tiltbillings wrote:5heaps wrote:not something inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality" just means that things "arise due to the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurrences of that dhamma", which mahayana emptiness has no problem with. What mahayana has a problem with is the very notion of "characteristic nature".
Why?
5heaps wrote:Because as Arya Nagarjuna argues, asserting characteristic natures creates ridiculous implications, which illustrates a further voidness of an impossible manner of existence much in the same way that an enduring own essence did.
You show no evidence that the Theravada is talking about “
characteristic natures” the same way Nagarjuna is using it. Also, you have told us what Nagarjuna asserts, but you have done so without presenting a carefully reasoned argument. As it stands, so far, what you have said is mere, unsupported assertion. And also, keep in mind Nagarjuna is not recognized as an authority within the Theravada, so what he says carries no weight. You will need to make your argument from a basis that the Theravada recognizes, which is consistent with traditional Buddhist debating standards.
An example of this further illustration is analyzing one's hand in order to try and find the hand. One of the ridiculous implications this debunks is the innate notion that there is a standalone independently appearing hand (the object that the word 'hand' refers to) which is the object of engagement by humans, dogs, cats, cattle, titans etc alike. But, this is very subtle and needs to be properly understood after years of training under a qualified teacher.
The Theravada, as has been carefully pointed out, does not ever assert “that there is a standalone independently appearing hand.”
If you are trying to make a point here,
you need to make the point.
Dhammas uphold their own nature because they uphold a characteristic nature. To say there is no such thing as a characteristic nature is to deny dhammas altogether. So it would seem that mahayana emptiness is actually nihilism, because that's exactly what they deny.
Read the Heart Sutra lately? What is the nature of
characteristic nature according the Theravada?
The punchline however is that although they deny such characteristic natures entirely it does not mean that they deny commonsense objects and characteristics such as the ones we are continuously experiencing all around us.
You are not being clear here at all. Again, you seem to reading a prasanghika critique as being applicable to the Theravada without establishing that the Theravada even uses the terminology the same way the the Madhyamaka does. You seem to assume that it does, but assumption is not enough.
This is because their actual mode of existence (emptiness) actually manages to establish commonsense objects whilst uniquely maintaining the position of being completely free of bad views (ie. even a slight logical, empirical, observable etc contradiction or fault).
So you assert, but this statement actually makes no sense as written.