First jhana thoughts - what kind of thinking must stay in the first jhana?

[lotus flower]

Hi as i wrote before in this topic maybe i am near to the first jhana. The topic is here http://dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f= ... 30#p359530" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

My thoughts are both unwholesome and wholesome during focus on the nimitta. Sometimes i have desire, anger, sometimes i am thinking about how joyful is the feeling what i feel at this state, i thinking about i am far from desires, far from anger, i thinking About the joy, about impermanence, about Anatta. Is this possible that the hindrances dissappears sometimes? So is this possible that the hindrances didn't disappears full, but some parts of the hindrances disappears ?

[dhammacoustic]

Ānanda, what is the path and method, to dispel the lower bonds of the sensual world? Ānanda, the bhikkhu secluding the mind thoroughly, by dispelling things of demerit, removes all bodily transgressions that bring remorse. Then secluding the mind, from sensual thoughts and thoughts of demerit, with thoughts and discursive thoughts and with joy and pleasantness born of seclusion abides in the first jhana. Established in it he reflects all things that matter, all feelings, all perceptive things, all intentions, all conscious signs are impermanent, unpleasant, an illness, an abscess, an arrow, a misfortune, an ailment, foreign, destined for destruction, is void, and devoid of a self. Then he turns the mind to the deathless element: This is peaceful, this is exalted, such as the appeasement of all determinations, the giving up of all endearments, the destruction of craving, detachment, cessation and extinction. With that mind he comes to the destruction of desires. If he does not destroy desires on account of greed and interest for those same things. He arises spontaneously, with the destruction of the five lower bonds, of the sensual world, not to proceed. Ānanda, this too is a method for overcoming the five lower bonds of the sensual world.
─ MN II, Mahā Māluṅkyāputta Sutta (not sure if the citation is correct)

[lotus flower]

Thank You.

[WorldTraveller]

First jhana thoughts - what kind of thinking must stay in the first jhana?

None. No thinking whatsoever in any jhana. Below quote from Ajahn Brahm's Mindfulness, Bliss, and Beyond.

FROM THE MOMENT of entering a jhāna, one will have no control. One will be unable to give orders as one normally does. When the will that is controlling vanishes, then the “I will” that fashions one’s concept of future also disappears. Since the concept of time ceases in jhāna, the very question “What should I do next?” cannot arise. One cannot even decide when to come out. It is this absolute absence of will, and of its offspring, time, that gives the jhānas their timeless stability and allows them to last sometimes for many blissful hours.

Because of the perfect one-pointedness and fixed attention, one loses the faculty of perspective within jhāna. Comprehension relies on comparison—relating this to that, here to there, now with then. In jhāna, all that is perceived is an unmoving, enveloping, nondual bliss that allows no space for the arising of perspective. It is like that puzzle where one is shown a photograph of a well-known object from an unusual angle, and one has to guess what it is. It is very difficult to identify some objects without looking at them from different angles. When perspective is removed, so is comprehension. Thus in jhāna not only is there no sense of time but also there is no comprehension of what is going on. At the time, one will not even know which jhāna one is in. All one knows is great bliss, unmoving, unchanging, for unknown lengths of time.

Afterward, when one has emerged from the jhāna, such consummate one-pointedness of consciousness falls apart. With the weakening of one-pointedness, perspective reemerges, and the mind has the ability to move again. The mind has regained the space needed to compare and comprehend. Ordinary consciousness has returned. Having just emerged from a jhāna, it is the usual practice to look back at what has happened and review the jhāna experience. The jhānas are such powerful events that they leave an indelible record in one’s memory store. In fact, one will never forget them as long as one lives. They are easy to recall with perfect retention. One comprehends the details of what happened in the jhāna, and one knows which of the jhānas it was. Moreover, data obtained from reviewing a jhāna form the basis of the insight that leads to enlightenment.

It is helpful to know, then, that within a jhāna:
1. There is no possibility of thought;
2. No decision-making process is available;
3. There is no perception of time;
4. Consciousness is nondual, making comprehension inaccessible;

[Cormac Brown]

I think that the most reliable definition of jhana is that found in the suttas. Ajahn Brahm seems to have his own thoughts and ideas, and plenty of them. Nothing, however, can be found in the suttas to support almost anything in the above quote, which might indicate how reliable or otherwise it is. I've faith that if one of the jhana factors was "the disappearance of the concept of time," the Buddha might have mentioned it. "No comprehension of what's going on" sounds more like a bad trip than a clear state of awareness. And as for the bliss being "unchanging..."

Anyway, as to what vitakka and vicara are as factors of the first jhana, it would seem fair to assume that they are activities of thought and attention aimed at the theme of one's mindfulness/satipatthana. My interpretation is that vitakka is the act of focusing on the theme "in and of itself" as described in the Satipatthana Sutta, and vicara is the act of evaluating how the meditation is going, or "alertness," as described in the same.

I might be wrong, though. Best find out for yourself.

