Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by mikenz66 » Thu Oct 05, 2017 6:47 pm

Thank you for the detailed analysis, ToVincent.

However, you seem to over-attributing the ideas to Bhikkhu Analayo:
Already in the first lecture, I have a hard time with how Analayo, reduces the meaning of Nāma...
The lectures contain verbatim renderings of Bhikhu Ñāṇananda's English translations of his original sermons. Bhikkhu Analyayo adds some additional background information and explanation, and modern translations of the Pali suttas, and parallels in some cases.

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by JiWe2 » Thu Oct 05, 2017 6:48 pm

ToVincent wrote:
Thu Oct 05, 2017 3:07 pm
In Pali, Akkheyya is the gerund of akkhāti (in SN 1.20 above)
Akkhāti,[ā + khyā]
- to declare, tell.
Sanskrit, Böhtlingk and Roth Grosses Petersburger Wörterbuch:

ākhyā (von khyā mit ā) f. Benennung, Name

khyā
ā
— 4) "benennen, Jmd" oder "Etwas als Etwas bezeichnen" ; mit zwei acc.: saptasāmopagītaṃ tvām - ācakhyuḥ RAGH. 10, 22. pass. ŚAT. BR. 10, 5, 4, 4. 14, 4, 3, 32. bhavānhi jñānavijñānasaṃpannaḥ sarvavinmama. ākhyātaḥ śarabhaṅgeṇa R. 3, 11, 12. vināśastu candrasya ya ākhyāto mahāsuraḥ MBH. 1, 2674. sevā śvavṛttirākhyātā M. 4, 6. SĀṂKHYAK. 5. Citat beim Sch. zu ŚĀK. 80.

Google translation: "to name, or to denote/call something as something" (I have no real knowledge of any of these languages, lol)

also,,,

आख्या ākhyā
आख्या 2 P. 1 (a) To tell, say, inform, commu- nicate, narrate (usually with dat. of person); इमानि शुक्लानि यजूंषि वाजसनेयेन याज्ञवल्क्येनाख्यायन्ते Bṛi. Up.6.5.3. ते रामाय वधोपायमाचख्युर्विबुधद्विषः R.15.5,41,71,93;12.42, 91; आख्याहि मे को भवानुग्ररूपो Bg.11.31,18.63; Me.1; Ms.8.224,9.73, Y.1.66,2.65; sometimes with gen. of person; आख्याहि भद्रे प्रियदर्शनस्य Pt.4.15; केनाहं तवा- ख्यातः Mb. (b) To declare, announce, signify; धनुर्भृतो$- प्यस्य दयार्द्रभावमाख्यातम् R.2.11. -2 To call, denominate, name; सुवर्णबिन्दुरित्याख्यायते Māl.9; R.1.21, Ms.4.6. -3 To look at, count; to recite (Ved.). -Caus. (ख्यापयति) 1 To cause to tell or narrate. -2 To declare.

Apte, Vaman Shivaram. Revised and enlarged edition of Prin. V. S. Apte's The practical Sanskrit-English dictionary. Poona: Prasad Prakashan, 1957-1959. 3v.
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/apte/

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by ToVincent » Thu Oct 05, 2017 7:45 pm

JiWe2 wrote:....
The only reference as a pre-Bhuddist text in yours galore, is the reference to the Bṛi. Up.6.5.3.
And it has the meaning of **explained**, as in:
"These white Yajuses (sacrificial formulas) are **explained** by Yājnavalkya".
Here **explained** means: "in his view". As in "what he deems to be".

Still no real "naming" into that.
Sorry.
Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------
https://justpaste.it/j5o4

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by ToVincent » Thu Oct 05, 2017 7:48 pm

mikenz66 wrote:
Thu Oct 05, 2017 6:47 pm
The lectures contain verbatim renderings of Bhikhu Ñāṇananda's English translations of his original sermons. Bhikkhu Analyayo adds some additional background information and explanation, and modern translations of the Pali suttas, and parallels in some cases.
Mike
:oops:
I thought these were the words of Analayo.

