Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Exploring Theravāda's connections to other paths - what can we learn from other traditions, religions and philosophies?
pt1
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by pt1 »

Hi retro,
retrofuturist wrote: Maybe you'd like to frame a new topic in the Classical Theravada section to explore the hypothesis?

I'd recommend against putting it in the Abhidhamma section, since there may be Sutta material of relevance to the question which I'm sure you don't want to ignore during your investigations.
Sounds good, will do that.

Best wishes

EDIT: This is the new thread
mogg
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually me

Post by mogg »

retrofuturist wrote:Greetings,
stuka wrote:People who are beyond such views nonetheless are sick to death of being accused by crusading fatuous dilletanti of being annihiliationists.
Yes, hence my reasons for starting this topic and keeping it distinct from the melee of the Great Rebirth Debate. Even myself, I've been accused of denying rebirth in the past simply because I find non-time-delineated models of dependent origination (a la Buddhadasa) more practical than the three-lives commentarial version. :shrug:

Metta,
Retro. :)
It is my understanding that the Ven. Buddhadasa's explanation of DP is not what the Buddha actually taught. Its clear from the suttas that when the Buddha talks about 'birth' in DP, he is talking about literal birth, not 'being born into each moment' or some similar notion.

With metta
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Alex123
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually me

Post by Alex123 »

A very widespread belief that "there is no self" is Ucchedavāda.
If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationismSN44.10
Maybe what it also means in a modern terminology is nihilism.
daverupa
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually me

Post by daverupa »

Alex123 wrote:A very widespread belief that "there is no self" is Ucchedavāda.
If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationismSN44.10
Maybe what it also means in a modern terminology is nihilism.
Nihilism is different from annihilationism. The latter speaks of the destruction of an existent thing, in this case a self; the former speaks of how knowledge and values have no objective foundation - nothing can truly be known, life is meaningless, etc. There are degrees of this view.
  • "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

    "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.

- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]
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Alex123
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually me

Post by Alex123 »

daverupa wrote:Nihilism is different from annihilationism. The latter speaks of the destruction of an existent thing, in this case a self; the former speaks of how knowledge and values have no objective foundation - nothing can truly be known, life is meaningless, etc. There are degrees of this view.
Mereological nihilism (also called compositional nihilism) is the position that objects with proper parts do not exist (not only objects in space, but also objects existing in time do not have any temporal parts), and only basic building blocks without parts exist, and thus the world we see and experience full of objects with parts is a product of human misperception (i.e., if we could see clearly, we would not perceive compositive objects).link
Some non-buddhists during Buddha's time had a similar view:
A person is a composite of four primary elements. At death, the earth (in the body) returns to and merges with the (external) earth-substance. The fire returns to and merges with the external fire-substance. The liquid returns to and merges with the external liquid-substance. The wind returns to and merges with the external wind-substance.DN2
Bhikkhu Bodhi trans wrote: [Herein, there is no killer, no slaughterer, no hearer, no speaker, no knower, no intimater.] Even one who cuts off another’s head with a sharp sword does not deprive anyone of life; the sword merely passes through the space between the seven bodies. SN24.8
Sounds to similar too what some say today...
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acinteyyo
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually me

Post by acinteyyo »

I try to explain my thoughts about it as easy as I can.
It all starts with believing in any sort of self. Then there can be two ways of thinking about such a belief. Either there is a self which is eternal or there is a self which isn't and therefore is or will be annihilated. It's not so much of importance whether somebody thinks a self lives forever or dies after some time and will be born again and dies and will be born again to belief in a self which is eternal. As well as it's not important whether somebody thinks a self isn't at all or won't be anymore in the future to belief in a self which is or will be annihilated. I suppose these both views are nothing but an extension to the underlying atta-vada an go hand in hand with it. It becomes more clear the more one understands what atta-vada means. It is the clinging, grasping to the aggregates and believing a part, parts or all of them to be the self, while anatta on the other hand is not trying to tell us that there is no self at all but rather that what we consider as self (while failing to see that it) is merely a part, parts or all of those very aggregates. So the eternalist actually beliefs a part, parts or all of the aggregates, which the eternalist considers being the self, is/are eternal while the annihilationist actually beliefs a part, parts or all of the aggregates, which the annhiliationist considers being the self, isn't at all or will be annihilated.