[mikenz66]

Perhaps this essay from Ven Sujato is helpful:
Why vitakka doesn’t mean ‘thinking’ in jhana

There is also some discussion at Sutta Central about this:
https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/vi ... ctors/2589


Mike

[Phena]

So if vitakka and vicara do not mean applied thought and sustained thought, as the first two jhana factors, does this then mean that verbal fabrications/constructions at sankhara in dependent arising (also vitakka and vicara) is not applied thought and sustained thought as well?

[Cormac Brown]

Perhaps this essay from Ven Sujato is helpful:
Why vitakka doesn’t mean ‘thinking’ in jhana

Thanks for the article, Mike, what did you think of it? The most convincing point I thought was at the beginning, in the example of the Buddha dividing his thinking into two sorts, good and bad, and despite opting for good over bad, eventually seeing that even constant good thinking would tire him out, therefore choosing to settle his mind instead. It seems plausible, though, that the "settling" and eventual dropping of thinking refers to the second jhana.

By way of correction,this sutta is given as evidence that thoughts of Dhamma must be abandoned in order to attain jhana. It doesn't say that:

"When he is rid of them, there remain only thoughts of the Dhamma. His concentration is neither calm nor refined, it has not yet attained serenity or unity, and is kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint. But there comes a time when his mind grows steady inwardly, settles down, grows unified & concentrated. His concentration is calm & refined, has attained serenity & unity, and is no longer kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint.

Pansadhovaka Sutta

Note that it doesn't actually mention the abandoning of thoughts of the Dhamma, only that "forceful restraint" subsides. It also seems possible that the first jhana might not always be calm or refined, given that it contains rapture, which some experience very intensely and even unpleasantly.

It is a very useful sutta, though, for this topic, as I'll mention in a following post, as it does seem to describe in detail what sorts of thoughts are absent in right concentration, which will hopefully go some way to answering the OP.

Furthermore:

Vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro:

Directed thought & evaluation are verbal fabrications.

Kamabhu Sutta

Vitakka vicārā = directed thought and evaluation, and factors of the first jhana.

Vacīsaṅkhāro = verbal fabrications/speech formations.

Despite the claims that vitakka and vicara mean something different when factors of jhana, I haven't seen any evidence of this in the suttas. The argument in the article is that other terms used to describe the quality of a mind in jhana, such as seclusion, in a jhana-context mean something different to what they normally mean. An example is that seclusion means "seclusion from unskilful qualities," rather than physical solitude. Therefore, Bhante's logic runs, vitakka and vicara must also mean something different to what they normally mean. The problem is that physical seclusion is repeatedly emphasised as a necessary requisite for meditation, for example the beginning of the Anapanasati Sutta: "an empty dwelling." And further, the Buddha gives a definition elsewhere of what mental seclusion, the alternative meaning in the description of jhana, entails. To my knowledge, he doesn't do the same for vitakka and vicara. They are only ever described as being "verbal" activities, never, as Bhante suggests, as "lifting the mind onto the object."

There is also an argument here that because even a mundane sense of peace in the present moment can be gained by (apparently) dropping verbal fabrications, as per the exercises suggested in the article, then how much moreso must jhana be free of these things. That he adopts this logic is perhaps understandable given that his teacher seems to think jhana is a form of blanking out with "no comprehension of what's going on." I think the same mind state has been termed by a Thai Ajahn, "Delusion Concentration." It seems bizarre to equate zoning out to jhana, yet we do hear this mistake quite often these days.

Lastly, the instructions for anapanasati, generally considered the foremost means of jhana practice, contain examples of verbal fabrications in all sixteen steps, and the metta instructions contain some very famous ones, too.

At the very least, I can't see that the article does anything to support the notion that the first jhana is free from verbal fabrication. It may even go some way to misleading even more people in thinking that it plays no role in getting the mind into right concentration in the first place, which seems like a significant error.

[Cormac Brown]

Pansadhovaka Sutta seems to give a detailed description of what kinds of thinking are done away with and which remain when the mind is raised to a suitably heightened level.

"There are these gross impurities in gold: dirty sand, gravel, & grit. The dirt-washer or his apprentice, having placed [the gold] in a vat, washes it again & again until he has washed them away.

"When he is rid of them, there remain the moderate impurities in the gold: coarse sand & fine grit. He washes the gold again & again until he has washed them away.

"When he is rid of them, there remain the fine impurities in the gold: fine sand & black dust. The dirt-washer or his apprentice washes the gold again & again until he has washed them away.

"When he is rid of them, there remains just the gold dust. The goldsmith or his apprentice, having placed it in a crucible, blows on it again & again to blow away the dross. The gold, as long as it has not been blown on again & again to the point where the impurities are blown away, as long as it is not refined & free from dross, is not pliant, malleable, or luminous. It is brittle and not ready to be worked. But there comes a time when the goldsmith or his apprentice has blown on the gold again & again until the dross is blown away. The gold, having been blown on again & again to the point where the impurities are blown away, is then refined, free from dross, pliant, malleable, & luminous. It is not brittle, and is ready to be worked. Then whatever sort of ornament he has in mind — whether a belt, an earring, a necklace, or a gold chain — the gold would serve his purpose.

