the great Nibbana = annihilation, eternal, or something else thread

[Alex123]

Hello Geoff,

Thank you for those sutta quotes. I did read them some time ago. Can you please explain to me the significance of them as you see it?

Why nāmarūpa is false is because it is Anicca. It changes, it doesn't remain the same. I do NOT believe that that quote says that nāmarūpa doesn't exist at all.
Reason why Nibbāna is true is because there isn't anything that changes and becomes otherwise.

For parinibbāna, Geoff & all, how do you interpret these two verses below?

With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all feelings, not being delighted in, will become cool right here; merebodily remains will be left." - SN12.51(1). Ven.BB Trans.
====
[Sariputta] how would you answer if you are thus asked: A monk, a worthy one, with no more mental effluents: what is he on the break-up of the body, after death?"
[Yamaka] "Thus asked, I would answer, 'Form is inconstant... Feeling... Perception... Fabrications... Consciousness is inconstant. That which is inconstant is stressful. That which is stressful has ceased and gone to its end."
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

With metta,

Alex

[mikenz66]

Hi 5heaps, Sobeh,

Are you saying that you think of the "Elements" as something akin to fundamental particles?

its a common notion

It's a sloppy generalization between two concepts developed to explain very different phenomena. Common or not, the notion is wholly flawed. If you wish to speak of elements (dhatu) at all, I think referring to Suttas is sufficient; recourse to scientific ontologies is simply inappropriate.

Tiltbillings has comment specifically about the "particle over interpretation" issue many times. Most recently in a similar context:

The Theravada does not necessarily teach "partless particles."

What else is it that you think it teaches?

Let me quote something I posted earlier in a different thread:
...
http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... =20#p89007" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

It seems to be common to take the Buddha's instructional method of slicing and dicing experience from different angles into aggregates, sense bases, elements, etc (not to mention the extensive elaborations to be found in the Abhidhamma) and take them as something that experience is built from, rather than as tools to analyse experience into.

Considering them as building blocks runs into some difficulties. For example, the "aggregate building blocks" and the "sense base building blocks" would have to be combinations of each other. They are, in my view easier to understand as being analogous to slicing a loaf in different directions.

Mike

[Vepacitta]

"There is no Bodhi Tree,
Nor stand of mirror bright,
Where all is void,
Where can the dust alighht?"

Hui-Neng, 6th Patriarch

Apologies to bring Cha'an into it but I do like this one and I think it's appropriate here.

If a person talks about this sort of thing too much - they start talking around self - even when they don't mean to.

We're so conditioned to think in terms of concepts, in terms of a 'thing', 'essence', 'that-ness', 'this-ness' - so when you start talking about 'what' is extinguished upon nibbana, or pari-nibbabana - that 'what' is the issue. It's inappropriate. It doesn't apply. So you get the Tathagata or Ven. Sariputta (and others) either remaining silent, or coming back with 'form is impermanent, etc etc' or 'form is non-self, etc etc' They just throw it back in one's face. It's measureless - and the wanting to quantify it leads one right down into attachment to a 'being' a 'selfi-ness' there.

What is it that's 'left' when all is quenched - only the arahants know - and they aren't talking. (and that favourite saying of mine is 'wrong' - as nothing really applies in this case).

Zennistically yours from Mt. Meru,

V.

[tiltbillings]

Are you saying that you think of the "Elements" as something akin to fundamental particles?

its a common notion

Yes. it is, but is not a notion characteristic of the suttas or even the Abhidhamm Pitaka. This has been pointed out to you more than once, but you continue to try to read very late Tibetan tenet stuff backwards into the Pali suttas and and Theravada in general, and in doing that you are simply, completely and totally wrong, incorrect, off base, not representing the the truth of the matter.

[Nyana]

I do NOT believe that that quote says that nāmarūpa doesn't exist at all.

Hi Alex,

I would suggest that the purpose of learning to see things according to conditional arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) is to learn to see how things work, not what things "are." And here we are better advised to follow the dhamma and look at our own mind. When I think a thought: "Nibbāna is _____________." What is the allure of this thought? What are the drawbacks of this thought? And what is the escape from this thought?

We each have to answer the first question for ourselves. But the drawbacks are that this thought is impermanent, subject to change, becoming otherwise, and therefore unsatisfactory. And by clearly seeing this and penetrating impermanence to the point of being able to abandon desire, infatuation, and craving for this line of thinking -- this, in this instance, is the escape from conditional arising.

For parinibbāna, Geoff & all, how do you interpret these two verses below?

