Meditation, conditionality, and anatta

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Alex,

The path is purely deterministic (A->B, B->C), with many conditions.

So you finally come out and say it...

In the suttas, this is how the Buddha regarded sectarians who held your view...

AN 3.61 - Tittha Sutta
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"Having approached the priests & contemplatives who hold that... whatever a person experiences... is all caused by what was done in the past,' I said to them: 'Is it true that you hold that... whatever a person experiences... is all caused by what was done in the past?' Thus asked by me, they admitted, 'Yes.' Then I said to them, 'Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings because of what was done in the past. A person is a thief... unchaste... a liar... a divisive speaker... an abusive speaker... an idle chatterer... covetous... malevolent... a holder of wrong views because of what was done in the past.' When one falls back on what was done in the past as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], 'This should be done. This shouldn't be done.' When one can't pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn't be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. One cannot righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative...

... These are the three sectarian guilds that — when cross-examined, pressed for reasons, & rebuked by wise people — even though they may explain otherwise, remain stuck in inaction.

Do you still cling to your deterministic views, even though the Buddha regarded them this way?

Do you see yet the danger in attributing present suffering to impersonal and deterministic past causes?

You may feel it absolves you from responsibility for how you feel at the present, but instead, remaining stuck in inaction, even going so far as to deny the efficacy of action, merely keeps you mired in suffering.

Such denial hardly sounds like a liberating Dhamma to me... it sounds sick and anaemic.

(P.S. Regarding the sutta, don't try insisting that "past" exclusively refers to "past lives" and excludes the past in this particular life, either. That's not what the Buddha is saying and that would be a blatant and crude distortion of his words to allege it. Neither does he say he's talking exclusively about past life kamma - that would be an even bigger misrepresentation of his words. Let us leave sectarian filters aside and focus on the Blessed One's words.)

Metta,
Retro.

[Alex123]

Hi Retro, Tilt, all,

Greetings Alex,
AN 3.61 - Tittha Sutta
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"Having approached the priests & contemplatives who hold that... whatever a person experiences... is all caused by what was done in the past,' I said to them: 'Is it true that you hold that... whatever a person experiences... is all caused by what was done in the past?' Thus asked by me, they admitted, 'Yes.' Then I said to them, 'Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings because of what was done in the past. A person is a thief... unchaste... a liar... a divisive speaker... an abusive speaker... an idle chatterer... covetous... malevolent... a holder of wrong views because of what was done in the past.' When one falls back on what was done in the past as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], 'This should be done. This shouldn't be done.' When one can't pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn't be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. One cannot righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative...

What happens now is not 100% due to past life, but also is due to what was happening in this life, what kind of teaching one has heard, the kind of friends one has, whether there is faith in Dhamma or faith in wrong teachings, etc.(see AN sutta quote below

All that happens is conditioned, and not by simply what has happened in past life. Purification doesn't happen through "wandering on" or due to one's wish. Certain conditions have to be met.

Bhikkhus, the shameless one without remorse becomes negligent It is not possible for the negligent one to dispel disrespect, unruliness and evil friendship. It is not possible for the one associating evil friends to gain faith, dispel stinginess and laziness. It is not possible for the lazy one to dispel excitement, lack of restraint and evil virtues. It is not possible for the un virtuous one to dispel the dislike to see noble ones, to hear the teaching of the noble ones and dispel the reproaching mind. It is not possible for one with a reproaching mind to dispel forgetfulness, lack of mindful awareness and the derangement of mind. It is not possible for one with deranged mind to dispel unwise attention, practicing in the wrong path and the mind's immobility. It is not possible for one with a sluggish mind to dispel the view of a self, doubts, and grasping virtues as the highest aim. It is not possible for the doubting one to dispel greed, hate and delusion. Without dispelling greed, hate and delusion it is not possible to dispel birth, decay and death.
...
Bhikkhus, the shameful one with remorse becomes diligent It is possible for the diligent one to dispel disrespect, unruliness and evil friendship. It is possible for the one associating spiritual friends to gain faith, dispel stinginess and laziness. It is possible for the one with aroused effort to dispel excitement, lack of restraint and evil virtues. It is possible for the virtuous one to dispel the dislike to see noble ones, to hear the Teaching of the noble ones and dispel the reproaching mind. It is possible for one without a reproaching mind to dispel forgetfulness, lack of mindful awareness and the derangement of mind. It is possible for one without deranged mind to dispel unwise attention, practicing in the wrong path and the mind's immobility. It is possible for one with a mobile mind to dispel the view of a self, doubts, and grasping virtues as the highest aim. It is possible for one without doubts to dispel greed, hate and delusion. Dispelling greed, hate and delusion it is possible to dispel birth, decay and death.