"In the same way, there are these gross impurities in a monk intent on heightened mind: misconduct in body, speech, & mind. These the monk — aware & able by nature — abandons, dispels, wipes out of existence. When he is rid of them, there remain in him the moderate impurities: thoughts of sensuality, ill will, & harmfulness. These he abandons, dispels, wipes out of existence. When he is rid of them there remain in him the fine impurities: thoughts of his caste, thoughts of his home district, thoughts related to not wanting to be despised. These he abandons, dispels, wipes out of existence.

"When he is rid of them, there remain only thoughts of the Dhamma. His concentration is neither calm nor refined, it has not yet attained serenity or unity, and is kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint. But there comes a time when his mind grows steady inwardly, settles down, grows unified & concentrated. His concentration is calm & refined, has attained serenity & unity, and is no longer kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint.

"And then whichever of the higher knowledges he turns his mind to know & realize, he can witness them for himself whenever there is an opening.

My question is: What is the difference between "mental misconduct" and "thoughts of sensuality, ill will & harmfulness?"

[Sylvester]

Hi Cormac

Perhaps there could be some examination of the semantic range of vitakka, as it is used in the suttas, instead of just relying on a translator's choice of English denotation. May I suggest you pop into the Critical Pali Dictionary and search for vitakka "in articles". A small sample to demonstrate that semantic range, emphasising the non-ruminative aspects -

1. akusala-saṁkappa = akusala-vitakka = sensual desire/ill-will/harmfulness (MN 78, which makes the connection with the jhana formulae explicit by stating in which jhana akusala and kusala saṁkappa cease without remainder). Here, it is clearly just examplars of kāmarāgānusa (the latent tendency to sensual desire) and paṭighānusaya (the latent tendency to aversion) anuseti-ing (being activated) by its corresponding feeling.

2. Ditto for kusala-saṁkappa in MN 78 = "kusala-vitakka" = renunciation/non-ill-will/non-harmfulness.

For #1 and #2 above, let me ask you - do you think/ruminate in order to get angry? Does one think in order to lust? Most of the time, we are not even aware of the anusaya being activated, which explains why SN 12.25 talks about how we generate unconscious intentions (asampajāno manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti). SN 12.25 is pretty explicit that this unconscious process applies to both meritorious and demeritorious kamma.

In fact, it is this very identification by MN 78 of what constitutes vitakka and vicāra in the First Jhana that we can safely say that they are the wholesome counterparts to the 2 anusayas responsible for lust and aversion. When an anusaya anuseti, that is a volition (SN 12.39). You can infer the same with its wholesome counterparts.

By way of correction,this sutta is given as evidence that thoughts of Dhamma must be abandoned in order to attain jhana. It doesn't say that:

"When he is rid of them, there remain only thoughts of the Dhamma. His concentration is neither calm nor refined, it has not yet attained serenity or unity, and is kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint. But there comes a time when his mind grows steady inwardly, settles down, grows unified & concentrated. His concentration is calm & refined, has attained serenity & unity, and is no longer kept in place by the fabrication of forceful restraint.

Pansadhovaka Sutta

Note that it doesn't actually mention the abandoning of thoughts of the Dhamma, only that "forceful restraint" subsides. It also seems possible that the first jhana might not always be calm or refined, given that it contains rapture, which some experience very intensely and even unpleasantly.

The texts underlined in the Pali are sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata and na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata. There's no "forceful restraint" in the Pali, which can be very prosaically translated "held at bay with will/saṅ­khā­ra" and "not held at bay with will/saṅ­khā­ra". The Chinese translators of the parallel SA 1246 also opted for the prosaic translation 有行所持 (with will) and 不為有行所持 (without will). You have to ask yourself why Ven T opted for such a rendering, but more on that below.

Yes, the text does not actually mention the abandoning of "Dhammathoughts", but as is typical in any series laid out in a sutta, if the preceding parts of the series do mention abandonment of various other kinds of thoughts, one can safely apply abandonment also to that final member of the series. There is in fact a very good reason why "Dhammathought" are not explicitly said to be abandoned. Look at the preceding parts of the series. The abandonment is described clearly with the pericope "These he abandons, dispels, wipes out of existence.". However, the tactic changes with the most subtle defilement. Instead of employing the sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata strategy, Dhammathoughts only fade away when you starve volition by using the na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata strategy. At the cusp of the First Jhana, there isn't even the slightest room for the wish for a defilement to go away. If you have that, paṭighānusaya anuseti (the latent tendency to aversion underlies). Take a look at SN 36.6 for the sign to recognise this; if there is the slightest bit of aversion even, that anusaya is already triggered.

Furthermore:

Vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro:

Directed thought & evaluation are verbal fabrications.

Kamabhu Sutta

Vitakka vicārā = directed thought and evaluation, and factors of the first jhana.

Vacīsaṅkhāro = verbal fabrications/speech formations.

