Self view and conceit

[sentinel]

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .wlsh.html

"No, friends, I do not say this 'I am' is the body,... consciousness, nor that it is other than the body,... consciousness. Yet with regard to the five groups of clinging,[1] 'I am' comes to me,[2] but I do not consider it (by way of wrong views) as 'This I am.' It is just like the scent of a blue, red or white lotus.[3] If someone were to say, 'The scent belongs to the petals, or the color, or the fibers,'[4] would he be describing it correctly?"

"Surely not, friend."
"Then how would he describe it correctly?"
"As the scent of the flower, would be the correct explanation."

excellent sutta

Though, friends, an Ariyan disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters,[5] there still remains in him a subtle remnant[6] from among the five groups of clinging, a subtle remnant of the 'I'-conceit, of the 'I'-desire, an unextirpated lurking tendency[7] to think: 'I am.' Later on he dwells contemplating the rise and fall of the five groups of clinging,[8] and he sees: 'This is the body, this is its arising, this is its passing away. These are feelings,... perceptions,... mental formations,... this is consciousness, this is its arising, this is its passing away.'

"So, as he dwells thus in contemplation of the rise and fall of the five groups of clinging, this subtle remnant from among the five groups of clinging, this subtle remnant of the 'I'-conceit, of the 'I'-desire, this unextirpated lurking tendency to think: 'I am' is brought to an end.[9]

Conceit belongs to which group of unwholesomeness root ? Ignorance , greed or hatred ?

[uojm]

> Does the (conceit or mana) or self identity is different from self view ?

Posts above show that there is at least a difference, other than just wording, between mana and sakkaya-ditthi.

> If a person cannot consider anything to be the self, How can the thinking of ...

This is basically the same question (if not sakkaya-ditthi, which of the two is left...). That could then mean that the earlier posts were not clearing things up.
Is it a problem perhaps that when you say **self**-identity, which you sided with mana (conceit, measuring), it *”feels”* for you like sakkaya-ditthi, as ‘**self** view’?

> If a person cannot consider anything to be the self

And perhaps this ’the self’ adds to this confusion? Because now we are talking about self-identity, self-view and the-self.

Viewpoints, opinions, do differ but if it helps:

Some think that things are not-self because there is not a/the self. While logically it is true it doesn’t mean things are not-self *only* in the case when there is no self (sn44.10).

You could perhaps consider “not-self” for a while (my body is not-self, because I can’t keep it from getting sick or older, etc.). This is logic true no matter what “self” you view. And perhaps think of mana as measuring. Then it can be easier to tackle the questions on a practical level as well.

[User1249x]

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .wlsh.html

excellent sutta

Though, friends, an Ariyan disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters,[5] there still remains in him a subtle remnant[6] from among the five groups of clinging, a subtle remnant of the 'I'-conceit, of the 'I'-desire, an unextirpated lurking tendency[7] to think: 'I am.' Later on he dwells contemplating the rise and fall of the five groups of clinging,[8] and he sees: 'This is the body, this is its arising, this is its passing away. These are feelings,... perceptions,... mental formations,... this is consciousness, this is its arising, this is its passing away.'

"So, as he dwells thus in contemplation of the rise and fall of the five groups of clinging, this subtle remnant from among the five groups of clinging, this subtle remnant of the 'I'-conceit, of the 'I'-desire, this unextirpated lurking tendency to think: 'I am' is brought to an end.[9]

Conceit belongs to which group of unwholesomeness root ? Ignorance , greed or hatred ?

i am not sure how to answer and i don't want to write a long response if you are just looking for a short answer but notions of conceit arise due to ignorance but so does greed and hatred as well. If i was to put it in one category id go with ignorance since both are abandoned with the attainment of the fourth path and it makes most sense.

[auto]

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

"'This body comes into being through conceit. And yet it is by relying on conceit that conceit is to be abandoned.' Thus was it said. And in reference to what was it said?

There is the case, sister, where a monk hears, 'The monk named such-and-such, they say, through the ending of the fermentations, has entered & remains in the fermentation-free awareness-release & discernment-release, having known & realized them for himself in the here & now.' The thought occurs to him, 'The monk named such-and-such, they say, through the ending of the fermentations, has entered & remains in the fermentation-free awareness-release & discernment-release, having known & realized them for himself in the here & now. Then why not me?' Then he eventually abandons conceit, having relied on conceit. 'This body comes into being through conceit. And yet it is by relying on conceit that conceit is to be abandoned.' Thus was it said, and in reference to this was it said.

Conceit=Why not me?

"'This body comes into being through craving. And yet it is by relying on craving that craving is to be abandoned.' Thus was it said. And in reference to what was it said? There is the case, sister, where a monk hears, 'The monk named such-and-such, they say, through the ending of the fermentations, has entered & remains in the fermentation-free awareness-release & discernment-release, having known & realized them for himself in the here & now.' The thought occurs to him, 'I hope that I, too, will — through the ending of the fermentations — enter & remain in the fermentation-free awareness-release & discernment-release, having known & realized them for myself in the here & now.' Then he eventually abandons craving, having relied on craving. 'This body comes into being through craving. And yet it is by relying on craving that craving is to be abandoned.' Thus was it said. And in reference to this was it said.