Thanks Mike.
Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------
https://justpaste.it/j5o4

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by mikenz66 » Thu Oct 05, 2017 8:00 pm

No problem,

You can find the original transcriptions of the English translations (which were done by Analayo from Ñāṇananda's tapes) here:
http://seeingthroughthenet.net/books/ Nibbāna – The Mind Stilled
http://seeingthroughthenet.net/wp-conte ... NMS_LE.pdf

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by JiWe2 » Thu Oct 05, 2017 9:08 pm

ToVincent wrote:
Thu Oct 05, 2017 7:45 pm
JiWe2 wrote:....
The only reference as a pre-Bhuddist text in yours galore, is the reference to the Bṛi. Up.6.5.3.
And it has the meaning of **explained**, as in:
"These white Yajuses (sacrificial formulas) are **explained** by Yājnavalkya".
Here **explained** means: "in his view". As in "what he deems to be".

Still no real "naming" into that.
Sorry.
Well, I liked it because I wanted to make my own interpretations of english possible. :)

After reading/listening these parts about the little child...
"Now the child has recognised the rubber ball not by the name that the world has given it, but by those factors included under 'name' in nāma-rūpa, namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention."

"This shows that the definition of nāma in nāma-rūpa takes us back to the most fundamental notion of 'name', to something like its prototype. The world gives a name to an object for purposes of easy communication. When it gets the sanction of others, it becomes a convention."

"Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator also has to understand, however much he may be conversant with the conventional world. But if a meditator wants to understand this name-and-form world, he has to come back to the state of a child, at least from one point of view."

"Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conventional names, for the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a meditator makes use of those factors that are included under 'name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention."

-Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda
...I thought that the english sutta translation of...
Akkheyyasaññino sattā,
akkheyyasmiṃ patiṭṭhitā,...


"Beings are conscious of what can be named,
They are established on the nameable,...
-Ñāṇananda

or

“Beings who perceive what can be expressed
Become established on what can be expressed....
-Bodhi
...meant something like this: perceiving things via their conventional names, or verbal expressions, is the problem, and that a meditator should go beyond it for insight and be conscious of, or perceive, the "real" nāma-rūpa, i.e. feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention etc.

Is that an impossible/unlikely interpretation of the original pali?

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by ToVincent » Thu Oct 05, 2017 10:01 pm

JiWe2 wrote:
Thu Oct 05, 2017 9:08 pm
.... perceiving things via their conventional names, or verbal expressions, is the problem, and that a meditator should go beyond it for insight and be conscious of, or perceive, the "real" nāma-rūpa, i.e. feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention etc.
What is a "real nāmarūpa"?

What I meant to say is that reducing the meaning of "Nāma" to "naming" - which the latter is for me just a mere "vaca" process (a vacīsaṅkhāra); and therefore just a part of Nāma - which in this case, is taking place in satta (and not in the nāmarūpa nidāna, or in saḷāyatana in which the latter descends), seems to be quite reductive.

We have seen that nāma, from both the definitions of the Nikāyas & the Āgamas/Sanskrit texts, can be finally defined (without incompability) as:
Viññāṇa, saṅkhāra, vedanā and sañña - & - phasso, vedanā (proper to satta) , sañña (proper to satta), cetanā and manasikāro.
The latter (the things done with the mano - manasi-kṛ, [which does not always mean "attention"],) might, in satta, include thoughts and the all vaca shebang (aka "naming"). But that can't be called Nāma proper.
It is way too reductive to reduce Nāma to this process only.
"Vacīsaṅkhāra" would be a more approaching and appropriate way to define "naming".
Might this vacīsaṅkhāra be processed by the mano; it remains a synergy (saṅkhāra) - and that is just a component of Nāma.

I don't think I'll follow your lead; because I feel totally on another backdrop. Pardon me.