at least that's what I think...

best wishes, acinteyyo
Thag 1.20. Ajita - I do not fear death; nor do I long for life. I’ll lay down this body, aware and mindful.
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equilibrium
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually me

Post by equilibrium »

Removal of the "I" created by the deluded self!.....as the deluded self is deluded hence it cannot see.....the teaching allows one to see if one is fit for it by removing what we thought was true but it is nothing but a believe.....and all along, we were the one enforcing this self deluded believe.....as the whole show is put to a stop by oneself!
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by ToVincent »

In this thread, you have written the following:
viewtopic.php?p=662665#p662665
Ceisiwr wrote:An annihilationist believes in a self which can be destroyed. An enternalist believes in a self that is never destroyed.
AND
Citta is dependently originated. It is dependent upon nāmarūpa thus being without substance, without permanence, without self, empty.
One partial and one crucial error, that show that you have understood neither Buddhism, nor the Indian philosophy of the time.

:::::::::
First:
:::::::::
There are some ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists . They assert the annihilation , utter loss (vinās/vinaś), and not-becoming (vi-bhava) of an existing satta on seven grounds.
Santi, bhikkhave, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ucchedavādā sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti sattahi vatthūhi.
...
Any ascetics and brahmins who assert the annihilation (uccheda), utter loss (vinās/vinaś) , and not-becoming (vi-bhava) of an existing satta, do so on one or other of these seven grounds. Outside of this there is none.
Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā ucchedavādā sato sattassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavaṁ paññapenti, sabbe te imeheva sattahi vatthūhi …
The Realized One understands this.
DN1
When it comes to annihilationism, Buddha speaks of an atta that belongs to a range encompassing the seven states; going from a purely physical atta in satta; to an atta in satta, that has reached the level of the nevasaññānāsaññāyatana.

You don't adress satta — only atta.
First error.

Satta is the the existing (sat) been made (sat-ta/sat kata), out of khandhas — Satta is just actuality (reality) of the khandhas, through the senses. Sattas cover all kind of attas (atmans) within them. From a purely physical atta in satta, to an atta that has reached the level of the nevasaññānāsaññāyatana.

Buddha did not go for the limitation of these annihilationists' seven grounds, NOR did He follow the eternalists & "annihilationists" views, of the khandhas as self (or self in khandhas, etc). Viz "I am".
He went further up to the knowledge of saññā­ve­dayi­ta­nirodhaṃsaññā — and in the process, He acknowledged no self in the khandhas, all the way up.
This is where the self separates (the other meaning of ucchid), from the satta.
Note: Ucchid takes the meaning of "separate", "cut off", in the Brahmanas; and of "destruction" in the Upanishads".

There is no self in satta for Buddha, at whatever "annihilationists' ground (7).
If there is a self, it is outside paṭiccasamuppāda. And if self there is, the separation (ucchid) from satta (the" existing been made"), is done beyond the cessation of perception & feeling (saññā­ve­dayi­ta­nirodhaṃsaññā).
This is why it is ridiculous to say that an arahat is annihilated (ucchijjati), and utterly lost (vinassati / vinaś) when his body breaks up — and does not exist after death (na hoti paraṁ maraṇā) — what the annihilationists believed in - which is not the message of the Buddha.
See SN 22.85

-------------
NOTES::

"The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another".
SN 12.46

"I might not be, and it might not be for me - I will not be, and it will not be for me.
SN 22.81

These are also the two additional views of the "annihilationists", adressed by the Buddha.