Craving=I hope that i, too, will

[pegembara]

At stream-entry ‘not-self’ is understood. But still the ‘sense of self’ is left. This ‘sense of self’ is regarding things that are not-self. So this is ‘making it about self, while it is not about self’. In this way it got the characteristics of conceit, hence conceit.

Conceit, arrogance, pride, self-esteem and so on, are all manifestations of this ‘nature of conceit’. The most subtile one is this ‘sense of self’; it is the conceit ‘I am’ (asmimana).

source: http://bit.do/ezdhP

"So, bhikkhus any kind of form whatever, whether past, future or presently arisen, whether gross or subtle, whether in oneself or external, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near, must with right understanding how it is, be regarded thus: 'This is not mine, this is not I, this is not myself.'

"Any kind of feeling whatever...

"Any kind of perception whatever...

"Any kind of determination whatever...

"Any kind of consciousness whatever, whether past, future or presently arisen, whether gross or subtle, whether in oneself or external, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near must, with right understanding how it is, be regarded thus: 'This is not mine, this is not I, this is not my self.'

Even if the 5 aggregates are to be regarded as not self. What remains is conceit/asmimana as Ven Khemaka tells.
For by regarding all conditioned experience as not self, it, unfortunately, suggests a so-called "self" which is apart from the conditioned.
As in the unconditioned is the "true self" which is conceit of an ultimate self (also is to be abandoned).

Sabbe sankhara anicca
Sabbe sankhara dukkha
Sabbe dhamma anatta

So it comes to be the last line that sabbe dhamma anatta instead of sabbe sankhara anatta.

[uojm]

For by regarding all conditioned experience as not self, it, unfortunately, suggests a so-called “self” which is apart from the conditioned.

1) The point that “taking things as not self is unfortunately suggesting a self” then seem to imply that this teaching (of not-self) would then lead to a misunderstanding, thus to more suffering.

2) To have not-self implying a self, would be in the case where not-self would first imply no “self” which in its turn would imply a “self”. Is that what you meant? If not help me a bit to understand, but if so: This would exactly have been Vacchagotta’s conclusion. Would the Buddha have said “there is no self” it would not only have sided with the wrong view of the annihilationists, but on top of that it would have lead to the conclusion “the self I used to have now doesn’t exist” (SN44.10). This then shows that “no self”, instead of not-self, has the problem you described. (That sermon also tackles the view of “self” as siding with the wrong view of the eternalists and on top of that as being not consistent with the teaching.)

As in the unconditioned is the “true self” which is conceit of an ultimate self (also is to be abandoned).

True self, false self, fine self, gross self, conditioned self, no matter how we view it, it keeps being based on ignorance. Many sermons fortunately point to practises. And “not-self” can be taken up, seen, as a practise, instead of making a statement.

And as with “self” so with conceit. Wether it is conceit of an ultimate self, or of a false self or of anything, it stays conceit. Conceit falls away if ignorance falls away. As long as the last fetters aren’t cut we don’t fully understand. Since we don’t fully understand what (/that) we view is open to errors. So the more details we put in, the more chance of errors. Keeping things small, like ‘conceit is just conceit’ (despite the view) and ‘not-self is not-self’ (despite the “cause”), then might be seen as true despite difference in views. This way we might perhaps less easily fall to statements (it is so, it is not so) while be able to polish more and more on verifiable steps.

[Spiny Norman]

For by regarding all conditioned experience as not self, it, unfortunately, suggests a so-called "self" which is apart from the conditioned.

Though there is clearly something which recognises anatta in the conditioned - I recall Ajahn Chah referred to this as "one who knows".

As in the unconditioned is the "true self" which is conceit of an ultimate self (also is to be abandoned).

If we abandon "the one who knows", how will we do this, practically speaking?

[Spiny Norman]

You could perhaps consider “not-self” for a while (my body is not-self, because I can’t keep it from getting sick or older, etc.). This is logic true no matter what “self” you view. And perhaps think of mana as measuring. Then it can be easier to tackle the questions on a practical level as well.

Why would having a self mean we have control over things? I don't see logic of going from "I have no control over the aggregates" to "I have no self".

[uojm]

Why would having a self mean we have control over things? I don't see logic of going from "I have no control over the aggregates" to "I have no self".

(Starting first with the last)

I don't see logic of going from "I have no control over the aggregates" to "I have no self".

With full control it should be possible to not to let your body decay, for example. But your body does; it is impermanent. And so are the other aggregates. What is impermanent is suffering, and what suffering is, is not-self. (Not-self should be seen/understood as: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self’) (SN22.15 etc.)

Some assume that these things are not-self because there is no self (they might assume that is what no-self is hinting at or not pick up on not-self, only interpret it as “no self”). The logic is valid: if there was no self, could then things be self?, but it does not necessarily mean the assumption is. ‘There is no self’ is an extreme.

