A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

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pulga
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by pulga » Tue Jun 16, 2015 10:00 pm

SarathW wrote:Buddha said it is not wise to see thing as exist or non exist.
Instead, he taught dependent origination as a result of ignorance.
A couple of footnotes to FS I.Static Aspect address the matter nicely, though somewhat cryptically.
Ven. Ñanavira wrote:[a] An existing thing is an experience (in German: Erlebnis), either present or (in some degree) absent (i.e. either immediately or more or less remotely present).

[c] All this, of course, is tautologous; for 'to be a thing' means 'to be able to be or exist', and there is no thing that cannot exist. And if anything exists, everything else does (see (a) above). Compare this utterance of Parmenides: 'It needs must be that what can be thought of and spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is no thing to be'. (Parmenides seems to have drawn excessive conclusions from this principle through ignoring the fact that a thought is an imaginary, and therefore absent, experience—or rather, a complex of absent experiences—; but the principle itself is sound. The images involved in thinking must, individually at least [though not necessarily in association], already in some sense be given—i.e. as what is elsewhere, or at some other time, or both—at the immediate level, before they can be thought. Perhaps the method of this Note will suggest a reconciliation between the Parmenidean absolute denial of the existence of no thing, with its corollary, the absolute existence of whatever does exist, and the merely relative existence of every thing as implied by the undeniable fact of change.)
This would imply of course that Dependent Origination isn't by necessity the result of ignorance, cf. DN 15.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by boris » Wed Jun 17, 2015 1:01 am

pulga wrote: This would imply of course that Dependent Origination isn't by necessity the result of ignorance, cf. DN 15.
Evidently you are mistaken - at least in the sense that it is not at all obvious to me. As I see it any kind of experience as such depends on ignorance. Even in the case of pancakkhanda where there is no upadana, experience depends on the fact that before ignorance was present, otherwise body, eye, ear, ... would not appear at all.
as long there is the attitude "I am", there is organization of five faculties of eye, ear ... S 22: 47
But since it is rather known to you, I believe, you have something else in mind ...
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SDC » Wed Jun 17, 2015 9:55 am

Please refer to this post for information on the purpose of this thread.


PARAMATTHA SACCA - 9th and Final Excerpt
Previous Excerpts: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8

Verses from Bhikkhunī Samyutta 10 <S.i,135>:
Māro pāpimā:
1 Kenāyam pakato satto, kuvam sattassa kārako,
2 Kuvam satto samuppanno, kuvam satto nirujjhatī ti.
Vajirā bhikkhunī:
3 Kin nu Sattoti paccesi, Māra, ditthigatam nu te,
4 Suddhasankhārapuñjo'yam, nayidha sattūpalabbhati;
5 Yathā hi angasambhārā hoti saddo Ratho iti,
6 Evam khandhesu santesu hoti Satto ti sammuti.
7 Dukkham eva hi sambhoti, dukkham titthati veti ca,
8 Nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti, nāññam dukkhā nirujjhatī ti.

Māra the Evil One:
1 By whom is this creature formed? Who is the creature's maker?
2 Who is the arisen creature? Who is the creature that ceases?
Vajirā the nun:
3 Why do you refer to 'the creature', Māra, are you involved in (wrong) view?
4 This is a pile of pure determinations; there is, here, no creature to be found.
5 Just as for an assemblage of parts there is the term 'a chariot',
6 So, when there are the aggregates, convention says 'a creature'.
7 It is merely suffering that comes into being, suffering that stands and disappears,
8 Nothing apart from suffering comes into being, nothing other than suffering ceases.
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:10. What, now, is the reason for this argument? Why has this notion of 'truth in the highest sense' been invented? We find the clue in the Visuddhimagga. This work (Ch. XVIII) quotes the last four lines (5, 6, 7, & 8) and then repeats in essence the argument of the Milindapañha, using the word satta as well as puggala. It goes on, however, to make clear what was only implicit in the Milindapañha, namely that the purpose of the argument is to remove the conceit '(I) am' (asmimāna): if it is seen that 'in the highest sense', paramatthato, no creature exists, there will be no ground for conceiving that I exist. This allows us to understand why the argument was felt to be necessary. The assutavā puthujjana identifies himself with the individual or the creature, which he proceeds to regard as 'self'. He learns, however, that the Buddha has said that 'actually and in truth neither self nor what belongs to self are to be found' (see the second Sutta passage in §4). Since he cannot conceive of the individual except in terms of 'self', he finds that in order to abolish 'self' he must abolish the individual; and he does it by this device. But the device, as we have seen, abolishes nothing. It is noteworthy that the passage in the Milindapañha makes no mention at all of 'self': the identification of 'self' with the individual is so much taken for granted that once it is established that 'in the highest sense there is no individual' no further discussion is thought to be necessary. Not the least of the dangers of the facile and fallacious notion 'truth in the highest sense' is its power to lull the unreflecting mind into a false sense of security. The unwary thinker comes to believe that he understands what, in fact, he does not understand, and thereby effectively blocks his own progress.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SDC » Wed Jun 17, 2015 9:56 am

