Challenging the Dhamma

[Samraj]

a)Why do you have to respect mind and body?
b)Why don't you go for you life. Just enjoy
c)Do you have parents? Did you ever go to school?
d)What do you practice? For what?

(a) Because that is what you've got, they are like your house. If you disrespect your house, you will end up badly.
(b) Because truth is in the middle. If you go for your life you are going for an extreme. Go for it, but with moderation.
(d) I learned that from them. In school I was told that no book or discourse contains the absolute truth. In each book there are some truths and some bullshits, and you have to check. Take the ripen mangos, leave the rotten ones.
(d) I practice yoga and meditation. Because it is beneficial to body and mind.

[Sam Vara]

I suppose anicca would be the fundamental character of experience.

As here, for example, where the aggregates ( experience ) are unsatisfactory because they are impermanent.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .nymo.html

We're still in agreement here! I think you are right in that anicca is fundamental. But even if it weren't, that wouldn't mean that the noble truth of Dukkha is somehow vitiated. Saying that impermanent things are unsatisfactory doesn't mean that they wouldn't be unsatisfactory even if they were permanent. Pain, for example. There are three types of Dukkha, and only two of them are related to inconstancy. Have a look at:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .wlsh.html

[Spiny Norman]

I suppose anicca would be the fundamental character of experience.

As here, for example, where the aggregates ( experience ) are unsatisfactory because they are impermanent.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .nymo.html

We're still in agreement here! I think you are right in that anicca is fundamental. But even if it weren't, that wouldn't mean that the noble truth of Dukkha is somehow vitiated. Saying that impermanent things are unsatisfactory doesn't mean that they wouldn't be unsatisfactory even if they were permanent. Pain, for example. There are three types of Dukkha, and only two of them are related to inconstancy.

Have a look at:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .wlsh.html

I'm still not sure whether this is describing three distinct types of dukkha, or whether it's a progressive analysis which considers increasing subtlety.

[Samraj]

We're still in agreement here! I think you are right in that anicca is fundamental. But even if it weren't, that wouldn't mean that the noble truth of Dukkha is somehow vitiated. Saying that impermanent things are unsatisfactory doesn't mean that they wouldn't be unsatisfactory even if they were permanent. Pain, for example. There are three types of Dukkha, and only two of them are related to inconstancy. Have a look at:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .wlsh.html

I don't know, seems to me that these two posts support my point of view.
You can see definition 3 and 4 express perfectly the Buddhist correlation between dukkha and anicca
(3) Sankhaara-dukkhataa, says
The suffering inherent in the formations has its roots in the imperfectability of all conditioned existence, and in the fact that there cannot be any final satisfaction within the incessant turning of the Wheel of Life.


I personally have always found absurd that final satisfaction. Why is that one has to measure suffering and pain against a final satisfaction? Isn't this movement implying that at the core of gotama's teaching is the search for a sukkha which is final, or permanent?

(4) Viparinaama-dukkhataa, says
the suffering associated with pleasant bodily and mental feelings: "because they are the cause for the arising of pain when they change"


Viparinaama-dukkhataa even traces a correlation between the cessation (discontinuity) of a pleasant feeling and the arising of suffering.

Definitions one and two are only a paradigmatic definition of the term. They don't specify a particular nuance of the term dukkha, they are like the dictionary definition of the word dukkha. If you were to write a dictionary entry, how would you define suffering? Whatever definition you will come up with, it will be like that of the word 'right' or 'left'. If you look for them on the dictionary, you will find only paradigmatic, or tautological, definitions. Isn't the very word Dukkha-dukkhataa a tautology?
---
Anyway IMO the standard definition of anicca is to be found is suttas like this, where is clearly stated that sukkha is direcly correlated to the finitude (discontintuity) of human life.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

[Sam Vara]

I'm still not sure whether this is describing three distinct types of dukkha, or whether it's a progressive analysis which considers increasing subtlety.

