If you are replying to me: I did not represent anyone. I just gave my ideas. This may surprise you but I actually think about what the buddha said.....and sometimes it leads me to have ideas on my own....and sometimes I present my very own ideas right here on this forum.cappuccino wrote: ↑Thu Oct 12, 2017 8:21 pm Do not speak thus. Do not misrepresent the Blessed One; for it is not good to misrepresent the Blessed One.
you misrepresent the teaching
If I am to give cappuccino benefit of the doubt, I would say that his or her emptiness is the Venerable Nāgārjuna's emptiness, which is neither void nor substance, nor any combination of the two, nor something else.
Surely the middle-way will lead one out of Samsara?cappuccino wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2017 2:52 pmNo self is an extreme view to be rejected. Self is an extreme view.Spiny Norman wrote:I'm still not clear on what your position is here.
Not self is different in a subtle way. Body isn't self, mind isn't self, etc.
Fire is fabricated and reality is unborn.....therefore reality hasn't disappeared!cappuccino wrote: ↑Mon Sep 04, 2017 7:04 pm If you blow out a fire,
has reality itself disappeared with the fire?
Yet one is under delusion.
Fabrications had always been considered as both not-self and self.wrote: form is not self already
Yet where one escapes Samsara.wrote:hence nirvana is not annihilation
Blimey!Coëmgenu wrote: ↑Fri Oct 13, 2017 7:05 pmIf I am to give cappuccino benefit of the doubt, I would say that his or her emptiness is the Venerable Nāgārjuna's emptiness, which is neither void nor substance, nor any combination of the two, nor something else.
Basically any 'stance' at all regarding Nibbāna, existence, or the self, etc, under those conditions (i.e. Madhyamaka), becomes a wrong view.
Neither from itself, nor from another, nor from combination [of self and other], nor by eschewing causation, has anything ever arisen.
This is called śunyatāśunyatā or 空空 in Madhyamaka. It is the emptiness of emptiness itself.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā wrote:
(Nagarjuna)
“The Transcendent Conqueror has taught
That all deceptive phenomena are false.
All conditioned phenomena are deceptive,
And, therefore, they are false. [XIII.1]
If a phenomenon that is deceptive is also false,
Then what is it that deceives?
With this, the Transcendent Conqueror
Has fully revealed emptiness. [XIII.2]
(Opponent)
Things are devoid of essence
Because they are perceived to change.
There are no entities without essence
Because entities possess emptiness. [XIII.3]
(Nagarjuna)
If there is no essence,
To what does change pertain?
If there were essences,
How could there be change? [XIII.4]
Change is not in that itself,
Nor is it in something else,
Because the young do not age,
And because the aged do not age. [XIII.5]
If that itself changes,
Then milk itself is yogurt.
What, other than milk,
Would turn into yogurt? [XIII.6]
If there were a bit of something that is not empty,
There could be a bit of something that is empty.
As there is not a bit that is not empty,
How could there be anything that is empty? [XIII.7]
The Victorious Ones have taught emptiness
As a deliverance from all views.
“For those whose view is emptiness, they teach,
Nothing can be accomplished. [XIII.8]”
Mabja Jangchub Tsondru. “Ornament of Reason: The Great Commentary to Nagarjuna's Root of the Middle Way.”
Just to add another piece of data in support of my hypothesis above, it appears Lance Cousins held a similar opinion regarding the uniqueness of the Sautrantika position, i.e. Nibbana without residue is non existence, a non implicative negation, the unconditioned is merely the absence of the conditioned, etc.aflatun wrote: ↑Fri Aug 18, 2017 2:23 pmWith respect to the suttanta camp I would agree, its a wide playing field. But regarding the former I'm not so sure. I guess it depends on how we define classical! If we mean commentarial tradition up to and including Burmese Vipassana, then I'm not aware of any significant departure from Buddhaghosa's general understanding, but I'm happy to be corrected on this if anyone has historical sources that imply otherwise.David N. Snyder wrote: Perhaps neither the classical Theravadins nor the suttanta Theravadins can be generalized to a specific view on nibbana. There is a wide range of views in all of them. I was familiar with Buddhaghosa not accepting the nihilist view, but I had thought most classical Theravadins today were of the atheist-death view for parinibbana (with rebirth up to that point).
For me this view is sharply distinct from those of specifically "Buddhist nihilism" (because despite all aggregates ending Nibbana is an unconditioned ultimate reality) and suttanta style "Buddhist eternalism" (because all aggregates end which rules out sentience). But I would still classify it as a form of "Buddhist Eternalism"...
The only thing I'm aware of that smacks of "absolute death, nothing else" aside from a few modern monks is the Sautrantikas, and I don't know their literature well enough to confirm this. I wouldn't be surprised to find more sublety there, similar to Bhante Sujato.
And so as a hypothesis-which is subject to revision!-my current understanding is that aside from the (maybe) Sautrantikas, this is an entirely modern phenomenon. Of course that doesn't make it wrong by default. But personally I have come to regard it as an aberration and an innovation.
I believe you have nailed it, good sirDavid N. Snyder wrote:Buddhism, especially Theravada does seem to have an appeal to nihilists. Perhaps it is because nibbana gets mistaken as annihilation.
Nibbāna and AbhidhammaLance Cousins wrote:It seems clear that although lists of unconditioned dharmas varied among the schools to some extent, they were all agreed that there were unconditioned dharmas were not the mere absence of the conditioned. Only the sautrantikas and allied groups disputed this last point. It seems clear that their position is a later development based upon a fresh look at the Sutra literature among groups which did not accord the status of authentic word of the Buddha to the abidharma literature.
...
To summarize the kind of evolution suggested here: We may say that the main force of the nikayas is to discount speculation about nibbana. It is the summum bonum. To seek to know more is to manufacture obstacles. Beyond this only a few passages go. No certain account of the ontological status of nibbana can be derived from the nikayas. It cannot even be shown with certainty that a single view was held. By the time of the early abidhamma the situation is much clearer. The whole Buddhist tradition is agreed that nibbana is the unconditioned dhamma, neither temporal nor spatial, neither mind (in its usual form) nor matter, but certainly not the absence or mere cessation of other dhammas. The uniformity is certainly a strong argument for projecting this position into the nikayas and even for suggesting that it represents the true underlying position of the suttas.