That concludes Paramattha Sacca. Thank you once again to all the participants. A review of the Shorter Notes to follow.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mikenz66 » Wed Jun 17, 2015 10:36 am

As I said above, it's good that Ven Nanavira teases out the difference between "being" and "self". However, as pointed out above: http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?p=342283#p342176 there are other suttas that do connect these concepts together. I think Chowhah's analysis above is useful: http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... 20#p341470.
The uninstructed worldling causes problems with both the self and the being concepts.

It's been interesting reading this note. Clearly "note" is the right term... :reading:

:anjali:
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by boris » Wed Jun 17, 2015 11:47 am

mikenz66 wrote:As I said above, it's good that Ven Nanavira teases out the difference between "being" and "self". However, ...
Let's be precise, Ven Nanavira main point is not dialectic satta - atta, but rather dialectic on English word "person" which is used often by translators to cover meaning of two quite different Pali words puggala and sakkaya. From this arises verbal confusion which can be avoided by rendering puggala as an individual. When this is made we have state of dukkha - person or sakkaya, and state of nibbana - cessation of person, sakkaya nirodho; in the last case we have individual - puggala- without personality - sakkaya.

But one thing is to clarify verbal confusion, and another to see that with my absence as a person (sakkaya) body, feeling, perception, intentions and consciousness can still function. But since I cannot imagine my own absence as a person, as a self, Lord Buddha, by teaching:

all determinations are impermanent
all things are not self

shows me that I am a victim of wrong identification, and the only right way is desidentification with aggregates and see them: "This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self".

Teaching chess is quite easy, since there is objective ranking which shows to student that teacher is really professional one. From this comes attitude, that if I do not understand what chess trainer says, I prescribe this to my weakness, and try to increase effort in order to understated him better.

The same attitude should be apply in Dhamma, but since there is no objective field on the ground which people can check competency of the teacher, general tendency is that any doubtful points are explained as the weakness of the teacher.

In other words, only intelligent people really quite clearly understand that they do not understand, and are able to learn something new, which contradicts their present set of views and ideas.
The man who wants to avoid grotesque collapses should not look for anything to fulfill him in space and time.

Nicolás Gómez Dávila

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by pulga » Wed Jun 17, 2015 1:38 pm

Point well taken, boris. As I understand it satta is a general term for a being or a creature in the Suttas, but given the nature of just what sort of thing it is, it is discussed enigmatically in some suttas. Its ambiguity lies in the fact that while both enlightened and unenlightened use the term, an ariyasāvaka will associate it with puggala, the puthujjana with sakkāya. Given that the puthujjana's understanding of the word is nothing less than sakkāyadiṭṭhi I don't think he can correct his interpretation gradually, but must acquire the insight that suddenly brings about the arising of the dhammacakkhu.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by boris » Wed Jun 17, 2015 2:05 pm

I think, that for didactic reasons is good sometimes to introduce the case of multiple personality disorder. When puthujjana sees that in one individual there can be multiple personalities, option for an individual with no personality at all can be seen, at least potentially. More or less in this sense so while psychiatry when it succeed to reduce many personalities in one individual to one, recognizes this as coming back to state of health, Lord Buddha as a perfect psychiatrist insist, that this one which left, also has to be removed. That individual with one personality still is the case for treatment, :smile:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_%28book%29" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