But sure!, a meditator should go through the all shebang of knowing better phasso >> vedanā (proper to satta) >> sañña (proper to satta) >> cetanā and >> manasikāro (and further/outside satta).
Just to understand better how there is a maintenance of consciousness. But "naming" is just one of the factors, for the maintenance of that consciousness.

Metta.
Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------
https://justpaste.it/j5o4

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by DooDoot » Fri Oct 06, 2017 2:41 am

ToVincent wrote:
Thu Oct 05, 2017 3:07 pm
Reducing nāma to "naming" is, I believe, to reduce nāma to just what it has become when it reaches satta - that is to say, when there is a descent of nāma-rūpa in saḷāyatana; and further, when nāma reaches satta proper.
The word 'satta' only exists in the nidana (link) of 'jati' ('birth'). Can you clarify what you mean here by 'satta'? You seem to be referring to "pāṇa­bhū­tesu" ("living beings") rather than 'satta' (PTS Pali English Dictionary satta1 hanging, clinging or attached to).
However, Nāma must also encompass the immaterial khandhas. One must adress the all Nāma shebang.

Analayo agrees that there is an immaterial side to nāma; but he seems to adress the Nikāyas' definition of it; and does not take much, the Āgamas' definition into account.
And I should insist again: "they are not at all conflictual - but just complementary".
This idea renders the Buddha an imperfect teacher, that is, that the Dhamma is not 'svakhato bhagavata dhammo' ('well-spoken').
The Āgamas' definition addresses the nature of nāma in the Nāma-Rūpa nidāna proper; as well as what it becomes, when it descends in saḷāyatana. While the Nikaya's definition addresses what nāma becomes, when it reaches satta proper - that is to say contact & the following.
The Agamas were composed after the Buddha and obviously includes centuries of distorted transmissions & interpretations. I think your ideas about "satta" are different to the Pali suttas but are similar to later views of dependent origination, which the Agamas appear to also be. The link you provided seems to hold to common view of re-linking consciousness or the 'descent' ('reincarnation') of a 'being'; which is not anything conclusive but merely an intepretation.
The "naming" process is definitely more tied up with the components in that latter definition of the Nikāyas (and with mano). But it is not what nāma means at large; or even more restrictively in satta.
I think this above is an example of how Buddhism changed from the original, which would included DN 15 as a later addition.
I have also a hard time with absolutely pairing Nāma and Akkheyya in Analayo's first lecture - that is to say, this:
Nāmaṃ sabbaṃ anvabhavi,
nāmā bhiyyo na vijjati,
nāmassa ekadhammassa,
sabbeva vasamanvagū.

Name has conquered everything,
There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name."
This translation has no coherent meaning.
And this
Akkheyyasaññino sattā,
akkheyyasmiṃ patiṭṭhitā,
akkheyyaṃ apariññāya,
yogam āyanti maccuno.

Beings are conscious of what can be named (?),
They are established on the nameable,
By not comprehending the nameable things,
They come under the yoke of death."
(Analayo ?)
SN 1.20
This translation is terrible.
And all the latter shows that the "naming" process has more to do with the vaca process (vitakka>>vicāra>>vaca), than with nāma - of which it is just a part in satta.

Yes. SN 5.10 states "conventions" or "names" are "satta". SN 23.2 states clinging is "satta". But I have never read in Pali suttas where nama-rupa is "satta" but I have not read 100% of the Pali suttas. DN 15 seems to say 'nama' is 'naming' but this seems to follow the traditional Brahmanistic idea of nama-rupa. What is your opinion about DN 15 and how it is different to SN 12.2?

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by DooDoot » Fri Oct 06, 2017 3:13 am

JiWe2 wrote:
Thu Oct 05, 2017 9:08 pm
"Now the child has recognised the rubber ball not by the name that the world has given it, but by those factors included under 'name' in nāma-rūpa, namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention."