With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all feelings, not being delighted in, will become cool right here; merebodily remains will be left." - SN12.51(1). Ven.BB Trans.

To paraphrase Ven. Ñāṇananda, it's not that an arahant gets half of nibbāna upon awakening, and the other half when s/he dies. Upon awakening they have already "gone out," they are "cool," and they have reached "the end." Even parinibbāna can be used to refer to a living arahant.

The dhamma isn't about some sort of thanatos desire to attain completion in the grave. It's about realizing "the end" here and now.

[Sariputta] how would you answer if you are thus asked: A monk, a worthy one, with no more mental effluents: what is he on the break-up of the body, after death?"

[Yamaka] "Thus asked, I would answer, 'Form is inconstant... Feeling... Perception... Fabrications... Consciousness is inconstant. That which is inconstant is stressful. That which is stressful has ceased and gone to its end."

This answer is sublime.

All the best,

Geoff

[Prasadachitta]

I would suggest that the purpose of learning to see things according to conditional arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) is to learn to see how things work, not what things "are." And here we are better advised to follow the dhamma and look at our own mind. When I think a thought: "Nibbāna is _____________." What is the allure of this thought? What are the drawbacks of this thought? And what is the escape from this thought?

We each have to answer the first question for ourselves. But the drawbacks are that this thought is impermanent, subject to change, becoming otherwise, and therefore unsatisfactory. And by clearly seeing this and penetrating impermanence to the point of being able to abandon desire, infatuation, and craving for this line of thinking -- this, in this instance, is the escape from conditional arising.

[Alex123]

Hi Geoff,

Hi Alex,
I would suggest that the purpose of learning to see things according to conditional arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) is to learn to see how things work, not what things "are." And here we are better advised to follow the dhamma and look at our own mind. When I think a thought: "Nibbāna is _____________." What is the allure of this thought? What are the drawbacks of this thought? And what is the escape from this thought?

I agree 100% regarding that the description of reality is to develop dispassion and let go of all clinging to that which was just dukkha. I agree that Dhamma is fully practical rather than dry philosophy.

As for Nibbāna, the right view on it is crucial. One must know the destination where one is going, and wrong views on it can, like in Yamaka's case, obstruct progress to stream entry. Unfortunately some people's views tend to betray the fact that they are clinging to some sort of survival (of what would for all intents and purposes be a subtle Self, even if it wasn't said so) when it occurs. I also do not approve of ideas that seem to suggest that this world is unreal and nibbana is real, this sounds too much like Advaita doctrine that has an idea of a Self hidden in it.

To paraphrase Ven. Ñāṇananda, it's not that an arahant gets half of nibbāna upon awakening, and the other half when s/he dies. Upon awakening they have already "gone out," they are "cool," and they have reached "the end." Even parinibbāna can be used to refer to a living arahant.

But the Buddha did talk about nibbāna with remainder and nibbāna without remainder. I also hope that there isn't an idea of permanent something that is being
implied.

The dhamma isn't about some sort of thanatos desire to attain completion in the grave. It's about realizing "the end" here and now.

Right, all mental suffering can be extinguished in this life. But the body will cease only at death, and prior to its death it can still grow old, becoming ill, experience extreme weather and extreme kāya-dukkha-vedanā

[Sariputta] how would you answer if you are thus asked: A monk, a worthy one, with no more mental effluents: what is he on the break-up of the body, after death?"

[Yamaka] "Thus asked, I would answer, 'Form is inconstant... Feeling... Perception... Fabrications... Consciousness is inconstant. That which is inconstant is stressful. That which is stressful has ceased and gone to its end."

This answer is sublime.

Please explain. I take those passages to mean that all dukkha ceases, and there isn't anything left. Not even "nothingness as something" left.

[Lazy_eye]

Hi Ñāṇa, and others,

Just wondering how Mahayana would address the questions raised in this thread. Where does tathagatagarbha enter into it?

It seems to me that, in an effort to counter nihilism, some Buddhists describe nibbana/nirvana as a special kind of consciousness-- understanding, of course, that to do so is to use the vocabulary of the conditioned world. This is an expedient means, not an absolute statement concerning the nature of nibbana (about which no statements can be made). However, in order to do this, logically we have to posit some sort of "fundamental ground" which is somehow outside conditioned consciousness.

