

CHAPTER XXI

Buddhaghosa, the Harmonizer

While many brilliant thinkers studied the history of Buddhist thought in India—some remaining faithful to the original teachings of the Buddha, others deviating from it, and still others being venerated as the founders of new schools—there is only one name that has remained prominent in the Theravāda countries of South Asia. That name is Buddhaghosa. Rhys Davids summed up in a few words most of what can be said about him: “Of his talent there can be no doubt; it was equalled only by his extraordinary industry. But of originality, of independent thought, there is at present no evidence.”¹ More recent work by a scholar-monk who was part of the tradition dominated by Buddhaghosa contains the following defense: “Modern critics have reproached him with lack of originality: but if we are to judge by his declared aims, originality, or to use his own phrase, ‘advertising his own standpoint,’ seems likely to have been one of the things he would have wished to avoid.”²

If the claim of the faithful followers of the Theriya tradition is that Buddhaghosa did not interpret or add anything to the Theravāda, or that he simply summarized the ideas expressed in the original Sinhalese commentaries and translated them into Pali, then these followers *cannot* claim to be the custodians of the original teachings of the Buddha as embodied in the discourses and in the Abhidhamma, which they themselves have preserved. The reason is that neither the *Visuddhimagga* (*Path of Purification*), Buddhaghosa’s most significant work, nor the commentaries he compiled on most of the canonical texts preserves the philosophical standpoint we have attributed to the Buddha, to the compilers of the Abhidhamma literature, and even to Moggallāputta-tissa. This is so because it is not impossible to trace some metaphysical speculations, such as those of the Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas, and even the Yogācārins, in the works attributed to Buddhaghosa. What is most significant is that these ideas are introduced in an extremely subtle manner, and that it took a few centuries for them to blossom into full-fledged, openly stated metaphysical positions. Yet even if Buddhaghosa possessed no originality, or if his capacity for innovative thinking was suppressed

by the context in which he had to work, a history of Buddhist thought would be incomplete without a chapter devoted to his writings, especially considering the tremendous influence he exerted on Buddhism in countries like Sri Lanka, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. For the traditional Buddhist scholars in this region, Buddhaghosa is literally the "voice" (*ghosa*) of the Buddha.

Buddhaghosa's life story is cloaked in mystery, as in the case of his predecessors. The Sri Lankan chronicle entitled the *Cūlavamsa* (thirteenth century) and the biography of Buddhaghosa, the *Buddhaghosupatti* (compiled by the Burmese monk Mahāmaṅgala during the early part of the fifteenth century), speak of Buddhaghosa as a native of Bodhgayā, where the Buddha attained enlightenment. This association with Bodhgayā is understandable, especially in view of his name, "the voice of the Buddha," given to him after he became a Buddhist monk. However, Buddhaghosa's own writings indicate that he was *living* in South India, close to Nāgarjunikoṇḍa, before his trip to Sri Lanka.³ This means that he was closely associated with the centers of Buddhist learning in South India (see Appendix).

The nature of Buddhaghosa's writings is best understood in the context in which they were undertaken and completed. He arrived in Sri Lanka during the reign of King Mahānāma (409–431 A.D.), who was not favorably disposed toward the Mahāvihāra, the center of Theravāda.⁴ Mahānāma is said to have erected several monasteries for the benefit of the monks of Abhayagiri,⁵ the fraternity with which Sanghamitra was associated, while his queen favored the Mahāvihāra. Under these circumstances, and against the background of the traumatic experiences of the reign of King Mahāsena (see Appendix), the monks of the Mahāvihāra had to be more cautious in dealing with a scholar-monk from South India who wanted to translate the Sinhalese commentaries into Pali for the use of Indian Buddhists. Buddhaghosa was not given access to the Mahāvihāra library until he demonstrated his abilities. This, according to the tradition, is the reason for the compilation of the *Visuddhimagga*. Furthermore, in the colophons to each of his commentaries, Buddhaghosa makes reference to a monk from the Mahāvihāra whom he says invited him to compile that particular work. Given the initial wariness of the Theravāda monks, we cannot be certain whether the monk in question was inviting him to compile the commentary or scrutinizing how Buddhaghosa was performing the task of summarizing and translating the Sinhalese commentaries.