"This shows that the definition of nāma in nāma-rūpa takes us back to the most fundamental notion of 'name', to something like its prototype. The world gives a name to an object for purposes of easy communication. When it gets the sanction of others, it becomes a convention."

"Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator also has to understand, however much he may be conversant with the conventional world. But if a meditator wants to understand this name-and-form world, he has to come back to the state of a child, at least from one point of view."

"Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conventional names, for the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a meditator makes use of those factors that are included under 'name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention."

-Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda
Ñāṇananda here seems to be saying "recognising" the ball is occurring before sense contact; which seems contrary to MN 18:
Dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one objectifies. MN 18
The word 'nama' within 'namati' is found in MN 19 & refers to a 'mental inclination' or 'bent':
Whatever a monk keeps pursuing with his thinking & pondering, that becomes the inclination of his mind. MN 19

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by JiWe2 » Fri Oct 06, 2017 8:16 am

DooDoot wrote:
Fri Oct 06, 2017 3:13 am
JiWe2 wrote:
Thu Oct 05, 2017 9:08 pm
"Now the child has recognised the rubber ball not by the name that the world has given it, but by those factors included under 'name' in nāma-rūpa, namely feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention."

"This shows that the definition of nāma in nāma-rūpa takes us back to the most fundamental notion of 'name', to something like its prototype. The world gives a name to an object for purposes of easy communication. When it gets the sanction of others, it becomes a convention."

"Now it is this elementary name-and-form world that a meditator also has to understand, however much he may be conversant with the conventional world. But if a meditator wants to understand this name-and-form world, he has to come back to the state of a child, at least from one point of view."

"Even though he is able to recognize objects by their conventional names, for the purpose of comprehending name-and-form, a meditator makes use of those factors that are included under 'name': feeling, perception, intention, contact and
attention."

-Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda
Ñāṇananda here seems to be saying "recognising" the ball is occurring before sense contact; which seems contrary to MN 18 [...]
My quote above was just some parts I copied from the first sermon. The story starts like this:
Well, this seems lucid enough as a definition but let us see, whether there is any justification for regarding feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention as 'name'. Suppose there is a little child, a toddler, who is still unable to speak or understand language. Someone gives him a rubber ball and the child has seen it for the first time. If the child is told that it is a rubber ball, he might not understand it. How does he get to know that object? He smells it, feels it, and tries to eat it, and finally rolls it on the floor. At last he understands that it is a plaything. Now the child has recognised the rubber ball...etc
https://www.bcbsdharma.org/wp-content/u ... a-01-1.pdf
So there was plenty of sense contact before "recognition".

My selection was only about the difference between non-verbalized recognition (nāma as feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention) and recognition based on language (nāma as a name-for-a-thing). ToVincent mentioned sanskrit form ākhyā and I thought that in its one dictionary meaning "to denote/call something as something" it might be related to the latter kind of recognition, but perhaps such meanings came later, after the time of the Buddha and the suttas.

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by DooDoot » Fri Oct 06, 2017 12:01 pm

JiWe2 wrote:
Fri Oct 06, 2017 8:16 am
My quote above was just some parts I copied from the first sermon. The story starts like this:
Well, this seems lucid enough as a definition but let us see, whether there is any justification for regarding feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention as 'name'. Suppose there is a little child, a toddler, who is still unable to speak or understand language. Someone gives him a rubber ball and the child has seen it for the first time. If the child is told that it is a rubber ball, he might not understand it. How does he get to know that object? He smells it, feels it, and tries to eat it, and finally rolls it on the floor. At last he understands that it is a plaything. Now the child has recognised the rubber ball...etc
https://www.bcbsdharma.org/wp-content/u ... a-01-1.pdf
So there was plenty of sense contact before "recognition".
But this still contradicts MN 18 & dependent origination because the original contact (phassa) with the rubber ball is occurring before nama-rupa (naming-forms) rather than after nama-rupa, as dependent origination describes.

It is an interesting thread because of the many diverse opinions about the topic of nama-rupa.