Despite the claims that vitakka and vicara mean something different when factors of jhana, I haven't seen any evidence of this in the suttas.

Well, the semantic range of vitakka and vicāra are not going to come through, if you just rely on English translations. Let's take a closer look at SN 41.06 for the reason of the identification -

Pubbe kho, gahapati, vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācaṃ bhindati, tasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro.

Having first directed one's thoughts and made an evaluation, one then breaks out into speech. That's why directed thought & evaluation are verbal fabrications.

(per Ven T, although I'm not going to gripe about the fact that he translated vacīsaṅkhāro as a plural noun, when it is clearly singular).

When was the last time you screamed in rage? Did you think about what and how you would scream? Did you in fact even notice the anusaya boiling up?

What sort of vitakka and vicāra persists in the First Jhana that it is not even enough to sustain speech : SN 36.11.

This brings us back to the issue of the semantic range of vitakka and vicāra in Early Buddhism. Besides MN 19 and MN 78 which give practical essays on vitakka in the context of saṁkappa, you have more formal listing such as DN 33 which also identify vitakka with intention. If you want to get a sense of comparative analysis with the treatment in the Sarva canon, take a look at this thread - http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 20#p230347" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

One of the things you need to be very careful with Ven T's translations is the agenda that drives his translations. I've pointed out the problem with his translation of AN 3.101 above. Elsewhere, you will see how he rewrote an absorption sutta into one that presents ruminative jhanas and attainments all the way to the attainment of Nothingness. My most recent post criticising Ven T's attempt to dilute the absorption sutta DN 9 can be found here -
http://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.ph ... 20#p367658" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;. DN 9 is pretty explicit in disallowing thinking in the jhanas.

In light of these, I think the only safe surmise we can make about vitakka and vicāra in First Jhana is that it is not ruminative thinking but affective inclinations. I like to call it the "Hello Kitty" feel (only because I find the character so harmless and endearing). Think of it this way - the compassion you feel for a cute little furry animal that you favour. It does "feel" like a feeling, but what is driving that? Did you have to think about it at all, or did that spring forth without thought?

I think it's time to abandon the romantic Western notion that ethical responsibility comes only from pre-meditation. SN 12.38 makes it amply clear that even if you do not intend, the activation of the anusayas is enough to drive rebirth. There's no running away from this and SN 12.25, that even if we claim not to have intended something, that unconscious reaction to our triggers qualifies as sankhāra. It may be a bleak outlook, but I don't pretend to sweep this doctrinal aspect under the carpet just so that it does not offend Western sensibilities on ethics.

[pulga]

Perhaps this essay from Ven Sujato is helpful:
Why vitakka doesn’t mean ‘thinking’ in jhana

I agree with much of what Ven. Sujato says in his essay, though his comment regarding Ven. Ñanamoli is historically incorrect:

Already in the Pali Text Society dictionary we find the combination vitakka & vicara rendered as ‘initial & sustained application’. This was taken up by Ven Nyanamoli in his translations, but was later removed by Bhikkhu Bodhi as he strove to complete Nyanamoli’s project of effectively finding one English word to translate each significant Pali word.

"Initial and sustained thought" was an early rendering that Ñanamoli used in his translation of the Visuddhimagga. He later preferred "thinking and pondering". When Bhikkhu Bodhi revised Ñanamoli's draft translation of the Majjhima Nikaya, he changed the rendering back to "initial and sustained thought". Ven. Bodhi has since come to prefer "thought and examination" as a translation for vitakkavicāra.

[Phena]

This is from SN 36.11 referred to above by Sylvester. However, it appears to support quite clearly and unequivocally that thought (though non-discursive) is still present in the first jhana and that it is speech that is eliminated to enter first jhana.

I have provided three different translations, which essentially show a similar progression from the course (speech/words elimination) to enter first Jhana, to the fine (non-discursive thought elimination) to enter second jhana:

"I have further taught, monk, the gradual cessation of conditioned phenomena. In him who has attained the first meditative absorption,[2] speech has ceased. Having attained the second absorption, thought-conception and discursive thinking has ceased. Having attained the third absorption, joy has ceased. Having attained the fourth absorption, inhalation and exhalation have ceased. ..."
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .html#fn-2" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

"And I have also taught the step-by-step cessation of fabrications. When one has attained the first jhāna, speech has ceased. When one has attained the second jhāna, directed thought & evaluation have ceased. When one has attained the third jhāna, rapture has ceased. When one has attained the fourth jhāna, in-and-out breathing has ceased. When one has attained the dimension of the infinitude of space, the perception of forms has ceased. ..."
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

“Thus, monk I have declared the gradual cessation of intentions. To one in the first higher stage of the mind words cease. To one in the second higher stage of the mind thoughts and thought processes cease. To one in the third higher stage of the mind the emotion of joy ceases. To one in the fourth higher stage of the mind in and out breathing cease. ..."
http://awake.kiev.ua/dhamma/tipitaka/2S ... ggo-e.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

[Bakmoon]

In addition to Sylvester's wonderful linguistic analysis of the topic, I'd like to remark that Vitakka and Vicāra are explained in more subtle senses than ordinary thought and examination in chapter three of the Milindapanha. Although it is only considered canonical by the Burmese, it is still a very old text with parts that probably go back to 100 B.C. so at the very least this shows that this understanding of the terms isn't part of some conspiracy by the Classical commentators or something.

