retrofuturist wrote:...
The assumption underpinning your line of inquiry is that rúpa, in the context of nama-rupa, is an ontological proposition, i.e. it is physical matter. Or in other words, it is a "body" that complements a "mind".
Hello Retro,
Sorry about the delayed response: I've been away from the computer for the past couple days.
The facticity that is an inherent aspect of our experience is hardly an ontological proposition -- it might very well be that aspect of our experience that determines for us what is real . The idea that I find questionable is the dependency of rúpa upon náma.
Any understanding of námarúpa needs to take into account the Anattalakkhanasutta. As I see it, the intractable nature of our experience is attributable to rúpa. That's not to say that rúpa is permanent, that it doesn't change, only that it is quite independent of our experience of it, and prior to its contact with náma.
Rúpa is only experienced, its resistence (patigha) only manifest through vedaná, saññá, cetaná, phassa, and manasikára, i.e. through náma (cf. M9), i.e. through our designation (adhivacaná) of it together with its presence (viññána). In and of itself it can't be said to exist, so I can imagine how someoned might liken it to a lump of insubstantial foam.
For an example, let's say that I learn of a new word. In order for the word to exist it has to be present (viññána) in some form (náma) -- even if its presence is in some far off corner of the recesses of my vocabularly. But the facticity of the word preceded my knowlege of it, preceded my experience of it. Its inertia (rúpa) is quite independent of my experience of it as námarúpa. (The clock doesn't stop when I leave the room." as the Ven. Ñanavira put it.)
And this is the case with anything we experience, even all those things mentioned in the Múlapariyáyasutta (ones vocabulary being the semantic counterpart to ones world). The experience of the arahant is námarúpa saha viññána just as it is for the puthujjana, but the puthujjana perverts his concept of reality through his belief in a self, his personalizing it (sakkáyaditthi). For the arahant all experience is utterly impersonal, but none the less real and that includes the concepts he draws from his own lived experience.
This is my take on the Ven. Ñanavira -- and I'm inclined to accept it --, so if there are any Ñanavirans out there, please correct me if I've strayed anywhere.
pulga
A