existence". How can emptiness be two? But one's understanding of emptiness can be at different levels.

And again:

"If emptiness and the great nature of a Buddha are viewed with reason, how could what is taught in the two vehicles be of unequal value for the wise?" - Preng pa verse 387 Hopkins translations, THE PRECIOUS GARLAND AND THE SONG OF FOUR MINDFULLNESSES, page 75

I've already said earlier in this thread that Small Vehicle teachings are absolutely necessary. And that no one would make sense of the Large Vehicle teachings without them. I've likened it to learning addition and subtraction, and then learning negatives. Once learning negatives, one does not forget foundation addition and subtraction rules of when they only dealt with positive numbers.

[Dexing]

The original discussion between the two of us, here. The issue of regression of arahats is very closely related to all forms of realization theory.

My only point on their realizations is that they take material as existing independently of consciousness. Of course the schools differ quite a bit on when and how phenomena exist, and on the status of the Arhats. But my point is only to contrast their view of "objective existence" with Mahayana "subjective consciousness". The rest is really irrelevant to my point in this thread.

[tiltbillings]

"The teaching of the Mahayana of non-production and of extinction in the Hinayana are the same emptiness [since they show that inherent existence] is extinguished, and that nothing [inherently existent] is produced." THE PRECIOUS GARLAND, trans by J. Hopkins, vs 386, p 75

Of course. No "objective existence" contains no "inherent existence". How can emptiness be two? But one's understanding of emptiness can be at different levels.

Nagarjuna is not stating they are at different levels. Quite the contrary.

And again:

"If emptiness and the great nature of a Buddha are viewed with reason, how could what is taught in the two vehicles be of unequal value for the wise?" - Preng pa verse 387 Hopkins translations, THE PRECIOUS GARLAND AND THE SONG OF FOUR MINDFULLNESSES, page 75

I've already said earlier in this thread that Small Vehicle teachings are absolutely necessary. And that no one would make sense of the Large Vehicle teachings without them. I've likened it to learning addition and subtraction, and then learning negatives. Once learning negatives, one does not forget foundation addition and subtraction rules of when they only dealt with positive numbers.[/quote]The Theravada is not hinayana or small vehicle. There is no objective basis for such a claim that they are.

[tiltbillings]

You missed this, which shows your statement has no basis.

Why are you here? To learn about the Theravada, or is it, as it seems, to evangelize for your school of the Mahayana?

To discuss the Bodhisattva path in relation to Theravada, which is included in the Mahayana perspective of "Small Vehicle" teachings. You can't speak about the Bodhisattva path without speaking of Mahayana, as you yourself have said that it is a Mahayana path not taught by the Buddha.

Of course Theravadin can talk about the bodhisatta path without any reference to the Mahayana, given that after the death of the Buddha - before the rise of the Mahayana - the basic of the bodhisatta path were developed and already in place; these are the basics the Mahayana used in their developing of their ideas about the bodhisattva. The Theravadin path of the bodhisatta is spelled out in the Uttama Purisa Dīpanī - A Manual of the Excellent Man http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=40" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; and in that there is no need for the later Mahayana notions of the bodhisattva path. The Theravada is not included in the Mahayana's polemical hinayana stuff.