So what I'm wondering is whether tathagatagarbha is an attempt to deal with the kinds of questions that have come up, for instance, in this thread. Similar to the way alaya-vinana was posited as a way to deal with logical problems arising from the (non)experience of cessation.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Alex,

As for Nibbāna, the right view on it is crucial. One must know the destination where one is going, and wrong views on it can, like in Yamaka's case, obstruct progress to stream entry.

Well, this is precisely the point... "one" doesn't "go" to nibbana, or parinibbana for that matter... neither do the aggregates "go" to nibbana. All dhammas are not-self and when that knowledge is actualized, there is, for all the reasons mentioned earlier about arahants having no measure etc., no grounds upon which an arahant would say they exist or don't exist in nibbana. They would no longer succumb to the polarity of claiming things exist or not. The arahant is no longer on any of the 31 planes of conditioned "existence", because they don't fall for that any more... they have transcended samsara.

If you see nibbana as a destination... what do you think goes there?

I also hope that there isn't an idea of permanent something that is being implied.

To me, it's quite clear that this isn't being implied and I don't quite understand why it keeps being raised.

Metta,
Retro.

[Alex123]

Greetings Alex,

If you see nibbana as a destination... what do you think goes there?

I repeat again. It is NOT a destination, just like an extingushed flame doesn't go anywhere, same when 5 aggregates cease and never rearise.

Nibbana = cessation (of suffering and all that can be unsatisfactory).


With metta,

Alex

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Alex,

It is NOT a destination, just like an extingushed flame doesn't go anywhere, same when 5 aggregates cease and never rearise.

Nibbana = cessation (of suffering and all that can be unsatisfactory).

Well said.

Metta,
Retro.

[5heaps]

Are you saying that you think of the "Elements" as something akin to fundamental particles?

its a common notion

Yes. it is, but is not a notion characteristic of the suttas or even the Abhidhamm Pitaka. This has been pointed out to you more than once, but you continue to try to read very late Tibetan tenet stuff backwards into the Pali suttas and and Theravada in general, and in doing that you are simply, completely and totally wrong, incorrect, off base, not representing the the truth of the matter.

its not "late tibetan tenet stuff", its straightforward abidharmakosha and all of indian buddhism 200AD onwards.

i think what you and mikenz66 say about the elements is very dangerous, since consciousness needs objects of engagement for its production. do you have any links or something that explain your position a bit more?

[mikenz66]

Hi 5heaps,

As Tilt pointed out in the link I gave above, http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... =20#p89007" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

The Theravada does not necessarily teach "partless particles."

(my colouring).

Clearly some Abhidhamma experts do interpret dhammas and elements in a very literal particle-like way, so I would not want to go so far as say that this is wrong but I don't think that it is necessary, and, as I said above, personally I find it most helpful to see the classifications in the Suttas and Abhidhamma as aids to analysis of experience.

So, there is room for discussion, and I'm certainly not convinced that anyone here can claim to have the "one true interpretation" of what exactly ceases on the attainment of Arahantship. This is a complex question that whole books have been written on and argued about...

Mike

[tiltbillings]

its a common notion

Yes. it is, but is not a notion characteristic of the suttas or even the Abhidhamm Pitaka. This has been pointed out to you more than once, but you continue to try to read very late Tibetan tenet stuff backwards into the Pali suttas and and Theravada in general, and in doing that you are simply, completely and totally wrong, incorrect, off base, not representing the the truth of the matter.

its not "late tibetan tenet stuff", its straightforward abidharmakosha and all of indian buddhism 200AD onwards.

Abhidharmakosha, but not Theravada. There is no justification for reading Sarvasitavada, especially as made static by the Tibetan tenet system, into the Theravada, which has a completely different set of Abhidhamma texts.

i think what you and mikenz66 say about the elements is very dangerous, since consciousness needs objects of engagement for its production. do you have any links or something that explain your position a bit more?

And these "objects" have to be little, itty bitty particles of self existing thingies? Is consciousness a particle? I don't think you have actually considered the quotes I have offered. Here is a response to this issue I posted earlier on this forum:

It is important to understand that Buddhism (here meaning Theravada) is not doing science. It is not commenting on the nature of the “external” world. It is dealing with what is experienced. A “fundamental particle” of experience is hardly an unchanging, unconditioned thing. It is a way of talking about the flow of experience that our senses can give us which we can call this or that.