Just as the Theravāda monks were cautious in welcoming Buddhaghosa, so Buddhaghosa was careful in introducing any new ideas into the Mahāvihāra tradition in a way that was too obvious. There seems to be no doubt that the *Visuddhimagga* and the commentaries are a testimony to the abilities of a great harmonizer who blended old and new

ideas without arousing suspicion in the minds of those who were scrutinizing his work. One prominent example shows how Buddhaghosa achieved his goal. In the commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgani*, Buddhaghosa makes a very important remark regarding the theory of moments (*khaṇa-vāda*). He says, "herein, the flowing present (*santati-paccuppanna*) finds mention in the commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*), the enduring present (*addhā-paccuppanna*) in the discourses (*sutta*). Some say (*keci vadanti*) that the thought existing in the momentary present (*khaṇa-paccuppanna*) becomes the object of telepathic insight."⁶ This account leaves the upholders of the theory of moments unidentified. The identification was made only by Ānanda, who compiled subcommentaries on Buddhaghosa's commentaries a few centuries later. The theory, even according to Buddhaghosa, was found neither in the discourses nor in the commentaries preserved at the Mahāvihāra, which Buddhaghosa was using for his own commentaries in Pali. Yet this momentary telepathic insight (*khaṇika-samādhī*) appears as an extremely important theory in his *Visuddhimagga*.⁷ Furthermore, Buddhaghosa utilized the theory of moments rather profusely in this and other works, especially in his explanation of the functioning of the mind and of the experience of material phenomena.⁸ It is important to note that the application of the theory of moments in explaining insight or intuition was popular in the Mahāyāna schools before and after Buddhaghosa, while its use in the explanation of empirical phenomena was common among the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas. It is not possible to say whether the monks of the Mahāvihāra were aware of the far-reaching consequences of Buddhaghosa's adoption of the theory of moments. There is no question that it did change the character of the original teachings introduced by Mahinda immediately after Moggalliputta-tissa's refutation of the heretical views during the third century B.C.

The *Visuddhimagga*

It is almost impossible to summarize the doctrines discussed in the *Visuddhimagga*. Unlike the treatises compiled by previous Buddhist scholars like Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu, in which attempts were made to resurrect the original teachings of the Buddha by adopting various approaches prompted by the nature of the prevalent metaphysical ideas, Buddhaghosa's treatise is no more than an encyclopedic treatment of the path of purification, with a profuse use of the early discourses, and whatever was available in the Sinhalese commentaries, along with a variety of doctrines with which he was familiar before he arrived in Sri Lanka. These latter include ideas emphasized by the Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas, Mādhyamikas, and Yogācārin. It is a gigantic synthesis. If there is any ingenuity in Buddhaghosa, it lies, as noted by Rhys Davids, not in any originality

or independent thought on his part but in how he was able to analyze and synthesize the contents of the enormous body of literature with which he worked and about which he possessed an awesome knowledge.

It is possible that the *Vimuttimaggā* (*Path of Freedom*) served as a model for Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimaggā*. The authorship of that work is attributed to Upatissa. It was available only in a Chinese translation of the sixth century A.D. until it was claimed to have been discovered in Sri Lanka in its Pali version, published in 1963.⁹ Even though Buddhaghosa makes no mention of it, his successor in the commentarial tradition, Dhammapāla, refers to it.¹⁰

The *Visuddhimaggā* treats its subject matter under three headings: morality or virtue (*sīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), and insight (*paññā*). In fact, Buddhaghosa begins the treatise with a verse in which the Buddha himself explains how to disentangle this tangle or puzzle of life:

A wise man, a monk [who] is ardent and sagacious, having established [himself] in morality, and developing his thought and insight, will disentangle this entangle.¹¹

The entire treatise is supposed to be a commentary on this verse. However, Buddhaghosa begins by analyzing the title of his work, "path of purification," into two elements, namely, the purification and the path leading to it. He equates purification with *nirvāṇa*. Being free from all defiling tendencies, it is utterly pure; it is the one goal. However, there can be many paths (*magga*) leading to that one goal (*ekāyana*). Quoting statements from the discourses, he lists at least six different ways of attaining the goal:

1. Insight (*paññā*)
2. Contemplation and insight (*jhāna* and *paññā*)
3. Action (*kamma*)
4. Morality or virtue (*sīla*)
5. Mindfulness (*sati*)
6. Right effort (*sammā vāyāma*), etc.¹²

However, Buddhaghosa is interested in presenting the path as a gradual one, so he opts for the explanation in terms of the threefold division of morality, concentration, and insight.

