A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

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mal4mac
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mal4mac »

Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:Phassa, 'contact', is defined ... as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness...
I'm not sure I get this.

According to modern science "a collection of photons" (form?) collides with the retina ( eye?). Then, nerve impulses are conducted to the brain and "consciousness" (eye-consciousness?) arises.

OK, maybe I do get this.

'Contact' is a combination of (i) the collection of photons emanating from the tree ('form'), (ii) the photons impact on the retina ('eye') (iii) consciousness of the tree (eye consciousness.

If any of these steps are missing we don't have contact - if the photons aren't emitted then obviously there's nothing to see, if the eye doesn't see them then no contact can take place, and if the guy's sleeping then the tree doesn't arise in consciousness, so no real contact has taken place.

Am I on the right track here?
- Mal
SarathW
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by SarathW »

Only the eye and the object should be there.
Consciousness is in the middle. (consciousness arise as a result)
If the person is sleeping or dead, it is considered that there is no eye.
It may helpful, If you read the operation of seventeen thought moment as per Abhidhamma.
Last edited by SarathW on Wed Aug 26, 2015 10:52 am, edited 1 time in total.
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mal4mac
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mal4mac »

Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote: But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.[a]
Yes that makes sense in my model - how can the photons be contacting the eye-consciousness directly! "Contact", as I see it, is simply those three things happening close together in time.

Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote: phassa is understood as 'contact between subject and object'.
Fair enough - if you (subject) see a tree (object) then obviously it makes sense to say there is contact between you and the tree.
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote: The ditthisampanna ... sees that ... with perception of impermanence ... 'things are mine' gives place to just 'things are' ... and 'I am' vanishes ... then, there continue to be 'objects' in the sense of 'things'; but if 'objects' are understood as necessarily correlative to a 'subject', then 'things' can no longer be called 'objects'...
Consider our tree to be such an object. Then why would we consider the tree as "necessarily correlative to a subject"? If I drag Fred into the garden and say, "What's that?" He will say, "a tree". So the tree is not correlative to me, the subject, but to two subjects, Fred and me. Therefore, the tree is an *objective* fact. So I can't see how, or why, I should accept Nanavira's demand to understand 'objects' "as necessarily correlative to a 'subject'".
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mal4mac
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mal4mac »

SarathW wrote:Only the eye and the object should be there.
So I'm not allowed to think of photons? :(
Consciousness is in the middle...
?

How about this 'no photon' model - the tree has a 'form' "taken in" by the 'eye', and 'eye consciousness' of the tree arises.

Can I imagine that 'taken in' happens through photons, light rays, or light waves? Just for ease of understanding? I mean forms have to have some kind of physical existence to make contact, don't they?
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mikenz66
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mikenz66 »

I don't think that photons were part of the ancient Indian vocabulary. In fact, I think that until relatively recently sight was thought of as a "contact", much like touch.

However, I think this may be a useful insight into what Ven N was trying to get across:
mal4mac wrote:
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote: But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.[a]
Yes that makes sense in my model - how can the photons be contacting the eye-consciousness directly! "Contact", as I see it, is simply those three things happening close together in time.
:anjali:
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mal4mac
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mal4mac »

mikenz66 wrote:I don't think that photons were part of the ancient Indian vocabulary.
Of course, I'm just trying to capture the concept in a model that I understand.
In fact, I think that until relatively recently sight was thought of as a "contact", much like touch.
How could they think of it as being 'like touch'? I mean how do they explain not being able to see the tree at night? How does the sun get involved in this 'sight-touch' mechanism? Are you not perhaps reading too much into the term 'contact' as applied to sight? Could it be that the Buddha just didn't go into the physical mechanism? Or is there a sutta which explains his theory of light?

Wikipedia:

"In ancient India, the philosophical schools of Samkhya and Vaisheshika, from around the 6th–5th century BC, developed theories on light... Light rays are taken to be a stream of high velocity tejas (fire) atoms."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_optics" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Sounds a bit like photons...
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acinteyyo
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by acinteyyo »

mal4mac wrote: Can I imagine that 'taken in' happens through photons, light rays, or light waves? Just for ease of understanding? I mean forms have to have some kind of physical existence to make contact, don't they?
It would be better not to mix up different approaches. Here, especially with the writings of Ven. Ñānavīra, you are supposed to try to understand the issues by applying it to your direct experience, i.e. phenomenologically. Imagining what happens, by deduction, is not the right approach.
Have you ever seen a photon? A photon is a scientific concept, valid in a scientific frame of reference only.
With respect to "phassa", photons as a scientific concept do not play a significant role.
As long as you are trying to imagine this process, "just for ease of understanding", you are actually not observing your experience, you rather ponder an imagination of how experience might happen and if you go on trying to understand things like that you will most probably miss the point.