[Cormac Brown]

Perhaps there could be some examination of the semantic range of vitakka, as it is used in the suttas, instead of just relying on a translator's choice of English denotation. May I suggest you pop into the Critical Pali Dictionary and search for vitakka "in articles". A small sample to demonstrate that semantic range, emphasising the non-ruminative aspects -

1. akusala-saṁkappa = akusala-vitakka = sensual desire/ill-will/harmfulness (MN 78, which makes the connection with the jhana formulae explicit by stating in which jhana akusala and kusala saṁkappa cease without remainder). Here, it is clearly just examplars of kāmarāgānusa (the latent tendency to sensual desire) and paṭighānusaya (the latent tendency to aversion) anuseti-ing (being activated) by its corresponding feeling.

2. Ditto for kusala-saṁkappa in MN 78 = "kusala-vitakka" = renunciation/non-ill-will/non-harmfulness.

For #1 and #2 above, let me ask you - do you think/ruminate in order to get angry? Does one think in order to lust? Most of the time, we are not even aware of the anusaya being activated, which explains why SN 12.25 talks about how we generate unconscious intentions (asampajāno manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti). SN 12.25 is pretty explicit that this unconscious process applies to both meritorious and demeritorious kamma.

In fact, it is this very identification by MN 78 of what constitutes vitakka and vicāra in the First Jhana that we can safely say that they are the wholesome counterparts to the 2 anusayas responsible for lust and aversion. When an anusaya anuseti, that is a volition (SN 12.39). You can infer the same with its wholesome counterparts.

Hi Sylvester,

Thank you for your response. You display your depth of learning. To try and summarise your main points:

Vitakka = samkappa.
Samkappa, as per MN 78, = Anusaya or its corresponding skilful counterpart.
Therefore, vitakka in the first jhana = skilful anusaya, or unconscious, undeliberate, and pre-verbal skilful intentions.

To respond:

The CPD's reason for equating samkappa with vitakka is unclear to me. MN 78 clearly talks about samkappa as one thing, and vitakka as another.

Anusayas, which you then link to samkappa, seem better equated with asavas, which in one description of DO, precede even avijja, and seem in any case more likely included under avijja than sankhara.

Moreover, insinuating that the latent tendencies are necessarily abandoned in the jhanas seems misguided (this is inferred from the link drawn between samkappa and anusaya, and the description in MN 78 of the first jhana as the state in which akusala samkappa "cease without trace"). They must still be latent, otherwise anyone emerging from the first jhana would find themselves defilement-free. Thus samkappa and vitakka are distinct from anusaya.

If I'm listening to someone speaking and get angry at what they're saying, it is partly a result of having directed my thoughts towards their speech that anger arises. There is likely already a set, verbal notion in my mind as to what sort of things they should or shouldn't say, accompanied with a further, verbal evaluation of what they are at that time actually saying.

The texts underlined in the Pali are sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata and na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata. There's no "forceful restraint" in the Pali, which can be very prosaically translated "held at bay with will/saṅ­khā­ra" and "not held at bay with will/saṅ­khā­ra". The Chinese translators of the parallel SA 1246 also opted for the prosaic translation 有行所持 (with will) and 不為有行所持 (without will). You have to ask yourself why Ven T opted for such a rendering, but more on that below.

If I were walking a large dog and it, on seeing another dog, pulled on the lead to pursue it, I would be "holding it at bay with will," or exercising "forceful restraint." It's unclear what you think the problem with this is. Is it that Ven Thanissaro's translation does not for you sufficiently negate the use of will in the attainment of jhana? As you highlight, there are resolves, or will, in the first jhana, the subject of this post. They only disappear altogether in the second.

Yes, the text does not actually mention the abandoning of "Dhammathoughts", but as is typical in any series laid out in a sutta, if the preceding parts of the series do mention abandonment of various other kinds of thoughts, one can safely apply abandonment also to that final member of the series.

I'm unaware of this phenomenon. Have you any other examples?

There is in fact a very good reason why "Dhammathought" are not explicitly said to be abandoned. Look at the preceding parts of the series. The abandonment is described clearly with the pericope "These he abandons, dispels, wipes out of existence.". However, the tactic changes with the most subtle defilement. Instead of employing the sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata strategy, Dhammathoughts only fade away when you starve volition by using the na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata strategy. At the cusp of the First Jhana, there isn't even the slightest room for the wish for a defilement to go away. If you have that, paṭighānusaya anuseti (the latent tendency to aversion underlies). Take a look at SN 36.6 for the sign to recognise this; if there is the slightest bit of aversion even, that anusaya is already triggered.

