"Is there a Self?"

[chownah]

Neverending topic

To say that there is no self is therefore wrong view.

He did not say that. Usually proponents of latent eternalism speak thus, because they just can't bear the very idea that there is no self And, well, for such people Buddha had a special method of instruction (presented largerly in the suttas) - he offered them to see everything they consider as their "self" as "this is not me/not mine". In the end, if they accomplish that task, they gain an understanding that there is no self. But if they fail somewhere on this way, they think thus: "this is not me/mine, this too.. this too.. and this as well... and my "self" must be dwelling somewhere aside from that" .)

Can you explain what kind of view is "I have no self" as indicated in red below:

"There is the case where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person... does not discern what ideas are fit for attention, or what ideas are unfit for attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas fit for attention, and attends instead to ideas unfit for attention... This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?'

"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

"The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones... discerns what ideas are fit for attention, and what ideas are unfit for attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas unfit for attention, and attends [instead] to ideas fit for attention... He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices."

— MN 2

chownah

[Zom]

How would this particular strategy work with Bill Vallicella's argument? He would presumably say that failure on this way is inevitable, due to the invalidity of the inference involved.

It won't work with anyone. If someone states a self from the very start, he, inevitably, builds all his views around this very self. Buddha showed this with analogy of a dog tied to a post.

Can you explain what kind of view is "I have no self" as indicated in red below:

This is a wrong (or - inaccurate) translation. In original here comes: "I have no self for me" (or we can paraphrase: "I have no self for my self" - or - "My self has no self"). Which returns us to that analogy of a dog tied to a post. Or, directs us to that famous dialogue with Vacchagotta, where Buddha explains why Vacchagotta would be bewildered.

[Sam Vara]

It won't work with anyone. If someone states a self from the very start, he, inevitably, builds all his views around this very self. Buddha showed this with analogy of a dog tied to a post.

I was referring to your point that the Buddha had a "special method of instruction". This was, apparently,

he offered them to see everything they consider as their "self" as "this is not me/not mine".

Are you saying that this method of the Buddha's was ineffectual? If not, how would this method engage with BV's argument?

[binocular]

for such people Buddha had a special method of instruction (presented largerly in the suttas) - he offered them to see everything they consider as their "self" as "this is not me/not mine". In the end, if they accomplish that task, they gain an understanding that there is no self. But if they fail somewhere on this way, they think thus: "this is not me/mine, this too.. this too.. and this as well... and my "self" must be dwelling somewhere aside from that" .)

How would this particular strategy work with Bill Vallicella's argument? He would presumably say that failure on this way is inevitable, due to the invalidity of the inference involved.

Actually, the not-self strategy is parallel to taking the Christian idea that God runs the Universe to its logical conclusions.

My house is not me or mine, because it's God's.
My wife is not me or mine, because she belongs to God.
My life is not me or mine, because it's God's.
My blood, my breath, my ability to think are not me or mine, because they're God's.
And so on.

Oddly enough, starting off with the idea that God runs the Universe (an idea that should be the least controversial one) and following it to its logical conclusions lands us is some kind of Hindu notion of Brahman.

[Sam Vara]

Actually, the not-self strategy is parallel to taking the Christian idea that God runs the Universe to its logical conclusions.

It might be, but it doesn't really deal with Bill V's point about the failure of the Sam Harris/David Hume inference.

[chownah]

How would this particular strategy work with Bill Vallicella's argument? He would presumably say that failure on this way is inevitable, due to the invalidity of the inference involved.

It won't work with anyone. If someone states a self from the very start, he, inevitably, builds all his views around this very self. Buddha showed this with analogy of a dog tied to a post.

Can you explain what kind of view is "I have no self" as indicated in red below:

This is a wrong (or - inaccurate) translation. In original here comes: "I have no self for me" (or we can paraphrase: "I have no self for my self" - or - "My self has no self"). Which returns us to that analogy of a dog tied to a post. Or, directs us to that famous dialogue with Vacchagotta, where Buddha explains why Vacchagotta would be bewildered.

OK. Then using your phrasing then, what kind of view is "I have no self for me" as this paraphrasing would appear in the sutta I brought?
(Aside: I think that english is not your first language if I remember correctly....the way I have always used english to say "I have no self" is the same as "I have no self for me"....the "for me" would usually be considered to be redundant (who else would you be having a self for?) so it is dropped.)
chownah

[binocular]

It might be, but it doesn't really deal with Bill V's point about the failure of the Sam Harris/David Hume inference.

Frankly, I find both their views dismissable because they implicitly appeal to authority -- their own, in presuming themselves to be rational and the arbiters of rationality (rather typical for Catholics and atheists).

[aflatun]

But, if this phenomenologically given self depends on the particular phenomena that it subtends and unifies, and cannot be found without them, can it be self?

Excellent question. My initial thought is to ask why you think that this type of self depends on anything; that (i.e. the attribution of dependence) seems to be as much an inference from the undisputed fact that we cannot find it without those other phenomena, as the thing that BV is attacking (i.e. the view that it therefore does not exist.)

And that's an even better question! I will try and re read the article and post some more later, but for now: If it is an inference, it would seem to be on the same level as the inference he is attacking. It would also be on the same level as inferences most of us don't want to accept, for example that there is nothing outside of what appears here and now in the present moment, because those things, in not appearing here and now, don't exist ("solipsism of the present moment"). Perhaps we should also therefore doubt that consciousness arises on the basis of sensory modality and "object," as just because they are always found together doesn't mean they are actually dependent. We could also dismiss every other relation within DO for similar reasons. If anatta is a doctrine that hinges on "what cannot be found, doesn't exist," and DO is a doctrine that hinges on "what is found together, cannot be found otherwise" then perhaps buddhist metaphysics is bulit on a house of cards? It would appear to be so, especially since we see many people claiming that the Right View of a Stream Entererer is a "conceptual right view" and that Self View is an "opinion." So much for certainty and liberating insight.

