Samatha v. vipassana?

[cooran]

Hi Retro,

Do you think that concepts lie outside the five aggregates of clinging? If so, where? If not, what makes them different?

I'm not completely sure, but without thinking too hard, I am inclined to say that the concepts perhaps are not aggregates, which I take to be basically properties of phenomena, as Ven Nyanatiloka explains http://what-buddha-said.net/library/Bud ... tm#khandha" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Presumably we'd agree that "body" is not an aggregate. It can be analysed into hardness, etc.. I believe that the same probably applies to concepts.

Anyway, I don't have anything new to say. As I said, this reality/concept thing is quite clear in the Abhidhamma, commentaries, and modern teachings. Exactly how much of it can be deduced just from the Suttas is something you might find interesting to pursue (there are probably some good essays on it somewhere).

Mike

Hello Mike and Paul,

Perhaps this booklet and article by K. Sujin and Nina van Gorkom may be of assistance. You'll need to scroll downwards:

9. Realities and Concepts by Sujin Boriharnwanaket
10. Understanding Reality by Nina van Gorkom (7 page article)
http://www.zolag.co.uk/ebook.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

with metta
Chris

[pt1]

Can you point to a Sutta passage where there is contemplation on concepts leading to (deep) insight?

The various aspects of concepts fall into the perception, formations and consciousness aggregates. The sutta passage you cite above lists all 3.

Do you think that concepts lie outside the five aggregates of clinging? If so, where? If not, what makes them different?

Afaik, concepts or aspects of concepts are not said to fall under any aggregates or outside them because they are said to be illusory. Thinking on the other hand would fall under aggregates - i.e. these would be dhammas involved - citta, sanna, manasikara, etc.

However, I would take that to mean that one discerns that concepts (and various other formations) arise and cease, one does not focus on the content of those concepts.

This is true of all the five aggregates, whether later materials classify them as "pannatti" or "paramattha". Perhaps by classifying them thus you are actually "focus[ing] on the content of those" aggregates and overlaying a level of conceptual proliferation over them, rather than simply observing the process?

We've discussed this several times before retro if you remember - it goes down to how the process of cognition is explained in abhidhamma/commentaries - the first mind-door process has a dhamma as the object of citta, which is then followed by more mind-door door processes that have a certain nimitta (concept) as the object of citta - and through many of these processes it can be said that the mind cognizes a simple thing such as 'hardndess' or 'mindfuleness'. Afaik, Mahasia sayadaw, Ledi sayadaw and other teachers that Mike considers authoritative, all support this explanation of the process of cognition.

So, insight is not about stopping thinking - thinking is a part of how things are. In my understanding, it's about whether wisdom of sufficient depth accompanies the citta or not. If it does, there would be awareness of a dhamma (like hardness) during that first mind-door process - and this would be insight. If it doesn't, there would be only "awareness" of nimittas (concepts) which come in the following mind-door processes - so this would be just thinking, not insight yet. Though as we also discussed before, thinking and pondering in the right way is also important in the way that it prepares the ground for insight to happen.

Is the Sujinite method of demonizing pannatti the best way to understand the characteristics of the entire loka of experience?

Aside from not being very nice, this is also a strawman. Besides, I'm pretty sure Mike is a Mahasi Sayadaw school student.

Presumably you can read it differently, but in the end, the important question is: "What is actually effective for awakening?"

What did you make of Dhammavuddho Thero's answer to your question?

I too failed to see how it was related exactly?

What did you make of The Buddha's answer to your question in the Simsapa Sutta?

Perhaps you can explain how you understand Simsapa sutta to relate to your POV? Imo, at the moment is seems to speak more in support of what Mike was saying.

Best wishes

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Some related scripture...

SN 35.23: Sabba Sutta
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"Monks, I will teach you the All. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak."

"As you say, lord," the monks responded.

The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range."

From MN 1 Mūlapariyāya Sutta...
http://www.yellowrobe.com/component/con ... sutta.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

2. “Bhikkhus, I shall teach you a discourse on the root of all things. [2] Listen and attend closely to what I shall say.” –- “Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

[2] Sabbadhammanmūlapariyāya. MṬ explains that the word “all” (sabba) is being used here in the restricted sense of the “all of personal identity” (sakkāyasabba), that is, with reference to all states or phenomena (dhammā) comprised within the five aggregates affected by clinging (see MN 28.4). Supramundane states – the paths, fruits, and Nibbāna – are excluded. The “root of all things” – that is, the special condition that maintains the continuity of the process of repeated existence – MṬ explains to be craving, conceit, and views (which are the underlying springs of “conceiving”), and these in turn are underlaid by ignorance, suggested in the sutta by the phrase “he has not fully understood it.”

So not only are concepts (like views, and "I") part of the aggregates, they're the very foundation of conceiving. They are the root of all things!