-----------

To say that Āḷāra Kālāma & Uddaka Rāmaputta were "annihilationists" might be right, but not absolutely right — in the sense that they might have seen their personal "ground" (achievment) , as the point of separation of satta from atta, at the time of death - and not as the annihilation of both.
But to say that Buddha was, (or had been at some point in time,) an annihilationist, is very peremptory.
Buddha might belong to "separationism", so to speak (ucchedavāda / ucchid = cut off) - but definitely not to "annihilationism" (ucchedavāda / ucchid = destroy).


_____________

::::::::::::::::::
Second:
::::::::::::::::::
Ceisiwr wrote:
Citta is dependently originated. It is dependent upon nāmarūpa...
Citta "dependent upon nāmarūpa".

"Dependent upon nāmarūpa".

Whoa there!
.
.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
Jack19990101
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by Jack19990101 »

Annihilationism is believe the cessation of being sentient & cessation of the potential to be sentient.

Cessation of being sentient is not a problem, nibbana is too, cessation of being sentient.
it is problematic to believe there is cessation of the potential to be sentient. Nibbana is the potential to be sentient.
Nibbana is the one and only power Beings ever run on.

Buddha declares that nibbana is undestroyable, which proves annihilist idea is not possible.

If annihists were right, one annihilist reaches his destiny, All sentients are destroyed & loss of conscious.
So far we are still here, that means no annihist ever succeeded.

The failure of annihilation idea, also means that enlightenment is individual and private affairs. That can't be mass enlightenment.

I don't think annihilationism is bad, it is actually rather pleasant, it is definitely freedom from suffering.
Only problem is, it implies to destroy nibbana which is deathless and unborn.
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cappuccino
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by cappuccino »

Jack19990101 wrote: Fri Jan 21, 2022 8:13 pm So far we are still here, that means no annihilist ever succeeded.
:goodpost:
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by Ceisiwr »

ToVincent wrote: Fri Jan 21, 2022 6:25 pm
When it comes to annihilationism, Buddha speaks of an atta that belongs to a range encompassing the seven states; going from a purely physical atta in satta; to an atta in satta, that has reached the level of the nevasaññānāsaññāyatana.
By self I was including all self notions.
You don't adress satta — only atta.
First error.
Both are conventions.
Satta is the the existing (sat) been made (sat-ta/sat kata), out of khandhas — Satta is just actuality (reality) of the khandhas, through the senses. Sattas cover all kind of attas (atmans) within them. From a purely physical atta in satta, to an atta that has reached the level of the nevasaññānāsaññāyatana.
I see no need to reify these concepts in such a manner.
If there is a self, it is outside paṭiccasamuppāda. And if self there is, the separation (ucchid) from satta (the" existing been made"), is done beyond the cessation of perception & feeling (saññā­ve­dayi­ta­nirodhaṃsaññā)
Sounds like wild speculation.
This is why it is ridiculous to say that an arahat is annihilated (ucchijjati), and utterly lost (vinassati / vinaś) when his body breaks up — and does not exist after death (na hoti paraṁ maraṇā) — what the annihilationists believed in - which is not the message of the Buddha.


Of course. The Arahant is a concept, and ultimately concepts do not exist nor not exist.
But to say that Buddha was, (or had been at some point in time,) an annihilationist, is very peremptory.
I've never said the Buddha was. I did say the Buddha-to-be likely was.
Citta "dependent upon nāmarūpa".

"Dependent upon nāmarūpa".

Whoa there!
Yes.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by SteRo »

Materiality is all that may persist but since it usually persists - although in different forms - even a view of eliminative materialism cannot be a a view of annihilationism. Outside of eternalist religions "annihilationism" is merely a fabrication of philosophically obsessed brains.

