"I can paint A and I can paint B, and I can paint them both on the same canvas: I
cannot, however, paint the both, nor paint the A and the B" (from Husserl's Sixth Logical Investigation)
"...in order to discover the general it is only necessary to put two particulars together, and what they have in common will be the general. This, I think, is clear. But also we can put it in a different way: we can say that whenever two particulars are found together, they ipso facto reveal the general. This means that whenever we perceive a togetherness of particulars, we do so because we perceive what they have in common (though it may be difficult to say precisely what it is). Whenever we see two (or more) different things that nevertheless seem to belong to each other, we are at once entitled to turn the situation the other way round and say that we see one and the same more general thing presenting two different aspects.
If you have grasped this idea, you will see that it can be applied to perception of change. In perception of change, we have first A, and then B; but we must also have the 'belonging-togetherness' of A and B, otherwise we fail to connect A's disappearance and B's appearance and do not say that 'A has changed into B' or that 'A has become B'." (from Ved. Ñanavira's to Mr. Wijerama)
"We have seen that categorial perception is founded on sense perception but does
not reduce to it, and that categorial objectualities are founded on sensible objects but do not reduce to
them. Now, once categorial objectualities of this first level — like sets or relations
— are given to us, new categorial intuitions can be built on the corresponding categorial
intuitions of the first level, and in such categorial intuitions of the second level new categorial
objectualities of second level are constituted — eg, relations between sets, say bijections between sets, and also sets of
relations, sets of sets (as, eg, the power set of a given set), and so forth. In this way, repeating the process indefinitely, a hierarchy of categorial intuitions is obtained and a
corresponding hierarchy of categorial objectualities is given to us, so that in categorial intuitions
of the nth level categorial objectualities of the nth level are constituted." ( from Husserl or Frege?: meaning, objectivity, and mathematics by Claire Ortiz Hill, Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock
I find the last quote bears a striking resemblance to Ven. Ñanavira's Fundamental Structure.