Maarten2 wrote:(This is a follow up post to an earlier post of mine.)
I would like to bring forward the following hypnosis: The Buddha did not consider his Dhamma ultimate truth/reality.
how do you come to that conclusion?
The implication of this would be that he would also approve of another Dhamma that also aims at cessation of suffering, but is rooted in Western Philosophy, Christianity or any other belief system. Can someone provide arguments for or against this hypnosis?
One postion in favour of this view might me that of Gethin (1998, Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University Press; received though wikipedia):
The word satya (Pali sacca) can certainly mean truth, but it might equally be rendered as ‘real’ or ‘actual thing’. That is, we are not dealing here with propositional truths with which we must either agree or disagree, but with four ‘true things’ or ‘realities’ whose nature, we are told, the Buddha finally understood on the night of his awakening. [...] This is not to say that the Buddha’s discourses do not contain theoretical statements of the nature of suffering, its cause, its cessation, and the path to its cessation, but these descriptions function not so much as dogmas of the Buddhist faith as a convenient conceptual framework for making sense of Buddhist thought.
wouldn't the Buddhas own words be better to use rather than an analysis of a term?
The Buddha disagreed with something based on its truth and how in line with the Dhamma it was, some texts shows teachings being discussed and the buddha disagrees with only half of one doctrine and half of another and merges the correct aspects together to form a cohesive whole, in the process refuting both teachers; another text shows him changing only one word of anthers doctrine.
but if something is useful it is useful, but the theory behind it, for argument sake in Christianity, is going to be flawed due to certain beliefs which go along with it, such as a creator god as being the source of true happiness....
Blog, Suttas, Aj Chah, Facebook.
He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them.
But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion …
He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them … he must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form.John Stuart Mill