But as far as eternalist christianity is concerned it is thus:
In Christianity, annihilationism (also known as extinctionism or destructionism)[1] is the belief that those who are wicked will perish or cease to exist. It states that after the Last Judgment, all unsaved human beings, all fallen angels (all of the damned) and Satan himself will be totally destroyed so as to not exist, or that their consciousness will be extinguished rather than suffer everlasting torment in Hell (often synonymized with the lake of fire). Annihilationism stands in contrast to both belief in eternal torture and suffering in the lake of fire and the belief that everyone will be saved (universal reconciliation or simply "universalism").

Annihilationism is directly related to the doctrine of Christian conditionalism, the idea that a human soul is not immortal unless it is given eternal life. Annihilationism asserts that God will eventually destroy the wicked, leaving only the righteous to live on in immortality. Thus those who do not repent of their sins are eternally destroyed because of the inherent incompatibility of sin with God's holy character.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annihilationism
Cleared. αδόξαστος.
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by ToVincent »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Jan 22, 2022 2:35 amBy self I was including all self notions.
No, what you wrote is "An annihilationist believes in a self which can be destroyed".
This is not what DN1 says.
DN1 says that an annihilationist believes in a SATTA which can be destroyed.
Whatever the attainment of the self there is in it.
You never adress satta proper.

Instead you go with that red herring "convention" of yours.
Have the annihilationists ever spoken about "convention"?

By the way, how do you see these "conventions"? — Is it in your 18th century frame of mind?
You should update your science and philosophy.
----------
Ceisiwr wrote:I see no need to reify these concepts in such a manner
Yet, that's a fact.

There is no realism in space and time. Because space and time is not fundamental.
But there is an objective reality outside space and time, independent of observation.

You are into some "all encompassing" conscious illusionism à la Dennett. What is at stake now is conscious realism, from a fundamental consciousness outside space and time - outside ākāśa (ākāś).
Very Buddhist indeed.

Again, you should update your science.

--------
Ceisiwr wrote:Sounds like wild speculation
Not so wild, considering SN 22.85, or Snp 5.7 (Upasīva­māṇava­pucchā).
Bhudda:
"As a flame overthrown by the force of the wind,”
“Accī yathā vātavegena khittā,
“goes to rest and can no longer be connected with (RV),
Atthaṁ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṁ;
just so the Sage free from the naming of the ci (nāmakāyā),
Evaṁ munī nāmakāyā vimutto,
comes to an end and can no longer be connected with.”
Atthaṁ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṁ”.
.....
"There is no measure of the one who has come to rest,”
“Atthaṅgatassa na pamāṇamatthi,
““there is nothing by which they can speak of (describe) him.
Yena naṁ vajjuṁ taṁ tassa natthi;
when everything has been completely removed,
Sabbesu dhammesu samohatesu,
all the pathways for speech are also completely removed.”
Samūhatā vādapathāpi sabbe”ti.

Saṅkha = saṅkhyā/saṃkhyā = to appear along with , be connected with , belong to RV. VS.

Nāmakāyā
Kāya is the active* of ci.
The ci is what "piles up", among other things.
* (grammar) expressing action, instead of a state of being.
Nāmakāyā is the mental "piling up" (of khandhas).

It is the first action of the ci in the Saṅkhārā nidāna.
And the last action a human can do to liberate himself from ignorance, is to get free of any influence of the ci, and get away from the dhṛman* of ignorance (paṭiccasamuppāda), through vijjā.
(* dhamma - from √ dhṛ = 'that undertakes, and maintains activity).

Citta is dependant on ignorance [Avijja], (not on nāmarupa) — SA 609, SN 47.42's parallel speaks of "assembling" , not about "dependence on").

(You should work upon suttas' parallels as well) .



-------
Ceisiwr wrote:yes
You say "yes" to citta is dependent on nāmarūpa.
See above, how wrong this is.

________

From all of the above, I really doubt that Buddha had ever been an annihilationist.
Buddha was looking for disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, peace, direct knowledge, enlightenment, and Nibbāna.
He was unsatisfied with the fact that both Āḷāra Kālāma & Uddaka Rāmaputta dhamma was leading to the REAPPEARANCE in either of their achievements.