Fair point - I'll have a little think about that. I had always thought the former.

For this issue, though, I think the case still stands as things might be dukkha because they are impermanent (because all impermanent things are dukkha) but they might be dukkha for another reason entirely.

And in any case, everything I have ever experienced has as a matter of fact been anicca...

[Spiny Norman]

I'm still not sure whether this is describing three distinct types of dukkha, or whether it's a progressive analysis which considers increasing subtlety.

For this issue, though, I think the case still stands as things might be dukkha because they are impermanent (because all impermanent things are dukkha) but they might be dukkha for another reason entirely.

I think another way of looking at this is to say that what we really want is a constant and continuing state of contentment, fullfillment, comfort, health etc, but of course impermanence always denies us this. Or to put it another way, aversion is frustrated craving.
So for example an episode of physical pain is unpleasant because it "interrupts" what I really want, ie a continuing state of physical comfort. So I feel aversion towards the pain because it frustrates my craving for comfort.

[Sam Vara]

We're still in agreement here! I think you are right in that anicca is fundamental. But even if it weren't, that wouldn't mean that the noble truth of Dukkha is somehow vitiated. Saying that impermanent things are unsatisfactory doesn't mean that they wouldn't be unsatisfactory even if they were permanent. Pain, for example. There are three types of Dukkha, and only two of them are related to inconstancy. Have a look at:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .wlsh.html

I don't know, seems to me that these two posts support my point of view.
You can see definition 3 and 4 express perfectly the Buddhist correlation between dukkha and anicca
(3) Sankhaara-dukkhataa, says
The suffering inherent in the formations has its roots in the imperfectability of all conditioned existence, and in the fact that there cannot be any final satisfaction within the incessant turning of the Wheel of Life.


I personally have always found absurd that final satisfaction. Why is that one has to measure suffering and pain against a final satisfaction? Isn't this movement implying that at the core of gotama's teaching is the search for a sukkha which is final, or permanent?

(4) Viparinaama-dukkhataa, says
the suffering associated with pleasant bodily and mental feelings: "because they are the cause for the arising of pain when they change"


Viparinaama-dukkhataa even traces a correlation between the cessation (discontinuity) of a pleasant feeling and the arising of suffering.

Definitions one and two are only a paradigmatic definition of the term. They don't specify a particular nuance of the term dukkha, they are like the dictionary definition of the word dukkha. If you were to write a dictionary entry, how would you define suffering? Whatever definition you will come up with, it will be like that of the word 'right' or 'left'. If you look for them on the dictionary, you will find only paradigmatic, or tautological, definitions. Isn't the very word Dukkha-dukkhataa a tautology?
---
Anyway IMO the standard definition of anicca is to be found is suttas like this, where is clearly stated that sukkha is direcly correlated to the finitude (discontintuity) of human life.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html

Yes, to some extent the sutta supports your view that dukkha is predicated upon impermanence; because the Buddha clearly says that everything that is impermanent is Dukkha. But not all Dukkha. Perhaps I am reading Dukkha a little more widely than you, in that I don't see it simply as "suffering". More like "unsatisfactoriness" - the sense that there is something not exactly "right" about our experiences. Hence, one of the sources of that unsatisfactoriness is the fact that things hurt (which is not tautological); another source or "version" of unsatisfactoriness is that pleasure declines; and another way in which they are unsatisfactory is that they are conditioned - they lack aseity.

[Sam Vara]

I'm still not sure whether this is describing three distinct types of dukkha, or whether it's a progressive analysis which considers increasing subtlety.

For this issue, though, I think the case still stands as things might be dukkha because they are impermanent (because all impermanent things are dukkha) but they might be dukkha for another reason entirely.

I think another way of looking at this is to say that what we really want is a constant and continuing state of contentment, fullfillment, comfort, health etc, but of course impermanence always denies us this. Or to put it another way, aversion is frustrated craving.