There are quite interesting descriptions in this book. Some of them better than passages from P.K Dick. Contrary to what she says now, it is rather impossible to invent some of the stories without direct experience, for example like cessation of time and shift from being 10 years old girl to 12 years old without anything between. ...
The man who wants to avoid grotesque collapses should not look for anything to fulfill him in space and time.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SDC » Wed Jun 24, 2015 2:41 pm

================================================================================================================================

Please refer to this post for information on the purpose of this thread.


A few short words regarding the footnotes before beginning a review of the "Shorter Notes' portion of Notes on Dhamma: some are quite dense, and in a few cases longer than the particular Note itself - I find their reading to be useful and relevant to this sort of review so in some cases I would like to include those footnotes in their place (to be indicated as such and in blue font). If this shows to complicate more than enhance I will go back to the practice of providing the link to nanavira.org. We'll see how it goes.

================================================================================================================================



Shorter Notes - 1st Excerpt (PHASSA - Part 1)

Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>(SN35.92,SN35.93) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.[a]
  • Footnote [a] wrote:This interpretation of phassa is not invited by the Mahānidānasuttanta (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>---[9]), where nāmarūpapaccayā phasso is discussed without reference to salāyatana, and in terms of adhivacanasamphassa and patighasamphassa. These terms are more easily comprehensible when phassa is understood as 'contact between subject and object'. (It is an elementary mistake to equate patighasamphassa ['resistance-contact'] with five-base-contact [cakkhusamphassa &c.] and adhivacanasamphassa ['designation-contact'] with mind-contact [manosamphassa]. Adhivacana and patigha correspond to nāma and rūpa respectively, and it is clear from Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,190-1>---[10] that both nāma and rūpa are conditions for each of the six kinds of contact. See NĀMA.)


Back to "Phassa":
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:So long as there is avijjā, all things (dhammā) are fundamentally as described in the earlier part of the Mūlapariyāyasutta (Majjhima i,1 <M.i,1>); that is to say, they are inherently in subjection, they are appropriated, they are mine (See ANICCA, MAMA, & A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [f]). This is the foundation of the notion that I am and that things are in contact with me. This contact between me and things is phassa. The ditthisampanna sees the deception, but the puthujjana accepts it at its face value and elaborates it into a relationship between himself and the world (attā ca loko ca—which relationship is then capable of further elaboration into a variety of views [[https://suttacentral.net/mn102]Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,233>[/url]]).

  • Footnote [b] wrote:The puthujjana takes for granted that 'I am' is the fundamental fact, and supposes that 'things are mine (or concern me) because I am'. The ditthisampanna sees that this is the wrong way round. He sees that there is the conceit (concept) '(I) am' because 'things are mine'. With perception of impermanence, the inherent appropriation subsides; 'things are mine' gives place to just 'things are' (which things are still significant—they point to or indicate other things—, but no longer point to a 'subject'); and 'I am' vanishes. With the coming to an end of the arahat's life there is the ending of 'things are'. While the arahat still lives, then, there continue to be 'objects' in the sense of 'things'; but if 'objects' are understood as necessarily correlative to a 'subject', then 'things' can no longer be called 'objects'. See ATTĀ. Similarly with the 'world' as the correlative of 'self': so long as the arahat lives, there is still an organized perspective of significant things; but they are no longer significant 'to him', nor do they 'signify him'. See Preface (f).



Back to "Phassa":

To be continued in next excerpt.

.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SDC » Fri Jun 26, 2015 5:02 pm

Please refer to this post for information on the purpose of this thread.