Why would having a self mean we have control over things?

Your question, like Vacchagotta’s implies (control or not) a self. The Buddha taught suffering and the end of suffering. ‘There is a self’ is another extreme.

[User1249x]

"I have no self".

Is a self contradictory statement because the meaning is "Self has no self"

The proper inference is;
"I have no control over the aggregates" therefore "The aggregates are not self"

Furthermore the statement "I have no control over the aggregates"

assumes that Aggregates are one thing and Self [I] is another which is wrong as well because the idea of Self arises in dependence on the aggregates and is conjoined and inseparable from the Aggregates.

Ie ideas and notions are sense impressions arising in dependence on intellect and mental data, when there are these two (intellect and mental data) there can be intellect-consciousness, meeting of the three is contact, when there is contact there is feeling, when there is feeling there is perception based on the intellect, what is perceived is cognized.

Thus the Idea of self is perceived and is classed as Perception and is among the past, present and future classes of six kinds of Perception arising in dependence on the six sense bases, the six kinds of past, present and future classes of perception are designated as the perception Aggregate.

Therefore the notion of self is not apart from the aggregates and "I have no control over the aggregates" is akin to saying "A room has no control over the house"

source;
on six classes of perception; https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

[uojm]

"I have no self".

Is a self contradictory statement because the meaning is "Self has no self"

With “idea of Self”, “notion of self”, “sense of self”, “Self(I)”, we don’t mean self as from ‘a self’ (a sakkayaditthi), but from ‘myself’ as synonym for ‘I’ (conceit). Then, to illustrate, were we to take ‘soul’ for the view, we would get ‘I have no soul’, which does not need to be seen as contradictory.

The suttas use ‘I am’ for this conceit. Which is better but this ‘I’ is by some only seen as selfishness or ego and can, for some, lead to avoid the use of ‘I’ in normal sentences. If we learn to differentiate between the two, we can relax a bit about this use of ‘I’: it belongs to the last fetters to break. We could then perhaps be focusing more on the ‘not-self’ aspect (to break the first fetters first), which doesn’t require speculation nor denying this ‘sense of I’.

… because the idea of Self arises in dependence on the aggregates and is conjoined and inseparable from the Aggregates.

But if that was the case, arahants, while around, would then have this notion too.

[Spiny Norman]

With full control it should be possible to not to let your body decay, for example.

Yes, I get that.

What is impermanent is suffering, and what suffering is, is not-self. (Not-self should be seen/understood as: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self’) (SN22.15 etc.)

But not-self here seems to be added as an afterthought. The formula would make sense if it was "What is not-self is suffering", but that isn't how it is presented in the suttas.

Also there is no explanation as to why having a self means being in control. It's quite possible to have a sense of self but still feel that one has little control over what happens.

[uojm]

The formula would make sense if it was "What is not-self is suffering", but that isn't how it is presented in the suttas.

I can not follow, could you help me a bit and guide me to this point?

Also there is no explanation as to why having a self means being in control.

I can only try to rephrase it a little. When you say “why having a self <feel-free-to-insert-anything>” your firstly view this ‘self’; it requires the (underlying) view ‘there is a self’. When Vacchagotta asked the Buddha if there was a self, the Buddha stayed silent. Why did was, was explained.

It's quite possible to have a sense of self but still feel that one has little control over what happens.

Who said otherwise? Though this ‘self’, in ‘sense of self’, comes from ‘myself’ as synonym for ‘I’. Thus we are talking about conceit (mana) here and not ‘self’ as from a ‘self’ (a sakkayaditthi).

[User1249x]

… because the idea of Self arises in dependence on the aggregates and is conjoined and inseparable from the Aggregates.

But if that was the case, arahants, while around, would then have this notion too.

The Arahants use personal pronous. Therefore obviously they can conceive of notions of oneself and others...

Dwelling at Savatthi... "Monks, before my Awakening, when I was just an unawakened Bodhisatta, the realization came to me: 'How this world has fallen on difficulty!

All concepts, notions, ideas and ideations arise in dependence on the Ideation faculty and thus inseparable from the Aggregates.

"And what is perception? These six classes of perception — perception of form, perception of sound, perception of smell, perception of taste, perception of tactile sensation, perception of ideas: this is called perception. From the origination of contact comes the origination of perception. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of perception. ...

The difference is that arahants understanding this no longer take the aggregates to be self and have abandoned even the underlying tendencies to do so and are thus no longer assailed by notions and ideas based on that misunderstanding.

[Spiny Norman]

It's quite possible to have a sense of self but still feel that one has little control over what happens.

Who said otherwise? Though this ‘self’, in ‘sense of self’, comes from ‘myself’ as synonym for ‘I’. Thus we are talking about conceit (mana) here and not ‘self’ as from a ‘self’ (a sakkayaditthi).

OK, so mana is the sense of "I am", the sense of a "me" having experiences. But it is quite possible to feel this, and also to feel that things are not in one's control. The two feelings are not mutually exclusive. That being the case, why equate the sense of "me" with being in control? I don't see a logical equivalence here.