Already in the first lecture, I have a hard time with how Analayo, reduces the meaning of Nāma.
Reducing nāma to "naming" is, I believe, to reduce nāma to just what it has become when it reaches satta - that is to say, when there is a descent of nāma-rūpa in saḷāyatana; and further, when nāma reaches satta proper.
However, Nāma must also encompass the immaterial khandhas.
One must adress the all Nāma shebang.
Analayo agrees that there is an immaterial side to nāma; but he seems to adress the Nikāyas' definition of it; and does not take much, the Āgamas' definition into account.
And I should insist again: "they are not at all conflictual - but just complementary".
Understanding such an evident fact, is a real improvement in the understanding of the Teaching.
I have explained that here - https://justpaste.it/1bzye
It has to do with understanding the meaning of: "Consciousness turns back; it goes no further than name-and-form" in SN 12.65 - But it explains very straightforwardly what Nāma is exactly - and the changes in its nature, along the all process (of nāma).
I strongly advise people to read it thoroughly and seriously.
All of it, is based on suttas with parallels.
The Āgamas' definition addresses the nature of nāma in the Nāma-Rūpa nidāna proper; as well as what it becomes, when it descends in saḷāyatana.
While the Nikaya's definition addresses what nāma becomes, when it reaches satta proper - that is to say contact & the following.
The "naming" process is definitely more tied up with the components in that latter definition of the Nikāyas (and with mano). But it is not what nāma means at large; or even more restrictively in satta.
I have also a hard time with absolutely pairing Nāma and Akkheyya in Analayo's first lecture - that is to say, this:
Nāmaṃ sabbaṃ anvabhavi,
nāmā bhiyyo na vijjati,
Name has conquered everything,
There is nothing greater than name,
All have gone under the sway
Of this one thing called name."
yogam āyanti maccuno.
Beings are conscious of what can be named (?),
They are established on the nameable,
By not comprehending the nameable things,
They come under the yoke of death."
“Beings who perceive what can be expressed
Become established in what can be expressed.
Not fully understanding what can be expressed,
They come under the yoke of Death.
Men, 'ware alone of what is told by names,
Take up their stand on what is so expressed.
If this they have not rightly understood,
They go their ways under the yoke of death.
(Mrs. Rhys Davids)
Perceiving in terms of signs,
beings take a stand on signs.
Not fully comprehending signs, they
come into the bonds of death.
Beings who perceive the expressible [what can be expressed]
Are established in the expressible.
Not fully understanding the expressible,
They go under the yoke of death.
The SĀ 1078 & the SA2 17 parallels have the same Chinese formulation:
Whoever says that the signs
arising from name-and-form (?) do truly exist,
know that this person
is on the road of death.
I have a hard time with Bingenheimer's translation.
The literal translation in the Chinese -> English look-up, on suttacentral, gives the following:
In accord with the arising of desire (愛) for ideation (想),
And by mean of the abinding in this desire for ideation,
One does not know the reason for this desire
And directly goes to death.
This is much more in line with the suttas.
For we know from the suttas with parallels, in accord with modern linguistics, that the vaca process is the following:
Vitakka (ideation - abstract thoughts) >> Vicāra (concretism [representation of an abstract idea in concrete terms] - concrete thoughts] - and vaca (word).
"Abstract thought" and "concretism" are my own translations - however based on a study of the words vitakka & vicāra in the suttas with parallels.
Earlier having abstractly thought, and mentally concretizing that thought, someone breaks into a word (speech); therefore vitakka & vicāra are verbal determinations.
Pubbe kho āvuso visākha vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācaṃ bhindati. Tasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro.
And all the latter shows that the "naming" process has more to do with the vaca process (vitakka>>vicāra>>vaca), than with nāma - of which it is just a part in satta.
In Pali, Akkheyya is the gerund of akkhāti (in SN 1.20 above)
Akkhāti，[ā + khyā]
- to declare, tell.
“For the sake of leading us across the flood
You **told** about the path with its many aspects.
anekavihitaṃ maggaṃ akkhāsi (Aor.)
Being asked, **tell** it to me.
taṃ me akkhāhi (Imper.) pucchito”ti
SN 1.42 & SN 2.17
In the case of pleasant progress with quick comprehension, progress **is told** (to be) excellent on account of both pleasantness and quick comprehension.
Tatra, bhante, yāyaṃ paṭipadā sukhā khippābhiññā, ayaṃ pana, bhante, paṭipadā ubhayeneva paṇītā akkhāyati sukhattā ca khippattā ca.
Note that the root √Khyā to which Akkheyya is bound, has a late meaning of "told" in the Sanskrit texts. While it has an underlying meaning of reckoning & appearing - like in संख्या saṃkhyā [ saṃ-√ khyā ] = to appear along with (RV. VS. ); and to reckon (ŚBr. MBh.).
The translation Akkheyyasaññino sattā might then be:
Beings who perceive what can appear (reckon >> judge to be probable >> deem to be >> think about in a particular way).
Beings who perceive what can be expressed
And the all strophe becomes:
Beings who perceive what deems to be
Become established in what they judge to be probable.
Not fully understanding what is thought about in a particular way,
They come under the yoke of Death.
In this context, khyā does not have the underlying meaning of "telling - but "reckoning", I suppose.