Morality or virtue (*sīla*) is examined in a variety of ways. Questions such as What is morality? In what sense is it morality? What are its characteristics, etc.? What are the benefits of morality? How many kinds of morality are there? and finally, How is it defiled? and How is it cleansed? are raised. Most of the answers are extremely authoritative, for they are substantiated by a profusion of quotations from the early discourses of

the Buddha. However, one question for which Buddhaghosa fails to provide substantiation from the early discourses is that relating to characteristics and the like.¹³ Yet for Buddhaghosa this is an extremely important question. Not finding appropriate quotations from the early discourses of the Buddha, he attributes the answer to the wise ones (*viññū*), and he continues to apply this definition in clarifying almost every concept he has to deal with. The definition is made in terms of four conditions: characteristic (*lakkhana*), quality (*rasa*), manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*), and foundation (*padatṭhāna*). The explanation of morality in terms of these four conditions is as follows:

1. Morality, in spite of its diverse elements, has the characteristic of composing (*sīlana*), like visibility in the case of different forms of visible data (*rūpa*).
2. Its quality is twofold: functional and consummative. Its functional quality or act-character is the destruction of bad moral habits (*dussīlya*) and its consummative quality is the attainment of blamelessness (*anavajja*).
3. It manifests in the form of purity (*soceyya*).
4. Its foundation consists of sensitivity (*ottappa*) and modesty (*hiri*), for without these there would be no moral life.

In the first place, Buddhaghosa's inability to quote any authoritative text from the early discourses in support of this definition weakens its authority, especially in the context of the hermeneutical principles laid down by the Buddha under the *mahāpadesas* (see Chapter v). Second, Buddhaghosa does not even refer to the definition or interpretation of concepts in the more authoritative non-canonical hermeneutical treatise, preserved at the Mahāvihāra, called the *Netti* (*Guide*), which contained a sophisticated method of conveying (*hāra*) the meanings of concepts.¹⁴ Even though that treatise was pre-Buddhaghosan, he seems to have ignored it. Dhammapāla, who followed Buddhaghosa, is said to have compiled the existing commentary on it. One reason Buddhaghosa may have disregarded this work is that its sixteen modes of conveying or determining the meanings of concepts were too cumbersome compared to the fourfold definition. But more important is the fact that the fourfold definition enabled Buddhaghosa to introduce, rather surreptitiously, the substantialist as well as essentialist standpoints of the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas. Dhammapāla did so more openly, and in the end the Mahāvihāra tradition seems to have been overwhelmed by such interpretations.

The fourfold definition demonstrates Buddhaghosa's capacity to harmonize several strands of thought that had by then emerged in the Bud-

dhist tradition. The categories that created much controversy among Buddhists—namely, the particular or the unique (*sabhāva* = *svabhāva*) and the universal or the abstract (*sāmañña* = *sāmānya*)—are here introduced under the guise of characteristics (*lakkhana* = *lakṣaṇa*), and came to be identified as such in later manuals.¹⁵ The recognition of such categories would not have been problematic if not for the fact that they were thus distinguished by later Theravādin philosophers, thereby allowing for the emergence of metaphysical theories of identity and difference comparable to those criticized by Nāgārjuna. Thus the particular (*sabhāva*, *salakkhaṇa*) came to be looked upon as the absolutely unique character not shared by anything else (*anaññasādhāraṇa*), the universal (*sāmañña*) being identified with the common or the shared (*sādhāraṇa*).¹⁶ This was more or less the standpoint of the essentialist. With the pursuit of such an essentialist conceptual enterprise, the explanation of events or entities in terms of their dependence (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) was relegated to the background.

The second definition, in terms of quality (*rasa*), enabled Buddhaghosa to accommodate the description of an event, entity, or thing in terms of its function. He was keenly aware of the significance of such a definition in the discourses of the Buddha.

The third condition, manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*, lit., “serving toward”), is more teleological in implication. The problems created by the previous essentialist interpretation probably called for such a definition, which eventually strengthened the essentialist enterprise by assigning specific goals for each of the processes assumed in the second condition.

The fourth condition, foundation (*padatṭhāna*), tightens the entire typological process by indicating definite conditions under which an event takes place. It is in some sense a counterfactual required by the first of the conditions. It is the foundation that specifies the conditions necessary for an event to occur.

