The Great anattā/anātman debate

[binocular]

To me, this whole matter is about making unwarranted inferences, demanding of people (under threat of expulsion) to make those inferences, to believe them, and punishing them if they don't.

Who is doing that?

I've had it happen to me. I can't say more about it in open forums.

[Sylvester]

My issue is with those who want me to declare that there is no self/no soul, ever. That, I won't do.

Well, leave aside those "naughty" conservatives would who demand that you declare "There is no self" (not that I've actually seen one in action).

Let's see how the Buddha invites one to make that inference -

“Attani vā, bhikkhave, sati ‘attaniyaṃ me’ti assā”ti?
“Evaṃ, bhante”.

“Attaniye vā, bhikkhave, sati ‘attā me’ti assā”ti? “Evaṃ, bhante”.
“Attani ca, bhikkhave, attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalab­bha­māne, yampi taṃ diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṃ: ‘so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avi­pari­ṇāma­dhammo, sassatisamaṃ tatheva ṭhassāmī’ti—nanāyaṃ
, bhikkhave, kevalo paripūro bāladhammo”ti?

“Kiñhi no siyā, bhante, kevalo hi, bhante, paripūro bāladhammo”ti.

“Bhikkhus, there being a self, would there be what belongs to my self?” - “Yes, venerable sir.”
“Or, there being what belongs to a self, would there be my self?” - “Yes, venerable sir.” -
“Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established, then this standpoint for views, namely, ‘This is self, this the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity’ - would it not be an utterly and completely foolish teaching?”
“What else could it be, venerable sir? It would be an utterly and completely foolish teaching.”

MN 22

Now, I am not sure if you're trained in syllogism, but the Q&A above is a classic Modus Ponens - Modus Tollens transformation, ie If A, then B = If not-B, then not-A.

For "A", insert "there exists a self". For "B", insert "The view "there exists a self" is apprehended as true and established".
The Buddha has just declared not-B; Modus Tollens dictates that therefore, it is the case that not-A is true. QED : there is no self.

(after Peter Harvey, "The Selfless Mind : Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism", p.24 - 28)

The invitation to infer (no need to declare) that there is no self has been made by the Buddha.

I had also asked you to comment on an earlier passage about the "non-existent internally" in MN 22. Will you deign to respond?

[binocular]

The invitation to infer (no need to declare) that there is no self has been made by the Buddha.

This is just a partial take. The problem at hand is that the self is not apprehended as true and established; and it's because it's not apprehended as true and established, that it would be foolish to talk about one's (true) self or what belongs to it.

I had also asked you to comment on an earlier passage about the "non-existent internally" in MN 22. Will you deign to respond?

As has been addressed several times, here another variation: As long as we are unenlightened, we cannot clearly see the self; as long as we are unenlightened, whatever positive or negative claim we would make about the self, would be problematic in some way.

In the religions that posit a (true, permament) self, they run into this problem all the time, and they try to do away with it in a process called "self-realization" -- a process where a person "gradually learns who they really are."
Of course, this process requires that a prospective self-realizer has total faith in their teacher, depends totally on their teacher, and possibly undergoes a lot of practices that don't make sense to them or that even seem harmful to them, for unspecifiedly long periods of time. This way, the practitioner becomes a mere pawn in the quest for their own (!) realization. So taking this path to self-realization is fraught with suffering.

"Monks, you would do well to cling to that clinging to a doctrine of self, clinging to which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair. But do you see a clinging to a doctrine of self, clinging to which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair?"

"No, lord."

"Very good, monks. I, too, do not envision a clinging to a doctrine of self, clinging to which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

The Buddha skirted all that and proposed a practice where the practitioner isn't merely a pawn in the quest for their own (!) realization, but instead engages in a practice where he can actually get some personal feedback, for himself, right where he is, using his current sense of self as a reference. And still make an end to suffering.

[tiltbillings]

In the religions that posit a (true, permament) self,

An unchanging self?

[binocular]

In the religions that posit a (true, permament) self,

An unchanging self?

In some yes, in some no.
In some Hindu systems, the self is said to be unchanging; its nature is that it has a particular kind of relationship with God and the nature of this relationship with God never changes (it's either one of awe; or of friendship; or of romantic love; etc.).

In Christianity, there is a variety of takes on it: e.g. the Calvinists maintain the self is unchanging (you are as you are, as God made you, and if this means he made you destined for eternal damnation, then that's who you really are); in Catholicism, the self has free will and appears to be changeable for some time (until death of the body).

And so on. There is a vast variety of such doctrines. One could go mad trying to figure out which one is the right one.

[tiltbillings]

In the religions that posit a (true, permament) self,

An unchanging self?

In some yes, in some no.
In some Hindu systems, the self is said to be unchanging; its nature is that it has a particular kind of relationship with God and the nature of this relationship with God never changes (it's either one of awe; or of friendship; or of romantic love; etc.).

