Hello again. Indeed I see you point. But then, let me ask you this: based on what does this opinion that there might be an "unobservable observer" lay on ? What made Kant think such a thing might exist ? Was it not this same feeling of subjectivity that we are speaking about ?boundless wrote: ↑Tue Feb 20, 2018 5:27 pmGreetings Circle 5,Circle5 wrote: ↑Mon Feb 19, 2018 10:59 pm
We were not speaking about self awareness. Your post to which I responded was a little older, I was late to respond. What you were talking about was "subjectivity of experience", this feeling that things are mine. There is this feeling there, nobody can deny it.
Here is where the trickery to understandin no-self lies. Here is where Buddha insight comes at play. Sam Vera and Alfatun are not interested in it. If you are interested in this, I can explain it and post the suttas in question. This is the hearth of the problem, this is where the trickery to understanding no-self lies.
In my opinion there is a sort of misunderstanding here.
I agree wit you that the reason why the belief of self arises, according to Buddhism, is because we feel "the subjective experience". From the "subjective experience" we (incorrectly) infer that there is a "self".
So the problem is like this as far as I understood it. We have the feeling of "subjective experience". You, following the suttas, in my opinion are arguing that we cannot "find" the self as an "object" of our experience and therefore searching the self is useless. This leads anatta etc.
BV (but also Kant, Schopenhauer etc) instead are arguing that the "self" cannot be an object of experience because it is the subject of experience. In the same way you do not see in the eye in the visual field. Therefore the argument of "unfindability" against this position is incorrect because it already says that the "subject" exists but cannot be found, i.e. it cannot be an object of experience. So in my opinion arguments like "the self cannot be found in experience, therefore is like the rabbit's horn" cannot be applied against this type of "self theories". So if the arguments you want to share argue for "anatta" are like these, IMO they cannot refute this particular view (about the "unobserved observer", or better "unobservable observer"). This is the reason why IMO Sam Vara and aflatun are not interested in arguments from "unfindability of the self in experience" (and they cannot be used here to disprove the "trascendental self" argument).
For this reason I tried to argue that the "unobservable observer" is simply a concept that is valid epistemologically but cannot be regarder as a self, because it does not entail self-awareness. I was trying to prove that the view itself is in some ways inconsistent without arguing from the "unfindability" of the self.
I hope to have been clearer this time and/or to have not misunderstood what you are trying to say
By the way, I am interested in your arguments, for simply the sake of learning the Dhamma (actually, being nothing more than a beginner I am here in DW for this reason...). But if they argue for "anatta" from the conclusion that a "self" cannot be found in experience, then IMO they cannot be applied to refute BV's position (and maybe this is the reason why Sam Vara and aflatun are not interested in them...).
Thank you in advance!
Greetings auto,
than you for the response.
Sorry if I do not answer now. I will respond you as soon as I can.
Why would one not think that there might be an unobservable observer inside a computer ? The fact that we can't see it does not disprove it in any way because neither can you see a self in another person, same as you can't see it in yourself. Based on this logic, of possible invisible things that can not be perceived by anyone existing, then there might be a self inside every rock, every airplane, every ciggarete.
This is the classic spaggete monster defense that I spoke about. Sure, one can never prove that there is no spaggete monster. That is fighting a strawman. Have you ever seen me saying that you can disprove the self or the spaggete monster in that way ? But the burden of prof lies on the one making the claim. Even if this invisible self or spaggete monster is totally invisible and can not ever be perceived, neither in onself neither in others, then one should try to prove that such a conclusion could be inffered from other information. For example when they tried to prove the world is round, they did not have pictures from outer space, but could make a case for that based on certain measurements and penomenons.
In the same one, one that makes a claim that a self or a spaggete monster might exist, he has to provide at least some form of evidence. The fact that the spaggete monster theory is irrefutable from a logic point of view does not in any way make a case for anything. The burden of prof is on the one claiming such a thing might exist.
I am still quite confused BTW ), these are my "comments". So, “reality” is a continuous process of arising and ceasing. We can see it in our breathing, for example. The cyclic idea of the universe suggests that even “everything” is such a process of arising and ceasing, re-arising and re-ceasing etc Interestingly this idea was quite popular in ancient cultures: even many Greeks thought that our universe was a beginning-less and end-less cyclical process. And in fact, as Parmenides said if some-thing really “was”, then it could not change. At the same time, however, since there is the arising we cannot conclude that things do not exist. So “existence” and “non-existence” cannot be applied to such a process. In fact a real “being” or a real “non-being” cannot “arise” and “cease”: they would be an “obstruction” to the “flow” of ever-changing phenomena. This is true to the cosmos. Also the cosmos as a whole is not a "being", but a process. (it is about the cosmos, but I added it because it is relevant in my reasoning...)