Greetings Mike,
retrofuturist wrote: ↑Wed Jun 13, 2018 2:17 am
Dependent origination explains an ignorant mis-understanding of emptiness, and its consequences.
mikenz66 wrote: ↑Wed Jun 13, 2018 4:02 am
Hi retro, would you mind explaining in detail the meaning of this brief passage?
OK, can do now, but will have to be brief, and done holding an occasionally grizzly baby with one arm.
Firstly, Nanavira from his Note On Paticcasamuppada... I will bold for emphasis... underline for conclusion.
11. Let us now turn to the beginning of the paticcasamuppāda formulation and consider the word sankhāra. The passage from the Cūlavedallasutta quoted in §5 evidently uses sankhāra to mean a thing from which some other thing is inseparable—in other words, a necessary condition. This definition is perfectly simple and quite general, and we shall find that it is all that we need. (If a sankhāra is something upon which something else depends, we can say that the 'something else' is determined by the first thing, i.e. by the sankhāra, which is therefore a 'determination' or a 'determinant'. It will be convenient to use the word determination when we need to translate sankhāra.)
12. Some discussion will be necessary if we are to see that sankhāra, whenever it occurs, always has this meaning in one form or another. We may start with the fundamental triad: Sabbe sankhārā aniccā; Sabbe sankhārā dukkhā; Sabbe dhammā anattā. ('All determinations are impermanent; All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering); All things are not-self.') (Dhammapada xx,5-7 <Dh. 277-9>) A puthujjana accepts what appears to be his 'self' at face value. When he asks himself 'What is my self?' he seeks to identify it in some way with one thing or another, and specifically with the pañc'upādānakkhandhā or one of them (see Khandha Samy. v,5 <S.iii,46>[4]). Whatever thing (dhamma) he identifies as 'self', that thing he takes as being permanent; for if he saw it as impermanent he would not identify it as 'self' (see DHAMMA). Since, however, he does see it as permanent—more permanent, indeed, than anything else—he will think 'Other things may be impermanent, but not this thing, which is myself'. In order, then, that he shall see it as impermanent, indirect methods are necessary: he must first see that this thing is dependent upon, or determined by, some other thing, and he must then see that this other thing, this determination or sankhāra, is impermanent. When he sees that the other thing, the sankhāra on which this thing depends, is impermanent, he sees that this thing, too, must be impermanent, and he no longer regards it as 'self'. (See SANKHĀRA.) Thus, when sabbe sankhārā aniccā is seen, sabbe dhammā anattā is seen. And similarly with sabbe sankhārā dukkhā. We may therefore understand sabbe sankhārā aniccā as 'All things upon which other things (dhammā) depend—i.e. all determinations (sankhārā)—are impermanent' with a tacit corollary 'All things dependent upon other things (sankhārā)—i.e. all determined things (sankhatā dhammā)—are impermanent'. After this, sabbe dhammā anattā, 'All things are not-self', follows as a matter of course.[e]
13. Every thing (dhamma) must, of necessity, be (or be somehow included within) one or more of the pañc('upādān)akkhandhā, either generally—e.g. feeling in general, feeling as opposed to what is not feeling—or particularly—e.g. this present painful feeling as opposed to the previous pleasant feeling (present as a past feeling). In the same way, every determination (sankhāra) must also be one or more of the pañc('upādān)akkhandhā. Thus the pañc('upādān)akkhandhā can be regarded either as sankhārā or as dhammā according as they are seen as 'things-that-other-things-depend-on' or simply as 'things themselves'. See Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,228>
Thus, all the five aggregates are actually sankharas, whether they are assigned to the sankhara aggregate or one of the other four.
As you know, the
SN 22.95: Phena Sutta goes on to describe how all five aggregates are to be known. In each instance there is the common refrain...
Then a man with good eyesight would see it, observe it, & appropriately examine it. To him — seeing it, observing it, & appropriately examining it — it would appear empty, void, without substance: for what substance would there be in [object]? In the same way, a monk sees, observes, & appropriately examines any [aggregates] that are past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near. To him — seeing them, observing them, & appropriately examining them — they would appear empty, void, without substance: for what substance would there be in [aggregates] ?
This is reaffirmed in verse...
Form is like a glob of foam;
feeling, a bubble;
perception, a mirage;
fabrications, a banana tree;
consciousness, a magic trick —
this has been taught
by the Kinsman of the Sun.
However you observe them,
appropriately examine them,
they're empty, void
to whoever sees them
appropriately.
So, whether we are reflecting in terms of paticcasamuppada or the five aggregates, everything that is a sankhata-dhamma (which, remember, is all dhammas with the exception of nibbana) is dependent upon
something. It's either dependent upon other sankhata-dhammas (which you could take back through a potentially infinite regress) but the fundamental dependence upon which the whole set of dhammas rely, is the ignorance (avijja) of the reality that dhammas are "empty, void, without substance". The whole set of sankhata-dhammas (whether measured by paticcasamuppada or the five aggregates) are what is known in the Dhamma as a "perversion of perception".
As Ven. Nanananda explains...
We are not willing to accept that existence is a perversion. Existence is suffering precisely because it is a perversion.
This is why over the years I have stressed the importance of not believing in the "existence" of dhammas, because when you think of them as "existing", you inadvertently think of them as real things, rather than as the products of erroneous / perverted perceptions. Non-existence of dhammas is equally wrong, because to talk of non-existence is to posit a thing, only to go on and negate its existence.
Hence, the Dhamma is a middle way between existence and non-existence... not just the middle way between existence and non-existence of a self, or soul... but between the existence and non-existence of
any thing.
That concludes the detailed explanation of what was said in brief.
Metta,
Paul.