Here, bhikkhus, an untaught ordinary person, who has no regard for noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who has no regard for true men and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, perceives x as x. Having perceived x as x [3], he conceives [himself as] x, he conceives [himself] in x, he conceives [himself apart] from x, he conceives x to be ‘mine,’ he delights in x [4]. Why is that? Because he has not fully understood it, I say.

The "x" used above is a variable, which is replaced by earth, water, fire, air, beings, gods, Pajapati, Brahma and so on through a whole of things from which conceiving can arise. The full sutta and footnotes are interesting and can be found via the link above.

Metta,
Retro.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings pt1,

Afaik, concepts or aspects of concepts are not said to fall under any aggregates or outside them because they are said to be illusory.

All aggregates (aspects of experience) are equally illusory. By putting concepts outside of this range you are "'Repudiating this All, I will describe another", like the SN 35.23: Sabba Sutta I quoted above. How could verbal communication between people, on any subject let alone the Dhamma, take place in the absence of an (approximately) shared set of concepts within each other's loka of experience?

I too failed to see how it [Dhammavuddho Thero's answer] was related exactly?

Mike asked about attainment of nobility/arya through the use of concepts. The Discourses are communicated to people via concepts. Contemplation of the Discourses leads to stream-entry. Hearers of the Dhamma are known as Savakas (hearers).

Speaking of range, hearing and such... here's a relevant extract from...

MN 28: Maha-hatthipadopama Sutta
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"Now if internally the intellect is intact but externally ideas do not come into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally the intellect is intact and externally ideas come into range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. But when internally the intellect is intact and externally ideas come into range, and there is a corresponding engagement, then there is the appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness.

... more evidence that concepts are within the domain of mind-consciousness... thus they are dhammas, thus the experience of them is anicca, anatta and dukkha.

Perhaps you can explain how you understand Simsapa sutta to relate to your POV? Imo, at the moment is seems to speak more in support of what Mike was saying.

The Buddha did not differentiate between "pannatti" or "paramattha". Even though he knew things that went beyond the scope of what he taught, he taught only that which was connected to the cessation of suffering. Its omission from the Suttas draws questions as to whether acknowledging or utilising the split is genuinely conducive to the cessation of suffering. Of course, if you took the Abhidhamma Pitaka to be the actual explicit teaching of the Buddha (rather than a later systemisation of it) then this argument would hold no sway. I concede that. That's why I often say things are often to be discerned by individuals for themselves in accord their their own understanding, logic, experience and what they take to be authorative. What is a satisfactory answer for one, will not necessarily be satisfactory for another.

Metta,
Retro.

[pt1]

Greetings pt1,
...

Thanks for explaining retro. There's a number of issues you raise that I think needs addressing, but I'm a bit short on time, so will try to answer in the evening or tomorrow morning at the latest.

Best wishes

[retrofuturist]

No worries, pt1.

Metta,
Retro.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings pt1,

Is the Sujinite method of demonizing pannatti the best way to understand the characteristics of the entire loka of experience?

Aside from not being very nice, this is also a strawman. Besides, I'm pretty sure Mike is a Mahasi Sayadaw school student.

I didn't say Mike held that view, but having been exposed to the views of people at Dhamma Study Group, you both know what kind of activity I'm talking about. Thankfully, it seems to only be followers of Sujin Boriharnwanaket who come out with this kind of logic, and not Sujin Boriharnwanaket herself. (from pages 20-21 of resource Cooran linked to above...)

Q: How can we do away with concepts?

S.: That is not possible. However, one should understand
correctly that, when one knows that there are beings,
people, or things, there are at such moments mind-door
process cittas which have a concept as object.

Yes, concept as object... just yet another object which is anicca, anatta and dukkha. In fact, it's probably one of the more important ones (rather than one to be shunted aside) since this is where the false perception of self hides. As conceptualisation underlies craving, conceit, and views it is indeed "the root of all things". So what if a spoon is not "ultimately" a spoon? So what if a grape not "ultimately" a grape? This matters not a jot in comparison to that which is the basis of the false perception of self.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

Yes, concept as object... just yet another object which is anicca, anatta and dukkha. In fact, it's probably one of the more important ones (rather than one to be shunted aside) since this is where the false perception of self hides. As conceptualisation underlies craving, conceit, and views it is indeed "the root of all things". So what if a spoon is not "ultimately" a spoon? So what if a grape not "ultimately" a grape? This matters not a jot in comparison to that which is the basis of the false perception of self.

Just to be clear, no one has said that concepts could not be objects of citta. In jhana the objects are generally concepts. I said that they could not be objects that arouse vipassana.

Mike

[tiltbillings]

Just to be clear, no one has said that concepts could not be objects of citta. In jhana the objects are generally concepts. I said that they could not be objects that arouse vipassana.

Is the experience of a concept the experience of a dhamma?