Yes, I think that says it neatly. The issue here seems to be whether we approach it via the 4NT, or the tilakkhana. This is why I am a bit wary of treating the latter as some kind of ontological statements about how things "really" are - I tend to think of the three marks, rightly or wrongly, as an aid or spur to practice. "You don't want to be clinging to or identifying with anything because, well, look what they do..."

[barcsimalsi]

We're still in agreement here! I think you are right in that anicca is fundamental. But even if it weren't, that wouldn't mean that the noble truth of Dukkha is somehow vitiated. Saying that impermanent things are unsatisfactory doesn't mean that they wouldn't be unsatisfactory even if they were permanent. Pain, for example. There are three types of Dukkha, and only two of them are related to inconstancy. Have a look at:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .wlsh.html

If we take into account the whole picture of becoming, i think it has to do with annica too because experience is inconstant.
If everything is static and permanent, pain becomes irrelevant as we can imagine the existence getting stuck in a pause mode with zero experience.

[Spiny Norman]

I think another way of looking at this is to say that what we really want is a constant and continuing state of contentment, fullfillment, comfort, health etc, but of course impermanence always denies us this. Or to put it another way, aversion is frustrated craving.

Yes, I think that says it neatly. The issue here seems to be whether we approach it via the 4NT, or the tilakkhana. This is why I am a bit wary of treating the latter as some kind of ontological statements about how things "really" are - I tend to think of the three marks, rightly or wrongly, as an aid or spur to practice. "You don't want to be clinging to or identifying with anything because, well, look what they do..."

My focus is usually on anicca because it's what I can notice, and on a good day the noticing can have a liberating effect. Of course dukkha is often there to be noticed, but I don't want to be looking at that all the time.

[Sam Vara]

We're still in agreement here! I think you are right in that anicca is fundamental. But even if it weren't, that wouldn't mean that the noble truth of Dukkha is somehow vitiated. Saying that impermanent things are unsatisfactory doesn't mean that they wouldn't be unsatisfactory even if they were permanent. Pain, for example. There are three types of Dukkha, and only two of them are related to inconstancy. Have a look at:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .wlsh.html

If we take into account the whole picture of becoming, i think it has to do with annica too because experience is inconstant.
If everything is static and permanent, pain becomes irrelevant as we can imagine the existence getting stuck in a pause mode with zero experience.

Yes, I see this as three things that are not "right" about our experiences. We can focus on either of the three things.

[culaavuso]

I personally have always found absurd that final satisfaction. Why is that one has to measure suffering and pain against a final satisfaction? Isn't this movement implying that at the core of gotama's teaching is the search for a sukkha which is final, or permanent?

Note that it is fabrications (saṅkhārā) that are inconstant (anicca) and unsatisfactory (dukkha), not all phenomena (dhammā). Unbinding (nibbāna) is described as unfabricated (asaṅkhata).

And what is the noble search? There is the case where a person, himself being subject to birth, seeing the drawbacks of birth, seeks the unborn, unexcelled rest from the yoke: Unbinding. Himself being subject to aging... illness... death... sorrow... defilement, seeing the drawbacks of aging... illness... death... sorrow... defilement, seeks the aging-less, illness-less, deathless, sorrow-less, undefiled, unexcelled rest from the yoke: Unbinding. This is the noble search.

Sukhamidaṃ, āvuso, nibbānaṃ.

This Unbinding is pleasant, friends.

[Spiny Norman]

Note that it is fabrications (saṅkhārā) that are inconstant (anicca) and unsatisfactory (dukkha), not all phenomena (dhammā). Unbinding (nibbāna) is described as unfabricated (asaṅkhata).

So does that mean that Nibbana is characterised by nicca? Or does it mean that Nibbana is beyond the nicca / anicca dichotomy?

[culaavuso]

So does that mean that Nibbana is characterised by nicca? Or does it mean that Nibbana is beyond the nicca / anicca dichotomy?

