Dhamma Wheel

Hi guys,

you can download this book now for free: https://www.academia.edu/32702524/Early ... on_Studies

theY wrote:Only with lobha (desiring). Buddha and arahanta are still compare themselves with another. But they have not mana.

I guess, they don't have a māna mainly because they got rid of the notion "I am", which is a prerequisite for comparing oneself to others.

Conceit or pride are not the best translations for māna since in the English they mean only "unduly favorable estimation of one's own abilities or worth; overly positive self-regard." Whereas māna in the Pāli means thinking about oneself as better, equal or worse from others.

Why [X; not-X; X and not-X; not-(X or not-X)] is called "The Fourfold Negation"? It obviously doesn't negate a proposition in four ways.

Bhikkhu Analayo: The Satipatthana Sutta

http://learn.wisdompubs.org/podcast/bhikkhu-analayo/

There's good sutta introduction on this topic written by Thanissaro Bhikkhu: There [in the Canon] you find emptiness approached from three perspectives, treating it (1) as a meditative dwelling, (2) as an attribute of objects, and (3) as a type of awareness-release. The first approach is obviously t...

Hi, here's very short sutta ( SN 1.25 ) for all who like to make a big deal out of language conventions and claim that there's something deeper going on: “If a bhikkhu is an arahant, Consummate, with taints destroyed, One who bears his final body, Would he still say, ‘I speak’? And would he say, ‘Th...

Hi, The question is whether from this it follows that there is no soul, ever, anywhere --? In Samanupassana Sutta ( SN 22.47 ) the Buddha said that: Monks, whatever contemplatives or brahmans who assume in various ways when assuming a self, all assume the five clinging-aggregates, or a certain one o...

Hi, Hi, jīva/sarīra was a dichotomy which wasn't taken up by the Buddha in his teachings. He famously rejected to answer if the soul (jīva) and the corpse (sarīra) are the same or different. Instead, to prevent from falling into sassata and uccheda possitions, he taught about name-form with cognizan...

Hi, jīva/sarīra was a dichotomy which wasn't taken up by the Buddha in his teachings. He famously rejected to answer if the soul (jīva) and the corpse (sarīra) are the same or different. Instead, to prevent from falling into sassata and uccheda possitions, he taught about name-form with cognizance (...

The Thai Forest Masters by Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu The Thai forest tradition is well-known for the style of its teachings–direct, down-to- earth . . . but very little has been written about the content of its teachings: the positions it took on controversial issues regarding virtue, concentration, disce...

No, his idea is that phassa is contacting "me" with something which is not "me". As he says, otherwise his paṭiccasamuppāda model would make no sense because phassanirodha would be unintelligible. The same applies to feelings, conciousness, and so on.

Hi,

tiltbillings wrote:Except for Ven Channa.

And Venerable Vakkali.

Hi acinteyyo , It seems to me that for example in SN 12.51 cessation ( nirodha ) is equated with nonexistence ( asata ) of things: “When there are utterly no volitional formations, with the cessation of volitional formations, would consciousness be discerned?” “No, venerable sir.” — Pari­vī­maṃ­sa­n...

Hi Mike , I don't think they made any mistake in this regard. If you look into the Brahmajāla-sutta (DN 1) where ucchedavāda is disscused then you can see how this two issues are connected. For example in case of first view it's said: Herein, bhikkhus, a certain recluse or a brahmin asserts the foll...