Phenomenology question - view about the world

[Janalanda]

Witch view is correct ?

1) The "external world" has no substance, it does not really exist. Everything is phenomenological.

2) The "external world" has substance, no matter what that means. But what we experience is entirely phenomenological. The "external world" exists, has substance, and manifests in the form of conditions that make certain things appear or disappear in the phenomenological world that we are experiencing.

[mikenz66]

Is this a question about what the Dhamma says, or a question about what members think personally?

To me, the suttas suggest the second option. External things do seem to be spoken of as having an influence in may cases. However, it's working with the phenomenological experience that the Dhamma seems to be about, so I don't think it's a particularly important question from a Dhamma point of view, though some ancient and modern schools would not agree with me...


Mike

[pulga]

Existence -- i.e. presence or consciousness -- requires the relation between an internal base (ajjhattikāyatana) and a plurality of external bases (bahiddhāyatanāni).

Cakkhuñcāvuso, paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ.

Dependent upon the eye, friend, and forms eye consciousness arises. MN 18

Prior to this relation the eye -- and the rest of the inner bases that constitute the body -- and the external visible forms in their pre-relational singularity are matter (rūpa), and as such are prior to consciousness and can't be said to exist. In order for matter to exist it must appear, i.e. it must be manifest through nāma. Being lies within the realm of the intelligible: in and of itself matter (rūpa) lacks any sort of relational contextuality and is thereby unintelligible

Yā ceva kho pana ajjhattikā pathavīdhātu, yā ca bāhirā pathavīdhātu, patha­vī­dhātu­revesā. ‘Taṃ netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attā’ti—evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Now both the internal earth element and the external earth element are simply earth element. And that should be seen as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ MN 28

At the risk of oversimplifying things nāma is the way rūpa appears, i.e. how we make sense of it; and in order to appear it must be present, i.e. it must exist. But since its facticity is independent of its appearance rūpa has a way of imposing itself upon us quite beyond our control, forcing us to reinterpret it and thereby altering its appearance.

[SamKR]

I did not select any of the options.

View 2) is definitely wrong (in my opinion). This view can never be verified in direct experience.

Regarding view 1) I think that the part "The "external world" has no substance" is correct, since nothing has a substance let alone the concept "external world". But the parts "it does not really exist" and "Everything is phenomenological" are the view positions that cannot be verified.

[chownah]

I think it is impossible to know which view is correct....knowing this is out of range. If someone has found a way to know this I would like to hear it.
chownah

[SamKR]

Pulga,

While I may not agree to or have understood fully what you are saying I like this:

In order for matter to exist it must appear, i.e. it must be manifest through nāma.

Whatever appears is what is present. Whatever does not appear as seen, heard, and sensed can only appear (or be present) as cognized else does not appear and so is not present.

[Spiny Norman]

Witch view is correct ?

1) The "external world" has no substance, it does not really exist. Everything is phenomenological.

2) The "external world" has substance, no matter what that means. But what we experience is entirely phenomenological. The "external world" exists, has substance, and manifests in the form of conditions that make certain things appear or disappear in the phenomenological world that we are experiencing.

I think the phenomenological approach allows for both possibilities.

Personally I go for option (2) and assume something "out there". Sp when crossing a busy "road" I do make a point of avoiding moving "cars" and "buses".

[SamKR]

Personally I go for option (2) and assume something "out there". Sp when crossing a busy "road" I do make a point of avoiding moving "cars" and "buses".

Are you implying that not having a view about something "out there" means when crossing a road one would not avoid cars? Perhaps not.

I strongly (I can not emphasize more) do not believe in option (2) . But still when crossing a busy road I also avoid moving cars and buses which are appearing and are present as they appear.

[Spiny Norman]

Personally I go for option (2) and assume something "out there". Sp when crossing a busy "road" I do make a point of avoiding moving "cars" and "buses".

Are you implying that not having a view about something "out there" means when crossing a road one would not avoid cars? Perhaps not.

I strongly do not believe in option (2) . But still when crossing a busy road I also avoid moving cars and buses which are appearing and are present as they appear.

If you don't believe that cars and buses are real, why bother avoiding them?

[SamKR]

If you don't believe that cars and buses are real, why bother avoiding them?

First, what do you mean by "real"? I also believe that cars and buses are undoubtedly real (my definition of real) as they appear. I just don't assume that they are out there independent of existence/consciousness/name. Both 'my' body and 'car' appear as consciousness/name-form. Anything beyond that is always a cognized (again consciousness).

[Spiny Norman]

If you don't believe that cars and buses are real, why bother avoiding them?

First, what do you mean by "real"? I also believe that cars and buses are undoubtedly real (my definition of real) as they appear. I just don't assume that they are out there independent of existence/consciousness/name. Both 'my' body and 'car' appear as consciousness/name-form. Anything beyond that is always a cognized (again consciousness).

So what if you are crossing a road and there is a bus bearing down on you, but you are distracted by something and don't notice it?

[Aloof]

Witch view is correct ?

1) The "external world" has no substance, it does not really exist. Everything is phenomenological.

2) The "external world" has substance, no matter what that means. But what we experience is entirely phenomenological. The "external world" exists, has substance, and manifests in the form of conditions that make certain things appear or disappear in the phenomenological world that we are experiencing.

I voted for option 2. But there is a little modification. What we experience has equally a strong substance.

[mikenz66]

Hi Sam,

Personally I go for option (2) and assume something "out there". Sp when crossing a busy "road" I do make a point of avoiding moving "cars" and "buses".

Are you implying that not having a view about something "out there" means when crossing a road one would not avoid cars? Perhaps not.

I strongly (I can not emphasize more) do not believe in option (2) . But still when crossing a busy road I also avoid moving cars and buses which are appearing and are present as they appear.

Is this a view based on the suttas, or on your personal philosophy? I'm interested in how people view this. The suttas seem to me to mostly take a pretty basic common-sense view of external things, though some seem to be open to a range of interpretations...


Mike

[chownah]

I think it is impossible to know which view is correct....knowing this is out of range. If someone has found a way to know this I would like to hear it.
chownah

Its the same old arguements again and again. All conjecture, all construal. Impossible to know. If it was possible to know it would be known and the arguements would cease. The continuation of the argument keeps reaffirming that it is impossible to know.
chownah

[Spiny Norman]

The suttas seem to me to mostly take a pretty basic common-sense view of external things...

Yes, they do. Perhaps there is some confusion with the idealist mind-only philosophy found in some other Buddhist schools?