[mikenz66]

Hi Retro,

From MN 1 Mūlapariyāya Sutta...
http://www.yellowrobe.com/component/con ... sutta.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

2. “Bhikkhus, I shall teach you a discourse on the root of all things. [2] Listen and attend closely to what I shall say.” –- “Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

[2] Sabbadhammanmūlapariyāya. MṬ explains that the word “all” (sabba) is being used here in the restricted sense of the “all of personal identity” (sakkāyasabba), that is, with reference to all states or phenomena (dhammā) comprised within the five aggregates affected by clinging (see MN 28.4). Supramundane states – the paths, fruits, and Nibbāna – are excluded. The “root of all things” – that is, the special condition that maintains the continuity of the process of repeated existence – MṬ explains to be craving, conceit, and views (which are the underlying springs of “conceiving”), and these in turn are underlaid by ignorance, suggested in the sutta by the phrase “he has not fully understood it.”

So not only are concepts (like views, and "I") part of the aggregates, they're the very foundation of conceiving. They are the root of all things!

I think that you are mixing things up here. Being "the root of all things" does not make views aggregates, it makes them a condition.

Mike

[mikenz66]

Hi Tilt,

Just to be clear, no one has said that concepts could not be objects of citta. In jhana the objects are generally concepts. I said that they could not be objects that arouse vipassana.

Is the experience of a concept the experience of a dhamma?

Not a paramattha dhamma, as far as I understand it. The Abhidhamma analysis of concepts (at least at the commentarial level) is on page 325 of A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma.
VIII 29

Therein, the material phenomena are just the aggregate of matter. Conciousness and mental factors, which comprise the four immaterial aggregates, and nibbana, are the five kinds that are immaterial. The are also called "name".

What remains are concepts, which are twofold: concept as that which is made known [i.e. a meaning], and concept as that which makes known [i.e. names something].

Mike

[tiltbillings]

Not a paramattha dhamma,

As a dhamma, its nature is?

[mikenz66]

Hi Tilt,

Not a paramattha dhamma,

As a dhamma, its nature is?

Sorry, I'm getting to the limit of my knowledge here. Perhaps you could tell us?

Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Mike,

I think that you are mixing things up here. Being "the root of all things" does not make views aggregates, it makes them a condition.

What can I say... I'm surprised you even conceive of some element or property of conditioned experience which falls outside of the loka of the five aggregates. Views are sankharas and can be the object of (mind) consciousness. Even Bhikkhu Bodhi says...

These five aggregates exhaust our psychophysical existence. Any event, any occurrence, any element in the mind-body process can be put into one of these five aggregates. There is nothing in this whole experiential process that lies outside them.

Source: http://www.beyondthenet.net/dhamma/fiveAggregates.htm" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

The Buddha's explanation is as follows...

SN 22.48: Khandha Sutta
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

At Savatthi. There the Blessed One said, "Monks, I will teach you the five aggregates & the five clinging-aggregates. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak."

"As you say, lord," the monks responded.

The Blessed One said, "Now what, monks, are the five aggregates?

"Whatever form is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of form.

"Whatever feeling is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of feeling.

"Whatever perception is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of perception.

"Whatever (mental) fabrications are past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: those are called the aggregate of fabrications.

"Whatever consciousness is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of consciousness.

"These are called the five aggregates.

"And what are the five clinging-aggregates?

"Whatever form — past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near — is clingable, offers sustenance, and is accompanied with mental fermentation: that is called form as a clinging-aggregate.

"Whatever feeling — past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near — is clingable, offers sustenance, and is accompanied with mental fermentation: that is called feeling as a clinging-aggregate.

"Whatever perception — past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near — is clingable, offers sustenance, and is accompanied with mental fermentation: that is called perception as a clinging-aggregate.

"Whatever (mental) fabrications — past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near — are clingable, offer sustenance, and are accompanied with mental fermentation: those are called fabrications as a clinging-aggregate.

"Whatever consciousness — past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near — is clingable, offers sustenance, and is accompanied with mental fermentation: that is called consciousness as a clinging-aggregate.

"These are called the five clinging-aggregates."

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

Hi Retro,

I don't know what else to say. Did you read the quote from CMA? If you don't like the Abhidhamma-based description, that's fine. Just ignore it.

However, It seems to me that you are thinking of aggregates as little building blocks. And also the result of putting the blocks together. I don't think either of those is correct, most especially the second. However, I'm at the limit of my knowledge here, so don't look to me to clarify it.

http://what-buddha-said.net/library/Bud ... tm#khandha" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Some writers on Buddhism who have not understood that the five khandha are just classificatory groupings, have conceived them as compact entities 'heaps', 'bundles', while actually, as stated above, the groups never exist as such, i.e. they never occur in a simultaneous totality of all their constituents. Also those single constituents of a group which are present in any given body-and-mind process, are of an evanescent nature, and so also their varying combinations. Feeling, perception and mental constructions are only different aspects and functions of a single unit of consciousness. They are to consciousness what redness, softness, sweetness, etc. are to an apple and have as little separate existence as those qualities.

Here is a question for you: Is "body" or "woman" an aggregate? Clearly I understand the answer to be "no".

Mike