6. Tayodhammasuttaṃ - Three things
http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/ ... ggo-e.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

So as you see, present factors are very important. But as the sutta shows, one thing leads to another. One steps conditions the next.

With metta,

Alex

[Alex123]

And within that process, there is choice, and there is thinking, no chooser, no thinker, but each are part of the process, which means we are not dealing with a strict determinism, which means we are responsible for our actions, as the Buddha clearly said. What we are is what we made ourselves.

Sounds like you are referring to a Self.

Owners of their kamma are beings, heirs of their kamma, kamma is their womb from which they are born, their kamma is their friend, their refuge. Whatever kamma they perform, good or bad, there of they will be the heirs. - M 135 iii 206. Whatever actions I do, I will be their heir.

You seem to take "owners" to literally mean beings who own things. IMHO the passage does not refer to Owners as a Self or controller of the aggregates, but to a distinct cause-effect streams.

From the arising of choice comes the arising of choosing. And, of course, choosing is between options. Conditionality does not rule it out.

And what was the cause for that particular choice? What motivated to chose this vs that option? What conditions made certain choices even to be considered?

Conditions might “force” an event, but there is nothing to say that is a necessary thing in all circumstances.

Are you saying that there are random, uncaused things?

When there are options within a conditioned circumstance, there may be pressure towards one choice over another, but the more difficult choice can be made.

And what was the cause, what was the reason for "more difficult choice to be made?"

You are the one ending your msg by saying that it is all strict determinism. A leaf is blown about by causes. It has no say as where it goes or how it gets there. That is strict determinism, and that is what you are advocating. If you find that emotionally unsatisfactory, that is you, not me.

So do you value the ability to freely choose despite causes & conditions? Is the choice conditioned or unconditioned?

if there is nothing I can do to influence my movement along the path,

Since there is no atta, you cannot do anything. It is just cause-effect without a doer.

with metta,

Alex

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

What happens now is not 100% due to past life, but also is due to what was happening in this life, what kind of teaching one has heard, the kind of friends one has, whether there is faith in Dhamma or faith in wrong teachings, etc.

As predicted, you attempt to disassociate yourself from the view the Buddha criticises by building some flimsy straw-man argument that the holder of such views is taking the past to mean "past lives", when the Buddha said no such thing. The Buddha said the "past", as in before now. Where did the Buddha say "past lives" there? He didn't.

Metta,
Retro.

[Alex123]

Hi Retro,

Greetings,

What happens now is not 100% due to past life, but also is due to what was happening in this life, what kind of teaching one has heard, the kind of friends one has, whether there is faith in Dhamma or faith in wrong teachings, etc.

As predicted, you attempt to disassociate yourself from the view the Buddha criticises by building some flimsy straw-man argument that the holder of such views is taking the past to mean "past lives", when the Buddha said no such thing. The Buddha said the "past", as in before now. Where did the Buddha say "past lives" there? He didn't.

Metta,
Retro.

What do you think about the sutta (Tayodhammasuttaṃ - Three things) quote that I've provided? It doesn't talk about past lives. It talks about past in this life.

Bhikkhus, the shameless one without remorse becomes negligent It is not possible for the negligent one to dispel disrespect, unruliness and evil friendship. It is not possible for the one associating evil friends to gain faith, dispel stinginess and laziness. It is not possible for the lazy one to dispel excitement, lack of restraint and evil virtues. It is not possible for the un virtuous one to dispel the dislike to see noble ones, to hear the teaching of the noble ones and dispel the reproaching mind. It is not possible for one with a reproaching mind to dispel forgetfulness, lack of mindful awareness and the derangement of mind. It is not possible for one with deranged mind to dispel unwise attention, practicing in the wrong path and the mind's immobility. It is not possible for one with a sluggish mind to dispel the view of a self, doubts, and grasping virtues as the highest aim. It is not possible for the doubting one to dispel greed, hate and delusion. Without dispelling greed, hate and delusion it is not possible to dispel birth, decay and death.
...
Bhikkhus, the shameful one with remorse becomes diligent It is possible for the diligent one to dispel disrespect, unruliness and evil friendship. It is possible for the one associating spiritual friends to gain faith, dispel stinginess and laziness. It is possible for the one with aroused effort to dispel excitement, lack of restraint and evil virtues. It is possible for the virtuous one to dispel the dislike to see noble ones, to hear the Teaching of the noble ones and dispel the reproaching mind. It is possible for one without a reproaching mind to dispel forgetfulness, lack of mindful awareness and the derangement of mind. It is possible for one without deranged mind to dispel unwise attention, practicing in the wrong path and the mind's immobility. It is possible for one with a mobile mind to dispel the view of a self, doubts, and grasping virtues as the highest aim. It is possible for one without doubts to dispel greed, hate and delusion. Dispelling greed, hate and delusion it is possible to dispel birth, decay and death.
http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/ ... ggo-e.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

It does list specific required conditions, in a step-by-step progression. To do good or bad, requires certain conditions that can come from this life. Unfortunately I cannot will to "only be good, never bad". If I could, I would. It is a matter of more wholesome conditions.