For me, if the Buddha saw a rubber ball for the 1st time, his ingrained wisdom would immediately know the rubber ball is impermanent, unsatisfactory & not-self and would not have to feel, smell, eat & roll it. A Buddha does not have a mentality (nama) polluted by ignorance; thus, unlike the child, does not have the inclination (namati) to contact the world with ignorance. That's my take on it. With metta.

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by Saengnapha » Fri Oct 06, 2017 4:59 pm

DooDoot wrote:
Fri Oct 06, 2017 12:01 pm
JiWe2 wrote:
Fri Oct 06, 2017 8:16 am
My quote above was just some parts I copied from the first sermon. The story starts like this:
Well, this seems lucid enough as a definition but let us see, whether there is any justification for regarding feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention as 'name'. Suppose there is a little child, a toddler, who is still unable to speak or understand language. Someone gives him a rubber ball and the child has seen it for the first time. If the child is told that it is a rubber ball, he might not understand it. How does he get to know that object? He smells it, feels it, and tries to eat it, and finally rolls it on the floor. At last he understands that it is a plaything. Now the child has recognised the rubber ball...etc
https://www.bcbsdharma.org/wp-content/u ... a-01-1.pdf
So there was plenty of sense contact before "recognition".
But this still contradicts MN 18 & dependent origination because the original contact (phassa) with the rubber ball is occurring before nama-rupa (naming-forms) rather than after nama-rupa, as dependent origination describes.

It is an interesting thread because of the many diverse opinions about the topic of nama-rupa.

For me, if the Buddha saw a rubber ball for the 1st time, his ingrained wisdom would immediately know the rubber ball is impermanent, unsatisfactory & not-self and would not have to feel, smell, eat & roll it. A Buddha does not have a mentality (nama) polluted by ignorance; thus, unlike the child, does not have the inclination (namati) to contact the world with ignorance. That's my take on it. With metta.
If you have the book or pdf, 'Seeing Through' by Nanananda, on page 18 of the book, page 28 of Adobe pdf reader, Nanananda explains what nama and rupa implies on a subtler level before 'contact'.

‘Dependent on eye and forms, there arises eye-consciousness. The coming together of the three is contact, dependent on contact is feeling ....’ and so forth. It is the first few words that convey something extremely deep.

And further: Apparently, here again, we are faced with the question of two things, but then let us take a peep into the backstage workings of consciousness. What is called ‘consciousness’ is a form of discrimination. In fact, consciousness itself is the very discrimination between an internal base and an external base – eye and forms, ear and sounds and so on.
But the irony of the situation is this. The very discrimination implies the ignoring of the relationship. That is why the birth of consciousness is in itself the birth of ignorance. Given this ignorance, there is the possibility of counting the three factors – eye, forms and eye-consciousness. This, then, is the triad – the three that are coming together to bring about contact. ‘Tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso’. This is the most basic reckoning – ‘phassa paññatti’ which implies the counting as a three. This might well appear as an extremely subtle problem for the logician. It is because of eye and forms that eye-consciousness has arisen. But once eye-consciousness has arisen, there is the tendency to forget – to ignore – the relationship and to make a reckoning in which the third factor – the ‘tertium-quid’ – is that very discrimination, ‘eye-consciousness’. In other words, there is an implicit ignorance of the fact that consciousness is dependently-arisen. Once this reckoning of the three as eye, forms, and eye-consciousness is taken seriously, the stage is set for ‘contact’ – ‘tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso’: ‘The coming-together of the three is contact.’

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by ToVincent » Fri Oct 06, 2017 10:08 pm

DooDoot wrote:What is your opinion about DN 15
Late stuff - https://justpaste.it/imcr
DooDoot wrote:Can you clarify what you mean here by 'satta'?
Satta
Pali: living being, creature.

Vedic: सत्त्व sattva [sat-tva]
सत् sat [ppr. √as]
- being , entity , reality (TS.)
√ अस् as
- to become (BṛĀrUp.)
॰त्व -tva
- forms neuter substantive of state.

