Is Theravada "Realist"?

[chownah]

I'm not suggesting rejection.....
I think that the view that there is an objective reality is wrong view....I think that the view that there is no objective reality is wrong view....I think that we should have no doctrine of objective reality in that it is beyond range and also because it is my view that the Buddha teaches that our views on the existence of an objective reality are projection of delusional self externally....a reference to support this is:

"Then, Bahiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that. When there is no you in terms of that, there is no you there. When there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the two. This, just this, is the end of suffering." -Ud 1.10

chownah

[alan]

Of course, we all know the Buddha would have walked away from a discussion like this.

[Sylvester]

Dear Sylvester,

I think I would accept that a kaya can exist without mental factors, but I'm not sure if the sutta-s would say that rupakhandha can exist without the the rest of the khandhas.

Is what planet Earth made of included in rūpakkhandha? Before there were any sentient beings on earth, did earth exist? Or did is somehow magically appear with the appearance of conscious beings?

Rather than planet earth we can include other planets, stars, etc. We could even include a case of when a person accidentally trips on a rock. He certainly wasn't aware of it until after the fall to the ground! So the rock had to have mind-independent existence.

Dear Alex

The external ayatanas (sense objects) are clearly "out there". While they may have "rupa", we're really talking about rupakhandha and not the externals. If the external ayatanas were equivalent to rupakhandha, MN 28 would not have gone through the trouble of seperating them via the distinction of whether contact was present or absent.

Now if internally the [insert indriya] is intact but externally [insert external ayatana] do not come into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally the [insert indriya] is intact and externally [insert external ayatana] come into range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. But when internally the [insert indriya] is intact and externally [insert external ayatana] come into range, and there is a corresponding engagement, then there is the appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. (all 6 indriyas and ayatanas are addressed)

"The form of what has thus come into being is gathered under the form clinging-aggregate. The feeling of what has thus come into being is gathered under the feeling clinging-aggregate. The perception of what has thus come into being is gathered under the perception clinging-aggregate. The fabrications of what has thus come into being are gathered under the fabrication clinging-aggregate. The consciousness of what has thus come into being is gathered under the consciousness clinging-aggregate. One discerns, 'This, it seems, is how there is the gathering, meeting, & convergence of these five clinging-aggregates.

So, yes, I would agree that external ayatanas exist independent of the cognitive act, but can rupakhandha be spoken of in the same terms? This brings us to your very interesting discussion of MN 109 below -

Regarding contact, please note that:
""Monk, the four great existents (earth, water, fire, & wind) are the cause, the four great existents the condition, for the delineation of the aggregate of form (rūpakkhandha). " . Contact is cause for 3 mental aggregates, and they plus aggregate of form are cause for consciousness aggregate
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;


Contact is not required for existence of four great elements cattāro mahābhūtā.

I agree, to the extent that the dhatus are "out there", whether or not there is contact. But let's not forget that we are not speaking of the dhatus simpliciter. The issues concerns rupa, specifically rupakhandha. "Rupakhandha" is not merely the dhatus. Rupa in relation to rupakhandha is tautologically defined as "the dhatus and the form derived from them". Something "extra" is slathered over the bare objective dhatus/properties.

Now, MN 109 is simply stating DO when it discusses "cause" (hetu) and "condition" (paccaya) in relation to each of the 5 Aggregates. As before, I read the discovery of this forward order of DO as pointing to the necessity of the hetu paccaya for rupakhandha.

MN 109 also discusses "paññapana", translated as "delineation". Paññapana is the making 'visible/manifest' of something. MN 109 is clear that without the 4 dhatus, there would be no "delineation" of rupakhandha. So, what can one make of this "delineation" in MN 109? The sutta which famously explicates "delineation" is MN 18 which discusses papanca. Note how MN 18 structures its analysis on terms similar to the MN 28 analysis of consciousness/contact.

Dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one objectifies. Based on what a person objectifies, the perceptions & categories of objectification assail him/her with regard to past, present, & future forms cognizable via the eye. (for all 6 contacts)

Now, when there is the eye, when there are forms, when there is eye-consciousness, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of contact (phassapaññattiṃ paññāpessatīti ). When there is a delineation of contact, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of feeling. When there is a delineation of feeling, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of perception. When there is a delineation of perception, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of thinking. When there is a delineation of thinking, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of being assailed by the perceptions & categories of objectification. (for all 6 contacts)

It would seem that while paññapana has the literal sense of "making discernible/manifest", MN 18 suggests that the process is not so passive or innocent. Paññatti works to "designate" the bare experience, and this, I suspect, is the slathering on of that something extra (ie meaning) to bare experiences.

DN 15 tackles this same issue but employs slightly different terminology - ie adhivacanasamphassa. It says -

'From name-&-form as a requisite condition comes contact. Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how, from name-&-form as a requisite condition comes contact. If the qualities, traits, themes, & indicators by which there is a description of name-group (namakaya) were all absent, would designation-contact (adhivacanasamphassa) with regard to the form-group (rupakaya) be discerned?"

DN 15 then summarises -

This is the extent to which there is birth, aging, death, passing away, and re-arising. This is the extent to which there are means of designation, expression, and delineation. This is the extent to which the sphere of discernment extends, the extent to which the cycle revolves for the manifesting (discernibility) of this world — i.e., name-and-form together with consciousness.

Ettāvatā kho, ānanda, jāyetha vā jīyetha [jiyyetha (ka.)] vā mīyetha [miyyetha (ka.)] vā cavetha vā upapajjetha vā. Ettāvatā adhivacanapatho, ettāvatā niruttipatho, ettāvatā paññattipatho, ettāvatā paññāvacaraṃ, ettāvatā vaṭṭaṃ vattati itthattaṃ paññāpanāya yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ saha viññāṇena aññamaññapaccayatā pavattati.

So, it appears that while the dhatus can exist out there, the rupakhandha is personal to the experiencer (be it of internal or external rupas).

Nevertheless, the khandhas may be taken to exist. piotr points to a cogent sutta on the Buddha's approach to the issue of the existence of the khandhas -

http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 31#p149851" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

What does Vibhaṅgapāḷi PTS 419 says when it says:

"eko khandho pātubhavati – rūpakkhandho;"
and
"Asaññasattā devā ahetukā anāhārā aphassakā avedanakā asaññakā acetanakā acittakā pātubhavanti."

It's not really for me to justify why the Abhidhammika feels that unconscious states can give rise to the experience of rupa. I just accept the fact that the Abhidhamma approach yields one result, and the sutta approach yields another.

[danieLion]

Metaphysics is ontology.
DL

This is incorrect. Metaphysics is concerned with being qua being, while ontology explores what sorts of things really exist. In Western philosophy it's common to begin with metaphysical assumptions, and then apply epistemological principles to that metaphysics in order to draw out an ontology.

Hi DR,
I suppose this "finer" distinction has some validity is some contexts. And I shouldn't have stated it so divisively. The point I wanted to make was historical and epistemic. When the monks systematizing Aristotle's (A) works tcame upon an untitled manuscript (A's ontology) the decision was made to title the document Metaphysics simply because it was on top of (literally "what came after") A's Physics. Hence, META-Physics was "born." Aristotle defines ontology/"metaphysics" as "the study of First Principles." For A, the study being qua being included theology, justifying to some thinkers the expansion of ontology to include metaphysical concerns like the investigation of nature or the constitution and structure of reality. As Michael V. Wedin puts it:

A...prefers 'first philosophy' or 'wisdom' (sophia). The subject defined as the theoretical science of the causes and principles of what is most knowable. This makes metaphysics a limiting case of A's broadly used distinction between what is better known to us and what is better known by nature. The genus animal, e.g., is better known by nature than the species man because it is further removed from the senses and because it can be known independently of the species. The first condition suggests that the most knowable objects would be the separately existing and thoroughly non-sensible objects of theology and, hence, that metaphysics is a special science. The second condition suggests that most knowable objects are simply the most general notions that apply to things in the general science of being qua being. Special sciences study restricted modes of being. Physics, for instance, studies being qua having an internal principle of change and rest. A general science of being studies the principles and causes of things that are, simply insofar as the are. A good deal of Metaphysics supports this conception of metaphysics. For example, Book IV, on the principle of non-contradiction, and Book X, on unity, similarity and difference, treat notions that apply to anything whatever. So, too, for the discussion of form and actuality in the central books VII, VIII, and IX. Book XII, on the other hand, appears to regard metaphysics as the special science of theology.