With metta,

Alex

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Alex,

What do you think about the sutta (Tayodhammasuttaṃ - Three things) quote that I've provided? It doesn't talk about past lives. It talks about past in this life.

Neither does the Tittha Sutta, which you avoid addressing... dancing past it as if it does not apply to your view.

As for the sutta you present, it talks about many things that are "possible". By applying your self-confessed "pure determinism", there is no "possible"... only what was and will be. Your sectarian (tittha) view is not aligned with what the Buddha is saying and you are trying vainly to twist his words to match your view.

Unfortunately I cannot will to "only be good, never bad". If I could, I would. It is a matter of more wholesome conditions.

I don't know how many times you will repeat this absurd straw-man example that leaves you so enamoured. No one is saying it's a case of wishing... it's a case of putting forth effort to be good. The decision to put effort forth is a choice. In the realm of pure determinism, the future is already pre-determined, with no potency of choice (i.e. no efficacy of kamma).

Metta,
Retro.

[Alex123]

Hi Retro,


Tittha sutta rejects chalking everything just to past causes indiscriminately. But there are not just any kind of past causes. There are specific conditions that are happening now, and recently that can condition wholesome or unwholesome action.

Good actions are due to wholesome causes, bad actions due to unwholesome causes. Some non-Buddhist teachers seemed to reject that, and perhaps that is part of the reason why the Buddha rejected what was said in Tittha sutta. That wrong view in Tittha sutta doesn't take into account the great positive effect that listening & considering the Dhamma can bring and negative effect of considering wrong teachings and placing faith in them.


With metta,

Alex

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Alex,

Where does the Buddha draw a distinction between "causes" and "conditions"?

If you can point me to the Pali words it would be greatly appreciated. I remain unconvinced that it's not some kind of sectarian side-step.

Metta,
Retro.

[Dan74]

redundant

[Alex123]

Hi Retro,

Greetings Alex,
Where does the Buddha draw a distinction between "causes" and "conditions"?
If you can point me to the Pali words it would be greatly appreciated. I remain unconvinced that it's not some kind of sectarian side-step.
Metta,
Retro.

Can you please explain how that relates to what we were talking about?
If causes & conditions are similar, then what does that imply?
If causes & conditions are different, then what does that imply?

In any case, present Kamma is not due to past kamma, and this is possible what is being rejected.

With metta,

Alex

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Alex,

Can you please explain how that [distinction between "causes" and "conditions"] relates to what we were talking about?

Because you seemingly regard them as separate notions here..

Tittha sutta rejects chalking everything just to past causes indiscriminately. But there are not just any kind of past causes. There are specific conditions that are happening now, and recently that can condition wholesome or unwholesome action.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

I've also been lurking, since I find this such a complex subject that I'm afraid that anything I say will be a gross oversimplification.

I found the article referred to early in the thread by Kirk: http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... =80#p98692" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; very useful in seeing the issues (but not necessarily resolving them in my mind).

Federman, Asaf (2010) What kind of free will did the Buddha teach? Philosophy East and West, Vol.60 (No.1). ISSN 0031-8221
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/3142/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Human choice and endeavor has a causally effective power within a causally
operated reality. In other words, the fact that reality is deterministic does not contradict
the ability of agents to speculate and reflect about what to do next and decide
accordingly. This kind of free will—imperfect and limited, but not powerless and
irrelevant—is not the opposite of determinism but the opposite of fatalism. While
determinism means that events happen because other events caused them, it is silent
on whether agents cause anything; determinism may well be true in a world without
agents at all. On the other hand, fatalism is an ethical stance because it says that
agents do not have the power to cause anything and that therefore there is no point
in trying. This has, of course, far-reaching ethical implications that are not overlooked
by the Buddha.

Conclusion

The Cartesian and Brahmanical understandings of free will refer to a power that
belongs in the soul, that transcends the physical, and that has ultimate control over
the body. The Buddha rejects this notion and at the same time rejects fatalism, which
leaves no room for significant choices. This rejection is similar in many aspects
to the contemporary rejection of the Cartesian notion of free will as expressed in Dennett’s work.
Both Dennett and the Buddha do not accept the idea of a God-like
eternal soul, and argue that there is no ultimate control that transcends causality and
that entertains supreme mastery of the body.