best wishes, acinteyyo
Thag 1.20. Ajita - I do not fear death; nor do I long for life. I’ll lay down this body, aware and mindful.
mal4mac
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mal4mac »

acinteyyo wrote:... try to understand the issues by applying it to your direct experience, i.e. phenomenologically.
So using Nanavira's terminology (contact, eye, form, eye consciousness...) how would you describe the experience of seeing a tree?
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acinteyyo
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by acinteyyo »

mal4mac wrote:
acinteyyo wrote:... try to understand the issues by applying it to your direct experience, i.e. phenomenologically.
So using Nanavira's terminology (contact, eye, form, eye consciousness...) how would you describe the experience of seeing a tree?
In general terms, as "natures" (dhammā) of the experience, seeing a tree is simply the eye and form, eye consciousness, the coming together of the three is contact, feeling and perception, with contact accompanied by ignorance there is craving and so on. This is the description of the experience. Anything else is a deviation from the nature of the experience.

What has to be done is to apply this description to one's own experience, let it be "seeing a tree" or anything else, the nature of it is all the same, and to directly see it, meaning understanding what happens.

Any attempt to understand this by imagining an explanation, however coherent it may be, is a deviation from the actual experience and will not lead to discernment.

best wishes, acinteyyo
Thag 1.20. Ajita - I do not fear death; nor do I long for life. I’ll lay down this body, aware and mindful.
mal4mac
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mal4mac »

acinteyyo wrote: In general terms, as "natures" (dhammā) of the experience, seeing a tree is simply the eye and form, eye consciousness, the coming together of the three is contact, feeling and perception, with contact accompanied by ignorance there is craving and so on.
So what is the "form". Would using Kantian terminology, and transcendental idealism, help at all in understanding this material? Is the "form of the tree" the "tree as noumenal object". That is is the "form of the tree" the tree "out there" that we can say nothing about because we haven't, and cannot, experience it?
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

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acinteyyo
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by acinteyyo »

mal4mac wrote:So what is the "form".
"Form" (rūpa) is the four great elements, according to the Buddha, but I'm sure that will not help you any further, because you seem to be looking for an explanation you can grasp intellectually. "Form" cannot be understood that way, this is what I'm trying to point out to you. You've come to a point where more words won't bring you clearer understanding, you have to search for the answer what "form" is within your experience. There it is.
mal4mac wrote:Would using Kantian terminology, and transcendental idealism, help at all in understanding this material?
I don't know. Maybe it is useful as a hint.
mal4mac wrote:Is the "form of the tree" the "tree as noumenal object". That is is the "form of the tree" the tree "out there" that we can say nothing about because we haven't, and cannot, experience it?
You approach it from the wrong side. There is no "form of the tree" and there is no tree "out there".
Form does not belong to the tree, but the tree belongs to form. The tree is derived from the experience of form (among other experiences).

I'll try to give you a hint that points to that part in experience where you have to take a closer look at.
The four great elements (mahā bhūta) are earth, water, fire and wind. These elements describe certain experiences. Earth for example is a description for an experience of hardness or resistence one could say. If you experience hardness (earth) as a tactile sensation and examine the whole experience further also taking information of the other senses into account, you may arrive at the conclusion of touching a tree.
BUT it is not a "real tree out there" you are touching, to think that exceeds beyond the sphere of experience, where actually no statement can be made, what you DO know is the experience of form (here earth) and anything derived from form is also nothing but form.

I hope you can follow my poor attempt to give you a hint.
And I hope I don't deviate too far from the topic.

best wishes, acinteyyo
Thag 1.20. Ajita - I do not fear death; nor do I long for life. I’ll lay down this body, aware and mindful.
mal4mac
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by mal4mac »

Thanks acinteyyo, your points are interesting, even though I struggle to understand, not having much knowledge in this area.

Would it be correct to say, "A form is a particular experience"? Or is the usage "a form" just plain wrong here. That is should I be saying, "I experience form, and that particular experience of form, leads to the conclusion 'tree'".
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acinteyyo
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

Post by acinteyyo »

mal4mac wrote:Would it be correct to say, "A form is a particular experience"? Or is the usage "a form" just plain wrong here.
"A form" is not plain wrong, but yes, it can lead to confusion if it is regarded as an absolute or independent "thing" somehow.
Any form, internal or external is just form. I recommend getting acquainted with the meaning of rūpa, nāma and the compound nāmarūpa.
Here some links to the shorter notes on rūpa and nāma. Maybe the shorter notes on dhamma are also helpful.

best wishes, acinteyyo
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SDC
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Re: A Review of Ven. Ñānavīra's "Notes on Dhamma"

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Please refer to this post for information on the purpose of this thread.