A...attempts to reconcile these two conceptions of metaphysics. Because it studies immovable substances, theology counts as first philosophy. However, it is also general precisely because it is first, and so it will include the study of being qua being. Scholars have found this solution as perplexing as the problem. Although Book XII proves the causal necessity for motion of an eternal substance that is an unmoved mover, this establishes no conceptual connection between the forms of sensible compounds and the pure form that is the unmoved mover. Yet such a connection is required, if a single science is to encompass both....

A had to face a prior difficulty concerning the very possibility of a general science of being. For the Posterior Analytics requires the existence of a genus for each science but the Metaphysics twice argues that being is not a genus. The latter claim, which A never relinquishes, is implicit in the Categories, where being falls directly into kinds, namely categories. Because these highest genera do not result from differentiation of a single genus, no univocal sense of being covers them. Although being is, therefore, ambiguous in as many ways as there are categories, a thread connects them. The ontological priority accorded primary substance in the Categories is made part of the very definition of non-substantial entities in the Metaphysics....

This also has implications for how we are to understand anatta/anicca in terms of A's ontology. As Wedin further notes:

The difficult central books of the Metaphysics...target[s]...the substance of the primary substances of the Categories. As concrete empirical particulars, [primary substances] are compounds of form and matter...and so their substance must be sought among these internal structural features. Thus, Metaphysics VII considers form, matter, and the compound of form and matter, and quickly turns to form as the best candidate. In developing a conception of form that can play the required explanatory role, the notion of essence (to ti en einai) assumes center stage. The essence of man, e.g., is the cause of certain matter constituting a man, namely soul. So form in the sense of essence is the primary substance of the Metaphysics.

[alan]

You have all wandered into thicket of views. Either way you turn it will hurt.
And it is also totally pointless.

[acinteyyo]

The four great elements (dhātu or mahā-bhūta) have their footing in consciousness. Without contact the dhātu are not established. Then they're not here, not there, nor inbetween. Rather like fire without sustenance, which is simply classified as "out" (unbound) the dhātu are brought to an end. It is wrong to assume the four great elements to be "out there", it's just a futile attempt to objectify non-objectification (se AN4.174).

And suppose someone were to ask you, 'This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East? West? North? Or south?' Thus asked, how would you reply?"
"That doesn't apply, Master Gotama. Any fire burning dependent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being unnourished — from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any other — is classified simply as 'out' (unbound)."

"Where do water, earth, fire, & wind have no footing? Where are long & short, coarse & fine, fair & foul, name & form brought to an end?

"'And the answer to that is:
Consciousness without feature, without end, luminous all around: Here water, earth, fire, & wind have no footing. Here long & short coarse & fine fair & foul name & form are all brought to an end. With the cessation of consciousness each is here brought to an end.'"

best wishes, acinteyyo

[danieLion]

IDEALISM

There once was a man who said: "God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."

-Ronald Knox

A REPLY

Dear Sir, your astonishment's odd,
I am always about in the Quad;
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by Yours faithfully, God.
-Anonymous


Epistemology

I.
Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones:
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones.

II.
We milk the cow of the world, and as we do
We whisper in her ear, "You are not true."
-Richard Wilbur

DL

[Alex123]

Dear Sylvester,

Dear Alex
The external ayatanas (sense objects) are clearly "out there"...
...So, yes, I would agree that external ayatanas exist independent of the cognitive act,...
...I agree, to the extent that the dhatus are "out there", whether or not there is contact. ...

I am glad that we agree that external āyatanas can exist without the mind. Considering that the OP question was about Theravada (which includes Tipitaka) and not Early Buddhism, then I feel it is proper to use definition from Vibhanga.