The above definition may appear to be harmless so long as Buddhaghosa's endeavor was to explain the empirical constituents and conditions of morality (*sīla*). These, according to the Buddha, are non-substantial (*anatta*); hence neither the category of characteristics (*lakkhana*, involving the particular/universal dichotomy) nor the category of foundation (*padatṭhāna*) should be understood in a rather strict sense as defining the *ultimate meaning* of the nature and constituents of morality. Yet for Buddhaghosa, the fourfold definition is intended to determine the precise meaning of morality, that is, to answer the question, In what sense is morality? (*Ken' atṭhena sīlam*). It is therefore not a simple empirical description but one intended to bring out the essential and real meaning. Thus the fourfold definition is not a hermeneutical device but a

language of precision intended to replace the empirical description (*sammuti, vohāra*) with more precise and technical vocabulary (*paramatthavacana*).

A philosophically correct language is not in itself an unreasonable ideal for a philosopher, but it need not be pursued at the expense of veridical knowledge. Unfortunately, Buddhaghosa's philosophical language eliminated not only metaphysical conceptions, such as permanent and eternal subjects and objects, but also empirical distinctions like woman (*itthi*) and man (*purisa*), retaining only the aggregates (*khandha*).¹⁷ The fact that this is an essentialist enterprise is made clear by his analysis of human life into discrete momentary events, which he justifies by quoting a passage that is supposed to be from the Buddha but that has not yet been traced in any of the early discourses.¹⁸

It seems that, because of the manner in which Buddhaghosa introduced this essentialist definition, which he used extensively in the *Visuddhimagga* and the entire set of commentaries he compiled on the three collections (*tipiṭaka*), the Mahāvihāra monks did not realize its far-reaching implications. Even if they were aware of them, they were probably fearful of being as aggressive as they had been on previous occasions. The consequences of this essentialist definition became apparent only in the writings of Theravāda teachers like Anuruddha and Sāriputta a few centuries later.

Buddhaghosa's use of the abovementioned essentialist perspective is most evident in his explanation of the restraint of the senses (*indriya-samvara*), which is an aspect of the moral life (*sīla*). His explanation of the sensory process and how it can be restrained is stated as follows:

Herein, there is neither restraint nor non-restraint in the actual eye-faculty, since neither mindfulness nor forgetfulness arises in dependence on the eye-sensitivity. On the contrary, when a visible datum as object comes into the eye's focus, then, after the life-continuum has arisen twice and ceased, the functional mind-element accomplishing the function of adverting arises and ceases. After that, eye-consciousness with the function of seeing; after that, resultant mind-element with the function of receiving; after that, resultant inoperative mind-element-consciousness with the function of investigating; after that, the inoperative mind-consciousness-element accomplishing the function of determining arises and ceases. Next to that, impulsion impels. Herein, there is neither restraint nor non-restraint on the occasion of the life-continuum, or on any of the occasions beginning with adverting. But there is non-restraint if immorality or forgetfulness or unknowing or impatience or idleness arises at the moment of impulsion. When this happens, it is called "non-restraint of the eye-faculty."¹⁹

This explanation may appear to bring out the essential features of the process of perception, and these essential features are couched in precise

and technical vocabulary. Yet, obviously, the very creative process of perception is thereby rendered sterile or lifeless. While very speculative, it also introduces concepts that are extremely metaphysical from the main-line Buddhist standpoint. We have here the recognition of an "unconscious" consciousness, referred to as "life-continuum" (*bhavaṅga*), to account for the continuity in the otherwise dissected and unrelated series of momentary mental events. Philosophically, this is not much different from the metaphysical conception of *ālaya*-consciousness presented in the *Lañkā*, except that it is not looked upon as originally pure.

The essentialist perspective thus introduced in the analysis of morality (*sīla*) is then applied in the explanation of concentration (*samādhi*) and insight (*paññā*). Part II (Chapters III–XI) of the *Visuddhimagga* provides a detailed description of the process of concentration (*samādhi*). This is the fourfold definition of concentration:

1. Characteristic = non-distraction (*avikkhepa*)
2. Quality = elimination of distraction (*vikkhepa-viddhamšana*)
3. Manifestation = non-wavering (*avikampana*)
4. Foundation = happiness (*sukha*)²⁰

Keeping this definition in view, Buddhaghosa elaborates on forty different meditative techniques leading up to concentration. As Nānamoli has noted, the account of each single meditation subject given here is incomplete unless taken in conjunction with the whole of Part III, namely, the section on insight (*paññā*),²¹ because the concentration discussed here relates to the eight attainments (*aṭṭha-samāpatti*), which provide a feeling of ease and comfort rather than knowledge and understanding. Interestingly, Buddhaghosa adds two more chapters in the section on concentration in order to explain the various forms of psychic powers (Chapter XII) and the five forms of higher knowledge (Chapter XIII), which he describes as mundane higher knowledge (*lokiyābhiññā*).