Shorter Notes - 2nd Excerpt (PHASSA - Part 2)
Previous Excerpts - 1
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:But though the ditthisampanna is not deceived, yet until he becomes arahat the aroma of subjectivity (asmī ti, ' am') hangs about all his experience. All normal experience is dual (dvayam—see NĀMA, final paragraph): there are present (i) one's conscious six-based body (saviññānaka salāyatanika kāya), and (ii) other phenomena (namely, whatever is not one's body); and reflexion will show that, though both are objective in the experience, the aroma of subjectivity that attaches to the experience will naturally tend to be attributed to the body.[c]

  • Footnote [c] If experience were confined to the use of a single eye, the eye and forms would not be distinguishable, they would not appear as separate things; there would be just the experience describable in terms of pañc'upādānakkhandhā. But normal experience is always multiple, and other faculties (touch and so on) are engaged at the same time, and the eye and forms as separate things are manifest to them (in the duality of experience already referred to). The original experience is thus found to be a relationship: but the fleshly eye is observed (by the other faculties, notably touch, and by the eyes themselves seeing their own reflexion) to be invariable (it is always 'here', idha), whereas forms are observed to be variable (they are plural and 'yonder', huram). Visual experience, however, also is variable, and its entire content is thus naturally attributed to forms and none of it to the eye. In visual experience, then, forms are seen, the eye is unseen, yet (as our other faculties or a looking-glass informs us) there is the eye. Also in visual experience, but in quite a different way (indicated earlier), objects are seen, the subject is unseen (explicitly, at least; otherwise it [or he] would be an object), yet there is the subject ('I am'). On account of their structural similarity these two independent patterns appear one superimposed on the other; and when there is failure to distinguish between these patterns, the subject comes to be identified with the eye (and mutatis mutandis for the other āyatanāni). See VIÑÑĀNA for an account of how, in a similar way, consciousness comes to be superimposed on the eye (and the six-based body generally). [BACK TO TEXT]

Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:In this way, phassa comes to be seen as contact between the conscious eye and forms—but mark that this is because contact is primarily between subject and object, and not between eye, forms, and eye-consciousness. This approach makes it possible to see in what sense, with the entire cessation of all illusion of 'I' and 'mine', there is phassanirodha in the arahat (where, though there are still, so long as he continues to live, both the conscious body and the other phenomena, there is no longer any appropriation). But when (as commonly) phassa is interpreted as 'contact between sense-organ and sense-object, resulting in consciousness'—and its translation as '(sense-)impression' implies this interpretation—then we are at once cut off from all possibility of understanding phassanirodha in the arahat;[d] for the question whether or not the eye is the subject is not even raised—we are concerned only with the eye as a sense-organ, and it is a sense-organ in puthujjana and arahat alike.

  • Footnote [d] Phusanti phassā upadhim paticca
    Nirūpadhim kena phuseyyum phassā

    Contacts contact dependent on ground—
    How should contacts contact a groundless one? Udāna ii,4 <Ud.12>

    It must, of course, be remembered that phassanirodha in the arahat does not mean that experience as such (pañcakkhandhā) is at an end. But, also, there is no experience without phassa. In other words, to the extent that we can still speak of an eye, of forms, and of eye-consciousness (seeing)—e.g. Samvijjati kho āvuso Bhagavato cakkhu, passati Bhagavā cakkhunā rūpam, chandarāgo Bhagavato n'atthi, suvimuttacitto Bhagavā ('The Auspicious One, friend, possesses an eye; the Auspicious One sees visible forms with the eye; desire-&-lust for the Auspicious One there is not; the Auspicious One is wholly freed in heart (citta)' (Cf. ATTĀ [c].)) (Salāyatana Samy. xviii,5 <S.iv,164>)—to that extent we can still speak of phassa. But it must no longer be regarded as contact with me (or with him, or with somebody). There is, and there is not, contact in the case of the arahat, just as there is, and there is not, consciousness. See CETANĀ [f].
    [BACK TO TEXT]


PHASSA to be continued in next excerpt.

PS - Thanks to mikenz66 for this alternate formating suggestion. :smile:

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SDC » Sun Jun 28, 2015 7:04 pm

Please refer to this post for information on the purpose of this thread.


Shorter Notes - 3rd Excerpt (PHASSA - Part 3)
Previous Excerpts - 1,2
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:Understanding of phassa now consists in accounting for consciousness starting from physiological (or neurological) descriptions of the sense-organs and their functioning. Consciousness, however, is not physiologically observable, and the entire project rests upon unjustifiable assumptions from the start.[e] This epistemological interpretation of phassa misconceives the Dhamma as a kind of natural-science-cum-psychology that provides an explanation of things in terms of cause-and- effect.