Please do look at this: https://justpaste.it/1695d - Satta is the pinky part.
Obviously, this is just a sketch. No one can represent perfectly, in a simple way, the complexity of paṭiccasamuppāda. But it does outline the major features of the Dhamma - and this is the best way, to my knowledge, to represent satta (a living being, like you and me).
DooDoot wrote:The Agamas were composed after the Buddha.
Āgamas are not "late" stuff. They are just late translations of early stuff.
!?!?!
SA 298, the "parallel" to SN 12.2, is a Sarvāstivāda text, translated in Chinese in the fourth century CE.
That does not make Sarvāstivāda, a fourth century CE sect.
Sarvāstivāda are said to have existed aroud 237 BCE; and the Theravada around 240 BCE.
I don't think three years will make such a big difference.

I suppose there has been as much "added stuff" in both camps.
DooDoot wrote:later views of dependent origination
?!?
What do you mean by "later views"?

_________________

To come back to the logic in https://justpaste.it/1bzye - I would say that the Pali suttas are in accord with that logical development.
For instance the descent of consciousness (SN 12.59) - and consciousness finding a home in the khandhas of NāmaRupa (SN 22.3) seems logical when the khandhas are viññāṇa, saṅkhāra, vedanā and sañña (as in SĀ 298 & Arv 5). But pretty weird, when what should be "khandhas", becomes: phasso, vedanā, sañña, cetanā and manasikāro.
This is just an example.

SĀ 298, [the same than the Sanskrit Arv 5]
云何名?
What is name?
謂四無色陰
The four formless (無 - non-existent) aggregates
受陰 feeling (sensation) aggregate
想陰 perception (ideation) aggragate
行陰 synergie (volition/"practice") aggregate
識陰 consciousness (know) aggregate

or

Avidyā saṃskārā vijñānaṃ nāmarūpaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ sparśo vedanā tṛṣṇā upādānaṃ bhavo jātir jarāmaraṇaṃ (Arv 5)

--

I have tried other pseudo-parallels like EA 49.5, (supposedly from a Mahāsāṃghika or Dharmaguptaka Ekottarāgama sutra;) but they don't fit the Pali suttas' logic of SN 12.2.
In other words - the complementarity of SA 298 and SN 12.2 seems totally evident; as far as the Pali's suttas are concerned. While EA 49.5 below, for instance, leads to a total nonsense.

云何名 為名?
what do we call name?
痛 pain
想 perception (ideation)
念 mindfulness
更樂 indulgence
思惟 thought

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Again, what do you mean by "later views" of paṭiccasamuppāda?
That would get my attention.

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Saengnapha wrote: Ñāṇananda wrote:
‘Dependent on eye and forms, there arises eye-consciousness. ...
.....
– ‘tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso’: ‘The coming-together of the three is contact.’
And contact is just the moment when the transfer of possesion occurs.
viewtopic.php?f=13&t=30370&sid=fece5b8e ... 0e#p440038
Transfer of the "sensualized" feeling khandha, from the nāmarūpa nidāna - to the feeling nidāna proper to satta.

Again, like when you see a picture of Picasso - what you see is the form, feeling, perception, synergies and consciousnes that Picasso has put in his painting. Once that picture gets in your sensorial eye; after having been "sensualized" in the external sensory field of experience (aka external sense base); then there is sense-consciousness, and contact. The latter being the transfer of possession. The moment when you appropriate these khandhas; first through your own feelings (vedanā nidāna) - and usually the rest of the khandhas become also "clinging"-khandhas (or appropriated-khandhas).