Part II (Chapters XIV–XXIII) of the *Visuddhimagga* also provides an exhaustive analysis of insight (*paññā*). Buddhaghosa's way of distinguishing insight from perception (*saññā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) may appear to be rather simple and uncontroversial until we get to the actual definition, when it becomes rather complicated. Utilizing a simile that became rather popular in the Theravāda after him, Buddhaghosa illustrates the distinctions thus:

Perception is like the child without discretion seeing the coin, because it apprehends the mode of appearance of the object as blue and so on. Consciousness is like the villager seeing the coin, because it apprehends the mode of the object as blue, etc., and because it extends further, reaching the penetration of its characteristics. Insight is like the money-changer seeing

the coin, because, after apprehending the mode of the object as blue, etc., and extending to the characteristics, it extends still further, reaching the manifestation of the path.²²

Thus perception (*saññā*) is direct sensory awareness, such as the perception of blue, etc. Consciousness (*viññāṇa*) provides understanding of characteristics such as impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and non-substantiality. Having stated that it is not easy to distinguish perception and consciousness from insight,²³ and recognizing the moral content of insight by indicating that it has the capacity to manifest the path to freedom, Buddhaghosa proceeds to define it in terms of the four conditions mentioned earlier:

1. Characteristic = penetration into the essential nature of phenomena (*dharmasabhāva-paṭivedha*)
2. Quality = abolishing the darkness of confusion that conceals the essential nature of phenomena (*sabhāvapaṭicchāda-mohāndhakāra-viddhamāna*)
3. Manifestation = non-delusion (*asammoha*)
4. Foundation = concentration (*samādhi*)²⁴

What Buddhaghosa means by essential nature (*sabhāva*) is not clear. His commentator takes this to mean both the particular or the unique (*sakabhāva*) and the general or the universal (*samānabhāva*).²⁵ If this were the case, it would justify the view expressed in the *Laṅkā* that the insight of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* is confined to the particular and the universal (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*; see Chapter XVIII). But if the essential nature of phenomena is to be understood in the sense of *dharmatā* (i.e., the dependent nature of phenomena),²⁶ then the object of insight would not be much different from the object of consciousness as described by Buddhaghosa above. The only difference would be that the former will be positive and the latter negative. However, this would contradict the three levels or tiers of understanding illustrated by the simile of the coin, with the knowledge of the money-changer bordering on absolute knowledge regarding the nature and value of the coin. In that explanation, the pragmatic as well as the moral content of knowledge is lost, and what we are left with is an extremely sophisticated, detailed, and value-free knowledge comparable to that of a typical scientist who is expected to be interested in the knowledge of phenomena for its own sake.²⁷

One cannot help thinking of such theoretical knowledge when reading Chapters XIV to XVII of the *Visuddhimagga*. Here we find experience being dissected and the separated components described and grouped in several alternate patterns. In most cases Buddhaghosa adopts the four-

fold essentialist definition mentioned above, which involves an exhaustive analysis of the aggregates and the various modes of the principle of dependence (*paṭiccasamuppāda*).

In contrast, Chapters xviii to xxi are practical. They provide instructions on how the theoretical knowledge of the earlier part can be internalized, that is, analyzed in terms of the meditator's individual experience in order to attain the five kinds of purification (*visuddhi*):

1. Purification of view (*diṭṭhi-visuddhi*)
2. Purification by overcoming doubt (*kaṅkhā-vitarāṇa-visuddhi*)
3. Purification by knowledge and vision of the path and the non-path (*maggāmagga-ñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi*)
4. Purification by knowledge and vision of practice (*paṭipadā-ñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi*)
5. Purification of knowledge and vision (*ñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi*)

Thus the five forms of purification are achieved by thoroughly examining the object of knowledge (*ñāta*) as well as knowledge itself (*ñāṇa*).²⁸ Progress occurs in relation to the eight forms of knowledge²⁹ aimed at the clarification of objective experience and the consequent modification of the subjective attitudes, until the meditator reaches the three gateways to freedom. These are reflections (*anupassanāni*) relating to (1) the absence of a mysterious cause (*animitta*), (2) the non-established (that is, the absence of a foundation, *appanīhita*), and (3) the empty (*suñña*).³⁰ These reflections are then utilized to generate the four types of activity in relation to the four noble truths, namely,