The statement, 'With the remainderless stopping & fading of the six contact-media [vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch, & intellection] is it the case that there is anything else?' objectifies non-objectification.

The adjective ''permanent'' is more open to questioning. Nibbana is described as nicca (permanent) in some later texts, but not in the Pali Suttas. However, dhuva (lasting) is found in the Suttas. Nonetheless, a careful consideration of the various synonyms and adjectives used to describe nibbana do not imply any ''sphere'' existing somewhere in the time and space of conventional physics.

The eternalists, overcome by the craving for existence, thought that there is some permanent essence in existence as a reality. But what had the Buddha to say about existence? He said that what is true for the fire is true for existence as well. That is to say that existence is dependent on grasping. So long as there is a grasping, there is an existence. As we saw above, the firewood is called upādāna because it catches fire. The fire catches hold of the wood, and the wood catches hold of the fire. And so we call it firewood. This is a case of a relation of this to that, idappaccayatā. Now it is the same with what is called ‘existence’, which is not an absolute reality.
...
As the phrase nibbutiṃ bhuñjamānā implies, that extinction is a blissful experience for the Arahants. It leaves a permanent effect on the Arahant, so much so that upon reflection he sees that his influxes are extinct, just as a man with his hands and feet cut off, knows upon reflection that his limbs are gone. It seems that the deeper implications of the word Nibbāna have been obscured by a set of arguments which are rather misleading.
...
Some are in the habit of getting down to a discussion on Nibbāna by putting saṅkhata on one side and asaṅkhata on the other side. They start by saying that saṅkhata, or the ‘prepared’, is anicca, or impermanent. If saṅkhata is anicca, they conclude that asaṅkhata must be nicca, that is the unprepared must be permanent. Following the same line of argument they argue that since saṅkhata is dukkha, asaṅkhata must be sukha. But when they come to the third step, they get into difficulties. If saṅkhata is anattā, or not-self, then surely asaṅkhata must be attā, or self. At this point they have to admit that their argument is too facile and so they end up by saying that after all Nibbāna is something to be realized.

All this confusion arises due to a lack of understanding of the law of Dependent Arising, paṭicca samuppāda.

Now as regards the condition after the cessation of the vortex, if someone asks where the vortex or the whirlpool has gone, what sort of answer can we give? It is the same difficulty that comes up in answering the question: "Where has the fire gone after it has gone out?" Because here too, what we call the whirlpool is that current of water which went against the main stream. It also consists of water, like the body of water outside it. So we cannot say that they united, nor can we say that it went and hid somewhere.
Here we find ourselves in a queer situation. All we can say in fairness to truth is that there had been a certain form of activity, a certain state of unrest, due to certain causes and conditions. Because of that activity that was going on there, it was possible to designate it, to give it a name. By worldly convention one could refer to it as "that place" or "this place".
The entire field of activity was called a whirlpool by worldly convention. But now, the so-called whirlpool is no more. The worldly convention is no more applicable as in the case of an extinguished fire. The word "fire" was introduced, the concept of "fire" was created, to designate a certain state of affairs that arose due to causes and conditions, due to graspings. So from this also we can see that it is in concepts that ignorance finds a camouflage.

[chownah]

SV posted:

"Now this, monks, is the noble truth of stress:[1] Birth is stressful, aging is stressful, death is stressful; sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair are stressful; association with the unbeloved is stressful, separation from the loved is stressful, not getting what is wanted is stressful. In short, the five clinging-aggregates are stressful.

doesn't refer to the fundamental character of reality or one's experience.

Then SN posted:
Logically it must be describing subjective experience rather than objective reality.
---------------------
"Logically it must be describing subjective experience rather than objective reality." is a perfectly clear statement of a doctrine of self as seen by the use of subjective/objective duality and the use of the experience/reality duality. The Buddha never spoke in these terms as far as I know. If the Buddha never spoke in these terms then there is the question why not. Do you think that perhaps the Buddha thought that thinking in these terms could not take you to the goal?
chownah