Here are interesting things that I've noticed:

For Asaññasattā devā there appears:
One aggregate: eko khandho...rūpakkhandho
One faculty: ekindriyaṃ...rūpajīvitindriyaṃ.
Two spheres: dve āyatanāni...rūpāyatanaṃ, dhammāyatanaṃ;
Two elements: dve dhātuyo...rūpadhātu, dhammadhātu;
Truth of Suffering (dukkha): ekaṃ saccaṃ...dukkhasaccaṃ
And no mental states for that being: ahetukā anāhārā aphassakā avedanakā asaññakā acetanakā acittakā
Vibhaṅgapāḷi PTS 419

I wonder if it is possible that rūpāyatanaṃ is included in rūpakkhandho according to that quote. There rūpāyatanaṃ is clearly independent of four aggregates.


With best wishes,

Alex

[Alex123]

Hello Acinteyyo,

The four great elements (dhātu or mahā-bhūta) have their footing in consciousness. Without contact the dhātu are not established. Then they're not here, not there, nor inbetween. Rather like fire without sustenance, which is simply classified as "out" (unbound) the dhātu are brought to an end. It is wrong to assume the four great elements to be "out there", it's just a futile attempt to objectify non-objectification (se AN4.174).

"Where do water, earth, fire, & wind have no footing? Where are long & short, coarse & fine, fair & foul, name & form brought to an end?
"'And the answer to that is:
Consciousness without feature, without end, luminous all around: Here water, earth, fire, & wind have no footing. Here long & short coarse & fine fair & foul name & form are all brought to an end. With the cessation of consciousness each is here brought to an end.'"

best wishes, acinteyyo

Here the Buddha talks about experience of four great elements. There is difference between experience of four great elements , and four great elements that are not experienced such as in the case of Asaññasattā devā according to Vibhaṅgapāḷi PTS 419.

[santa100]

Talking about the 4 great elements, let's use an example. The speed of light is ~ 300,000 km/sec. If there's a star 600,000 km away from earth, it'll take its photons (units of light) ~ 2 seconds to reach our eyes. So, the star already existed 2 seconds ago. It just didn't "exist in our eyes" until 2 seconds later..

[Alex123]

Talking about the 4 great elements, let's use an example. The speed of light is ~ 300,000 km/sec. If there's a star 600,000 km away from earth, it'll take its photons (units of light) ~ 2 seconds to reach our eyes. So, the star already existed 2 seconds ago. It just didn't "exist in our eyes" until 2 seconds later..

rūpa can exist independent of citta. Just because we do not see some star in some corner of the universe, it doesn't mean that rūpa which underlies it doesn't exist.

[santa100]

Yes, that's the point I was trying to make. The star already existed 2 seconds ago..

[Alex123]

Yes, that's the point I was trying to make. The star already existed 2 seconds ago..

When we see a star, we see a light that it emits which exists at this moment when it interacts with eye-sense organ. And at this moment there can be a certain perception of presently existing rūpa.

[santa100]

Alex123 wrote:
And at this moment there can be a certain perception of presently existing rūpa.

And the perception of reality doesn't always reflect the real reality. If we substitute our distant star with a person, John Doe, and increase the distance of John Doe from earth to 100 light-years away (it'll take 100 years for light from the object to reach earth). According Jane Roe, who's standing on earth peeking thru a telescope, all she sees is John Doe, the newly born baby, while in reality, John Doe is a 100 year-old man and might has already been dead!

[Alex123]

Alex123 wrote:
And at this moment there can be a certain perception of presently existing rūpa.

And the perception of reality doesn't always reflect the real reality.

And I've didn't say that what we see is exactly how the world is. See my post at: http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 60#p148101" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; .

The idea that "perception of reality reflect the real reality" is called Naive (or common sense) Direct Realism which I do not accept. It is interesting that two polar opposites (Naive Direct Realism and Idealism) are actually identical in the belief that the world is as we perceive it. The difference is that one believes it is made of matter, and the latter believes that it is only mental.

In short, Theravada is realist when it comes to existence of some mind independent dhammas and rūpa, but anti-realist when it comes to concepts (at least in some versions of Theravada).

"In analytic philosophy, the term anti-realism is used to describe any position involving either the denial of an objective reality of entities of a certain type" - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-realism" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;