1. Thorough understanding (*pariññā*) of the truth of suffering (*dukkha*)
2. The relinquishing (*pahāna*) of the arising (*samudaya*) of suffering
3. The cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the path (*maggā*) leading to the cessation of suffering
4. The realization (*sacchikiriya*) of the cessation (*nirodha*) of suffering

Quoting a passage from the *Samyutta-nikāya*,³¹ where the Buddha maintains that a person who perceives suffering also perceives its arising, its cessation, and the path leading to its cessation, Buddhaghosa insists that all these four different activities take place simultaneously "during one moment" (*ekakkhaṇe*):

For this is said by the Ancients (*porāṇā*): Just as a lamp performs four functions simultaneously in a single moment—it burns the wick, dispels darkness, makes light appear, and uses up the oil—so, too, path-knowledge penetrates to the four truths simultaneously in a single moment—it penetrates

to suffering by penetrating to it with full understanding (*pariññā*), penetrates to arising by penetrating to it with relinquishing (*pahāna*), penetrates to the path by penetrating to it with cultivating (*bhāvanā*), and penetrates to ceasing by penetrating to it with realizing (*saccikiriya*).³²

This is an ingenious way of harmonizing two different paths—the gradual path, with which he began the treatise, and sudden realization based on momentary concentration (*khaṇika-samādhi*). It is also an interesting way to reconcile two philosophical standpoints—the foundationalism or essentialism with which he began the work, and the anti-foundationalism or anti-essentialism embodied in the three gateways to freedom (*animitta*, *appaṇihita*, and *suñña*). It is indeed a work of highest erudition on the part of a great harmonizer.

Chapter XXI

1. *Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 2, p. 887, quoted in E. W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena, 1953), p. 4.
2. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, *Buddhaghosa: The Path of Purification* (tr. of *Visuddhimagga*), (Colombo: Semage, 1964), p. xix.
3. *Ibid.*, p. xvi, esp. n. 8.
4. Adikaram, *Buddhism in Ceylon*, p. 93.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *DhsA* 421.
7. *Vism* 144, 290, 291, etc.
8. *Ibid.* 140–141, 475, 509, 560, 600, 613, 631–632, 691ff.
9. *Vimuttimagga*, ed. G. Siri Ratnajoti and K. Siri Ratnapala (Colombo: Government Press of Ceylon, 1963).
10. See Ñāṇamoli, *Buddhaghosa*, p. 104.
11. *S* 1.13.
12. *Vism* 2.
13. *Ibid.* 8–9.
14. See *Nettipakarana*, ed. E. Hardy (London: PTS, 1961); also George Bond,

- “The Netti-pakaraṇa: A Theravāda Method of Interpretation,” in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, ed. Somaratne Balasuriya, et. al. (London: Gordon Fraser, 1980), pp. 16–28.
15. See *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī*, ed. A. P. Buddhadatta (Colombo: Anula Press, 1961), p. 11.
 16. *Visuddhimagga-ṭīkā (Paramatthamañjusa)*, ed. M. Dhammananda (Colombo: Mahabodhi Press, 1928), p. 211.
 17. *Vism* 526.
 18. *Ibid.* 328.
 19. *Ibid.* 21.
 20. *Ibid.* 85.
 21. Ñāṇamoli, *Buddhaghosa*, p. xxxi.
 22. *Vism* 437.
 23. *Ibid.* 437–438.
 24. *Ibid.* 438.
 25. Ñāṇamoli (*Buddhaghosa*, p. 481, n. 3) takes the latter to mean “existing essence” (*samāna* = present participle from *as*, “to exist”). However, in the present context it is more appropriate to understand it in the sense of “like,” “similar” (*samāna*), as opposed to “unlike,” “dissimilar” (*asamāna*). *Samāna* would then be a synonym for *sādhāraṇa* or “common.”
 26. *A* 5.3, 313; see also *Kārikā* xxii.16.
 27. Note the interesting comments by C. S. Peirce, *Collected Works of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960), 1.76.
 28. *Vism* 642.
 29. *Ibid.* 639.
 30. *Ibid.* 658.
 31. *S* 5.437.
 32. *Vism* 690.