If they are abandoned by a different strategy, why doesn't the Buddha simply say so? The evidence is: that he doesn't mention the abandoning of DTs; that resolves/intentions/wills/wishes do remain in the first jhana. What wishes remain, then? If there is a wish for a defilement to go away, that would mean one is present, thus indicating that the meditator isn't in the first jhana. A wish for defilements not to arise, though, would seem appropriate, which might also be regarded as a wish to stay in jhana or to enter into the second jhana. I think it's entirely plausible that verbal fabrications such as these might remain: "This is nice. How do I keep this going? Or make it better?" I'd also still contend that considerable evidence for verbal thought existing in jhana lies in the fact of the anapanasati and metta instructions both containing verbalisations.

It seems regarding SN 36.6 that you've made a common and worrying misreading. The Buddha here isn't criticising aversion towards defilements, but aversion towards physical pain. You might wish here to question your own underlying agendas rather than those of Ven Thanissaro.

When was the last time you screamed in rage? Did you think about what and how you would scream? Did you in fact even notice the anusaya boiling up?

What sort of vitakka and vicāra persists in the First Jhana that it is not even enough to sustain speech : SN 36.11.

Not long enough ago. I'm sure thought arose prior to/along with the speech. Yes, and I still didn't refrain from giving it expression. It's all very quick, as in Ajahn Chah's description of DO as being like falling from a tree.

That is not to say that verbal thought is absent. We are perfectly capable even outside of the first jhana of thinking verbally without speaking.

This brings us back to the issue of the semantic range of vitakka and vicāra in Early Buddhism. Besides MN 19 and MN 78 which give practical essays on vitakka in the context of saṁkappa, you have more formal listing such as DN 33 which also identify vitakka with intention.

Could you please identify this identification? I can't find it. And again, even if they are identified, samkappa remain in the first jhana. And, as already proved, samkappa is not simply a pre-verbal inclination/skilful anusaya. Samma samkappa includes thoughts of non-harming, renunciation etc.

And perhaps you could enlighten me, either here or in PM, as to Ven Thanissaro's "agenda?" Levying spurious and blatant criticisms against this honourable man is a game many on here seem to like playing, but is one that seems to me quite dangerous for the participants. Proceed with care. You'd be better advised to observe and proclaim his good points. Most criticisms I've observed of his writings have seemed to me to be based on poor analysis. I read some of an article recently that you recommended elsewhere as an "antidote" to the "Not-Self Strategy." It was disappointingly full of embarrassing missteps, and advocacy of the article highlights a failure to see through these. Anyway, do be careful of outright and named criticisms of others, particularly monks upholding high standards of practice - it reflects poorly on your character, and may bring further demerit.

In light of these, I think the only safe surmise we can make about vitakka and vicāra in First Jhana is that it is not ruminative thinking but affective inclinations. I like to call it the "Hello Kitty" feel (only because I find the character so harmless and endearing). Think of it this way - the compassion you feel for a cute little furry animal that you favour. It does "feel" like a feeling, but what is driving that? Did you have to think about it at all, or did that spring forth without thought?

If by the strangely negative word, "ruminative" you mean simply, "verbal," I don't think this surmisal is as safe as you make out. If by "compassion" you mean "affection," which is the more commonly experienced emotion in relation to cute, furry animals, I would say that seems to spring forth without thought because it is part of an underlying defiled tendency - one that is so habituated that it seems almost natural. Nevertheless, it is likely to be accompanied by verbal fabrication: "Aww..." To feel compassion, I would have to make a deliberate effort, thinking, "May you be free from suffering." It would likely be a not altogether comfortable feeling, at least to begin with, as it'd be paired with the knowledge that a cute, furry animal is normally far from attaining Nibbana.

I think it's time to abandon the romantic Western notion that ethical responsibility comes only from pre-meditation. SN 12.38 makes it amply clear that even if you do not intend, the activation of the anusayas is enough to drive rebirth. There's no running away from this and SN 12.25, that even if we claim not to have intended something, that unconscious reaction to our triggers qualifies as sankhāra. It may be a bleak outlook, but I don't pretend to sweep this doctrinal aspect under the carpet just so that it does not offend Western sensibilities on ethics.

This is an interesting point. We would have a difficult time, I suspect, convincing Western romantics that taking birth is ethically irresponsible. Nor will ethical/social responsibility likely be the predominant motivation for putting an end to birth, but rather it will be the realisation that birth is painful first and foremost for the one who is born, and that its ending is exquisite first and foremost for the same.

[Sylvester]

To try and summarise your main points:

Vitakka = samkappa.
Samkappa, as per MN 78, = Anusaya or its corresponding skilful counterpart.
Therefore, vitakka in the first jhana = skilful anusaya, or unconscious, undeliberate, and pre-verbal skilful intentions.

Technically, skillful anusayas would be an oxymoron. So, I would prefer the bit above. I only drew the contrast as anusayas are unconscious and undeliberate.

The CPD's reason for equating samkappa with vitakka is unclear to me. MN 78 clearly talks about samkappa as one thing, and vitakka as another.