Dennett’s alternative is expounded systematically in the modern Western philosophical
manner. It includes redefining free will as the agent’s ability to control
action according to will whenever there are no constraints, coercions, and compulsions
that limit performance. He adds an important cognitive layer to the analysis
and shows how imagination of possibilities, prediction, and self-control are the basic
functions that make agents free. One of Dennett’s main contributions to the free-will
debate is the distinction between determinism as a metaphysical position and inevitability,
or fatalism, which are ethical positions.

The Buddhist treatment of free will has to be extracted from the doctrine, as the
doctrine is by no means a systematic philosophical treatise. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the Buddha saw that freedom has a negative correlation with compulsions.
While the Western tradition tends to emphasize external compulsion and social freedom,
Buddhist doctrine tends to emphasize internal compulsions and psychological
freedom.

Much of the confusion around whether the Buddha taught free will can be
avoided by dropping the Cartesian model and using a compatibilist model. Buddhist
doctrine contains a version of compatibilism that may explain the seemingly contradictory
statements given by some scholars: Buddhism rejects the idea that free will
exists outside the causal nexus, and at the same it affirms that people can choose
and take responsibility for their choices. Choosing right action is not derived from a
supernatural or super-causal origin. It is derived from wise contemplation over the
possible consequences. This wisdom enables free will, and is a faculty that can be
developed. What limits free will is not causality itself, but various mental compulsions.
The kind of free will that the Buddha taught is the acquired ability for clear
reflection and wise choice that emerges with their eradication

Mike

[Alex123]

Greetings Alex,

Because you seemingly regard them as separate notions here..

That was just my style of writing in that post.

To answer re: Tittha sutta, I believe the shortest and possibly truest answer is that:
Buddha denies that present Kamma is caused just by past Kamma.

[Alex123]

Hello Mike, all,

Thank you for posting, Mike.

Human choice and endeavor has a causally effective power within a causally operated reality. In other words, the fact that reality is deterministic does not contradict the ability of agents to speculate and reflect about what to do next and decide accordingly. This kind of free will—imperfect and limited, but not powerless and irrelevant—is not the opposite of determinism but the opposite of fatalism. While determinism means that events happen because other events caused them, it is silent on whether agents cause anything; determinism may well be true in a world without agents at all. On the other hand, fatalism is an ethical stance because it says that agents do not have the power to cause anything and that therefore there is no point in trying. This has, of course, far-reaching ethical implications that are not overlooked
by the Buddha.

That article talks about agents, and this seems to be very similar to what the Buddha would call Atta. There is sentence in your excerpt that defends my point
"determinism may well be true in a world without agents at all". Buddha taught anatta. He didn't teach about agents. The world is empty of Self or what belongs to it, SN35.85. "Agent" is not the cause of kamma. Phassa (contact) is proximate cause of Kamma.

Contact is the cause by which kamma comes into play.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"Insofar as it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self: Thus it is said, Ananda, that the world is empty. "
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Note: It is not the will, resolution, determination, choice, etc, that is the cause. Phassa (contact) is.




With metta,

Alex

[mikenz66]

That article talks about agents, and this seems to be very similar to what the Buddha would call Atta. ...

I think you need to read the whole article carefully:

Besides the absence of constraint, the compatibilist definition of free will requires
also an agent that is capable of monitoring wishes in order to execute actions.
Although the Buddha denied ultimate agency—the singular point from which soul
ultimately controls the body—he acknowledged moral choice and personal retribution.
The agent in this case is nothing but a collection of physical and mental processes,
but as such it can still choose what to do. The Buddha rejected the view,
attributed to Makkhali Gosala, that there is no self-agency (attaka¯ ra) 42 and replied
to another question on the same subject that people have an ‘‘ability of initiating’’
(a¯rabbha-dha¯ tu).43 Some other Pa¯li terms that fall under the English ‘‘intention’’—
san˜ cetana¯ , sankappa, cetana¯—indicate that for the Buddha a person is able to consciously
plan and direct action. Being part of the eightfold path samma¯ -sankappa is
singled out as a function that can direct behavior toward non-harm and renunciation.
44 Cetana¯ is singled out as equally important when the Buddha declares that it
defines action with moral consequence (kamma).45 Denying intention, that is, the
ability to plan and deliberate action, would be similar to accepting the fatalistic doctrine
of Makkhali Gosala.

Mike