  • Footnote [e] The reader may note that the word 'sensation' is claimed by physiology: a sensation is what is carried by, or travels over, the nervous system. One respectable authority speaks 'in physiological terms alone' of 'the classical pathways by which sensation reaches the thalamus and finally the cerebral cortex'. Presumably, therefore, a sensation is an electro-chemical impulse in a nerve. But the word properly belongs to psychology: Sensation, according to the Pocket Oxford Dictionary, is 'Consciousness of perceiving or seeming to perceive some state or affection of one's body or its parts or senses or of one's mind or its emotions'. What, then, is sensation—is it nervous impulse? or is it consciousness? Or is it not, rather, a convenient verbal device for persuading ourselves that consciousness is nervous impulse, and therefore physiologically observable? 'Consciousness' affirms our authority 'is the sum of the activities of the whole nervous system', and this appears to be the current official doctrine.

    The notion of sensation, however, as we see from the dictionary's definition, is an abomination from the start—how can one 'perceive the state of one's senses' when it is precisely by means of one's senses that one perceives? (See MANO.) Another individual's perception (with his eye) of the state of my eye may well have, in certain respects, a one-one correspondence with my perception (with my eye) of, say, a tree (or, for that matter, a ghost, or, since the eye as visual organ extends into the brain, a migraine); but it is mere lazy thinking to presume from this that when I perceive a tree I am really perceiving the state of my eye—and then, to account for my sensation, inferring the existence of a tree in a supposed 'external' world beyond my experience. The reader is referred to Sartre's excellent discussion of this equivocal concept (op. cit., pp. 372-8), of which we can give here only the peroration. 'La sensation, notion hybride entre le subjectif et l'objectif, conçue à partir de l'objet, et appliquée ensuite au sujet, existence bâtarde dont on ne saurait dire si elle est de fait ou de droit, la sensation est une pure rêverie de psychologue, il faut la rejeter délibérément de toute théorie sérieuse sur les rapports de la conscience et du monde.' ('Sensation, hybrid notion between the subjective and the objective, conceived starting from the object, and then applied to the subject, bastard entity of which one cannot say whether it is de facto or de jure,—sensation is a pure psychologist's day-dream: it must be deliberately rejected from every serious theory on the relations of consciousness [which, for Sartre, is subjectivity] and the world.') Descartes, it seems, with his 'representative ideas', is the modern philosopher primarily responsible for the present tangle—see Heidegger, op. cit., p. 200 et seq. (Heidegger quotes Kant as saying that it is 'a scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general' that there is still no cogent proof for the 'being-there of things outside us' that will do away with all scepticism. Then he remarks 'The "scandal of philosophy" is not that this proof is yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again'.) Removal of the pseudo-problem of the 'external' world removes materialism, but does not remove matter (for which see NĀMA & RŪPA).
    [Back to text]
This concludes "Phassa".

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SDC » Tue Jun 30, 2015 3:54 pm

Please refer to this post for information on the purpose of this thread.


Shorter Notes - 4rd Excerpt (Rūpa - Part 1)
Previous Excerpts - 1,2,3
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:In the Kevaddhasutta (Dīgha i,11 <D.i,223>), it is said that the question 'Where do the four mahābhūtā finally cease?' is wrongly asked, and that the question should be 'Where do [the four mahābhūtā] get no footing? Where do nāma and rūpa finally cease?' Matter or substance (rūpa) is essentially inertia or resistance (see Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>---[9]), or as the four mahābhūtā it can be regarded as four kinds of behaviour (i.e. the four primary patterns of inertia—see NĀMA). Behaviour (or inertia) is independent of the particular sense-experience that happens to be exhibiting it: a message in the Morse code (which would be a certain complex mode of behaviour) could be received in any sense-experience (though seeing and hearing are the most usual). In any one kind of sense-experience there is revealed a vast set of various behaviours, of various patterns of inertia; and in any other contemporary sense-experience there is revealed a set that, to a great extent, corresponds to this first set.[a] (One particular group of behaviours common to all my sense-experiences is of especial significance—it is 'this body', ayam kāyo rūpī catummahābhūtiko ('this body composed of matter, of the four great entities') [Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,500>].)