I presume you're referring to this -

Ime ca, thapati, kusalā saṅkappā kuhiṃ aparisesā nirujjhanti? Nirodhopi nesaṃ vutto. Idha, thapati, bhikkhu vitak­ka­vicārā­naṃ vūpasamā … pe … dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati; etthete kusalā saṅkappā aparisesā nirujjhanti.

Now where do skillful resolves cease without trace? Their cessation, too, has been stated: There is the case where a monk, with the stilling of directed thoughts & evaluations, enters & remains in the second jhana: rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from directed thought & evaluation — internal assurance. This is where skillful resolves cease without trace.

Ven T transl

I follow Ven Analayo and Ajahn Brahm in reading this passage as identifying the cessation (vūpasama) of vitak­ka­vicārā with the cessation (nirodha) of kusalā saṅkappā. From this, we infer that vitak­ka­vicārā of the First Jhana = kusalā saṅkappā.

Furthermore, if you look at the earlier part of MN 78 which discusses the infant -

For even the thought 'body' does not occur to a stupid baby boy lying on its back, so from where would it do any evil action with its body, aside from a little kicking? Even the thought 'speech' does not occur to it, so from where would it speak any evil speech, aside from a little crying? Even the thought 'resolve' (saṅkappoti) does not occur to it, so from where would it resolve (saṅkappissati) on any evil resolve, aside from a little bad temper? Even the thought 'livelihood' does not occur to it, so from where would it maintain itself with any evil means of livelihood, aside from its mother's milk?
Ven T transl

Technically, the word "thought" does not occur in the Pali, but the fact that the words are enclosed in the iti quotation mark (see the red bit), it's OK to translate that as indicating a "thought". The MLDB translates this as "notion".

Now, where else does this infant simile recur? Take a look at MN 64 -

For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘identity,’ so how could identity view arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘teachings,’ so how could doubt about the teachings arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to doubt lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘rules,’ so how could adherence to rules and observances arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to adhere to rules and observances lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘sensual pleasures,’ so how could sensual desire arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to sensual lust lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘beings,’ so how could ill will towards beings arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to ill will lies within him.
per MLDB

Do you now see the identification of bad saṅkappa with the anusayas at its most fundamental level?

Anusayas, which you then link to samkappa, seem better equated with asavas, which in one description of DO, precede even avijja, and seem in any case more likely included under avijja than sankhara.

I think that will violate SN 12.38 - 40, where an anusaya anuseti-ng is definitely classified under sankhāra. I do however agree that anusayas are āsavas.

Moreover, insinuating that the latent tendencies are necessarily abandoned in the jhanas seems misguided (this is inferred from the link drawn between samkappa and anusaya, and the description in MN 78 of the first jhana as the state in which akusala samkappa "cease without trace").

Not so, if you accept the allowance in MN 44 that the specific anusaya does not anuseti the specific feeling in each jhana, as well as the feeling encountered when struggling for a jhana.

They must still be latent, otherwise anyone emerging from the first jhana would find themselves defilement-free. Thus samkappa and vitakka are distinct from anusaya.

I think this is where you will need to invest in a wee bit of Pali studies, as the texts do not equate "anuseti-ng" with "lying latent" (even though it has occassionally been translated as such). Whether or not an anusaya anusetis can only be inferred by the absence or presence of eg lust or aversion in response to pleasure and pain respectively. Take a look at how SN 36.6 and MN 148 discuss this. I'm surprised that you do not feel that emergence from the attainments gives freedom from the defilements. That is not consistent with AN 9.35; perchance you're using Ven T's translation?

If I'm listening to someone speaking and get angry at what they're saying, it is partly a result of having directed my thoughts towards their speech that anger arises. There is likely already a set, verbal notion in my mind as to what sort of things they should or shouldn't say, accompanied with a further, verbal evaluation of what they are at that time actually saying.

We'll leave it at that and agree to disagree. But it might interest you to consider Libet's model of the "readiness potential".

The texts underlined in the Pali are sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata and na sasaṅ­khā­ra­nig­gay­ha­vārita­gata. There's no "forceful restraint" in the Pali, which can be very prosaically translated "held at bay with will/saṅ­khā­ra" and "not held at bay with will/saṅ­khā­ra". The Chinese translators of the parallel SA 1246 also opted for the prosaic translation 有行所持 (with will) and 不為有行所持 (without will). You have to ask yourself why Ven T opted for such a rendering, but more on that below.

If I were walking a large dog and it, on seeing another dog, pulled on the lead to pursue it, I would be "holding it at bay with will," or exercising "forceful restraint." It's unclear what you think the problem with this is. Is it that Ven Thanissaro's translation does not for you sufficiently negate the use of will in the attainment of jhana? As you highlight, there are resolves, or will, in the first jhana, the subject of this post. They only disappear altogether in the second.

Yes, Ven T's translation preserves too large a role for will in the attainment of jhana, IMO. More pertinent to the question of course is how "willful" is one with one's resolves in the First Jhana? Have you considered DN 9's proposition that if one wills in a jhana, one falls out of it? Pls use a translation other than Ven T's.