Shorter Notes - 17th Excerpt
Previous Excerpts - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16

DHAMMA
Ven. Ñāṇavīra wrote:The word dhamma, in its most general sense, is equivalent to 'thing'—i.e. whatever is distinct from anything else (see ANICCA). More precisely it is what a thing is in itself, as opposed to how it is;[a] it is the essence or nature of a thing—that is, a thing as a particular essence or nature distinct from all other essences or natures. Thus, if a thing is a solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I now see, its nature is, precisely, that it is solid, that it is pleasant, that it is shady, that it is a tree for lying under, and that it is visible to me. The solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see is a thing, a nature, a dhamma. Furthermore, each item severally—the solidity, the pleasantness, the shadiness, and so on—is a thing, a nature, a dhamma, in that each is distinct from the others, even though here they may not be independent of one another. These dhammā, in the immediate experience, are all particular. When, however, the reflexive attitude is adopted (as it is in satisampajañña, the normal state of one practising the Dhamma), the particular nature—the solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see—is, as it were, 'put in brackets' (Husserl's expression, though not quite his meaning of it), and we arrive at the nature of the particular nature. Instead of solid, pleasant, shady, tree for lying under, visible to me, and so on, we have matter (or substance), feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness, and all the various 'things' that the Suttas speak of. These things are of universal application—i.e. common to all particular natures (e.g. eye- consciousness is common to all things that have ever been, or are, or will be, visible to me)—and are the dhammā that make up the Dhamma. The Dhamma is thus the Nature of Things. And since this is what the Buddha teaches, it comes to mean also the Teaching, and dhammā are particular teachings. The word matter—'I will bear this matter in mind'—sometimes expresses the meaning of dhamma (though it will not do as a normal rendering).

Sabbe sankhārā aniccā; Sabbe sankhārā dukkhā; Sabbe dhammā anattā. ('All determinations are impermanent; All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering); All things are not-self.') Attā, 'self', is fundamentally a notion of mastery over things (cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> & Khandha Samy. vi,7 <S.iii,66>[7]). But this notion is entertained only if it is pleasurable,[c] and it is only pleasurable provided the mastery is assumed to be permanent; for a mastery—which is essentially a kind of absolute timelessness, an unmoved moving of things—that is undermined by impermanence is no mastery at all, but a mockery. Thus the regarding of a thing, a dhamma, as attā or 'self' can survive for only so long as the notion gives pleasure, and it only gives pleasure for so long as that dhamma can be considered as permanent (for the regarding of a thing as 'self' endows it with the illusion of a kind of super-stability in time). In itself, as a dhamma regarded as attā, its impermanence is not manifest (for it is pleasant to consider it as permanent); but when it is seen to be dependent upon other dhammā not considered to be permanent, its impermanence does then become manifest. To see impermanence in what is regarded as attā, one must emerge from the confines of the individual dhamma itself and see that it depends on what is impermanent. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) aniccā is said, meaning 'All things that things (dhammā) depend on are impermanent'. A given dhamma, as a dhamma regarded as attā, is, on account of being so regarded, considered to be pleasant; but when it is seen to be dependent upon some other dhamma that, not being regarded as attā, is manifestly unpleasurable (owing to the invariable false perception of permanence, of super-stability, in one not free from asmimāna), then its own unpleasurableness becomes manifest. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) dukkhā is said. When this is seen—i.e. when perception of permanence and pleasure is understood to be false --, the notion 'This dhamma is my attā' comes to an end, and is replaced by sabbe dhammā anattā. Note that it is the sotāpanna who, knowing and seeing that his perception of permanence and pleasure is false, is free from this notion of 'self', though not from the more subtle conceit '(I) am' (asmimāna);[d] but it is only the arahat who is entirely free from the (false) perception of permanence and pleasure, and 'for him' perception of impermanence is no longer unpleasurable. (See also A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §12 & PARAMATTHA SACCA.)
“Life is swept along, short is the life span; no shelters exist for one who has reached old age. Seeing clearly this danger in death, a seeker of peace should drop the world’s bait.” SN 1.3
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