Conclusion: there is no reason to mix the experience of the object-subject (in one) - but instead, to prevent this transfer of possession.
Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
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We are all possessed - more or less.
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And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
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https://justpaste.it/j5o4

Saengnapha
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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by Saengnapha » Sat Oct 07, 2017 5:49 am

ToVincent wrote:
Fri Oct 06, 2017 10:08 pm
Saengnapha wrote: Ñāṇananda wrote:
‘Dependent on eye and forms, there arises eye-consciousness. ...
.....
– ‘tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso’: ‘The coming-together of the three is contact.’
And contact is just the moment when the transfer of possesion occurs.
viewtopic.php?f=13&t=30370&sid=fece5b8e ... 0e#p440038
Transfer of the "sensualized" feeling khandha, from the nāmarūpa nidāna - to the feeling nidāna proper to satta.

Again, like when you see a picture of Picasso - what you see is the form, feeling, perception, synergies and consciousnes that Picasso has put in his painting. Once that picture gets in your sensorial eye; after having been "sensualized" in the external sensory field of experience (aka external sense base); then there is sense-consciousness, and contact. The latter being the transfer of possession. The moment when you appropriate these khandhas; first through your own feelings (vedanā nidāna) - and usually the rest of the khandhas become also "clinging"-khandhas (or appropriated-khandhas).

Conclusion: there is no reason to mix the experience of the object-subject (in one) - but instead, to prevent this transfer of possession.
It does seem that consciousness makes it 'personal', possessive. Perception seems to be the fabrication of the image of subject and object, the split that takes place the moment something is recognized. It is felt as an experience. The feeling of an experience is already a fabrication an illusion that the Buddha seems to have resolved. In a sense, no experience is ever perceived by the Buddha as name and form are not linked through consciousness.

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Re: Bhikkhu Anālayo’s e-learning course on the Nibbana sermons by Bhikkhu Katukurunde Ñāṇananda

Post by DooDoot » Sat Oct 07, 2017 7:40 am

ToVincent wrote:
Fri Oct 06, 2017 10:08 pm
Again, like when you see a picture of Picasso - what you see is the form, feeling, perception, synergies and consciousnes that Picasso has put in his painting. Once that picture gets in your sensorial eye; after having been "sensualized" in the external sensory field of experience (aka external sense base); then there is sense-consciousness, and contact. The latter being the transfer of possession. The moment when you appropriate these khandhas; first through your own feelings (vedanā nidāna) - and usually the rest of the khandhas become also "clinging"-khandhas (or appropriated-khandhas). Conclusion: there is no reason to mix the experience of the object-subject (in one) - but instead, to prevent this transfer of possession.
Before I see a picture of Picasso, there is ignorance (avicca) conditioning my mentality & materiality (nama-rupa), which results in mentality creating the intention (cetana) & inclination (namati) to search for sensual pleasures. This intention & inclination includes perceptions & feelings of what my mentality (nama) perceives & feels what future sensual pleasures may be like. This nama is mental inclination, as described in MN 19. This ignoble search leads to looking at pictures by Picasso, which is contact (6th link); and giving rise to feelings of pleasure (7th link), perceptions of colours & shapes, cravings for pleasures (8th link), attachment to pleasure (9th link), views about 'beauty' (9th link) and attachment of ideas about "I" (9th link) having pleasure seeing a picture of Picasso. As for "transfer of possession of the sense object" (āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho), this appears to fully occur at "jati" (11th link), according to the suttas.
Bhikkhus, whatever a bhikkhu frequently thinks and ponders upon, that will become the inclination (nati) of his mind. If he frequently thinks and ponders upon thoughts of sensual desire, he has abandoned the thought of renunciation to cultivate the thought of sensual desire, and then his mind inclines (namati) to thoughts of sensual desire. If he frequently thinks and ponders upon thoughts of ill will…upon thoughts of cruelty, he has abandoned the thought of non-cruelty to cultivate the thought of cruelty, and then his mind inclines to thoughts of cruelty. MN 19
Katamā ca, bhikkhave, jāti? Yā tesaṃ tesaṃ sattānaṃ tamhi tamhi sattanikāye jāti sañjāti okkanti abhinibbatti khandhānaṃ pātubhāvo āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho. SN 12.2

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