I don't think BV is intimidated by the idea; just disappointed by its lack of credibility. I guess he would say that claiming existence for the self is rational, in that such knowledge is God-given, and not too different from claiming knowledge of any empirical fact. He would only jib at claiming aseity for anything other than God.

You're right, I was referring to the poor chap that reached out to him in the first place. BV doesn't strike me as intimidated by anything !

And I'm sure you're right about his take on the aseity of God vs. others. In Christian, Jewish and Muslim Neo-Platonic inspired thinking, only God exists, or rather God is sheer Existence. The Soul, like everything else, is a non existent quiddity, and merely participates in the Divine Existence...

[Zom]

OK. Then using your phrasing then, what kind of view is "I have no self for me" as this paraphrasing would appear in the sutta I brought?
(Aside: I think that english is not your first language if I remember correctly....the way I have always used english to say "I have no self" is the same as "I have no self for me"....the "for me" would usually be considered to be redundant (who else would you be having a self for?) so it is dropped.)
chownah

This "for me" is not just one of the possible english translations but it is there in original text in Pali. This little addition is obviously quite important, and of course gladly ignored by eternalists, because it ruins their eternal self theory.

Ven. Bodhi translation: “When he attends unwisely in this way, one of six views arises in him. The view ‘self exists for me’ arises in him as true
and established; or the view ‘no self exists for me’ arises in him as true and established; or the view ‘I perceive self with self’ arises in him as true and established; or the view ‘I perceive notself with self’ arises in him as true and established;

If you take a look on wrong views just after this pair, you will notice the similarity: "A Self thinks something about A Self". In this sense all these wrong views listed here are the same, sharing the same feature. This is that very dog running around a post. This "For Me" here is this very dog. This is why this view is a wrong one. However, remove the dog, and and it becomes a right view, because, well, there is no self

Actually, the not-self strategy is parallel to taking the Christian idea that God runs the Universe to its logical conclusions.

Logic may seem the same, but method is different, because offers to get an insight why that is so. Impermanent -> Suffering -> Not Self

Are you saying that this method of the Buddha's was ineffectual?

It is not effective for everyone. Buddha couldn't "save" all people. Some can understand, others can't.

If not, how would this method engage with BV's argument?

Again, one following the method either drops his clinging to self or not. If not (if his clinging is too strong) all arguements start working for him in a wrong way, because he "saves" his self for himself while trying to remove everything which is notself. Thus he can't drop it, no matter how many objects he dismissed as being notself. In the end he is caught up in a situation of "transcendental" self - which is unperceivable, which is located behind the time and space, etc etc... this is what Buddha called "caught in a net of views, in a thicket of views". There is little he could do with such a person - his clinging to self is too strong -)

[Sam Vara]

Frankly, I find both their views dismissable because they implicitly appeal to authority -- their own, in presuming themselves to be rational and the arbiters of rationality (rather typical for Catholics and atheists).

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Do you dismiss rationality? Or merely the presumption that one is rational? If the latter, then how does one go about defining the truly rational as opposed to the spuriously or merely supposedly so?

[bodom]

Some people have misinterpreted the teaching on not-self to mean that there is no self, but the Buddha identified both the view, “I have a self,” and the view, “I have no self,” as wrong views. Instead, “not-self” is a value judgment, saying simply that the object you perceive as not-self isn’t worth claiming as “me,” “my self,” or “what I am,” because such a claim automatically entails suffering. This perception helps to undercut any desire you might have to fasten on to any of the aggregates through any of the four types of clinging, and in particular the fourth: clinging through doctrines of the self.

https://www.dhammatalks.org/books/Buddh ... l_toc_id_4

[Zom]

https://www.dhammatalks.org/books/Buddh ... l_toc_id_4

Yes, a nice example of eternalist eel-wriggling.

[Sam Vara]

the Buddha identified both the view, “I have a self,” and the view, “I have no self,” as wrong views. Instead, “not-self” is a value judgment, saying simply that the object you perceive as not-self isn’t worth claiming as “me,” “my self,” or “what I am,” because such a claim automatically entails suffering.

https://www.dhammatalks.org/books/Buddh ... l_toc_id_4

I find this a bit puzzling, but perhaps only the expression is a bit awry. If "not self" merely entails that the object perceived as not-self isn't worth claiming as "me", "myself", or "what I am", then this would appear to be either an analytic truism, or an everyday judgement made by virtually all sane people. When does one ever claim the reverse, i.e. that an object that one perceives as not self (e.g. a banana) is worth claiming as self (i.e. that one is in fact that banana)? A view that what one perceives as self isn't worth claiming as such would appear to have more meat to it. But I may have misunderstood this entirely...

[Sam Vara]

...

Likewise, I'll post later. I probably need the right amount of calm, plus some strong English tea to approach this one.

[auto]

A situation where i need tell who i am and what i do, in short i need identify myself.
I don't do anything and also bring no benefits, so my correct position is to avoid public places, not show the face, eyes looking downwards to avoid eye contact, no hand contact, no talking..

So instead of painful, cringe sweat dripping event if people would know that these people actually exist it would be possible to tell who i am.
The religious rules are made so that i would have a place. Of course if i would have a light body and ability to disappear i would but i can't so cringe overload death by fire and pain.
I almost know the face when hearing about someone doesn't do anything.