Yes, the text does not actually mention the abandoning of "Dhammathoughts", but as is typical in any series laid out in a sutta, if the preceding parts of the series do mention abandonment of various other kinds of thoughts, one can safely apply abandonment also to that final member of the series.

I'm unaware of this phenomenon. Have you any other examples?

Actually, nothing else I can think of specifically for abandonment of thoughts. I was relying on the fact that in the suttas, when a series is applied to a subject (some of which may only be discussed once such as the above), the series must have a common thread/threads.

If they are abandoned by a different strategy, why doesn't the Buddha simply say so? The evidence is: that he doesn't mention the abandoning of DTs; that resolves/intentions/wills/wishes do remain in the first jhana. What wishes remain, then? If there is a wish for a defilement to go away, that would mean one is present, thus indicating that the meditator isn't in the first jhana. A wish for defilements not to arise, though, would seem appropriate, which might also be regarded as a wish to stay in jhana or to enter into the second jhana. I think it's entirely plausible that verbal fabrications such as these might remain: "This is nice. How do I keep this going? Or make it better?" I'd also still contend that considerable evidence for verbal thought existing in jhana lies in the fact of the anapanasati and metta instructions both containing verbalisations.

Could you elaborate on the above?

It seems regarding SN 36.6 that you've made a common and worrying misreading. The Buddha here isn't criticising aversion towards defilements, but aversion towards physical pain.

Where does it say "physical" pain? It says "bodily", and in the MN 148 expansion of the SN 36.6 schema, "bodily feelings" are felt at all 6 senses. I won't rehash my arguments; if you are interested, you can follow the discussion in the "Constant Jhana" thread where I argue that kāyika feelings are hedonic tone felt at all 6 senses, while cetasika feelings are emotions.

Let me ask you, when you think/realise something undesirable, is that painful? The suttas always make a distinction between hedonic tone and the affective sequel, even at the mind-base. If you allow aversion to develop, that is the underlying tendency to aversion anuseti-ng. Take a look at MN 137 where pain and pleasure arose at the Buddha's mind, but He remains equanimous about those feelings. Now, infer from that - when you discern a defilement, is that unpleasant? You see, according to MN 148, the mind is more than capable of feeling pain, but a well-trained mind does not spiral into aversion, brief, anger etc etc in response to the pain felt by the mind.

This brings us back to the issue of the semantic range of vitakka and vicāra in Early Buddhism. Besides MN 19 and MN 78 which give practical essays on vitakka in the context of saṁkappa, you have more formal listing such as DN 33 which also identify vitakka with intention.

Could you please identify this identification? I can't find it.

My apologies; in my haste I typed DN 33, when I was referring to the Agama content in the Sarva Canon.

And again, even if they are identified, samkappa remain in the first jhana. And, as already proved, samkappa is not simply a pre-verbal inclination/skilful anusaya. Samma samkappa includes thoughts of non-harming, renunciation etc.

As above, where I draw the connection between bad saṅkappa and anusaya based on the infant simile in those 2 suttas.

And perhaps you could enlighten me, either here or in PM, as to Ven Thanissaro's "agenda?" Levying spurious and blatant criticisms against this honourable man is a game many on here seem to like playing, but is one that seems to me quite dangerous for the participants.

Let me blunt (even if I do not mean to be rude) - how good is your Pali that you feel adequate to the task of deciding if Ven T was not messing around with a sutta translation? In relation to his agenda, I've taken potshots at his-

1. mistranslations of DN 9, AN 9.35 and AN 9.36. These are not mistakes, but very deliberate mis-statements of the suttas to disguise the absorption model he opposes.
2. temporal interpretation of the idappaccayatā formulae, both on grammatical grounds and doctrinal grounds (the suttas contradicting him are not offered on Access to Insight)
3. his Not-Self strategy
4. his "unestablished consciousness" that roams happily ever after.

I do not levy spurious and blatant criticisms against him. Each time I take a swipe at him, I back it up with doctrinal propositions and linguistic analysis. If your knowledge of Pali is not at an appropriate level, you won't even be able to spot the points, let alone decide if I've been cavalier.

Proceed with care. You'd be better advised to observe and proclaim his good points.

Are you asking me to keep silent on his errors, when they are so easy to demonstrate? When do brownie points grant immunity against legitimate criticism?

Most criticisms I've observed of his writings have seemed to me to be based on poor analysis. I read some of an article recently that you recommended elsewhere as an "antidote" to the "Not-Self Strategy." It was disappointingly full of embarrassing missteps, and advocacy of the article highlights a failure to see through these.

Perhaps you can start a new thread to discuss this article and its mis-steps. I'm always open to changing my mind.

Anyway, do be careful of outright and named criticisms of others, particularly monks upholding high standards of practice - it reflects poorly on your character, and may bring further demerit.

I believe I'm pretty safe. As for the Ven being caught out on his translations, I'm not so sure I would call that a high standard of practice.