Ven Nyanamoli in a footnote in his PATH OF PURIFICATION, pages 317-8, states: "In the Pitakas the word sabhaava seems to appear only once...," it appears several times in Milindapanha, and it is used quite a bit in the PoP and it commentaries. He states it often roughly corresponds to dhaatu, element and to lakkhana, characteristic. An interesting passage from the PoP reads:

"On the contrary, before their rise [the bases, aayatana] they had no individual essence [sabhaava], and after their fall their individual essence are completely dissolved. And they occur without mastery [being exercisable over them] since they exist in dependence on conditions and in between the past and the future." Page 551 XV 15.

Piatigorsky (In his study of the Pitaka Abhidhamma texts, THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT, p 182) puts it: “From the point of view of consciousness, it can be said that, when consciousness is conscious of one’s mind, thought, or consciousness directed to their objects, then it is ‘being conscious of’ that may be named ‘a state of consciousness’ or a dharma.”

Piatigorsky (THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT, p 146) explains: “the meaning of each abhidhammic term [dhamma] consists (or is the sum) of all its positional meanings and of all positional meanings of its connotations.”

Nyanaponika quotes a sub-commentary to an Abhidhamma text: "There is no other thing than the quality borne by it." (na ca dhaariyamma-sabhaavaa an~n~o dhammo naama atthi). Abhidhamma Studies, page 40. Which is to say: We simpy cannot say that 'a dharma is... (a predicate follows)', because a dharma, in fact, 'is' no thing, yet [it is] a term denoting (not being) a certain relation or type of relation to thought, consciousness or mind. That is, dharma is not a concept in the accepted terminological sense of the latter, but a purely relational notion. -- Piatigorsky, THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT, page 181.

By arranging the mental factors in relational groups a subordinate synthetical element has been introduced into the mainly analytical Dhammasangani. By so doing, the danger inherent in purely analytical methods is avoided. This danger consists in erroneously taking for genuine separate entities the “parts” resulting from analysis, instead of restricting their use to sound practical method with the purpose of classifying and dissolving composite events wrongly conceived as unities. Up to the present time it has been a regular occurrence in the history of physics, metaphysics, and psychology that when the “whole” has been successfully dissolved by analysis, the resultant “parts” themselves come in turn to be regarded as little “wholes.”

In the Pali tradition it is only for the sake of definition and description that each dhamma is postulated as if it were a separate entity; but in reality it is by no means a solitary phenomenon having an existence of its own. . . . If this Abhidhammic view of existence, as seen from its doctrine of dhammas, cannot be interpreted as a radical pluralism, neither can it be interpreted as an out-and-out monism. For what are called dhammas -- the component factors of the universe, both within us and outside us -- are not fractions of an absolute unity but a multiplicity of co-ordinate factors. They are not reducible to, nor do they emerge from, a single reality, the fundamental postulate of monistic metaphysics. If they are to be interpreted as phenomena, this should be done with the proviso that they are phenomena with no corresponding noumena, no hidden underlying ground. For they are not manifestations of some mysterious metaphysical substratum, but processes taking place due to the interplay of a multitude of conditions.

"'They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature [sabhaava]. They are dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld according to their own nature' (Asl.39). Here 'own-nature' would mean characteristic nature, which is not something inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arise due to the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurrences of that dhamma. This is of significance as it makes the Mahayana critique of the Sarvastivadin's notion of own-nature largely irrelevant to the Theravada."

"The most significant new idea in the commentaries is the definition of a 'principle' or element (dharma): dharmas are what have (or 'hold', 'maintain', dhr. is the nearest equivalent in the language to the English 'have') their own own-nature (svabhaava). It is added that they naturally have this through conditions."

Dhammas are "ultimate things" only as a way of talking about aspects of the relational flow of experience, not in terms of describing static realities. In other words, dhammas are empty of self.

In other words Dhp 279: "All dhammas are not-self", which is to say: empty of any self existing, particly thingyness.

[5heaps]

as I said above, personally I find it most helpful to see the classifications in the Suttas and Abhidhamma as aids to analysis of experience.

ive seen that quote a few times. is there more? every time i see it it always strikes me as being somewhat confused -- it confuses me.

for example Tilt says "It is important to understand that Buddhism (here meaning Theravada) is not doing science. It is not commenting on the nature of the “external” world. It is dealing with what is experienced. A “fundamental particle” of experience is hardly an unchanging, unconditioned thing. It is a way of talking about the flow of experience that our senses can give us which we can call this or that."

he says buddhism not addressing the nature of the external world. then he talks about physical and mental ultimates not being unchanging and unconditioned.

who says theyre unchanging and unconditioned? how does their lack of being unchanging and unconditioned make them nonultimates? if it doesnt, why cant they be physical ultimates?