In Christianity, there is a variety of takes on it: e.g. the Calvinists maintain the self is unchanging (you are as you are, as God made you, and if this means he made you destined for eternal damnation, then that's who you really are); in Catholicism, the self has free will and appears to be changeable for some time (until death of the body).

And so on. There is a vast variety of such doctrines. One could go mad trying to figure out which one is the right one.

In talking about Buddhism, Xtianity really has no place or bearing. If a self is changing, it makes no logical sense to refer to it as permanent.

[binocular]

In talking about Buddhism, Xtianity really has no place or bearing.

Then, when qouting, leave out the parts you don't mean.

In the religions that posit a (true, permament) self,

An unchanging self?

If a self is changing, it makes no logical sense to refer to it as permanent.

Depends on what about it is changing.

[tiltbillings]

If a self is changing, it makes no logical sense to refer to it as permanent.

Depends on what about it is changing.

If it is a "true, permanent self," changing would mean that's its characteristics would be changing, ceasing to be one thing, becoming another, no longer true to the one thing it was, which is again to say, ceasing to be one thing by becoming another, arising and falling depending upon conditions. In other words, it is a self dependent upon causes and conditions, and if the causes and conditions stop altogether, -- ooops -- no more self. Hard to characterize something such as that as being permanent, eternal, true, stable. To be a permanent, eternal, true the self would need to not be subject to change, not subject to being conditioned.

The Buddha had this to say about that:

• • Samyutta Nikaya III 144; CDB 954: "Bhikkhus [the Buddha said, holding a small lump of cowdung on his hand], there is not even this much of self existence [attabhava: individual selfhood/metaphysical being, atman] that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much individual existence that was permanent , stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living the of the holy for the complete destruction of suffering could not be discerned."

Attabhava is a compound word. As it stands it is not a strictly defined technical term. Its meaning varies by context. The CRITICAL PALI DICTIONARY gives as first meaning:

• • Attabhava [literally, atta, self +bhava, becoming]: 1. (abstract) existence of a soul …

[binocular]

Depends on what about it is changing.

If it is a "true, permanent self," changing would mean that's its characteristics would be changing, ceasing to be one thing, becoming another, no longer true to the one thing it was, which is again to say, ceasing to be one thing by becoming another, arising and falling depending upon conditions. In other words, it is a self dependent upon causes and conditions, and if the causes and conditions stop altogether, -- ooops -- no more self. Hard to characterize something such as that as being permanent, eternal, true, stable. To be a permanent, eternal, true the self would need to not be subject to change, not subject to being conditioned.

And yet in Krsnaloka (the place where liberated/fully realized souls go), the devotees of the Lord are sometimes happy, sometimes sad, sometimes they have a lot of possessions, sometimes a little, sometimes they know the Lord as the Lord, sometimes they think he's just a beautiful boy, and so on and on.

IOW, the personalists don't have the sort of troubles you describe. Even Christians tend to think that in heaven (when people are true to their true selves), they sing and dance, as opposed to sitting there like marble statues.

The Buddha had this to say about that:

• • Samyutta Nikaya III 144; CDB 954: "Bhikkhus [the Buddha said, holding a small lump of cowdung on his hand], there is not even this much of self existence [attabhava: individual selfhood/metaphysical being, atman] that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much individual existence that was permanent , stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living the of the holy for the complete destruction of suffering could not be discerned."

Attabhava is a compound word. As it stands it is not a strictly defined technical term. Its meaning varies by context. The CRITICAL PALI DICTIONARY gives as first meaning:

• • Attabhava [literally, atta, self +bhava, becoming]: 1. (abstract) existence of a soul …

Note the part about bhava.

[Sylvester]

The invitation to infer (no need to declare) that there is no self has been made by the Buddha.

This is just a partial take. The problem at hand is that the self is not apprehended as true and established; and it's because it's not apprehended as true and established, that it would be foolish to talk about one's (true) self or what belongs to it.

What do you mean by "partial take"? What residual unexplored issues would remain from that passage which couches the question about the self in the existential locative absolute (attani sati and attaniye sati)? In case you don't recognise this, it's the same grammatical construction used in idappaccayatā to formulate the relationship of necessary conditions (paccaya) for something to arise. The hypothetical posed by the Buddha requires a self to exist, in order for the possibility of attaniya to be true etc. Since the Buddha denies the plausibility of such an apprehension, that exhausts every possibility for a self to exist. Might you be able to point to the residue I have missed? Ontic commitments are binary.

I had also asked you to comment on an earlier passage about the "non-existent internally" in MN 22. Will you deign to respond?

As has been addressed several times, here another variation: As long as we are unenlightened, we cannot clearly see the self; as long as we are unenlightened, whatever positive or negative claim we would make about the self, would be problematic in some way.

Even ontic commitments or otherwise? That's odd and hard to square with the instances where the Buddha is recorded denying the existence of a self in MN 22 and MA 62.

[piotr]

Hi,

here's very short sutta (SN 1.25) for all who like to make a big deal out of language conventions and claim that there's something deeper going on:

• “If a bhikkhu is an arahant,
  Consummate, with taints destroyed,
  One who bears his final body,
  Would he still say, ‘I speak’?
  And would he say, ‘They speak to me’?”
  
