An interesting comparison with these two doctrines of skepticism can be made with the theory of logic and etymology in the Jain tradition. Maybe the philosopher Pyrrho met jain sages in India from where he learned this concept?
Anekantavāda ("the school of manifoldness") is built into Jain tradition of logic and reasoning as an ontological theory of relative truths, and promotes the idea that there are manifold ways to see, know, or perceive "The" truth. The famous story of blind men describing an elephant illustrates this view.
The etymological root of anekāntavāda lies in the compound of two Sanskrit words: anekānta ("manifoldness") and vāda ("school of thought"). The word anekānta is a compound of the Sanskrit negative prefix an, eka ("one"), and anta ("attribute"). Hence, anekānta means "not of solitary attribute". The Jain doctrine lays a strong emphasis on samyaktva, that is, rationality and logic.
An extension of Anekantavada comes in the form of "conditional predication", Syādvāda.
Syādvāda (Sanskrit: स्याद्वाद) is the theory of conditioned predication, which provides an expression to anekānta by recommending that the epithet syād be prefixed to every phrase or expression. Syādvāda is not only an extension of anekānta ontology, but a separate system of logic capable of standing on its own. The Sanskrit etymological root of the term syād is "perhaps" or "maybe", but in the context of syādvāda, it means "in some ways" or "from a perspective". As reality is complex, no single proposition can express the nature of reality fully. Thus the term "syāt" should be prefixed before each proposition giving it a conditional point of view and thus removing any dogmatism in the statement. Since it ensures that each statement is expressed from seven different conditional and relative viewpoints or propositions, syādvāda is known as saptibhaṅgīnāya or "the theory of seven conditioned predications". These saptibhaṅgī are:
syād-asti—in some ways, it is,
syād-nāsti—in some ways, it is not,
syād-asti-nāsti—in some ways, it is, and it is not,
syād-asti-avaktavyaḥ—in some ways, it is, and it is indescribable,
syād-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ—in some ways, it is not, and it is indescribable,
syād-asti-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ—in some ways, it is, it is not, and it is indescribable,
syād-avaktavyaḥ—in some ways, it is indescribable.
Each of these seven propositions examines the complex and multifaceted nature of reality from a relative point of view of time, space, substance and mode. To ignore the complexity of reality is to commit the fallacy of dogmatism
There is a third school of Nayavāda, Naya -" of partial viewpoint".
The Jains are praised to have dared to "hold both the horns of the bull", i.e. to have syncretised the opposed viewpoints of permanent vs. impermanent, an eternal ātman vs aniccā, of Vedic and Buddhist thought. Of course, as far as I remember the Buddha gave a famous rejoinder to such relativistic logic: that the assertion of relativistic logic cannot be wholly accepted by its own rules. (I forget which sutta was this in.)
I end with the following quote (courtesy Wiki):
(Gautama is not be confused with Siddartha Gautama)
The Jain breadth of vision embraces the perspectives of both Vedānta which, according to Jainism, "recognizes substances but not process", and Buddhism, which "recognizes process but not substance". Jainism, on the other hand, pays equal attention to both substance (dravya) and process (paryaya).
Gautama: Lord! Is the soul permanent or impermanent?
Mahāvīra: The soul is permanent as well as impermanent. From the point of view of the substance it is eternal. From the point of view of its modes it undergoes birth, decay and destruction and hence impermanent.