  • Footnote [a] Mind-experience is not considered in this Note to avoid complication. It is not, however, essentially different. See MANO [c].
[Back to text]
Shorter Note on "Rūpa" to be continued in next excerpt.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SDC » Thu Jul 02, 2015 12:28 pm

Please refer to this post for information on the purpose of this thread.


Shorter Notes - 5th Excerpt (Rūpa - Part 2)
Previous Excerpts - 1,2,3,4
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:Thus, when I see a bird opening its beak at intervals I can often at the same time hear a corresponding sound, and I say that it is the (visible) bird that is (audibly) singing. The fact that there seems to be one single (though elaborate) set of behaviours common to all my sense-experiences at any one time, and not an entirely different set for each sense, gives rise to the notion of one single material world revealed indifferently by any one of my senses. Furthermore, the material world of one individual largely corresponds to that of another (particularly if allowance is made for difference in point of view), and we arrive at the wider notion of one general material world common to all individuals. The fact that a given mode of behaviour can be common to sense-experiences of two or more different kinds shows that it is independent of any one particular kind of consciousness (unlike a given perception—blue, for example, which is deppendent upon eye-consciousness and not upon ear-consciousness or the others); and being independent of any one particular kind of consciousness it is independent of all consciousness except for its presence or existence. One mode of behaviour can be distinguished from another, and in order that this can be done they must exist—they must be present either in reality or in imagination, they must be cognized. But since it makes no difference in what form they are present—whether as sights or sounds (and even with one as visible and one as audible, and one real and one imaginary)—, the difference between them is not a matter of consciousness.[c]


Shorter Note on "Rūpa" to be continued in next excerpt.
Last edited by SDC on Sun Jul 05, 2015 2:13 pm, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mikenz66 » Thu Jul 02, 2015 8:46 pm

SDC wrote: Although the participation in this thread has diminished it seems that it is still getting quite a number of views...
I had hoped to find time to get to the bottom of the "phassa" note:
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>(SN35.92,SN35.93) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.
On the face of it, this seems contradictory to this standard passage:
In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; ...
https://suttacentral.net/sn12.44
https://suttacentral.net/mn18 ...
https://suttacentral.net/search?query=% ... contact%22
The note seems to be arguing for a redefinition of contact, but I'm afraid it loses me quite quickly.

The note continues:
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote: ... This contact between me and things is phassa.
Whereas, in MN18 the arising of "me" seems to be dependent on contact:
"Dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one objectifies. Based on what a person objectifies, the perceptions & categories of objectification assail him/her with regard to past, present, & future forms cognizable via the eye. ...
:anjali:
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by acinteyyo » Fri Jul 03, 2015 6:53 am

mikenz66 wrote:
SDC wrote: Although the participation in this thread has diminished it seems that it is still getting quite a number of views...
I had hoped to find time to get to the bottom of the "phassa" note:
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>(SN35.92,SN35.93) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.
On the face of it, this seems contradictory to this standard passage:
In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; ...
https://suttacentral.net/sn12.44
https://suttacentral.net/mn18 ...
https://suttacentral.net/search?query=% ... contact%22
The note seems to be arguing for a redefinition of contact, but I'm afraid it loses me quite quickly.
I have tried to explain this once somewhere, but I can't remember where exactly.
It seems that "The meeting of the three is contact." is to be understood as a coming together of eye, forms and eye-consciousness, but not in the way that these three "contact" each other but that the arising of the three together is what is called "contact". The german translation of "phassa" holds the connotation of "impression". When there is the eye and forms and eye-consciousness arises, it comes to an "impression", sense-impression.
This is imo what "phassa" means, not that eye, forms and eye-consciousness contact each other.

Ven. Ñāṇavīra's explanation points in the same direction.

best wishes, acinteyyo
Thag 1.20. Ajita - I do not fear death; nor do I long for life. I’ll lay down this body, aware and mindful.

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