  “If a bhikkhu is an arahant,
  Consummate, with taints destroyed,
  One who bears his final body,
  He might still say, ‘I speak,’
  And he might say, ‘They speak to me.’
  Skilful, knowing the world’s parlance,
  He uses such terms as mere expressions.”
  
  “When a bhikkhu is an arahant,
  Consummate, with taints destroyed,
  One who bears his final body,
  Is it because he has come upon conceit
  That he would say, ‘I speak,’
  That he would say, ‘They speak to me’?”
  
  “No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
  For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
  Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
  He still might say, ‘I speak,’
  He might say too, ‘They speak to me.’
  Skilful, knowing the world’s parlance,
  He uses such terms as mere expressions.”

[tiltbillings]

Depends on what about it is changing.

If it is a "true, permanent self," changing would mean that's its characteristics would be changing, ceasing to be one thing, becoming another, no longer true to the one thing it was, which is again to say, ceasing to be one thing by becoming another, arising and falling depending upon conditions. In other words, it is a self dependent upon causes and conditions, and if the causes and conditions stop altogether, -- ooops -- no more self. Hard to characterize something such as that as being permanent, eternal, true, stable. To be a permanent, eternal, true the self would need to not be subject to change, not subject to being conditioned.

And yet in Krsnaloka (the place where liberated/fully realized souls go), the devotees of the Lord are sometimes happy, sometimes sad, sometimes they have a lot of possessions, sometimes a little, sometimes they know the Lord as the Lord, sometimes they think he's just a beautiful boy, and so on and on.

That nice, and from a Buddhist perspective they are still in a kammic/karmic realm.

IOW, the personalists don't have the sort of troubles you describe. Even Christians tend to think that in heaven (when people are true to their true selves), they sing and dance, as opposed to sitting there like marble statues.

That nice, and from a Buddhist perspective they are still in a kammic/karmic realm, given that the creator god has admitted as much.

I am surprised in your attempts at negating the Buddha's position you did not mention Valhalla.

The Buddha had this to say about that:

• • Samyutta Nikaya III 144; CDB 954: "Bhikkhus [the Buddha said, holding a small lump of cowdung on his hand], there is not even this much of self existence [attabhava: individual selfhood/metaphysical being, atman] that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much individual existence that was permanent , stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living the of the holy for the complete destruction of suffering could not be discerned."

Attabhava is a compound word. As it stands it is not a strictly defined technical term. Its meaning varies by context. The CRITICAL PALI DICTIONARY gives as first meaning:

• • Attabhava [literally, atta, self +bhava, becoming]: 1. (abstract) existence of a soul …

Note the part about bhava.

And you can note the part about "existence of a soul," I could have, and really should have, plugged in "nature" instead of "becoming" in the brackets comment -- in other words: self nature, which is far more consistent with the text. The bottom line is that the Buddha rejected any idea of a permanent, eternal self.

[tiltbillings]

Hi,

here's very short sutta (SN 1.25) for all who like to make a big deal out of language conventions and claim that there's something deeper going on:

• “If a bhikkhu is an arahant,
  Consummate, with taints destroyed,
  One who bears his final body,
  Would he still say, ‘I speak’?
  And would he say, ‘They speak to me’?”
  
  “If a bhikkhu is an arahant,
  Consummate, with taints destroyed,
  One who bears his final body,
  He might still say, ‘I speak,’
  And he might say, ‘They speak to me.’
  Skilful, knowing the world’s parlance,
  He uses such terms as mere expressions.”
  
  “When a bhikkhu is an arahant,
  Consummate, with taints destroyed,
  One who bears his final body,
  Is it because he has come upon conceit
  That he would say, ‘I speak,’
  That he would say, ‘They speak to me’?”
  
  “No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
  For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
  Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
  He still might say, ‘I speak,’
  He might say too, ‘They speak to me.’
  Skilful, knowing the world’s parlance,
  He uses such terms as mere expressions.”

This a good text for any number of things, but if you would be so kind as to draw out the points you are alluding to, that would be appreciated.

[binocular]

Ontic commitments are binary.

Provided they are properly worded and there is no equivocation or mistake happening.

Even ontic commitments or otherwise? That's odd and hard to square with the instances where the Buddha is recorded denying the existence of a self in MN 22 and MA 62.

And what kind of self did he deny, and in what context, on what terms did he deny it?

[binocular]

That nice, and from a Buddhist perspective they are still in a kammic/karmic realm, given that the creator god has admitted as much.

The happiness, sadness, and other changes that the liberated souls experience are transcendental, they are not karma.

I am surprised in your attempts at negating the Buddha's position you did not mention Valhalla.

Except that I am not negating the Buddha's position, I am questioning your interpretation of the Buddha's position.

The bottom line is that the Buddha rejected any idea of a permanent, eternal self.

He rejected speculating about such a self while one is still unenlightened. Arguably, once enlightened, one would have no need to speculate, about anything.