Were the annihilationists talking about Nibbāna - or were they talking about annihilation?
Sounds like Āḷāra Kālāma & Uddaka Rāmaputta believed also in Nibbāna - like Buddha — not in the annihilation of satta, (at whatever level of atta it could be).
.
.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by Ceisiwr »

ToVincent wrote: Sat Jan 22, 2022 12:23 pm
No, what you wrote is "An annihilationist believes in a self which can be destroyed".
This is not what DN1 says.
DN1 says that an annihilationist believes in a SATTA which can be destroyed.
Whatever the attainment of the self there is in it.
You never adress satta.
DN 1 talks of annihilationists who believe in an atta which is destroyed, thus they talk of existing beings being annihilated. In other words, they are taking the word "atta" as referring to a real existent. Atta really is (atthi), then is not. The reality is that all that can be said of atta is that it is merely a concept/word. No substance can be found behind the word, as the real referent of the concept. When someone then talks of a self which is destroyed, they are thinking in terms of existing beings. They are taking the view that the self exists now and then does not. As for being or notions of existence itself, they are merely concepts people adhere to when clinging.
Instead you go with that red herring "convention" of yours.
Have the annihilationists ever spoken about "convention"?
I'm sure they knew the concept, yes.
By the way, how do you see these "conventions"? — Is it in your 18th century frame of mind?
You should update your science and philosophy.
Conceptions, labels and words. In science they are the various scientific theories we find. Useful models of the world, but models nonetheless. As for philosophy, sometimes the old ideas are best.

"Nothing exists;
Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it; and
Even if something can be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others.
Even if it can be communicated, it cannot be understood."


- Gorgias

GORGIAS' ON THE NONEXISTENT OR ON NATURE 3. SEXTUS, AGAINST THE SCHOOLMASTERS VII 65: Gorgias of Leontini began from the same position as those who have abolished the criterion, but did not follow the same line of attack as the school of Protagoras. In what is entitled On the NONEXISTENT OR ON NATURE he proposes three successive headings: first and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being expressed or explained to the next man.

(66) Now he concludes in the following way that nothing exists: If <anything> exists, either the existent exists or the nonexistent or both the existent exists and the nonexistent. But, as he will establish, neither does the existent exist nor the nonexistent, as he will make clear, nor the existent and <the> nonexistent, as he will also teach. It is not the case then that anything exists. (67) More specifically, the nonexistent does not exist; for if the nonexistent exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same time, for insofar as it is understood as nonexistent, it will not exist, but insofar as it is nonexistent it will, on the other hand, exist. It would, however, be entirely absurd for something to exist and at the same time not to exist. The nonexistent, therefore, does not exist. And to state another argument, if the nonexistent exists, the existent will not exist, for these are opposites to each other, and if existence is an attribute of the nonexistent, nonexistence will be an attribute of the existent. But it is not, in fact, true that the existent does not exist.

<Accordingly>, neither will the nonexistent exist. (68) Moreover, the existent does not exist either. For if the existent exists, it is either eternal or generated, or at the same time eternal and generated. But it is neither eternal nor generated nor both, as we shall show. The existent therefore does not exist. For if the existent is eternal (one must begin with this point) it does not have any beginning. (69) For everything which is generated has some beginning, but the eternal, being ungenerated, did not have a beginning. And not having a beginning it is without limit. And if it is without limit it is nowhere. For if it is somewhere, that in which it is, is something other than it, and thus if the existent is contained in something it will no longer be without limit. For the container is greater than the contained, but nothing is greater than the unlimited, so that the unlimited cannot exist anywhere. (70) Moreover, it is not contained in itself. For in that case container and contained will be the same, and the existent will become two things, place and body (place is the container, body the contained). But this is absurd. Accordingly, existence is not contained in itself. So that if the existent is eternal it is unlimited, and if it is unlimited it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist. Accordingly, if the existent is eternal, it is not existent at all. (71) Moreover, neither can the existent be generated. For if it has come into being, it has come either from the existent or the nonexistent. But it has not come from the existent. For if it is existent, it has not come to be, but already exists. Nor from the nonexistent. For the nonexistent cannot generate anything, because what is generative of something of necessity ought to partake of positive existence. It is not true either, therefore, that the existent is generated. (72) In the same way it is not jointly at the same time eternal and generated. For these qualities are mutually exclusive of each other, and if the existent is eternal it has not been generated, and if it has been generated it is not eternal.

