Because your questions are irrelevant and unrelated to the subject matter you claim to be an expert on.
Quite right, if she would have looked at what I was graciously and with good intention trying to share with her she would have learned that to say Paticcasumapadda happens in a single 'moment' makes it temporal due to the assertion of 'moment' which denotes a perception of 'time'. Also she fails to say what question two even has to do with Nanaviras work at all.
And I admit that I don't understand his take on it completely yet, I'm chipping away at it; I just know enough to say that her questions aren't applicable to his view, whether that view is true or not.
I'll post just a little since she doesn't seem truly concerned with getting the answers to her question herself, makes me question how much the questioner actually cares about the question, in which case I'm wasting my time trying to help, so for instance here is why she is stuck on the vanishing arahant that B. Bodhi puts forth who obvious did not bother to learn about Nanaviras actual view either (some of the pali characters get messed up in copy and pasting but a knowledgeable person should be able to correct the errors in their heads), Nanavira:
In spite of the venerable tradition, starting with the Pañisambhidàmagga
(or perhaps the Abhidhamma Piñaka) and continued in
all the Commentaries (see Aïguttara V,viii,9 <A.iii,107,§4>), pañiccasamuppàda
has nothing to do with temporal succession (cause-andeffect).
Precedence in pañiccasamuppàda is structural, not temporal:
pañiccasamuppàda is not the description of a process. For as long as
pañiccasamuppàda is thought to involve temporal succession (as it is,
notably, in the traditional ‘three-life’ interpretation), so long is it liable
to be regarded as some kind of hypothesis (that there is re-birth and
that it is caused by avijjà) to be verified (or not) in the course of time
(like any hypothesis of the natural sciences), and so long are people
liable to think that the necessary and sufficient criterion of a ‘Buddhist’ad
is the acceptance of this hypothesis on trust (for no hypothesis
can be known to be certainly true, since upon the next occasion it may
fail to verify itself). But the Buddha tells us (Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,265>)
that pañiccasamuppàda is:
sandiññhiko akàliko ehipassiko opanayiko
paccattaü veditabbo vi¤¤åhi.
(immediate, timeless, evident, leading,
to be known privately by the wise)
What temporal succession is akàlika (timelessness)?
For an ariyasà-vaka, pañiccasamuppàda is a matter of direct reflexive certainty: the ariyasàvaka has direct, certain, reflexive knowledge of the condition upon which birth depends. He has no such knowledge about re-birth,
which is quite a different matter. He knows for himself that avijjà is
the condition for birth; but he does not know for himself that when
there is avijjà there is re-birth. (That there is re-birth, i.e. saüsàra,
may remain, even for the ariyasàvaka, a matter of trust in the
Buddha.) The ariyasàvaka knows for himself that even in this very life
the arahat is, actually, not to be found (cf. Khandha Saüy. ix,3
<S.iii,109-15> and see Paramattha Sacca), and that it is wrong
to say that the arahat ‘was born’ or ‘will die’. With sakkàyanirodha
there is no longer any ‘somebody’ (or a person—sakkàya,) to whom
the words birth and death can apply. They apply, however, to the
puthujjana, who still ‘is somebody’. But to endow his birth with a
condition in the past—i.e. a cause—is to accept this ‘somebody’ at its
face value as a permanent ‘self’; for cessation of birth requires cessation
of its condition, which, being safely past (in the preceding life),
cannot now be brought to an end; and this ‘somebody’ cannot therefore
now cease. Introduction of this idea into pañiccasamuppàda infects
the samudayasacca with sassatadiññhi and the nirodhasacca with
ucchedadiññhi. Not surprisingly, the result is hardly coherent. And to
make matters worse, most of the terms—and notably saïkhàra
—have been misconceived by the Visuddhimagga.
It is sometimes thought possible to modify this interpretation of
pañiccasamuppàda, confining its application to the present life. Instead
of temporal succession we have continuous becoming, conceived as a
flux, where the effect cannot be clearly distinguished from the cause—
the cause becomes the effect. But this does not get rid of the temporal
element, and the concept of a flux raises its own difficulties.
The problem lies in the present, which is always with us; and any
attempt to consider past or future without first settling the present
problem can only beg the question—‘self’ is either asserted or denied,
or both, or both assertion and denial are denied, all of which take it
for granted. Any interpretation of pañiccasamuppàda
that involves time is an attempt to resolve the present problem by
referring to past or future, and is therefore necessarily mistaken. The
argument that both past and future exist in the present (which, in a
certain sense, is correct) does not lead to the resolution of the problem