Accordingly, if the existent is neither eternal nor generated nor both at once, the existent should not exist. (73) And to use another argument, if it exists, it is either one or many. But it is neither one nor many, as will be set forth. Therefore, the existent does not exist. For if it is one, it is an existent or a continuum or a magnitude or a body. But whatever of these it is, it is not one, since whatever has extent will be divided, and what is a continuum will be cut. And similarly, what is conceived as a magnitude will not be indivisible. And if it is by chance a body it will be three-dimensional, for it will have length, and breadth and depth. But it is absurd to say that the existent is none of these things. Therefore, the existent is not one. (74) And moreover it is not many. For if it is not one, it is not many either, since the many is a composite of separate entities and thus, when the possibility that it is one was refuted, the possibility that it is many was refuted as well. Now it is clear from this that neither does the existent exist nor does the nonexistent exist. (75) It is easy to conclude that both the existent and the nonexistent do not exist either. For if the nonexistent exists and the existent exists, the nonexistent will be the same thing as the existent as far as existence is concerned. And for this reason neither of them exists. For it is agreed that the nonexistent does not exist, and the existent has been shown to be the same as the nonexistent and it accordingly will not exist. (76) Of course, if the existent is the same as the nonexistent, it is not possible for both to exist. For if both exist, they are not the same, and if the same, both do not exist. To which the conclusion follows that nothing exists. For if neither the existent exists nor the nonexistent nor both, and if no additional possibility is conceivable, nothing exists.

(77) Next it must be shown that even if anything exists, it is unknowable and incomprehensible to man. For, says Gordias, if things considered in the mind are not existent, the existent is not considered. And that is logical. For if "white" were a possible attribute of what is considered, "being considered" would also have been a possible attribute of what is white; similarly, if "not to be existent" were a possible attribute of what is being considered, necessarily "not to be considered" will be a possible attribute of what is existent. (78) As a result, the statement "if things considered are not existent, the existent is not considered" is sound and logically follows. But things considered (for this must be our starting point) are not existent, as we shall show. The existent is not therefore considered. And moreover, it is clear that things considered are not existent. (79) For if things considered are existent, all things considered exist, and in whatever way anyone considers them. Which is absurd. For if one considers a man flying or chariots racing in the sea, a man does not straightway fly nor a chariot race in the sea. So that things considered are not existent.

(80) In addition, if things considered in the mind are existent, nonexistent things will not be considered. For opposites are attributes of opposites, and the nonexistent is opposed to the existent. For this reason it is quite evident that if "being considered in the mind" is an attribute of the existent, "not being considered in the mind" will be an attribute of the nonexistent. But this is absurd. For Scylla and Chimaera and many other nonexistent things are considered in the mind. Therefore, the existent is not considered in the mind. (81) Just as objects of sight are said to be visible for the reason that they are seen, and objects of hearing are said to be audible for the reason that they are heard, and we do not reject visible things on the grounds that they are not heard, nor dismiss audible things because they are not seen (since each object ought to be judged by its own sense, but not by another), so, too, things considered in the mind will exist even if they should not be seen by the sight nor heard by the hearing, because they are perceived by their own criterion. (82) If, therefore, someone considered in the mind that chariots race in the sea, even if he does not see them, he should believe that there are chariots racing in the sea. But this is absurd. Therefore, the existent is not an object of consideration and is not apprehended. (83) But even if it should be apprehended, it would be incapable of being conveyed to another. For if existent things are visible and audible and generally perceptible, which means that they are external substances, and of these the things which are visible are perceived by the sight, those that are audible by the hearing, and not contrariwise, how can these things be revealed to another person? (84) For that by which we reveal is LOGOS, but LOGOS is not substances and existing things. Therefore we do not reveal existing things to our neighbors, but LOGOS, which is something other than substances.

Thus, just as the visible would not become audible, and vice versa, similarly, when external reality is involved, it would not become our LOGOS, (85) and not being LOGOS, it would not have been revealed to another. It is clear, he says that LOGOS arises from external things impinging upon us, that is, from perceptible things. From encounter with a flavor, LOGOS is expressed by us about that quality, and from encounter with a color, an expression of color. But if this is the case, LOGOS is not evocative of the external, but the external becomes the revealer of LOGOS. (86) And surely it is not possible to say that LOGOS has substance in the way visible and audible things have, so that substantial and existent things can be revealed from its substance and existence. For, he says, even if LOGOS has substance, still it differs from all the other substances, and visible bodies are to the greatest degree different from words. What is visible is comprehended by one organ, LOGOS by another. LOGOS does not, therefore, manifest the multiplicity of substances, just as they do not manifest the nature of each other. (87) Such being, in Gorgias' view, the problems, insofar as they are valid, the criterion is destroyed. For there would be no criterion if nature neither exists nor can be understood not conveyed to another.
https://academic.mu.edu/taylorr/Ancient ... ature.html


Gorgias was quite close to the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras and Ven. Nāgārjuna, don't you think?

"The is nothing to understand, nothing at all to understand. For nothing in particular has been indicated, nothing in particular has been explained." - Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra
There is no realism in space and time. Because space and time is not fundamental.
But there is an objective reality outside space and time, independent of observation.
Addressed above.
Not so wild, considering SN 22.85, or Snp 5.7 (Upasīva­māṇava­pucchā).
Nothing in that supports speculations about some atta thingy existing somewhere.
You say "yes" to citta is dependent on nāmarūpa.
See above, how wrong this is.
The mind originates from name and form.
Nāmarūpasamudayā cittassa samudayo;
When name and form cease, the mind ends.
nāmarūpanirodhā cittassa atthaṅgamo.


SN 47. 42
From all of the above, I really doubt that Buddha had ever been an annihilationist.
Buddha was looking for disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, peace, direct knowledge, enlightenment, and Nibbāna.
He was unsatisfied with the fact that both Āḷāra Kālāma & Uddaka Rāmaputta dhamma was leading to the REAPPEARANCE in either of their achievements.

Were the annihilationists talking about Nibbāna - or were they talking about annihilation?
Soundsclike Āḷāra Kālāma & Uddaka Rāmaputta believed also in the former - like Buddha.
Given that Āḷāra Kālāma & Uddaka Rāmaputta were likely annihilationists, but not of the materialist kind, it's easy to assume that they too were seeking enlightenment and Nibbāna which they saw in terms of the destruction of an existing being. Part of the Buddha's awakening is in seeing that this was an assumption, and that ultimately no existing being which suffered could be established. That the Buddha to be sought out Āḷāra Kālāma & Uddaka Rāmaputta suggests that initially he saw things in terms of ending his own existence in order to escape dukkha, that is to say he was thinking in terms of an existing self which suffers.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sat Jan 22, 2022 2:51 pm, edited 1 time in total.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
ToVincent
Posts: 1839
Joined: Tue Aug 30, 2016 6:02 pm

Re: Ucchedavada (annihilationism) - what does it actually mean?

Post by ToVincent »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Jan 22, 2022 1:35 pm ...
Should I bother?
.
.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
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